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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines patterns of power relations between waterfront workers and 
waterfront employers during the years 1953 to 1993. It argues that the key actors on 
each side, and the relationships between them, were constituted by the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1953 which established a 'bureau system' oflabour administration. This 
legislative intervention created an occupational registration scheme which was 
complemented by the registration, as legal entities, of the main organized interests 
within the labour market - the unions and the employers' organization. The 
relationships between these actors are explored at three separate (although 
overlapping) levels: employment relations, industrial relations and work relations. 
Using these categories, an analysis of two distinct periods is presented: the break-bulk 
era (1953-1971) and the container era (1972-1986). The thesis concludes with a 
discussion of the period after deregulation (1987-1993). 
The thesis demonstrates that unions were empowered by the bureau system of labour 
administration by being granted formal 'joint control' of certain crucial aspects of the 
labour supply. The resulting union strength was constituted in and through a blend of 
local and national bargaining together with the judicious use of strike action. At the 
level of work relations, the bureau system exacerbated the inherent problems of 
control associated with the performance of work by gangs. This produced a particular 
pattern of work relations which centred on the wage-effort bargain. In the break-bulk 
era, this pattern led to a tension between the organization of the labour market and the 
wage-form. Despite this tension, watersiders had considerable control of work 
practices. This control was carried over to the period after containerization. 
In the relationship between firms and the labour market, the study reveals that firm 
size was as much a function of the type of labour market, as the type of labour market 
was a function of firm size. As well as empowering the unions, the bureau system 
secured the existence of small firms. These, the most significant, unintended 
consequences of this system intersected in the 1970s when several unions became 
involved in establishing small new entrant stevedoring companies. 
Key developments in ownership and control followed containerization. Rather than 
containerization resulting in pervasive vertical integration, this process occurred 
unevenly and was accompanied by a parallel process of vertical disintegration. 
Instead of large vertically integrated shipping companies becoming the main players 
within stevedoring, a number of new types of organizations and firms entered the 
field. This fragmentation of waterfront employers at an economic level became a 
persistent source of employer disunity which significantly impacted upon outcomes 
within the spheres of employment relations, industrial relations and work relations 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The resulting dynamic of union strength and employer 
weakness only began to be eroded after the institutional and legislative supports of the 
unions were systematically dismantled by state reformers in the late 1980s. 
The effects of the bureau system in producing considerable union control, set limits 
upon what could be achieved by both state reformers and employers in the period 
after deregulation. All attempts to restructure the industry have come up against the 
barrier of labour that is already unionized and well-organized. Port reform has, 
however, allowed a new space for small firms, operating now as stand alone players 
in the labour market. These small firms have the greatest potential to erode the last 
remnants of the bureau system, in the union's control of the labour supply, by 
reintroducing non-union casual labour into the industry. 
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When an occupation is legally recognized it acquires a title, its 
prerogatives are laid down as are the way in which recruitment takes 
place and the qualifications needed. In other words, competition is 
regulated in a field of occupations having to share a market. 
Thevenot (1984:6). 
SECTION ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
I first became interested in studying the waterfront industry in 1989. My interest 
was sparked by media reports of a situation that developed on the New Zealand 
waterfront on October 1 of that year which resulted in work stopping for nine days 
at all of the country's ports. At the time, employers and union officials alike were 
at pains to point out that the stoppage was 'not a strike' - it was simply that 
watersiders had no employer. As I discovered, the key to this paradoxical 
situation was that, for almost 50 years, watersiders had been 'employed' under a 
specialist state-appointed scheme. In one fell swoop, the fourth Labour 
Government had abolished the Waterfront Industry Commission, the successor to 
the institutions which had first been used to decasualize the industry in 1940. 
Indeed, 1989 was not a good year for waterfront workers the world over. . A 
pervasive international trend towards the deregulation of transportation (see Bell 
and Cloke 1990; Button and Pilfield 1991; Bannister and Button 1991) had its 
concomitant in a 'rising tide' of waterfront industry reform which targeted the 
labour market (see Turnbull and Weston 1992). As Turnbull et al. observe, "1989 
marked a year of worldwide attacks on dockers' exclusive status and advantageous 
terms and conditions of employment" (1992:3). 
These favourable conditions were the product of struggles, which reached back to 
the late nineteenth century, by organized labour in Western Europe, America and 
Australasia to decasualize waterfront work. These struggles were, in turn, a 
response to the labour market conditions that confronted waterfront workers. In 
their classic study, Lascelles and Bullock drew attention to these conditions in the 
following manner: 
the work of loading and unloading ships must, from its nature, be 
subject to frequent and violent fluctuations. Ships arrive and depart 
intermittently; there must be no delay in the 'tum round' when they 
arrive; and demands for labour fluctuate with each ship. The 
fluctuations cannot be foreseen with any precision because the 
arrival of a ship may be affected by weather and tide. . . . In 
consequence of these fluctuations, it has always been the practice 
of employers to engage their labour, or a large portion of it, each 
day as required, and to dismiss it the moment that it is not wanted. 
The system necessarily depends on the existence in each port of a 
'pool' of available labour sufficient to meet the full demands of the 
port on the busiest day, with the obvious result that on all other 
days there must be a 'necessary margin' of labour available for 
work but unoccupied (1924:1). 
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The need for this 'necessary margin' is the reason why in most countries the 
waterfront has, historically, been a stronghold of casualism (see Evans 1969). 
Employers in the industry have typically used casual labour, at one time or 
another, in order to solve the problems of synchronizing the supply of and demand 
for labour. This solution ensured the existence of a permanent and continuous 
oversupply oflabour. 
In this context, casualism often resulted in unmitigated employer prerogative in 
hiring (see Hill 1976; Larrowe 1955; DiFazio 1984; Levy 1989; Kimeldorf 1988). 
Waterside workers in New Zealand still tell stories (usually of their father's 
experiences) of discriminatory preferential hiring by employers, of insecure 
employment and income, under the 'auction block' (also referred to by some as 
the 'chopping block') method of hiring. Histories of the local watersiders' unions 
make numerous references to the iniquities that resulted from this hiring system 
(see Pettit 1948; Norris 1980; Roth 1993). 
These labour market conditions shaped the contours of trade union organization 
and strategy on the waterfront. They resulted in the principal struggles being 
focused on decasualization through the establishment of registration systems, in 
3 
order to effect "exclusionary closure" (Parkin 1979:45) within the labour market. 
In most cases, these stmggles were not brought to their fruition until the 1930s and 
1940s, when they resulted in the establishment of specialized institutions which 
decasualized and regulated the labour supply. 
The differences among these 'systems of labour administration', as I will call 
them, are registered primarily by the 'institutional mix' with respect to the role of 
unions, employers, and (moreover) the state, in constituting and managing them. 
For example, on the Western seaboard of the United States waterfront work was 
decasualized in 1934 through the establishment of a union-administered hiring 
hall. In Britain, however, decasualization was accomplished in 1947 when the 
state established the National Dock Labour Scheme. Similarly, in New Zealand, 
as in Britain and elsewhere (see Turnbull et al. 1992:9), waterside workers became 
subject to the "bureaucratic capacities" (Smith 1992:277) of the state. 
In 1940, the first Labour Government systematically decasualized waterfront 
labour in New Zealand. This move consolidated earlier attempts by the Waterside 
Workers Union to do so, by establishing a system of labour administration which 
systematically 'closed' the labour market, and regulated the hiring of watersiders. 
The most significant and enduring of the institutions which it created, the 
Waterfront Industry Commission, assumed responsibility for hiring and paying 
watersiders. That New Zealand's system of labour administration was 
implemented by the state did not, in and of itself, make it unique. However, it was 
coupled to an industry-specific variant of New Zealand's unique state-regulated 
arbitration system in which unions, along with employers' organizations, were 
themselves 'registered' (hence the title of the thesis). 
Legal regulation, by its very nature, rmses the possibility of its obverse: 
deregulation. The state-regulated system, in which organized interests were 
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'registered', was therefore a double-edged sword. Because just as the state can 
secure unions as legal entities, by means of a registration system, it can also be 
used to render their powers ineffective. This is precisely what happened during 
the 1951 waterfront dispute in New Zealand, when Sid Holland's National 
Government deregistered the national Waterside Workers Union and registered 26 
'new' unions at the port level (see Bassett 1972). 
Symbolically, the 1951 waterfront dispute still represents the zenith of industrial 
conflict in the postwar period. Apart from the devastating consequences for the 
deregistered union and its members, many of whom were expelled from the 
industry (see Scott 1952), one of the most significant developments in the 
aftermath of this dispute was that the state locked in place a system of labour 
administration (similar to the one which had preceded it) by means of the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1953. This system was to persist, with modifications, 
until September 30 1989. 
On the eve of the Waterfront Industry Commission's demise John Mitchell, 
himself a veteran of the 1951 dispute (and a former watersiders' union executive 
officer) likened the events of 1989 to those of 1951. He remarked that watersiders 
"have their backs to the wall and need the support of the rest of the trade union 
movement and international backing to protect their conditions won over the past 
40 years or SO."l The juxtaposition ofthe events of 1951 and 1989, both of which 
hinged on decisive legislative interventions sparked my interest in 'industrial 
relations' (broadly conceived) in the intervening period. This was so in two 
senses. 
I As quoted in National Business Review, 28/9/89. 
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It appeared (as John Mitchell's statement alludes to) that despite being defeated in 
1951 by the employers and the state, and their national union being dismantled, in 
the interim watersiders not only reorganized themselves but came to regain, and 
perhaps even surpass, their former influence on the waterfront. Indeed it was a 
commonplace popular assertion in the 1970s (when I was growing up) that 'the 
unions ruled on the waterfront', and watersiders were frequently described in the 
media using pejorative terms such as 'worker aristocrats'. Their wages and 
conditions were the envy of many other groups of blue-collar workers, and some 
stories of their level of job control attained almost legendary status within working 
class circles. That this should be so at the very time when containerization 
occurred, which is generally regarded as threatening the employment and income 
of waterside workers internationally (see Evans 1969; Mills 1979; DiFazio 1985), 
further stimulated my interest in this period. 
Also, I was (and still am) of the firm belief that it is not possible to understand or 
explain deVelopments in the post-reform period without understanding how the 
relationships between employers and unions took shape before that time. So I 
began reading about the intervening period primarily with a view to studying the 
events of 1989. I believed that I would merely have to read the existing historical 
accounts of the period after 1951, identify the 'pattern' of industrial relations and 
workplace relations, wherein labour had presumably achieved the upper hand, and 
then evaluate how deregulation had affected this pattern. This latter task, then, 
would form the bulk of the thesis. 
To my surprise, however, accounts of this period are very thin on the ground. 
Most historians who write about the waterfront are preoccupied by the 1951 
dispute, the years which preceded it, and its immediate aftermath (see Scott 1952; 
MacDonald 1955; Bassett 1972; Green 1989; Townsend 1985; Porzsolt 1985). Of 
those writers who do examine the later period, their accounts are fragmentary. 
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There are isolated studies of patterns of industrial conflict (Turkington 1976, 
1980), waterside workers' consciousness (Inkson and Gidlow 1981), union 
politics (Fernandez 1969; Meade 1980), and histories of particular port unions 
(Norris 1980; Roth 1993)? But, overall, there is no systematic and historically 
detailed account of patterns of industrial relations and work organization during 
this period. Significantly, there is no account of the challenges posed by 
technological change to watersiders and their unions, of the way it impacted on 
how employers were organized, or on the relationships between these actors. 
While some authors have examined the political issues and developments 
surrounding the shift to containerization (see Sinclair 1973; Craw 1982), their 
particular research focus is such that they do not address effects of this process of 
technological change upon relationships between employers and waterside 
workers. 
The lack of academic interest in the waterfront is curious, given that historically 
watersiders were a group of blue collar workers who were central to the labour 
movement. It is even more curious given the centrality of ports to New Zealand's 
economy, as a 'small state' (Katzenstein 1985) which has traditionally been reliant 
on agricultural exports (see Curtis 1996). Having discovered this significant and 
seemingly inexplicable gap in the literature, the task I set myself in this thesis was 
to fill it. There is, in this sense, another dimension to the title 'registering 
interest': the thesis addresses a hitherto neglected topic which I believe is 
intrinsically w011hy of investigation. Of necessity, this intention has meant that 
the thesis is primarily an historical sociology, of the period from 1953 until 1989, 
with just two chapters that deal with the post-reform period. 
2 The study by Norris fonns part of an important, albeit small, vemacular literature written by 
watersiders. Included within this literature is the novel by Davis (1964). 
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In the thesis I examine the nature of the relationships between waterfront 
employers and watersiders within the spheres of industrial relations and work 
during the 40 years from 1953 to 1993. The key premise of the study is that these 
relationships are, as Gouldner (1954: 154) writes in another connection, 
"explainable only in terms of the balance of power, of the relative strengths of 
opposing groups." Taking this premise as the point of departure, I will seek to 
identify "the relative ... power of the key actors" (Fligstein and Fernandez 
1988:6) and, recognizing that power relations are dynamic, changes in this balance 
over time. How did these relationships develop, in the aftermath of 1951 dispute, 
during the break-bulk era? What were the effects of containerization upon the 
pattern of power relations which crystallized in this latter period? More recently, 
what have the effects of port reform been on the relative power of the key actors? 
And what new actors have entered the scene? 
British and American studies alike (see Hill 1976; Mills 1976; DiFazio 1985) 
identify the waterfront, in the break-bulk era, as a site of resistance to the shift to 
employer control of labour markets and work which, according to authors within 
the Braverman-inspired labour process tradition, characterizes industries within 
the manufacturing sector. However authors who write in this latter tradition 
regard the resistance on the waterfront to this historical trend as being undone by 
containerization, which facilitates greater employer control of labour markets and 
work (see Mills 1979). Still other studies demonstrate that this process of 
technological change does not automatically and unambiguously result in a 
(re)assertion of managerial prerogative (Finlay 1988; Wellman 1995). Insofar as 
relationships of power between waterfront workers and their employers have the 
potential to vary considerably between different national settings, the thesis seeks 
to identify how these relationships developed in New Zealand within both the pre-
and post-container periods. 
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Ultimately the thesis identifies, and accounts for, a pattern of union strength and 
employer weakness which emerged in the 1960s, crystallized in the 1970s, and 
began to be undone in the late 1980s. The argument that I will make is that these 
developments were in no sense predetermined, whether by the nature of labour 
process, or by the existence of an 'occupational subculture'. Rather they were 
contingent outcomes that were shaped by the legally constituted institutional 
framework the key actors on the waterfront were part of, the power resources they 
gained control of within this framework, and the success (or failure) of the 
strategies they employed. 
The contingent nature of the developments in the period under consideration is 
amply demonstrated by the fact that, contra the claims of labour process theorists 
such as Mills (1979), containerization did not lead to a (re )assertion of managerial 
prerogative on the New Zealand waterfront. Paradoxically, in the 1970s, instead 
of containerization enhancing the capacity of employers to 'control' workers, it 
had the opposite effect: the employers, as a 'bloc', became increasingly 
fragmented and the watersiders' unions capitalized upon this situation by means of 
decentralized bargaining. The historical account I provide adopts what Sewell 
(1992:33) has termed an "eventful conception of temporality", which invokes 
"multiple registers of causation" to explain these historical developments. 
Inevitably the approach that I take to exploring the relationships between 
waterside workers and their employers within the time period specified has been 
influenced by existing accounts, both international and local, of work and 
industrial relations on the waterfront. It is therefore necessary to review the 
studies in this area, in order to identify their relevance to the thesis. It is to this 
task that I now tum. 
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CHAPTER 1 : THE SOCIOLOGY OF WATERFRONT LABOUR 
(1) Introduction 
Waterfront work, the men who do it, and the labour markets in which they 
compete, has attracted the attention of sociologists (and other academics) for 
several decades. Indeed studies of the waterfront can be used to index the 
predominant 'orientations' and foci of British and American industrial sociology 
in the post-war period. As I will demonstrate, the few fragmentary studies of the 
New Zealand waterfront, in the main, tend to follow the concerns ofthis literature. 
That these studies are dominated by debates formulated (usually some years 
before) in other countries is, I believe, largely explicable in terms of the fact that 
in Australasia "there has been, until recently, a lack of an industrial sociology 
tradition" (Bray and Littler 1988:553). Undoubtedly this is also responsible, at 
least in part, for the paucity of studies of the waterfront in this country. 
In this chapter I will review the overseas literature and, where relevant, position 
each study within a particular tradition of industrial sociology. Having identified 
the broad contours of the literature, and located the relevant New Zealand studies 
within it, in the next chapter I will map out the framework for my own analysis. 
Recently, there have been calls to reorientate industrial sociology around studying 
the organization of work (see Thompson and Ackroyd 1995). My prescription for 
studying the waterfront, and the approach I adopt in this thesis, is somewhat 
different. I want to suggest that because of the nature of the systems of labour 
administration, through which waterfront labour markets are decasualized, the 
primacy of how the labour market is organized (relative to patterns of work 
relations) must be recognized. Moreover because of the features of the particular 
system that was established in New Zealand this labour market focus, which is 
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apparent in the best of the overseas studies reviewed, must be combined with an 
'institutionalist' approach to analysis. 
(2) Sociological Studies of Waterfront Labour 
The first studies of the waterfront that emerged in the 1950s range from those 
concerned with the nature of the individuals who performed waterfront work, and 
the cultural and community context in which they were embedded, to accounts 
detailing the nature of the employment relationship. The former emphasis was 
used to identify the factors that rendered waterfront workers 'different' from other 
groups of workers. In one of its most well-known formulations, that of Kerr and 
Siegel (1954), the concern was to explain the 'strike proneness' of waterfront 
workers. According to their argument regarding the 'interindustry propensity to 
strike', the geographical and/or social isolation of waterfront workers (and other 
groups like them), which separates them from the rest of the 'community', fosters 
a certain occupational identity and set of values which results in an increased 
willingness and, by engendering social solidarity, an increased capacity to engage 
in strike action. 
Despite the weaknesses of Kerr and Siegel's argument regarding the causes of 
differences in strike rates between industries, for which it has since been roundly 
criticized (see Edwards 1977), the emphasis upon the theme of culture and 
community as the key to understanding the 'waterfront worker' persisted within 
industrial sociology. In this view the waterfront worker, as a particular 'type', is 
essentially constituted and conditioned by the occupational subculture and 
communities of which they are part. This approach is exemplified by David 
Lockwood's classification of waterfront workers in his now classic model of 
workers' consciousness. 
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Within this model Lockwood (1966) identified three different 'types' of worker 
(traditional proletarians, traditional deferential workers, and privatized workers). 
It is worth quoting him at length, both to show the extent to which Kerr and Siegel 
were the progenitors of his argument, and also the key features of his definition 
which epitomizes the 'occupational subcultures' approach: 
The most highly developed forms of proletarian traditionalism 
seem to be associated with industries such as mining, docking, and 
shipbuilding; industries which tend to concentrate workers together 
in solidary communities and to isolate them from the influences of 
the wider society. Workers in such industries usually have a high 
degree of job involvement and strong attachments to primary work 
groups that possess a considerable autonomy from technical and 
supervisory constraints. Pride in doing 'men's work' and a strong 
sense of shared occupational experiences make for feelings of 
fraternity and comradeship which are expressed through a 
distinctive occupational culture. These primary groups of 
workmates not only provide the elementary units of more extensive 
class loyalties but work associations also carry over into leisure 
activities, so that workers in these industries usually participate in 
what are called 'occupational communities' (Lockwood 1966:250-
1). 
This model of community-based proletarian traditionalism was 'tested' in relation 
to New Zealand by Turkington (1976) and Inkson and Gidlow (1981). 
Turkington (1976) conducted an analysis of strike rates on the waterfront in New 
Zealand. Although he is critical of aspects of Kerr and Siegel's 'hypothesis', his 
study shares their emphasis on identifying factors which render certain groups of 
workers (in this case those in the waterfront, construction and meat processing 
industries) more strike prone than others. The principal weakness of Turkington's 
account is the very limited time-frame addressed (1967-73); in effect he presents 
only a 'snapshot view' of strike rates in these industries. In this respect his study, 
like that of Kerr and Siegel, is overly synchronic. Furthermore, while Turkington 
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identifies a number of variables that shape industrial conflict on the waterfront, his 
study lacks a clear identification of which ones are causally prior. 1 
Inkson and Gidlow qualified the argument regarding the 'type' of worker who 
worked on the waterfront in New Zealand, providing only limited support for the 
'traditional proletarian' thesis. As with Lockwood, however, this study largely 
ignores the institutional context in which the 'type' of workers identified actually 
worked. For my purposes, the main problem with these accounts of waterfront 
workers, whether in the incipient form of Kerr and Siegel's 'isolated mass' 
hypothesis or when given sociological 'flesh' by Lockwood in his argument about 
'traditional proletarians', is that the occupation of waterfront work is used to test 
general arguments drawn from sociological theory regarding community and 
social integration. In this type of research, sociological concepts like 'tradition', 
'occupational subcultures' and so forth, function as a substitute for, rather than a 
supplement to, detailed empirical analysis of labour market structure and actual 
work organization. For example, despite its centrality to his model of the 
'traditional proletarian', Lockwood merely assumed the existence of the dockers' 
freedom from direct supervision. Nor did he examine the institutional framework 
through which dock work was actually organized. 
The study by Inkson and Gidlow likewise ignores the actual organization of work 
and the labour market. This is curious, because they criticize Lockwood on 
similar terms to my own, yet in their account institutions of labour market 
regulation and the work situation exist as a shadowy backdrop to their attempt to 
identify the 'type' of worker who inhabited the New Zealand waterfront. 
Significantly, the 'bureau' system of labour administration, through which the 
labour market was organized, does not even rate a mention in their article. 
I Although he extended his analysis to 1978 in a subsequent work (Turkington 1980), it is 
characterized by the same approach. 
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The broader point is that abstract sociological models of community and social 
integration, and appeals to sociological terms like 'occupational subcultures', 
serve to obscure as much as to explain. The approach of these types of studies has 
been criticized by Turnbull, who argues that their predominance resulted in "a 
failure to fuse sociological studies of workers' attitudes with the more 
institutionally orientated studies of industrial relations which focus on such 
variables as changing labour market conditions, work organization, payment 
systems and technological developments" (1992a:296). In particular, he argues 
that in explaining waterfront strike rates, 'occupational culture' must be linked to 
the institutional framework which underpinned the industry. This type of 
argument finds support in an earlier formulation by Miller (1969) who suggested, 
albeit tentatively, that the level of development and degree of influence of the 
'dockworker subculture' is in fact dependent on the way that the labour market 
was decasualized. 
The classic sociological study of waterfront work in Britain which focuses on 
institutions was produced by the Department of Social Science at Liverpool 
University in 1956. The second major work by the Department in the 1950s (see 
Brown 1965), 'The Dock Worker' (as it was entitled) focused on the Port of 
Manchester and was in large part concerned with how the National Dock Labour 
Scheme affected this port. In particular, it sought to identify the "exact impact of 
the scheme on the life and labour ofthe Manchester dock worker" (1954:18). In a 
sense, this study reflects the (false) hopes of bureaucratic reform which were 
central to British industrial sociology in the 1950s (see Brown 1992:1-38). 
Manchester had previously been a port relatively free from industrial conflict but 
in 1951, while the study was being undertaken, it was the site of two unofficial 
strikes. The researchers attempted to discover whether this upsurge in conflict 
could be explained, not in terms of community, but in the way that the new 
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Scheme "tended in practice to emphasize ... economic ... [security] at the cost of 
weakening the more important and fundamental psychological security" (ibid: 11). 
The focus upon psychological consequences is one of the hallmarks of this study. 
Despite its institutional focus the Liverpool study can therefore be bracketed 
alongside the work of Lockwood and others, as examining the attitudes of the 
workforce (albeit in a social-psychological manner) with a view to explaining the 
incidence of strikes.2 But, unlike these other studies, it did examine in detail the 
effects on these attitudes of the transformation of the employment relationship 
wrought by the NDLS. Thus the researchers engaged in empirical research with 
the intention of identifying how changes in the employment relationship impacted 
on industrial relations within the port, rather than merely pressing into service 
catch-all concepts such as 'isolated masses' or 'occupational subcultures' to 
explain the strikes that occurred. 
The institutional focus of the Liverpool study had its counterpart in studies of the 
hiring systems which operated on the waterfronts of the East and West Coast of 
America (see Larrowe 1955; Philpott 1965). A seminal transnational comparison 
of waterfront hiring systems was conducted by Jensen (1964), who also carried out 
a detailed study ofthe Port of London (Jensen 1971). 
The 'second wave' of sociological studies of the waterfront in Britain was initiated 
by Stephen Hill's classic work 'The Dockers'. Although it was framed as a study 
of class and occupational community (which resulted in a continuity in emphasis 
with the earlier studies of dock labour), underlying these overt themes is an 
2 The account of unofficial strikes is consonant with the emphasis on industrial conflict which 
characterized the Department of Social Science's subsequent studies of the coal and steel 
industries. However, insofar as the Manchester study largely preceded their foray into systems 
theory in these later works, it has an 'agent' rather than 'systems' focus (on this point see Brown 
1992:50). Thus this study ranks as the exception to the Department's programme of research 
(Brown 1965:276). 
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argument about a tension between two competing modes of industrial organization 
('craft' versus 'bureaucratic') that emerged at a time when the employment 
relationship had been fundamentally transformed (Hill 1976). The changes he 
examined were a result of modifications to the National Dock Labour Scheme 
carried out in light of the Devlin Committee's findings. 3 
There is an overlap between Hill's study and that of Lockwood in relation to the 
'craft' basis of dock work, which hinged on dockers' freedom from direct 
supervlSlon. However unlike Lockwood, who merely assumed the existence of 
craft control of work, Hill carried out empirical research on the actual organization 
of dock work. On the basis of his findings, he argued that the existence of 'craft 
administration', wherein dockers retained considerable control over work and 
exercised this autonomy 'responsibly', hinged on the particular system of labour 
administration (a local variant of the National Dock Labour Scheme) in the Port of 
London which gave rise to the non-permanent status of dockers in the labour 
market.4 After the cScheme was modified, dockers were granted permanent status 
which led to an erosion, not so much of the autonomy and freedom that dockers 
enjoyed at work, but rather the pressures emanating from the employment system 
which hitherto had resulted in them exercising this autonomy in a responsible 
fashion. Thus it was the craft system of control, from the employers' point of 
view, that was undermined. As Hill observed, "no one in supervision or 
management could control the men once permanency was established" 
(1976:157). Beyond the specific features of Hill's argument, the strength of his 
study is that it is empirical research which looked beyond worker or employer 
3 This Committee of Inquiry, led by Lord Devlin, was charged with inter alia investigating the 
operation of the NDLS, and published its fmdings in 1965. As Hill (1976:6) noted, "The 
fundamental transformation occurred in 1967 when casual labour by the half-day, often for 
different employers on different days, was replaced by permanent employment for a single fIrm." 
This development was followed by the abolition of piecework in 1970. 
4 Under this hiring regime, the principal "source of supervisory control over the men ... [was] the 
actual employment relationship itself' (Hill 1976:28). In short, if dockers did not work effectively 
they stood less chance of being rehired. 
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attitudes to examine how changes in the organization of the labour market 
impacted on the way that work was actually carried out. 
The focus upon the organization of work in Hill's study was continued in a 
different way through studies of the nature of the 'labour process'. Unlike classic 
industrial sociology, which always stressed the variable nature of the social 
relations of work, the labour process approach - in its original formulation -
stressed the homogenizing consequences of deskilling (see Braverman 1974). The 
waterfront then emerged in the 1970s as one of the diverse sites where sociologists 
gathered evidence to evaluate the 'deskilling thesis' originally developed by 
Braverman to explain developments in work organization in general. 
The main exponent of this approach is Herb Mills, himself an ex-longshoreman, 
whose concern is with issues of technological change, deskilling and control on 
the San Francisco waterfront (Mills 1976; 1977; 1979). In particular, he examines 
the effects of a process of technological change that swept through the waterfront 
industry worldwide in the 1950s and 1960s following the introduction of 
'containers' (large boxes of standardized dimensions). This process 
revolutionized methods of cargo-handling and profoundly changed the nature of 
waterfront work. 
Mills identifies the waterfront as a site of prolonged and extensive worker (or 
union) control of work, which is eroded by technological change. His analysis of 
containerization reads as a graphic chronicle of a rising 'dread-tide' of 
technological change that degraded and routinized waterfront work, and eroded 
the sense of community, solidarity and pride among the men who worked on the 
San Francisco waterfront. In this sense, his findings fit squarely within a version 
of the labour process tradition, which: 
suggests a dynamic of bureaucratization and mechanization 
resulting in (a) a transfer of accountability and responsibility for the 
labour process from workers to management, (b) increased 
managerial control of workers behavior, and (c) increased 
management control of the labour supply (Steiger and Form 
1991:251). 
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But his work also speaks to the tradition of studies that documented pride, 
community, and 'men's' work. 
There are a number of problems associated with this type of labour process 
approach. Insofar as Mills's study is written through the metaphors of freedom 
and degradation it tends to idealize the nature of waterfront work in the break-bulk 
era. The account he provides is replete with nostalgia for a 'lost' era. Moreover, 
he does not allow for cross-national variations in the pattern of work relations in 
the break-bulk era, insofar as 'worker autonomy' is explained purely in terms of a 
standardized set of conditions which flow from the 'logic' of the labour process. 
In this sense, worker autonomy, like worker sub-cultures, is regarded as a 
universal and constant property, rather than something that may vary between 
times and places. Insofar as containerization fundamentally altered the nature of 
the labour process this control of work is regarded as being automatically and 
unambiguously eroded. Any potential for worker (or union) resistance to change, 
the concern of those who investigate occupational subcultures, is therefore largely 
overlooked.5 
If an earlier generation of industrial sociologists who wrote about the waterfront 
over-emphasized issues of unofficial community regulation by the workers 
themselves, to the exclusion of official institutions and the sources of industrial 
regulation, writers in the labour process tradition bend the stick too far in the other 
5 This is a common failing of studies within this version of the labour process approach, for which 
they have since been criticized (for example, see Littler and Salaman 1982; Brown 1992:206-11). 
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direction by emphasizing 'objective conditions' to the largely same effect.6 In 
short, this approach focuses upon the organization of work to the exclusion of 
both unofficial practices and the official institutional factors that condition it. 
While there are no studies that examine the effects of technological change upon 
waterfront work in New Zealand, the 'labour history' study by Green (1989) ofthe 
break-bulk era (during the years from 1915 until 1951) bears the imprint of the 
labour process school. 7 Her approach is largely characterized by what Zeitlin 
calls a 'rank and filism', a view which regards the primary dynamic on the 
waterfront as "a spontaneous struggle for control of the labour process which 
pitted rank-and-file workers against trade unions as well as their employers" 
(1987: 169). In this version, the waterfront worker is fundamentally conditioned, 
not by geographical isolation or by an occupational subculture, but rather by the 
nature of the labour process itself. Like Mills, Green writes as if work exists in a 
vacuum, divorced from an institutional setting. 8 Institutions are relegated to the 
status of mere epiphenomena, and the focus is on the objective 'bedrock' of the 
labour process. This approach not only unduly 'objectifies' waterfront work, it 
ultimately results in an inability to account for any differences that might exist in 
the organization of waterfront work, both among ports within the same country 
and between different countries. 
A recent study by Finlay (1988) of work in the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, 
on America's West Coast, opens up a way of addressing these questions. In 
6 More recently, of course, the labour process debate has itself returned to consider issues of 
subjectivity. The study by Burawoy (1979) was a fIrst step in this direction, which led to these 
issues being explicitly addressed in subsequent studies (see Jermier et al. 1994). While the 
waterfront has proven to be a fertile ground for the evaluation of propositions formulated within 
industrial sociology, it has not as yet been addressed by this turn in the debate. To date, Mills's 
study exemplifies accounts of waterfront work in the labour process tradition. 
7 As yet, Green's doctoral dissertation is not publicly available (Green 1989). Here I am relying on 
two articles (Green 1992, 1994) which are based on her dissertation. 
8 Indeed in one article she argues that the arbitration system was, by an large, 'unimportant' with 
respect to the waterfront (Green 1994). 
19 
Finlay's account institutions are central. In particular, he fuses the concern with 
how the labour market is organized and the employment relationship constituted, 
which is implicit within the Liverpool study and Hill's analysis, with the labour 
process emphasis on work organization. Finlay demonstrates that the evolutionary 
assumptions regarding increasing employer control of labour markets and work, 
which characterize the work of orthodox labour process theorists such as Mills, do 
not necessarily apply on the waterfront even after containerization occurred. 
Finlay's concern is one of how the employment relationship is secured. Standard 
labour process accounts of the employment relationship associate the dynamic of 
bureaucratization - the establishment of formal rules and procedures to govern 
hiring - with attempts to foster greater employer control of the labour supply (see 
Clawson 1980; Edwards 1979). However it is apparent from Finlay's study that 
the evolutionary assumptions utilized by authors within the labour process school 
are questionable insofar as this dynamic does not necessarily work itself through 
in the same manner on the waterfront. While the decasualization of waterfront 
labour markets in Western Europe, America and Australasia is analogous to early 
developments in the factory system, when the boundaries of the firm were 
cemented by establishing formal rules to govern hiring and dismissal, there are a 
number of important differences. Firstly, this process occurs much later on the 
waterfront (in most countries it dates only from the 1930s or 1940s) than in 
manufacturing. Secondly, this process involved systems of labour administration 
that were external to firms. Thirdly, for this reason, these systems do not 
automatically and unambiguously lead to increased employer control of the labour 
market. Indeed such systems can actually strengthen the position of workers in the 
labour market by giving their unions considerable control over the labour supply. 
What the study by Finlay (1988), and to some extent another by Wellman (1995), 
demonstrates is that, not only do systems of labour administration allow unions to 
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exert control over the labour supply and the labour market, this control can also 
assist in staving off the potential of technological change to effect a (re)assertion 
of managerial prerogative. In a sense, this returns us to the concerns of the 
Liverpool researchers and Hill in answering the questions addressed by Kerr et al. 
and Lockwood: What makes waterfront workers 'different' (after decasualization, 
that is) is not occupational communities or the labour process per se, but rather the 
institutions that the labour market is organized through.9 The 'dock worker' is 
thus not primarily (or essentially) constituted through occupational subcultures or 
by the labour process, but rather through institutional frameworks of labour 
market regulation which cut across both occupations and the actual organization of 
work. This argument is consistent with the findings of Turnbull (1992a) that the 
occupational culture of dockers, such as it existed historically in Britain, was 
replaced by the institutions of the NDLS. These institutions 'breathed life into' 
and came to form the basis of the occupation. 
(3) From Community and Work to Institutions 
This reading of the literature suggests that the separation of analyses of 
community or subcultures from the details of how work is organized, or the labour 
process approach, has promoted an ahistorical set of observations about waterfront 
labour. By contrast, for an historical approach the starting point in any analysis of 
relationships between employers and workers on the waterfront falls on how the 
labour market is decasualized through the institutionalization of registration 
systems (see Phillips and Whiteside 1985). This different approach requires an 
empirically grounded analysis and one that, as Gallie writes in another context, 
9 Both Hill's argument regarding the perpetuation of what he terms 'craft administration', wherein 
dock workers had control of the labour process, and Finlay's discussion of the way that an informal 
arrangement ('the deal') fosters worker autonomy within the labour process, hinge on the nature of 
the respective systems of labour administration in Britain and America. 
rejects the search for simple universal laws of labour market 
stmcture and development in favour of an analysis of the interplay 
of the historically conditioned institutional stmctures that generate 
specific systems of labour market regulation (1988: 18). 
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To this end, it is necessary to examine the "nationally distinctive institutional 
configurations" (Locke and Thelen 1995:341) regarding systems of labour 
administration. I will argue that these configurations, or the 'institutional mix', in 
tum, have important implications for where to 'focus' the historical analysis, 
specifically whether it takes the form of a 'labour history' or, as in this thesis, that 
of a more 'institutionally orientated' type of historical account. 
The 'institutional configurations' in question hinge on different ways of 
institutionalizing registration systems. These differences are exemplified by the 
contrasting approaches to decasualization that were taken on America's seaboards. 
On the West Coast the union closed the labour market via a hiring hall system. 
On the East Coast, however, state legislatures intervened to control corruption on 
the New York waterfront (see Levy 1989). In each case, however, the union form 
was not given, or secured by the state, and the best studies of union organization 
on both coasts are 'labour history' accounts of the politics of union organizing 
(Nelson 1988; Kimeldorf 1988). Of particular significance in these studies is an 
analysis of the break between the International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union and the International Longshoremen's Association, and 
how this schism fed into the respective ways that the labour market was 
decasualized in each of these settings. 
The fact that the system of labour administration in New Zealand was created by 
the state does not make it unique, as the examples of New York, Britain (and 
elsewhere) demonstrate. What rendered it unique was that the occupational 
registration system was complemented by the registration, as legal entities, of the 
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main organized interests within the labour market - the unions and the employers' 
organization - under an industry-specific variant of the New Zealand's unique 
state-regulated arbitration system. In New Zealand the unions were based on a 
labour market secured by act of law, and unions themselves were given legal 
recognition. This unique overlap of an occupational registration system and a 
union registration system, within a specialist legal framework, rendered waterside 
workers a particular type of 'corporate group', similar in form to the British 
miners analysed by Beynon and Austrin (1994). 
(4) Conclusion 
With respect to studying waterfront labour, I have argued in this chapter for a shift 
from sociological analysis per se, to sociologically informed historical analysis 
which has a strong 'institutional' focus. The need for a shift from sociology to 
history emerges from a critique of the literature on waterfront labour, and the 
institutional focus 'fits' the New Zealand case, the hallmark of which was a 
unique form of legal regulation. This approach forms the basis of the analytical 
framework that I utilize in the thesis. Outlining the nature of this framework, and 
overviewing the thesis as a whole, constitute the main tasks of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 : FROM A SOCIOLOGY OF WATERFRONT LABOUR TO 
AN mSTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONS 
(1) Introduction 
In his critique of labour history, Zeitlin (1987) has noted that analysis of 
distinctive institutional configurations requires more than a simple switch from the 
rules governing work to the practices of rank and file workers. He argued for a 
shift from 'labour history' studies of the rank and file to a 'history of industrial 
relations' which has a strong institutional and organizational focus. l In this 
approach, rather than treating institutions "as secondary phenomena responding 
positively or negatively to interests and identities determined by more fundamental 
social processes and relationships" (ibid: 159), instead they are regarded as 
crucially conditioning relationships between employers and workers. 
Given its unique state-regulated system, this approach has considerable analytical 
. purchase in the New Zealand context. Hence, rather than labour history from the 
bottom up, as promoted in the tradition of E.P. Thompson, the focus in this study 
is upon how the relationships between waterfront employers and waterfront 
workers were fundamentally shaped from 'above', as well as from 'below', by the 
institutional framework of legal regulation. In adopting this 'institutionally 
orientated' approach, I will draw on an argument developed by Walsh and Fougere 
(1987) regarding the effects of New Zealand's state-regulated arbitration system. 
Like Zeitlin these authors argue that the law was crucial, not merely in 
constraining the behaviour of the key actors within industrial relations, but rather 
in creating the actors in the first place. 
I This 'institutionalist' emphasis resonates with recent debates within American labour history (see 
Lembcke 1995). The historical emphasis has been recognized to the point where a new journal, 
entitled Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, has recently been established. 
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On the waterfront the effects of legal regulation extended well beyond 'industrial 
relations' (narrowly defined), to the system of labour administration as a whole, 
which encompassed hiring practices and certain crucial aspects of work 
organization. However, the important point is that the Waterfront Industry Act 
1953 did not just decasualize the labour market; it positioned the actors in 
particular ways. Moreover, rather than the law merely regulating and constraining 
already existing actors and interests, it was crucial in constituting sets of actors 
and interests (see Walsh 1993). 
This approach implies acceptance of a particular view of institutions. Rather than 
institutions simply being regarded as externally constraining, they must be 
conceptualized as both constraining and enabling (Giddens 1984: 173). Recent 
deVelopments within the 'new institutionalist' sociology have made it more 
commonplace for such a view to be adopted. In the next section I briefly discuss 
this school and then I outline the analytical framework that I employ in the thesis. 
(2) The Analytical Framework 
The over-arching framework that this study is informed by is the 'new 
institutionalism'. While this approach spans several disciplines (including 
political studies, economics, and organizational analysis) and takes a number of 
diverse forms (for reviews see DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Zucker 1988), m 
sociology it has taken a particular form. As Brubaker insightfully observes: 
by movmg beyond a concern with the institutional contexts of and 
constraints on interested action to emphasize the institutional 
constitution of both interests and actors, the new institutionalism in 
sociology diverges from the older sociological institutionalism as well as 
from the new rational-choice institutionalisms of economics and 
political science (1994:48, emphasis his). 
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Thus the new institutionalism treats "institutions as independent variables" 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991 :8). This is a view of institutions as causally prior 
(which is shared with the 'old institutionalism' of, say, Emile Durkheim), but 
constituting in their effect, rather than merely constraining already existing 
'interests and actors' which spring forth fully-fledged and organized. In a slightly 
weaker version institutions are regarded as refracting, as through a prism, nascent 
interests. In an article which draws on this perspective in analysing labour 
politics, Locke and Thelen note that "accounts emanating from the institutionalist 
school focus on the way interests are shaped and/or mediated by their institutional 
environment" (1995:342). 
This approach underpins my argument that the 'corporate' actors on the waterfront 
were produced through the operation of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. Rather 
than merely being constraining, the institutions created by this legislative 
intervention were constitutive in their effect. 'Capital' and 'labour' on the 
waterfront did not nakedly confront each other as "objective interests inscribed in 
capitalist relations of production" (Zeitlin 1987:165). Instead these 'basic' 
interests were refracted through, and conditioned by, the institutional framework 
established under the Act. In short, they were institutionally mediated. Workers 
and employers were regulated in a way that positioned them (not by choice, but 
rather by act of law) as new sets of 'corporate' actors (unions and an employers' 
organization) with their own specific sets of interests. What emerged, then, was a 
particular configuration of actors and interests that was consequent upon capital 
and labour being 'organized' through a registration system. The actors were thus 
not in any sense 'given' prior to being regulated; they emerged in and through the 
process ofregulation, and their interests, in this sense, were 'relational' rather than 
'essential' (Somers 1993). 
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Given the adoption of this type of overarching 'institutionalist' framework the 
problem which immediately arises is that of how to explore the relationships 
between the key actors, within an industrial setting, over time. It hinges on a 
tension between the synchronic and the diachronic (Althusser 1977), or, simply 
stated, the problem of how to blend sociology and history (see Lipset 1968; 
Abrams 1980; Sztompka 1986; Wieviorka 1992; Sewell 1992). The specific 
problem I faced was one of 'form and -content': how to structure the study, given 
the time period covered and the complexity of the relationships involved. 
After a great deal of consideration, I elected to adopt the framework developed by 
Gospel (1992) which involves a threefold division of the relationships between the 
key actors into the spheres of 'employment relations', 'industrial relations' and 
'work relations' .2 This decision was not a matter of arbitrary choice nor the result 
of a desire on my part to superimpose a simplifying framework onto a complex set 
of relationships. For these categories do not just have analytical purchase (and 
hence the framework is not merely a heuristic device); rather they correspond to a 
real set of arrangements that was created by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. 
Before highlighting this correspondence I will briefly explain the sets of 
relationships that these categories refer to. 
Under the definition that I have adopted 'employment relations' refers to 
recruitment (entry to the labour market and the composition of the labour supply), 
register strengths (the size of the labour supply), and bureau rules (how labour was 
allocated to employers). Here I must emphasize that this is what I will call 'the 
labour market', and it is separated out from the realm of bargaining over wages 
and conditions - the province of 'industrial relations'. Similarly, each of these 
2 Gospel developed these categories to explain the evolution of employer strategy in Britain from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the present. However I have abstracted these categories from his 
analytical framework (which is based on the distinction between 'markets' and 'hierarchies'). 
Storey and Bacon (1993) have likewise adopted Gospel's categories and put them to a different use 
(in their case, developing a typology of individualism and collectivism). 
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spheres is differentiated from 'work relations' which I have taken to mean "the 
relations between employers and employees at the point of production which 
govern how work is carried out" (Edwards 1986: 1). As opposed to the formal 
agreement, which codified wages and conditions, the level of work relations is the 
province of the wage-effort bargain on the job (Baldamus 1961). 
The correspondence between these analytical constructs and the actual 
arrangements which existed on the waterfront is perhaps most evident in relation 
to the distinction between employment relations and industrial relations. Under 
the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, the regulation of the labour supply (the province 
of 'employment relations') was organized in a manner which separated it from the 
way that the rules governing work were negotiated and applied. Considered as 
processes of rule-making, a separate set of codified rules regulated employment 
relations and industrial relations. To conflate the two 'levels' in analysis would be 
to overlook important institutional arrangements which separated them. 
Furthermore, the key actors at each of these levels differed. For example, 
individual firms were marginalized as actors within employment relations, insofar 
as all decisions on the employers' side regarding the labour supply were the legal 
responsibility of the employers' organization (the Port Employers Association). 
Within the realm of industrial relations, however, along with their summit 
organization individual firms were constituted as actors, with the right to enter into 
legally binding agreements with watersiders' local unions and their Federation. 
The Act thus made institutional resources available to individual unions and 
employers at the port level which meant that they did not have to rely on their 
respective national bodies. This raised the issue of which should be the legitimate 
actor: individual firms or the employers' association, unions or their Federation. 
Thus the Act did not supply a definitive institutional 'blueprint', insofar as 
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tensions existed within the organizations which emerged out of the regulatory 
matrix. 
While the approach of the thesis is broadly consonant with the 'new 
institutionalism', in its emphasis upon the way that actors and interests are 
constituted by institutions, in structuring the empirical analysis around the 
preceding categories it proved necessary to supplement this overarching analytical 
frame with various literatures and studies which speak to the issues addressed in 
each of the three spheres. At this level, an eclectic approach is adopted. The final 
result blends classic and contemporary writings on labour markets, industrial 
relations and work. 
In the analysis of employment relations I draw on a model of labour markets 
developed by Fligstein and Fernandez (1988). This model, which the authors 
developed in a syncretic manner, attempts to overcome the limitations surrounding 
the way that the main contemporary schools, of the neo-classical, segmented 
market and Marxist varieties have typically analysed the labour market. Fligstein 
and Fernandez conceptualize labour markets as "organized systems of conflict" 
into which different sets of resources are brought by firms and workers (ibid:23). 
The organization of labour markets is ultimately regarded as "a manifestation of 
power relations among the ... [key] actors in labour markets" (ibid:22). 
Although their attempt to develop a typology of labour markets is overly 
synchronic (and is based largely on American examples), their conception of the 
labour market as being a contingent outcome of struggles for "power resources" 
(Batstone 1988:223) by the key actors within it is a useful heuristic device. I use it 
to analyse the effects of New Zealand's state-regulated system of labour 
administration. This system institutionalized a series of local labour markets 
organized around exclusive registers at the port level. Using this approach, I 
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examine how the occupational registration system shaped the pattern of power 
relationships that emerged within these markets (or the sphere of 'employment 
relations', as I have termed it). This pattern, in turn, was based on the power 
resources that the respective corporate actors (the local watersiders' unions and the 
Port Employers Association) were able to secure control of within this system. 
These relationships determined the size and composition of the labour supply, 
along with the manner in which watersiders were allocated to work. 
The analysis of industrial relations is informed by, and responds to, a 
(predominantly Australasian) literature on the effects of legally constituted 
arbitration systems. Because of the assumed homogeneity of New Zealand's 
unique state-regulated arbitration system, it has been largely overlooked that 
industrial relations in New Zealand's ports were regulated by a 'specialist' legal 
framework, established by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, which placed the 
waterfront outside the 'mainstream' arbitration system. In examining the effects 
of this framework, I extend the argument developed by Walsh and Fougere (1987) 
regarding the effects of the arbitration system in constituting the key actors and 
shaping the relationships between them, and the way in which this system closed 
off some courses of action, but facilitated others. I show that within the 
'specialist' framework these relationships were characterized by a series of 
tensions between the national level and the local (port) level. These tensions, 
between centralization and decentralization, were expressed both within and 
between the watersiders' and employers' national organizations. 
Contrary to a common view of arbitration systems (see Littler et al. 1989), this 
framework did not centralize bargaining on the waterfront. Instead, bargaining 
was simultaneously centralized and decentralized. Furthermore, national 
bargaining and local bargaining were held in tension throughout the period under 
consideration. Thus I examine how local bargaining on the waterfront actually 
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worked in practice within a specific 'subsystem' of a legally regulated arbitration 
system. Local bargaining was potentially both a source of strength and weakness 
to unions and employers. While national bargaining was important, an important 
source of power within bargaining for the national organizations was gaining 
leverage over bargaining at the local level. Indeed it was the contingent interplay 
between the options provided and constraints imposed by the state-regulated 
system, together with the tension and shifting balance between the national and the 
local, between centralized and decentralized forms of organization and modes of 
action, which shaped the pattern of power relations between the key actors within 
the sphere of industrial relations in the period under consideration. 
The analysis of work relations draws, in the first instance, on a reinterpretation of 
the work of the sociotechnical systems school by Kelly (1978). Kelly argues that 
the "principal achievement" of this school "has been to discover the limiting 
conditions . . . beyond which certain tenets of scientific management cease to be 
economically viable" and hence the sites where 'group working' based on 
'autonomous work groups' is the most effective way of organizing work 
(1978:1083). This identification of the 'limits to Taylorism' is useful insofar as 
waterfront work, prior to containerization, was characterized by high levels of 
'process uncertainty' (one of the crucial limiting factors that Kelly argues was 
discovered by the sociotechnical systems school). The stowing of cargo involved 
"non-uniform tasks" (Litwak 1961: 1 78), and the consequent non-routine nature of 
waterfront work limited the capacity of employers to effect a Taylorist 
transformation of it. Instead,' autonomous work groups', in the form of gangs, 
were typically utilized. If these conditions explain why gang systems of work 
were utilized by employers, they tell us nothing about the terms on which gangs 
actually worked. 
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Beyond the palpable limits that high levels of process unceltainty place upon the 
extent to which waterfront work can be 'Taylorized', the way that work is 
organized has the potential to differ substantially from one setting to another. 
Gangs can be self-selected or assigned, permanent or temporary, directly 
employed or indirectly employed. Moreover, contra Mills (1979), there is no 
immutable logic of the labour process that operates with respect to the degree of 
autonomy and freedom characteristic of gangs in the break-bulk era, or the effects 
of technological change upon it. This autonomy, which hinges on the relationship 
between foremen and gangs (on the nature of supervision, that is), is not a 
constant. As Kelly pointed out, one cannot refer to "autonomous work groups as a 
single form of work organization", because "group autonomy is a continuous 
rather than a discrete property" (1978:1095). 
This point brings the argument back to a consideration of particular systems of 
labour administration, and the way in which gang systems of work are 
institutionalized within them. I identify the problems for employers thrown up by 
the indirect employment relationship under the bureau system of labour 
administration. I argue that this system exacerbated the inherent problems of 
control associated with gang systems of work in the break-bulk era. The ways that 
these problems were resolved produced a particular pattern of work relations 
which centered on the wage-effort bargain. I variously draw on classic studies of 
supervision, payment systems and work groups, in the analysis of these 
relationships. These themes, the focus on the wage-effOli bargain and the nature 
of supervision, are retained in analysing the effects of containerization on the 
pattern of work relations which crystallized in the break-bulk era. 
Considered in this way, a corpus of (somewhat diverse) literature is utilized in the 
empirical analysis. Equally, viewed in another way, the benefit of this eclectic 
approach is that the waterfront becomes a site from which I contribute to a number 
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of significant international debates within the field of industrial sociology. These 
debates include the following: the role of occupational registration systems in 
structuring labour markets (see Macdonald 1985; Witz 1992); the effects of legally 
regulated arbitration systems on bargaining practices (see Littler et al. 1989); the 
nature of supervision (see Hill 1973; Child 1975; Lowe 1992), specifically the 
position of the foreman within systems of collectivized labour; the impact of 
bonus systems (Roy 1953; Whyte 1955; Lupton 1963; Burawoy 1979), elaborated 
with respect to tensions between the organization of the labour market and the 
wage form; the relationship between technological change and vertical integration 
(Gold 1986), and the impact of new technology upon employer organization and 
bargaining power; and the determinants of firm size (see Lazerson 1988; You 
1995; Kimberly 1976; Hodson 1984), specifically the interplay between labour 
markets and film size (Granovetter 1984). In each case, I make a modest 
contribution to the debate. 
Although (as I explain below) I deal with the relationship between employers and 
waterside workers at each of the three levels in separate chapters, specifying the 
principal lines of tension both within as well as between employment relations, 
industrial relations and work relations, is a central task of the thesis. This is 
because patterns of power relations in these spheres overlapped and intersected in 
various ways. In some cases this interplay was mutually reinforcing for a 
particular actor. For example, the existence of an occupational registration system 
based on exclusive registers, together with the local watersiders' unions exercising 
formal 'joint control' over the size of the labour supply, was a crucial source of 
union power within the labour market. In turn, this was an important source of the 
unions' industrial strength, and the resulting 'bargaining power' within the realm 
of industrial relations allowed the unions to restrict the use of casual labour (which 
supplemented the registered workforce) in the 1970s, at a time when 
containerization was exerting downward pressures on register strengths. 
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However there are examples which demonstrate that, while patterns of power 
relations overlapped, they were not necessarily mutually reinforcing for either the 
employers or the unions. The complex interplay between employment relations 
and work relations in the break-bulk period illustrates this point. On the one hand, 
the indirect employment relationship constituted by the Waterfront Industry 
Commission crucially affected the relationships between employers and workers 
at the point of production, in a way that empowered gangs of watersiders. But on 
the other hand, one of the employers' solutions to this problem of control (a bonus 
system) resulted in a tension between a compulsory (union-sponsored) work 
equalization scheme and the wage-form. This tension, in tum, resulted in the 
"reconstitution of hierarchical conflict as lateral conflict and competition" between 
water siders (Burawoy 1979:67). This raised internal problems that every port 
union was forced to resolve for the sake of harmony amongst its members. 
Thus the interplay between the three levels was contingent (and complex), and 
was also subject to change through time. But despite this complex interplay, the 
relationships between these levels were not completely arbitrary. This is an 
important point, and one which has influenced my decision regarding the order in 
which to deal with each set of relationships. It should be noted that the order in 
the thesis title (,work, employment and industrial relations') is for rhythmic effect, 
and does not reflect the actual order of the analysis. How, then, did I arrive at the 
order in which the discussion is presented? 
Given the threefold division that I have adopted, it seemed logical to deal with 
industrial relations prior to the discussion of work relations. This is because of the 
relative importance, in New Zealand, of the legally regulated industrial relations 
framework in shaping particular patterns of work relations. The 'institutional 
configuration' in New Zealand was such that rights for unions were secured by the 
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state and 'job control', as such, was not as important as, say, in the United States 
(see Locke and Thelen 1995). The union form was legally 'given' and unions did 
not have to be built up 'from below'; in many cases job controls emerged after the 
unions were established, and sometimes informally. In this setting the legally 
enforceable industrial agreements negotiated by the key actors were central as the 
formal basis of job regulation, broadly circumscribing the character of work 
relations, and then the "silences in the contract of employment" (Hyman 1995: 11) 
were filled through an 'informal' process of wage-effort bargaining at the point of 
production (Edwards 1986). 
If it is not difficult to justifY the decision to examme relationships between 
employers and workers at the point of production after those within the sphere of 
industrial relations, electing to deal with employment relations prior to industrial 
relations is perhaps more controversial. My reason for this 'ordering' of the 
analysis is as follows. The sphere of employment relations will be dealt with first, 
insofar as the occupational registration system (which was its cornerstone) shaped 
control of the labour supply which, in turn, shaped industrial relations. To be sure, 
the unions' resulting labour market strength did not automatically translate into 
sheer 'bargaining power' within the realm of industrial relations. For the extent to 
which the unions could use this strength in the labour market to extract gains in 
bargaining was refracted through the industrial relations framework, which 
facilitated some courses of action (decentralized bargaining, for example) but 
closed off others (such as 'free' collective bargaining which was not an option 
because of compulsory arbitration). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the 
pattern of union strength (and employer weakness) which I describe in this study 
was underpinned by the nature of employment relations. 
There is an additional reason for this 'ordering' of the analysis: it corresponds to 
the real order in which the process of labour being 'put to work' occurred. 
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Individuals who had entered the labour market by becoming registered were 
allocated to work as members of gangs under 'bureau rules' (each of which were, 
in my definition, the province of employment relations). Only then did they 
become subject to the legally enforceable industrial agreement (industrial 
relations), and once on the job were subject to the authority of the foreman-
stevedore who was the initial broker on the employers' side of the wage-effort 
bargain (work relations). 
In any event the utility of this analytical grid, which in my view 'fits' the case, will 
undoubtedly be judged by the manner in which the empirical analysis is 
constructed. There is, I believe, a certain symmetry and coherence from using 
these categories in the specified order which has emerged in the course of writing 
the thesis. That said, the issues of 'form' which remain to be dealt with are the 
periodization of the study and its actual structure. But before this, there are some 
limitations to the scope of the study that I wish to highlight. 
Firstly, the study examines only the relationships between the groups crucially 
affected by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 (waterside workers and their 
employers, that is). Although other occupational groups worked on the waterfront 
(principally harbour workers, foremen-stevedores and tally clerks), no account will 
be given of the relationship between these groups and their employers. Although 
these latter groups were drawn into the specialist industrial relations framework 
when the Waterfront Industry Act was amended in 1976 (see Chapter 9), they 
remained outside the broader system of labour administration and as such 
continued to be 'directly employed' by their employers. In this sense, the thesis is 
restricted to examining the effects of New Zealand's waterfront system of labour 
administration, which regulated a specific occupation rather than an entire 
industry as such. The 'unit of analysis', therefore, is the occupation and the 
system of labour administration through which it was organized. In general, other 
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groups of workers are only dealt with insofar as they were parties to inter-
occupational disputes with watersiders. 
Secondly, the overall emphasis in the study is upon institutional 'effects' rather 
than 'origins'. Most significantly, I will not attempt to explain the origins of the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1953, nor to identify the reasons for its abolition. I 
believe that this is justifiable because its origins have, to some extent, been 
documented in earlier historical studies (see Bassett 1972). Similarly, to explain 
the reasons for its demise would require an analysis of the pressures that mounted 
for deregulation, of the complex matrix of 'interested groups' involved, and the 
influence that these groups exerted upon policy making during the 1980s. This 
type of analysis is outside the scope of this (already somewhat lengthy) study. 
That said, there is a sense in which the account I provide, which identifies a 
dynamic of increasing union strength and employer weakness under this legal 
framework, suggests why the bureau system was abolished. Indeed, the approach 
of successive governments in the 1970s was one of 'containment': trying to 
prevent the wages and conditions of waterside workers from spreading beyond the 
ports. The approach taken in the 1980s, however, was to abolish the specialist 
legislation and with it the 'corporate group' status of waterside workers which 
formed the basis of their industrial strength. 
The preceding limitation also applies to how I deal with technological change. As 
in the study by Finlay (1988), new technology will be examined as an exogenous 
source of change. No attempt will be made to explain why it was introduced. In 
any case, in a 'small society' like New Zealand the decision to containerize 
cargoes was as much a political decision as one made by employers, the 
dimensions of which have been adequately documented elsewhere (see Sinclair 
1973; Craw 1982). However I do examine in detail the effects of technological 
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change, not only upon unions but also upon employers. I demonstrate that new 
sets of actors and interests emerged on the employers' side following 
containerization, and that the overall fragmentation this produced at an 
organizational level weakened their position in bargaining, a situation which the 
unions exploited to good effect. 
The last point I wish to make is that while I will, where appropriate, make 
comparisons to waterfront systems of labour administration in other countries, and 
while the study is framed through literatures which deal with other countries, this 
is not fundamentally a comparative study. This is in large part a trade-off which 
has allowed me to examine the New Zealand case in depth. Each of these 
limitations speak to the point that I do not purport to have written 'the' definitive 
history of the waterfront, but rather one particular history, which addresses 
specifically delimited issues. All studies require limits; the ones that I have set 
allow me to explore, in a considerable degree of detail, the relationships between 
workers and their employers which developed within a unique system of labour 
administration. 
In the course of researching the thesis, I examined a considerable amount of 
archival material (much of which had not been previously consulted by other 
researchers). These primary sources were supplemented with interviews with 
former watersiders, union officials, employer's representatives and Waterfront 
Industry Commission staff, along with additional fieldwork (see the 
Methodological Appendix). Although it is not possible to capture events in all of 
their complexity, one can (and should) try for a high degree of 'correspondence'. 
In this vein, I have attempted to illustrate all of the major arguments and points in 
the substantive empirical chapters with detailed evidence, whether from 
documents contained in archives, quotes from interviews conducted with 
individuals who were involved in the events described, or observations I made 
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during the course of my fieldwork. The emphasis, then, is on 'thick description', 
but in a way that interweaves sociological analysis. Together with the time frame 
examined, and the structure adopted, this attempt to achieve verisimility accounts 
for the (considerable) length of the thesis. 
(3) Periodization and Overview of the Thesis 
In this section I will discuss the periodization that I have utilized, as well as 
provide an overview of the structure of the thesis as a whole. As Beynon and 
Austrin (1994:4) note, "In any historical account, there is an expectation of an 
historical narrative which has a chronology. Indeed it can be argued that a sense 
of chronology and of periodization is central to the historical craft." In the 
introduction I pointed out that the period prior to, and the immediate aftermath of 
the 1951 dispute has been well-documented elsewhere. In response to the eminent 
business historian Alfred Chandler's dictum that "most histories have to begin 
before the beginning", I can confidently state that the 'beginning' of this particular 
historical study (the period prior to 1953) has already been written. Thus this 
thesis begins at 1953, the year that the Waterfront Industry Act was passed. It also 
seemed logical to begin the analysis at that point, because (as I have argued) this 
legislative intervention was crucial in shaping the key actors and the relationships 
between them in the years that followed. The thesis ends at 1993, the year in 
which I ceased carrying out fieldwork. 
Within these broad time limits, the periodization has been accomplished by 
grouping the individual chapters into sections covering the years 1953-71, 1972-
86, and 1987-93. These periods broadly correspond to various 'breaking points', 
or events and developments, which I examine for their effects on the pattern of 
power relations between waterside workers and their employers. In Section 2, I 
examine how these relationships took shape within the regulatory matrix 
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established by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, through until 1971. This period 
was characterized predominantly by break-bulk methods of cargo handling. 
Overall, the thesis assumes no prior knowledge of the New Zealand arrangements. 
Consequently the legislative framework is dealt with in depth in Chapter 3, as are 
the main sets of actors and interests that it constituted. The relationships between 
the key actors, at each of the levels of employment relations, industrial relations 
and work relations, are then dealt with in Chapters 4 to 6 respectively. 
In Section 3 there are three 'inter-chapters' which serve as a link between the 
analysis of employment relations, industrial relations, and work relations in the 
pre- and post-container periods. These chapters both carry the continuity of 
historical events, and deal with significant developments. Chapter 7 examines the 
process of technological change, which as I noted above, was an important 
'exogenous' source of change. Chapter 8 then teases out the interlinkage between 
labour market structure and firm size and type, and also deals with the impact of 
containerization upon firms. This latter task is crucial to identifying the sources of 
employer disunity in the years following containerization, which I address in 
Chapter 9. 
In Section 4, I deal with the effects of containerization upon the pattern of 
employment relations, industrial relations and work relations which crystallized in 
the previous period. Again these levels will be dealt with in separate chapters 
(Chapters 10 to 12), which cover the years 1972 to 1986. While there are no 'hard 
and fast' breaks between these periods, with respect to the transition from break-
bulk to container methods of work, in many respects they also correspond to 
certain key events. Notably, after a specially constituted two year conciliation 
forum (the 'Waterfront Conference'), a much-disputed watershed industrial 
agreement (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5) was settled in 1971. 
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Finally, in Section 5, I deal with the effects of the abolition of the bureau system 
of labour administration, and the broader deregulation of industrial relations, upon 
the relationship between waterfront employers and watersiders. Chapter 13 
specifically addresses the Labour Relations Act 1987, which abolished the 
'specialist' industrial relations framework that hitherto governed the waterfront. 
This chapter also includes a discussion of the abolition of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission (which occurred in 1989). Chapters 14 and 15 then examine the 
period following the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. An 
overall summary of the thesis is presented in the concluding chapter, which draws 
together and summarizes the main arguments and findings contained in the body 
of the thesis. 
SECTION TWO 
WORK, EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
1953-1971 
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CHAPTER 3 : INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS 
(1) Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, far from 
merely constraining already existing sets of actors and interests, was crucially 
important in constituting the key actors on the waterfront. In this chapter I outline 
the formally defined roles, rights and responsibilities of the institutions and 
organizations legally constituted by the Act. While the Act afforded the Port 
Employers Association and the port unions legal recognition, in no sense did it 
predetermine the power relations between them and hence these cannot simply be 
'read off from the Act. Rather this pattern crystallized over time and was a 
product of the differing power resources that these actors were able to secure 
control of within this legislative framework. 
A crucial variable in this process was the "organizational capacities" (Kimeldorf 
1988:79) of the corporate actors. These capacities were crucially shaped by the 
manner in which the actors were constituted by the Act, and by the legal 
framework which opened some courses of action but closed off others. However, 
within these broadly circumscribed limits, the outcomes were contingent. For 
example, the state constituted new port unions, but as 'empty vessels' they were 
subject to internal struggles between deregistered watersiders and the 'new 
unionists'. The unions also combined into new organizations in the form of 
regional federations. The federations, in turn, faced organizational problems 
because of the manner in which the Act empowered individual port unions as the 
basic 'unit' of organization (in the realms of employment relations and industrial 
relations, at least) in a manner which ensured their local autonomy. 
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Similarly, while the Port Employers Association was legally recognized as an 
actor, the employers did not 'naturally' organize as an homogeneous bloc within 
this organization. Rather, it was subject to internal divisions between different 
types of firms. These divisions were exacerbated by the fact that the Act 
empowered individual firms as actors within the sphere of industrial relations. 
In this chapter, as well as outlining the provisions of the Act, I will tease out 
aspects of the respective 'organizational capacities' of the key actors it constituted. 
Specifically I will identify the principal lines of cleavage within the respective 
summit organizations on each side. This discussion will form the backdrop to 
examining the relationships between these actors within the spheres of 
employment relations, industrial relations and work relations. 
(2) The Legislative Framework 
The Waterfront Industry Act 1953 created a national system of labour 
administration that regulated the employment of waterside workers throughout the 
country. The system was regulated by two institutions, the Waterfront Industry 
Commission (WIC) and the Waterfront Industry Tribunal (WIT). The principal 
functions of the Commission were, as the rubric in the Act states, 
To carry out all administrative work in connection with the 
engagement and employment of, and the payment of wages to, 
waterside workers .... To carry out all administrative work in 
connection with the payment of guaranteed minimum payments to 
waterside workers, the payment for holidays, the administration of 
any co-operative contracting scheme or any other system for 
payment by results .... To provide amenities for waterside 
workers .... To administer and enforce the rules determining the 
priority of the allocation of labour and the bureau rules from time 
to time made by Port Conciliation Committees (s 8). 
The Waterfront Industry Commission was controlled by a Commissioner who was 
appointed by the Minister of Labour. It was administered by an executive staff 
43 
composed of a General Manager, a Chief Accountant and two senior accountants. 
The appointment of a sole Commissioner was significant insofar as it meant that 
the Commission itself, at the national level, was not a representative institution in 
that it did not incorporate union or employer representatives. This alTangement 
contrasts with the majority of systems oflabour administration in Western Europe 
where some form of 'joint control' typically operated at the national level 
(Turnbull and Weston 1992:388-91).1 
To carry out its legislatively prescribed functions the Commission was empowered 
to levy all employers of waterside workers in order to fund the administration 
costs of the system, together with "guaranteed minimum payments to waterside 
workers, and other payments to waterside workers not directly chargeable to 
individual employers" (s 9 (l)b). Thus the Act, in a sense, 'collectivized' labour 
by means of a national levy on employers. Furthermore, the Commission assumed 
many of the traditional responsibilities of employers such as the payment of wages 
and the provision of amenities. 
This system of labour administration was both centralized and decentralized. 
While the Commission itself was located in Wellington (the national capital), 
under s 9b of the Act it was charged with "operating labour engagement bureaux 
and central pay offices" in each of the ports where waterside workers were 
employed. Each bureau (hence the term 'bureau system') was controlled by a 
Branch Manager, who was subject to the authority of the General Manager and the 
1 The non-representative nature of the Waterfi'ont Industry Commission rendered it similar to an 
early postwar system of labour administration in Australia. Contrasting it with the National Dock 
Labour Scheme in Britain, Turnbull makes the point that "the Stevedoring 1ndustfy Act 1949, 
which created the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board, did not include the Waterside Workers 
Federation on the board, whereas the Transport and General Workers Union has always held joint 
control (50:50 representation) on both the National and Local Dock Labour Boards set up in 1947" 
(l992b:233). The situation in Australia changed in 1956 when the Stevedoring Industry Authority 
was established which incorporated union as well as employer representatives (ibid:233). However 
the Waterfront Industry Commission in New Zealand persisted in its original form until 1976 (see 
Chapter 9). 
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Commissioner, and was operated by an administrative staff. The labour bureaux 
were responsible for the day-to-day administration of the system, including the 
allocation of work and the payment of minimum and ordinary wages to waterside 
workers. The Commission through the local bureaux paid all wages and bonuses, 
but the actual cost of labour incurred when watersiders were 'employed' on a job 
was recovered by charging the shipping companies and stevedoring companies 
that requisitioned gangs of watersiders. 
The Commission was responsible for ensuring that a bureau register was kept in 
each port which contained the names of all workers who were recommended to be 
registered by the Port Employers Association (PEA). The Act also specified that 
union membership was required in order for a worker to be registered, and it 
granted preference to registered workers. Furthermore it stipulated that the PEA, 
together with the local Port Conciliation Committees (PC C), had the right to 
recommend that a worker's name be removed from the bureau register. Similarly 
workers had the right to appeal deregistration to their local PCC. The right of 
union officials to inspect the bureau register at each port was granted and the 
officers of the Commission had the reciprocal right to inspect the register of 
members kept by each local union. 
The concomitant of the state-regulated occupational registration system was the 
legal regulation of industrial relations. Most significantly, the Act placed the 
practice of industrial relations outside of the mainstream arbitration system by 
creating a 'mini arbitration system' specific to waterside workers and their 
employers. It should be noted, however, that other occupational groups on the 
waterfront (namely tally clerks, foremen-stevedores, and harbour workers) 
remained within the Arbitration system and subject to the rulings of the 
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Arbitration Court.2 Under the 1953 Act a specialized institutional framework was 
created to regulate collective bargaining and to resolve disputes. Within this 
framework, the port unions and Port Employers' Association were legally 
registered (albeit under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act), which 
required their commitment to conciliation and compulsory arbitration.3 In 
keeping with New Zealand's unique legally enforced national award system, the 
primary source of industrial regulation was a series of 'principal orders' issued by 
the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. 
The Waterfront Industry Tribunal was a specialist labour court that comprised a 
judge, who was appointed its Chairman, and two other members. As in the case of 
the Commission, the Tribunal's members were not required to be union or 
employer representatives. The principal functions of the Tribunal, as specified by 
the Act, were as follows. First, the Tribunal was charged with making, amending 
and interpreting the principal orders which governed the terms and conditions of 
employment of waterfront workers (s 11). Provision was made for the unions and 
the employers, either individually or collectively, to apply to the Tribunal for a 
principal order. Applications for individual ports were made through the local 
Port Conciliation Committee, but an application for two or more ports had to be 
made to the Tribunal directly which then referred it to the National Conciliation 
Committee (see below). The respective committees were charged with initiating 
conciliation proceedings. Provision was made for "orders by consent" to be made 
by the Tribunal when the union and employers in conciliation agreed in toto or in 
part on the provisions within a newly negotiated order. In the case of such orders 
the Tribunal was not required to exercise its arbitration function. Decisions and 
2 The fact that these groups were not subject to the Tribunal further illustrates that the bureau 
system, at it was originally conceived, was designed to 'regulate' one specific occupational group, 
namely watersiders. This arrangement remained in place until a revised form of the Waterfront 
Industry Act was enacted in 1976. The new Act brought the other three main occupational groups 
within the ambit of the Tribunal. This development will be addressed in Chapter 9. 
3 The features of this state-regulated system, which was unique to New Zealand, will be elaborated 
further in the discussion of industrial relations in Chapter 5. 
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orders of the Tribunal were legally binding on all waterfront employers and 
employees. In line with its arbitration function, the Tribunal was empowered to 
consider and lUle on "any disputes that arise in relation to waterside work" (s 10). 
The Waterfront Industry Act provided for local Port Conciliation Committees 
which were to consist "of an equal number of employers' and workers' 
representatives with an independent Chairman" (s 31 (1)). The employers' 
representatives were to be nominated by the PEA with the provision that at 
'railway ports' the Railways Department was entitled to nominate its own 
representative.4 Similarly the union representatives were nominated by the local 
union. The PCCs were given a number of legislatively prescribed functions apart 
from their role in conciliation proceedings and in resolving local disputes. Each 
pce was charged with ensuring an adequate supply of labour at its port, 
determining the number of registered workers at the port, and classifying 
waterside workers. Moreover, the Committees were required to "make and 
enforce bureau lUles for the engagement and penalizing of workers engaged 
through labour engagement bureaux" (s 32 (1)c). 
Insofar as the PCCs exercised, apart from a conciliation function, the 
administrative responsibility of formulating and enforcing lUles regarding the day-
to-day operation of ports, with regard to regulating the supply of labour and 
disciplining workers, a type of 'joint control' existed at the local port level. 
Decisions of the PCCs were made by majority vote. With equal numbers of union 
and employer representatives, the balance of power resided with the Chairman 
4 Railway ports usually had minimal or no access by road. At the time that the bureau system was 
established several ports were constituted as railway ports including two of the countries four major 
ports (the POli of Lyttelton and Port Chalmers). As a Commission ofInquiry into the role of the 
railways noted: "At railway ports ... the railways employ the wharf labour, haul goods from the 
wharf, sort the shipments, and finally deliver the goods to local carriers or the consignees" (Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Railways 1952:28). As a result of the recommendations of this 
investigation railway ports were abolished in 1955 and these functions returned to harbour boards, 
shipping companies, and stevedoring companies (Leitch and Stott 1988: 109-110). 
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who exercised a casting vote. Similarly, the National Conciliation Committee 
comprised eight employers' representatives and eight union representatives along 
with an independent Chairman. However, unlike the PCCs, this committee was 
charged solely with a conciliation function in relation to bargaining. 
The Waterfront Industry Tribunal was also responsible for determining appeals 
from decisions made by the National Amenities Committee and the National 
Conciliation Committee. Similarly, decisions made by the Port Conciliation 
Committees could be appealed to the Tribunal - with three notable exceptions. 
These were decisions regarding removing a worker from the bureau register, 
decisions on disputes over dirt money or head room (hence these aspects of 
workplace bargaining remained at the local level), and decisions concerning "any 
other dispute which the members of the Committee unanimously agree is of local 
significance only" (s 20 (2)a). Thus the powers of the Tribunal were limited in 
certain cases by the discretion at a local level of the PCCs. Finally, in "exercising 
its powers and functions" the Tribunal was given the brief of "promoting the 
efficiency of waterfront work" and of "ensuring the full and proper utilization of 
waterside labour for the purpose of facilitating the rapid and economical turn 
round of ships and the speedy transit of goods through ports" (s 10 (2)b). 
It is apparent from this summary that the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 created a 
complex legal framework which regulated the employment of labour on the 
waterfront. In the following sections I examine the main corporate actors on the 
side of employers and of watersiders that the Act constituted, and their respective 
organizational capacities. 
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(3) The Port Unions 
In this section I will examine how the port unions organized in the aftermath of the 
1951 dispute, within the parameters of the legislative framework established by 
the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. It is beyond the scope of this section to 
comprehensively deal with all of the issues of labour politics surrounding the port 
unions (their key personalities, political affiliations, union democracy and so f0l1h) 
and the representative organizations they formed. 5 Rather I will identify some 
specific organizational problems raised by the decentralized union form which 
was secured by law during the 1951 waterfront dispute. Given this structure, the 
primary tension that emerged was between organizing at the local level and 
organizing at the national level. 
To recap, the decentralized union structure formally recognized by the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1953 was a product of the 1951 dispute. The national Waterside 
Workers Union was deregistered by the Government in 1951 and 26 new port 
unions registered in its place. As Bassett (1972: 189) notes, these unions were 
"padded to varying degrees with members who had never before had experience of 
waterfront work." The deregistration of the national union meant that all 
watersiders were themselves 'deregistered'. Roth (1973:80) incisively observes 
that: "Deregistration had been the Government's main weapon in breaking the 
recalcitrant unions, but it was compUlsory membership which made this weapon 
really effective because it forced the deregistered members to join the new 
Government-approved unions." Furthermore, the Government granted the 
employers the exclusive right to select new recruits to fill the 'empty vessels' that 
5 To some extent, these issues have been documented by Meade (1980). I will draw on aspects of 
her account of union politics, which focuses predominantly upon the years 1951-53. More 
generally, unofficial and political groups within the unions were insignificant with respect to the 
pattern of indutrial relations which developed in the time-period covered in the thesis. 
Consequently, although at various points I examine relationships between the rank-and-file and the 
unions, a detailed discussion of these groups is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
Percent 
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were the new unions. 6 Consequently, many deregistered watersiders (particularly 
those who had previously been union officials) were systematically excluded by 
the employers from joining the new unions. In short, they were expelled from the 
industry. 
The level of discriminatory preferential hiring varied between ports. Overall, 
Graph 3.1 7 indicates the proportion of deregistered watersiders who were able to 
join each of the new port unions that were registered in 1951. For example, at 
Auckland the waterfront employers were successful in excluding most of the 
deregistered watersiders. There was also a preponderance of 'new unionists' (as 
they were called) at the ports of Oamaru, Picton, Napier, Gisbome and Dunedin. 
At other ports (such as Lyttelton, Nelson and Bluff) the membership was divided 
between deregistered watersiders and new unionists. However, at the ports of 
Timaru, Port Chalmers and New Plymouth, the membership of each union 
remained largely intact. And at the small ports of Greymouth and Westport, on 
the West Coast of the South Island, the membership was entirely comprised of 
deregistered watersiders (see Roth 1973:81). The situation at Wellington was 
somewhat more complex, where there were two unions: one dominated by 
deregistered watersiders and the other by new unionists. 8 
The creation of this type of union resulted in the emergence of a distinct set of 
organizational dynamics and tensions. The most salient tension at ports with 
6 This arrangement was formalized after the 1951 dispute by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 
which granted formal control over recruitment to the Port Employers Association. Because 
compulsory unionism was extended to the waterfront under s 28 of the Act, whereby all registered 
watersiders had to join their local union, employers effectively had control over the composition of 
the port unions. 
7 Data sources for all graphs are presented in Appendix Two. 
S As Roth (1973:103) explains, "During the 1951 waterfront dispute a Wellington Waterfront 
Workers' Union was registered to take the place of the deregistered union whose members had 
ceased work. When the old watersiders returned to work and gained the upper hand in this union, 
the new men walked out and formed a second organization, the Wellington Maritime Cargo 
Workers' (Permanent) Union which was also granted registration. This dual unionism persisted on 
the Wellington waterfront until the two organizations amalgamated in 1955." 
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'mixed' memberships was between 'new' unionists and 'old' unionists for control 
of the union. At ports like Auckland, by sheer force of numbers the dominance of 
new unionists within the local union was assured (see Roth 1993:160). Similarly 
within the unions where deregistered water siders predominated (such as New 
Plymouth, Timaru and Port Chalmers), members from their ranks typically 
ascended to positions of leadership. Although the outcome was not so clear-cut at 
ports where the union membership was bifurcated, at many of these the 
deregistered men won out. For example, at the Port of Lyttelton deregistered 
watersiders regained leadership positions within the local union almost 
immediately (see Norris 1980:158-167). 
Even at the Port of Wellington, where the two groups were divided into separate 
unions, deregistered watersiders were able to gain the upper hand.9 In 1954, at a 
time of labour shortages, 248 watersiders were allowed to transfer across from the 
local Waterfront Workers Union to the Maritime Cargo Workers Union (Meade 
180:134). These watersiders were later described by the President of the North 
Island Federation as doing the "work of educating the industrially uneducated."lo 
The two unions subsequently amalgamated in 1955. 
Coupled with the tensions between new and old unionists, the Government's 
establishment, by legal means, of this decentralized type of union form had 
important consequences for developments in the post-1953 period. It resulted in 
very different types of unions, both large and small, some controlled by 
deregistered watersiders, and others where the 'new unionists' held sway. These 
differences, in turn, generated tensions over organizing at a national level in the 
context of each union having local autonomy. 
9 Meade (1980: 107 -36) provides a detailed account of how the amalgamation between the two 
union in 1955 was achieved. 
to Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 6/11/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/15 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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It must be emphasized that, although the port unions had been created as a strike-
breaking tactic by the Government during the 1951 dispute, there was no legal 
barrier to them forming a genuinely 'national' organization. Indeed, shortly after 
the dispute ended there were moves by some of the port unions to form a new 
national organization. A New Zealand Association of Watersiders was formed in 
August 1951. However, the Association's founding members were port unions 
where 'new unionists' dominated (Auckland, Dunedin, Bluff, Gisborne and 
Napier), and consequently it was not recognized by unions such as Lyttelton and 
Port Chalmers which were controlled by deregistered watersiders (Meade 
1980:61). The incipient national organization subsequently fell apart under the 
strain of this division. 
Two regionally based federations of port unions were then formed in 1952: the 
North Island Waterfront Workers Industrial Association and the South Island 
Waterside Workers Federation. l1 The union executive at the Port of Lyttelton, 
with the cooperation of the unions at the ports of Timaru, Westport, Greymouth 
and Oamaru, was the catalyst for forming the South Island Federation (see Meade 
1980:64-8). The North Island Federation, on the other hand, was formed by the 
Auckland Union in concert with the 'casual' union at Wellington which was 
controlled by deregistered watersiders (see Meade 1980: 80-2).l2 By 1953, these 
federations incorporated the majority of the port unions.13 A 'joint conference' of 
the two Federations was held in 1952 where the decision was made to establish a 
11 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these organizations as the 'North Island Federation' and 
the 'South Island Federation'. 
12 It is important to note that, in the interim, the Auckland Union had undergone a change in its 
leadership. Although it was still dominated by new unionists, the former individuals on the 
executive who were entirely hostile to the deregistered watersiders were replaced by a more 
moderate group (see Roth 1993:149-57). 
13 The North Island Federation comprised the unions at the following ports: Auckland, Napier, New 
Plymouth, Wanganui, Awanui, Opotiki, Gisborne, Wellington, and Whangarei. The South Island 
Federation comprised the unions at the ports of Lyttelton, Timam, Oamam, Port Chalmers, 
Dunedin, Bluff, Greymouth, Westport, Nelson, and Motueka. 
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'Joint Council' made up of four representatives of each Federation. 14 Through 
this forum the Federations' representatives consulted on matters of importance, 
particularly with a view towards cooperating in order to bargain at the national 
level with the Port Employers Association (see Chapter 5). 
Under this organizational structure the port unions retained local autonomy with 
respect to decision-making and action, tempered only by the broad policy 
guidelines of their respective Federation. In this sense, the Federations were very 
much driven 'from below' by the port unions. The unions were decentralized, 
local actors organized around exclusive registers at the port level. Under the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1953 they were granted formal 'joint control' over 
register strengths and the making of bureau rules (although, significantly, not over 
recruitment). Together with this organizational structure, the port unions were 
formally empowered as actors within the realm of industrial relations and were 
fully able to enter into negotiations and agreements with individual employers 
and/or the Port Employers Association. 
In the context of diverse types of unions (some dominated by 'new' unionists and 
some by 'old' unionists), this union autonomy posed a number of problems for the 
new federations. There was a constant threat of a union 'breaking away' and 
negotiating its own industrial agreement with the employers at a port. Indeed in 
1953 the Picton Union (which was replete with new unionists) did just that. It 
withdrew from the South Island Federation, negotiated a port-specific agreement 
with the employers, and refused to ratify the new national agreement which had 
been negotiated that year (see Chapter 5). The case of the Picton Union 
disaffiliating from the South Island Federation illustrates the fragile unity of the 
14 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 25/11/52. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Federations which resulted from a dynamic tension between centralized and 
decentralized forms of organization and modes of action. 
The tension between the national bodies and the local port unions was largely 
submerged in their dealings with the Port Employers Association during the late 
1950s and for much of the 1960s (see Chapter 5). However this tension was 
clearly evident within each of the Federations during this period. It manifested 
itself in the problem of how to organize nationally, in the context of a split 
between the larger and more militant port unions which sought to establish a 
national organization, and the smaller and more conservative unions which did 
not. 
These tensions, which centered on forming a national organization, were 
intertwined with the relative influence of certain types of unions within each 
Federation. Within the North Island Federation the largest unions were those of 
Auckland and Wellington, and in the late 1950s they emerged as the more militant 
ones. In the case of the Wellington Union this militancy was not unusual insofar 
as it was replete with deregistered watersiders (who had taken control of the union 
which had been established by new unionists). The Auckland Union, however, 
had been almost completely devoid of deregistered watersiders within its 
membership. As the Secretary of the union, Eddie Isbey, was later to comment: 
There were not the old hand in the membership who had a 
knowledge of the industry and of unionism in the days gone by, and 
this as a matter of course had an effect on the organization in its 
early stages. is 
Roth (1993), in his history of the Auckland Union, provides a good account of the 
way that this union was systematically 'rebuilt' during the 1950s. Very rapidly 
15 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 29/11160. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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there emerged within the union's ranks a 'new guard' of left-leaning militant 
watersiders, amongst whom was Eddie Isbey, who ascended to executive positions 
within the Union. 16 This process was consolidated when Isbey became the union 
president in 1956. Indeed the Port Employers Association was moved to remark 
in its 1958 Annual Report that he had "triumphed over the more moderate 
element.,,17 The Auckland Union was one of the first of the port unions to 
threaten strike action after the 1951 dispute, and alongside Wellington it became 
one of the country's more militant unions in the late 1950s (see Roth 1993:165-9). 
The Auckland and Wellington unions quickly came to exercise a considerable 
degree of influence within the North Island Federation. Its executive officers were 
largely drawn from these unions: Jim Napier, a member of the Auckland Union, 
was the General Secretary of the Federation from 1953-67, and Eddie Isbey (the 
President of the Auckland Union from 1956-60 and 1961-68) became the 
President of the Federation in 1957 (Roth 1993:167). Overall, the North Island 
Federation was more militant than the South Island Federation, and from very 
early on it had sought to amalgamate with the South Island Federation in order to 
create a national organization. 
The South Island Federation, on the other hand, was somewhat different in 
composition and outlook. This Federation was led by Jim Roberts, a former 
national secretary of the deregistered Waterside Workers Union (see Roth 
1973:82).18 The 1957 Port Employers Association Report stated that "The South 
Island Federation appears to be mainly held together by loyalty to the reputation of 
16 Roth notes that "Isbey, a London-born merchant seaman, had worked on the Sydney waterfi'ont 
before starting on the Auckland wharf in 1954. In the same year he joined the Labour Party. A 
year later he was elected to the union executive, in May 1956 he was elected vicepresident and in 
July, when [Bill] Hooker resigned, he succeeded him as president" (1993: 166). 
17NZPEA Report (1958:30). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
18 Roberts ceased to be the Union's General Secretary in 1942 shortly after he was appointed to the 
Waterfront Control Commission, the war-time predecessor to the Waterfront Industry Commission 
(see Roth 1973:79-84). 
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Mr 1. Roberts." 19 Although this comment undoubtedly oversimplifies the 
structure of the Federation, it does indicate the centrality of Roberts as its general 
secretary. 
The largest union within the South Island Federation, at the Port of Lyttelton, had 
been instrumental in forming the Federation and was controlled by deregistered 
watersiders who almost immediately looked to the formation of a national 
organization (see Meade 1980:151-6). However the South Island Federation also 
comprised a number of smaller unions that were more conservative in outlook 
(such as Oamaru and Nelson) and opposed the formation of a national 
organization. Paradoxically a number of these unions (such as Westport, 
Greymouth, and Timaru) had retained the bulk of their former membership 
(deregistered watersiders, that is) after the 1951 dispute. But it was precisely 
because they had that led them to be suspicious of moves to form a national 
organization. There was a concern amongst the members of the smaller South 
Island unions, which stemmed from their experience in the 1951 dispute, that such 
an organization might be dominated by the larger North Island unions of Auckland 
and Wellington. As Meade notes (1980:152), many members of the smaller South 
Island unions regarded the larger branches of the former national union (invariably 
Auckland and Wellington) as having dominated the Union, and as having drawn 
them into the fray in 1951. 
This type of sentiment was expressed frequently at the annual conferences of the 
South Island Federation during the 1950s. For example, in response to a remit 
presented to the 1954 Conference by the Lyttelton Union, that proposals be 
formulated regarding the formation of a national organization, an Oamaru Union 
representative (A. McKay) stated: 
19NZPEA Report (1957:4). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
the Oamaru Waterside Workers were definitely opposed to 
association with the North Island .... They were afraid of 
domination by the North Island unions again.2o 
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The majority of unions in the South Island Federation were wary of a national 
organization, and most definitely opposed to a national union as such. Although 
Jim Roberts favoured a national organization, he himself had been scathingly 
critical of the actions of the deregistered Union's leadership during the 1951 
dispute and was circumspect about attempts to establish a national organization 
given the view of the majority of South Island unions. Similarly the President of 
the Federation from 1952 until 1962, Paddy Weith, had been "the champion of the 
rights of the smaller branches" while the Secretary of the Waterside Workers 
Union's Timaru branch prior to 1951, and he was equally wary about forming a 
new national organization (Meade 1980:153). 
In terms of the particular character of 'union politics' at this time, apart from the 
contest between deregistered watersiders and the 'new unionists' within the port 
unions, the over-riding issue was the problem of how to organize nationally. The 
principal split was between the North Island Federation, supported by the 
Lyttelton Union, which sought to establish a national organization, and the smaller 
and more conservative unions within the South Island Federation. 
At the North Island Federation's Conference in 1956 a remit was passed that 
supported the formation of a national federation?l Throughout the rest of the 
1950s the North Island Federation, together with the Lyttelton Union, pushed for 
amalgamation with the South Island Federation. But because of the opposition of 
the majority of the port unions in the South Island this did not occur. Yet it must 
20 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 4/12/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
21 Ibid. 
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be emphasized that alongside these failed attempts by the North Island Federation 
and the Lyttelton Union to effect a union between the two Federations, through 
their Joint Council the Federations cooperated in bargaining with the Port 
Employers Association to good effect (see Chapter 5). Thus these 'internal' 
divisions did not manifest themselves 'externally' in the relationships of the 
federations with the employers. That this cooperation between the Federations did 
not result in them amalgamating was to the consternation of the North Island 
Federation's national officials. President Eddie Isbey, who was invited to address 
a South Island Federation conference in 1960, stated that: 
It is strange but true that on all questions of national importance the 
South Island representatives and ourselves have moved together 
jointly whether it has been meeting the Employers, the 
Government, the Commission or the Tribunal, yet when it comes to 
the logical follow through of one organization there seems to be a 
b · h 22 arner somew ere. 
When a ballot of the members of the South Island Federation was held in 1964, 
the result was 429 in favour and 889 against amalgamating with the North Island 
Federation.23 This demonstrates that opposition to amalgamation overwhelmingly 
came from the rank and file. Nonetheless, the situation differed between unions. 
For example, the Lyttelton Union had held ballots of its own in 1954, 1956 and 
1962 which each time had supported the creation of a single federation of port 
unions (Meade 1980:155). Similarly, the Greymouth and Port Chalmers unions 
supported amalgamation (ibid: 166). 
The development which finally led to the formation of a national organization was 
the secession of two unions, Lyttelton and Port Chalmers, from the South Island 
22 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 2/2/60. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
23 South Island Federation Executive Circular, 17/7/64. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 1/15 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Federation to the North Island Federation. The Lyttelton Union resigned from the 
South Island Federation after the ballot of its members in 1962 which supported 
joining the North Island Federation (Norris 1980:192). The Union then sent 
delegates as observers to this Federation's annual conference in 1962, and 
increasingly aligned itself with the Federation's policies. It was formally accepted 
into the North Island Federation in 1964. The secession of the Lyttelton Union 
coincided with the retirement of Jim Roberts from his position as the South Island 
Federation's general secretary (ibid: 193). 
The secession of the POli Chalmers Union from the South Island Federation after a 
ballot of its members in 1966, together with the Dunedin Union's threat to follow 
suit, led the remaining unions to consider amalgamating with the North Island 
Federation (see Meade 1980:166-71). At the South Island Federation conference 
in 1966 a remit was passed to the effect that amalgamation with the North Island 
Federation should occur, and as a result the united Waterside Workers Federation 
was formed in January 1967. Within the new Federation, representatives of North 
Island unions were elected to the positions of general secretary, assistant general 
secretary and president, and they also occupied half of the positions on the 
executive (ibid:170-1). 
It must be emphasized that the national organization formed by the port unions in 
1967 was a federation, and not a national union as such. Consequently, within 
this organization the port unions retained their local autonomy. Together with 
their continued recognition as key actors by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, this 
autonomy continued to be a potential threat to national unity. As the case of the 
Picton Union demonstrates, there was always the possibility that a union would 
break ranks, either in industrial action or in bargaining, and 'go it alone'. As I will 
demonstrate in Chapter 5, that is what occurred in 1970; however at this time it 
was not a small and conservative union that acted independently, but rather the 
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two most numerically significant unions. The militant Auckland and Wellington 
unions, which had previously been central to the North Island Federation, posed a 
potentially explosive threat to unity within the Federation. The tension between 
centralization and decentralization therefore continued to be an important dynamic 
within the new national organization. 
(4) The Port Employers Association 
In this section, I examine how the waterfront employers were organized. As in the 
preceding discussion, I will deal with the manner in which the organizational 
capacities of the employers were influenced by the framework of legal regulation. 
Contra Offe and Wiesenthal (1980), who argue that it is 'natural' for capital to 
organize (and indeed more natural than for labour to do so) because of a 
homogeneity of interests at the economic level, I will demonstrate that there was a 
fundamental cleft within the employers' organization which did pose 
organizational problems for the employers. These problems, while not as acute, 
were comparable to those faced by the watersiders' Federations. As Kimeldorf 
(1988:79) notes, in a similar analysis of how waterfront employers organized on 
each of America's seaboards, "capital's own organizational capacities, like 
labor's, are far from absolute." 
In a sense, the legislative framework established by the Waterfront IndustlY Act 
1953 required the existence of an employers' organization, which it constituted as 
a key corporate actor. In the realm of employment relations the system of 
occupational registration removed from individual firms the right to make 
decisions about the composition and size of the labour supply at the port level, and 
instead conferred this right upon the employers' organization. Collectively, the 
employers also had an interest in forming a united organization in order to 
exercise disciplinary control over individual firms, which were empowered by the 
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Act to negotiate with the POlt unions within the sphere of industrial relations. 
Similarly, insofar as the Act provided for bargaining at the national level, which 
the watersiders' Federations readily sought to effect, the employers organized at 
this level in order to 'mirror' the approach of their counterpart. 
This legal framework meant that individual employers, while competing at an 
economic level, had to cooperate within a representative organization. The term 
coined by Gospel (1992) for this mode of organization, wherein employers' 
organizations are formed and act on behalf of individual employers, is 
'externalization'. Whereas Gospel coined this term to analyse developments in 
employer strategy in Britain, on the waterfront in New Zealand an 'externalized' 
form of organization was not merely the result of a freely formed employer 
strategy. Rather this term is a useful 'shorthand' way of describing the 
arrangements that resulted from legal regulation, which necessitated the existence 
of an employers' organization.24 
Although a 'summit' organization on the employers' side was, in this sense, 
produced by the system of legal regulation, the one that was recognized by the Act 
(the Port Employers Association) had been formed several years earlier in 1949.25 
Unlike the summit organizations that the port unions formed (which were two 
loosely knit federations linked via a 'joint council'), the Port Employers 
Association was a centralized national organization whose branches at the port 
level had only a modicum of local autonomy. While membership of the 
Association was not compulsory, in practice the majority of waterfront employers 
in the 1950s and 1960s were members. 
24 For a discussion (on a broader scale) of the effects of the legal regulation of industrial relations 
upon employer organizations in New Zealand, see Brosnan et al. (1990:128-58). 
25 Until that time, the waterfront employers had been represented by the Waterside Employers 
Association which had been formed in 1925 (see Green 1992: 103). The Port Employers 
Association assumed the functions of this latter organization. 
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The Port Employers Association was directed from the national level by an elected 
'Management Committee' which comprised nine elected representatives of its 
member companies, along with a general secretary appointed by these 
representatives. The Association had branches at the port level that were managed 
by a branch committee, a chairman, and a branch secretary. Like the general 
secretary, the branch secretaries were employed (at the larger ports on a full-time 
basis) by the Association. The local branch committees comprised representatives 
of the firms that were members of the Association at each port. In the 1950s, the 
number of members of the PEA at the port level ranged from 18 at the port of 
Auckland to just two at the minor port of Westport. In general, the main 
employers within each port were represented on the branch committee. However, 
insofar as the maximum number of representatives on branch committees was 
nine, at the larger ports like Auckland not all of the Association's members were 
represented during the 1950s.26 
Although the Port Employers Association was a national organization that was 
centrally administered, it was fundamentally divided between two separate 
'interest groups'. The lines of division within the Association corresponded with 
the main types of companies that were involved in stevedoring.27 On the one 
hand, there were large overseas shipping companies which carried out their own 
stevedoring (either through their own stevedoring department or through 
subsidiary stevedoring companies). Of these, the largest was the Union Steam 
Ship Company, followed by the four British Conference Lines (Shaw Savill and 
Albion, Port Line, Blue Star and the New Zealand Shipping Company). The 
coastal shipping companies, many of which also carried out their own stevedoring, 
26 Because of the number of employers at the port of Auckland, the size of the branch committee 
was increased to 12 in 1964 at the PEA's Annual General Meeting. Minutes of Port Employers 
Association Annual General Meeting, 16/10/64. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 
203 (Alexander Turnbull Librmy, NLNZ). 
27 Insofar as Chapter 8 is devoted to an analysis of the companies that were involved in stevedoring, 
in this section I will only provided a brief outline of the main company types. 
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constituted the second set of interests. The third type of company, that of 
'independent' stevedoring companies, was confined to small, locally based 
companies that operated at just one or two ports (see Chapter 8). 
Insofar as the 'independent' stevedoring companies were not a major force at this 
point, the principal split within the Port Employers Association, throughout the 
1950s and much of the 1960s, was between the two different groups of shipping 
companies. The large shipping companies were grouped into the Overseas 
Shipowners Committee, while the coastal shipping companies were represented by 
the New Zealand Shipowners Federation. Thus the PEA was itself largely 
composed of representatives of two different organizations that represented 
shipping companies. This structure was reflected in the composition of the 
Association's Management Committee during the 1950s and 1960s.28 
In some respects, the interests of these two main groups within the PEA differed 
substantially. The minutes of Management Committee meetings show that the 
Committee spent a considerable amount of its time resolving differences which 
emerged between these groups at the port level. F or example, a dispute that 
frequently arose between the two groups was whether overseas vessels or coastal 
vessels should have priority in the allocation of labour at times of labour 
shortages.29 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s numerous disputes of this type 
were referred to the Management Committee to resolve. Similarly, inter-firm 
28 In 1957 the Management Committee comprised two representatives of the Union Steam Ship 
Company, one representative of each of the British Conference Lines, and one representative of the 
Federal Steam Navigation Company, Anchor Shipping and Richardson and Company (these latter 
being two of larger coastal shipping companies). In 1963 the Management Committee was 
essentially the same, except that the representative of Richardson and Company had been replaced 
by a member of the Canterbury Steamship Company which, once again, was one of the larger 
coastal companies. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull 
Library, NLNZ). 
29 These differences were given a full airing at the PEA Management Committee Meeting 314, 
18/7/62. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 202 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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disputes over the availability of cranes and other cargo-handling equipment were 
frequently dealt with by the Committee. 
As well as attempting to resolve the inter-firm disputes between "the overseas 
interests" and "the coastal interests" (as the minutes of Committee meetings 
frequently referred to them), the Management Committee also had to deal with 
differences between these groups regarding their relationship with labour. For 
example, the Committee was required to resolve differences over the terms and 
conditions that each groups believed should be sought in national bargaining, and 
the types of concessions that should be made.30 The Management Committee also 
established policy regarding how the local branches of the PEA, and individual 
firms, should handle disputes which occurred at the local port level. Often entire 
Committee meetings would be taken up with this issue, and in some cases 
meetings were specially convened to deal with a particular dispute. 
Apart from reconciling the differences of interest which resulted from this cleft 
within the organization, the PEA Management Committee, like the union 
Federations, also had to deal with the problem of controlling its individual 
members within the realm of industrial relations. Within employment relations, 
insofar as individual firms were not constituted as actors they were required to 
'externalize' their decision-making regarding the labour supply to the local branch 
of the Association. Thus firms could only influence decisions in this area by 
attempting to shape the policy of the Association. However within industrial 
relations the Act empowered individual firms to negotiate industrial agreements 
with port unions, which the Association could only control by exerting pressure on 
30 For example, in the national bargaining round in 1967 a difference of opinion emerged between 
the two groups. The New Zealand Shipowners Federation representatives argued that a wage 
increase should be offered, whereas the Overseas Shipowners maintained that the matter should be 
submitted to arbitration. In this case, the Management Committee decided to offer the wage 
increase. Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 414, 20/4/67. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
64 
its members to adhere to its policy in this area. The policy was that the 
Management Committee had to consent to any such negotiations. Consequently, 
as I explain in Chapter 5, the balance between national bargaining and local 
bargaining was somewhat fragile, and was dependent on the organizational 
capacities both of the PEA (together with those of the Federations) to keep their 
members 'in line'. 
In this area the Association's task was complicated by the fact that firms were not 
required to join it. However the Association had considerable success at drawing 
in companies, because of the resources at its disposal (particularly with respect to 
representation). Once firms became members, the Association then sought to hold 
them to its policy. Dillingham Transportation Ltd (an owner and operator of tugs 
and barges), which applied to join the Association in 1967, is a case in point. An 
excerpt from the minutes of a Management Committee meeting illustrates the 
point: 
It would certainly be of advantage for the Company to be a member 
of the Association because the Association had already, to some 
extent, been adversely affected by agreements made by the 
Company with waterside workers without reference to the 
Association.3l 
Like the watersiders' Federations, then, the employers' summit organization was 
internally divided and it faced the familiar problem of how to exercise disciplinary 
control over its membership. There is no doubt that some employers regarded this 
'externalized' mode of organization, and the Port Employers Association itself, as 
much as a source of constraint as enablement in their relationships with waterfront 
labour. A comment by a former manager of a stevedoring company succinctly 
expresses this view: 
31 Minutes of Port Employers Association Management Committee Meeting 427, 15/l1/67. Port 
Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
It was a terrible setup, really. You had the Port Employers 
Association which I always referred to as the Port Destroyers .... 
There were countless committees. Every port had its own Port 
Employers Association at the branch level. . . . Then you had a 
Management Committee in Wellington, and then that had about six 
committees springing off that. And you spent your whole day, your 
whole working life virtually, going to meetings in Wellington. 
Everybody ran to Wellington. And it was a very top heavy thing. 
(Interview) 
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However, like the union Federations in another respect, these differences were 
largely able to be resolved internally throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Association had a considerable degree of success throughout most of this 
period in reconciling the divergent interests of its two main groups, and in 
coordinating at a national level the actions of its members. 
Employer disunity only began to emerge in the lead-up to containerization in the 
late 1960s. The split between the two main interest groups within the PEA was 
kept largely under control until the late 1960s, when the introduction of container 
technology was being contemplated. At that time, tensions between the overseas 
interests and the coastal interests began to surface increasingly frequently, 
particularly over the differences in the terms and conditions that each of these 
interest groups wanted the PEA to pursue in national negotiations with the 
Federations. For example, the Overseas Shipowners sought to introduce shiftwork 
but the coastal shipping companies opposed this move (see Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, the divisions within the Port Employers Association were 
exacerbated by the emergence of new sets of actors and interests on the 
employers' side (see Chapter 8). Whereas, previously, shipping companies (albeit 
of two different types) controlled stevedoring and the PEA, this pattern changed in 
the late 1960s. As the 'independent' stevedoring companies grew in size and 
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importance they came to constitute a distinct set of interests, of some influence, 
within the PEA. As early as 1965 Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores, a 
stevedoring company based at the Port of Tauranga, threatened to break with the 
Association and establish a separate organization to represent stevedoring 
companies.32 Although such an organization was not formed until 1978 (see 
Chapter 9), the actions of this latter company were indicative of a new sets of 
tensions which began to emerge within the PEA, as new types of firms entered the 
scene prior to and during the shift to containerization. 
Indeed the composition of the Port Employers' Association changed over time as 
new corporate actors emerged in the late 1960s. The principal split between the 
overseas and coastal shipowners, although it still existed within the organization, 
gave way to a different intricate set of divisions which centered particularly on a 
cleft between the shipping companies (both overseas and coastal) and the 
stevedoring compames. Furthermore, the PEA increasingly became 
unrepresentative of the main types of firms that operated within the industry, 
which resulted in the formation of a new employers' organization. As I will 
demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the resulting differentiation of actors and 
interests began to undermine the organizational capacity of the employers as a 
'bloc'. 
(5) Conclusion 
In this chapter I outlined the provisions of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, 
identified the key actors which were constituted by it on the sides of capital and 
labour, and the respective organizational capacities of these actors which 
developed within the context of this framework of legal regulation. This 
32 Minutes of Port Employers Association Management Committee Meeting 371, 20/1/65. Port 
Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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discussion serves as a precursor to examining how the power relations between the 
key actors developed within the spheres of employment relations, industrial 
relations and work relations. 
Although the employers' and unions' summit organizations were divided 
internally, these divisions were largely subordinated in their dealings with each 
other. But despite this 'united front', their respective organizational capacities 
ebbed and flowed in this period. The unions rebuilt their national organization 
during the 1960s but, as we shall see, this faltered in 1970. The decisive factor in 
the instability which emerged in 1970 was the resources that the legal framework 
made available to individual unions (see Chapter 5). The employers, on the other 
hand, already had a national organization. However it too contained divisions, 
which became exacerbated in the late 1960s. 
In a sense, then, the following three chapters are a chronicle of a dynamic of 
increasing union control and, towards the end of the period examined (in the late 
1960s), the emergence of a persistent source of employer disunity that was to 
become a principal cause of weakness in the 1970s. In subsequent chapters I will 
demonstrate that, whereas the Waterside Workers Federation was able to resolve 
the internal divisions which became manifest in 1970, the Port Employers 
Association was not able to do so; in each case the level of 'internal strength' of 
each of these corporate actors decisively impacted upon their 'external strength' 
(Fox and Flanders 1969:155). 
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CHAPTER 4 : EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 1953-1971 
(1) Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the pattern of power relations that developed within the 
labour market (or the sphere of 'employment relations', as I have labelled it) 
between the key institutional actors that were constituted by the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1953. The analysis centers on identifying the degree of control that 
each of these actors, respectively the port unions and the Port Employers 
Association, were able to exert over various facets of the labour supply during the 
years from 1953 until 1971. 
In the analysis I draw on a model developed by Fligstein and Fernandez, who 
suggest that "labor markets are organized systems of conflict" (1988:23). In this 
view, the organization of the labour market is an outcome of the power relations 
between the key actors within it. In turn, this outcome is based on the resources 
that the key actors can secure control of, and hence their "relative power". Taking 
this approach as my point of departure, I identify the effects of the system of 
labour administration, which secured the labour market by institutionalizing an 
occupational registration system. This system, in turn, created a series of local 
labour markets that were organized around exclusive registers at the port level. I 
examine how the occupational registration system shaped the pattern of power 
relations which emerged within the labour market. These outcomes were 
contingent, insofar as they were dependent on the strategies of the collective 
actors, the institutional framework that they were subject to, and the "power 
resources" (Batstone 1988:223) that they were able to gain control of within the 
labour market. 
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The chapter begins with some preliminary observations about the waterfront 
labour market. It then shifts to identify the relative control of the key actors over 
each of three aspects of the labour supply: recruitment, workforce size, and work 
allocation. I end the chapter with some analytical observations about the structure 
of the labour market. 
(2) The Organization of the Labour Market: Preliminary Observations 
Institutional labour markets create truly noncompeting groups. 
Markets are more specifically delimited, and entrance into them, 
movement within them and exit from them more precisely defined. 
Such labour markets find their definition not in the composite of 
individual preferences but in precise rules. 'Natural' frictions are 
replaced by institutional ones; the free and ignorant man by the 
exclusive and knowledgeable group. 
Clark Kerr (1954:193) 
The bureau system of labour administration, in effect, created an institutional 
labour market regulated by a set of formal rules and procedures. Insofar as this 
system was based on the principle of labour registration, some brief comments on 
the properties of registers are warranted. In the abstract, a register functions as a 
record that is used to, or assists in, the classification of individuals. In carrying 
out this task registers can take the form of passive records (as files or lists) or they 
can be actively used as administrative mechanisms to carry out organizational 
tasks. Furthermore, registers can be differentiated according to whether they are 
inclusive or exclusive in nature. Craft unions, for instance, operate as exclusive 
organizations that use registers in order to secure skill. Conversely, inclusive 
registers are often established to facilitate the testing and treatment of some 
medical conditions. Although the abstract characteristics of registers can be 
identified, registers do not exist in the abstract. Exactly how a register is used 
(whether actively or passively, inclusively or exclusively) is not predetermined, 
but rather depends on how the register is instantiated in a specific context. 
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The bureau system of labour administration constituted a series of local labour 
markets within specified geographical limits that were organized around exclusive 
registers. To use a term coined by Parkin (1979:45), in his systematic reworking 
of Weber's concepts, this system resulted in a form of "exclusionary closure" 
within waterfront labour markets. The state granted waterfront workers the status 
of a "legally privileged group" (Weber 1968:342) which afforded them permanent 
status in the labour market, and by linking registration to union membership the 
Waterside Workers Union secured a state-sanctioned "legal monopoly."l By 
establishing a registration scheme which systematically closed the labour market 
to 'outsiders' (to invoke another of Weber's metaphors), the bureau system shaped 
the power relations between the key actors. 
Within this labour market the traditional rights of firms qua employers were 
abrogated which had the effect of 'decentering' individual firms as significant 
actors in the labour market. Competing firms were forced to cooperate through 
the local Port Employers Association and to 'externalize' decisions over the 
supply of labour (which under normal circumstances they would control) to this 
organization. Management strategy in relation to the labour supply was therefore 
developed at the level of the port (through the PEA), rather than the firm. Firm 
size was eliminated as a significant variable in the organization of the labour 
market: large companies (such as the Union Steam Ship Company) and smaller 
companies (such as the Canterbury Steamship Company) coexisted in ports and 
were represented on the local branch of Port Employers Association. 
Consequently the "key actor" in the labour market, on the employers' side, became 
the employers' organization. Similarly, with respect to waterside workers, the 
1 In Economy and Society Weber writes of ''jointly acting competitors ... [who] form an 'interest 
group' toward outsiders" which, over time, may become a "legally privileged group" to which 
belong "privileged members" (1968:342). 
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"key actors" in the realm of employment relations were the port unions, rather 
than their respective federations or the workers themselves. 
The waterfront labour market, therefore, was organized around the legally defined 
'occupation', rather than around firms, taking a "labour-market-wide 
'occupational' form" (Stinchcombe 1990:262), albeit based at the local port level. 
However the power relations between the key actors did not automatically flow 
from the mere fact of the labour market being 'closed' in this manner. Rather they 
crystallized over time within the broad limits circumscribed by the registration 
system. Thus it is necessary to identify the primary power resources with respect 
to the labour supply that were struggled over within this system. 
Although registers are mentioned in most studies of the waterfront (e.g. Jensen 
1964; Evans 1969; Finlay 1988), the discussion is by and large restricted to their 
role in decasualizing waterfront labour. Rarely are registers examined as a 
specific type of organizational 'tool' or administrative mechanism used to manage 
and regulate the supply of labour. Indeed the more sophisticated sociological 
literature on occupational registration is almost entirely limited to studies of 
professions (for instance, see Macdonald 1985; Witz 1992). A strength of authors 
within this field is precisely that they examine registers as 'contested sites'. But 
the fact that the literature on waterfront labour markets does not typically consider 
registers in this manner is, at least in part, a result of the distinctive features of 
some waterfront registration systems. For example, within the 'hiring hall' system 
on the West Coast of the United States, in which the union itself took the labour 
supply out of competition, registers are not 'contested' to the degree that they are 
within many professional labour markets (or, for that matter, within the bureau 
system in New Zealand). 
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The role of unions in regulating the labour supply in the American setting is not 
unique to the waterfront. Fligstein and Fernandez's (1988) model of labour 
market structure, which implicitly informs the approach I have adopted in this 
chapter, can be briefly used to highlight the distinctive features of New Zealand's 
state-sponsored system. Fligstein and Fernandez identify certain American craft 
industries (such as construction) as being characterized by 'worker-controlled' 
labour markets. Within these 'craft type' of labour markets the unions take the 
labour supply out of competition by controlling hiring and labour allocation. 
Within these labour markets recruitment and certification (or registration) and the 
allocation of workers to jobs are intertwined in that they are regulated by the 
union. Hence these authors can write unproblematically about craft industries in 
which worker-controlled recruitment leads to 'worker-controlled' labour markets, 
because recruitment and certification are linked through arrangements such as 
union-controlled apprenticeship schemes. In these cases, recruitment 
automatically confers certification, to wit when a person joins a union they have in 
fact been accepted to be trained. This arrangement allows the unions both to 
regulate the size of the labour supply and the individuals who comprise it. On the 
waterfront the equivalent of these craft labour markets is the union hiring hall 
system on America's West Coast wherein recruitment and registration are 
intertwined (in a similar fashion to recruitment and skill certification) such that the 
union, by maintaining and administering the register, is able to controi all aspects 
of the labour supply (see Finlay 1988).2 
However, the dynamics of the bureau system of labour administration in which the 
state, rather than the union, took the labour supply out of competition were very 
2 Indeed, the control that the IL WU exerts over the labour market has led some authors to describe 
these arrangements as conforming to a craft model of organization, and to bracket the industry with 
craft-based industries such as construction. Kerr (1954), for instance, in his classic discussion of 
the 'balkanization' of labour markets referred to waterfi:ont unions as craft unions and labelled 
longshoremen 'craft workers'. More recently, Doeringer and Piore (1971:3-4) used longshoring 
and construction to illustrate the operations of' craft intemallabour markets'. 
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different from its American counterpart. Significantly, the state-sponsored 
registration system resulted in three independent sites (not one, as Fligstein and 
Fernandez assume) where struggles over the labour supply occUlTed: recruitment 
(the selection of potential candidates for registration), registration (the numbers 
that were allowed entry to the labour market and hence the size of the labour 
supply) and the rules of labour allocation (which regulated how registered 
waterside workers were allocated to jobs on a day-to-day basis). These sites were 
'relatively autonomous' in the sense that control over one (such as recruitment) 
did not automatically confer control of the other two. The sections that follow 
will identify both the relative control that the key actors exerted over each of these 
facets of the supply of labour, and the outcomes that resulted. 
(3) Recruitment Practices 
Over at the three deepwater wharves a medly of masts, derricks, 
samson-posts and funnels caught the last of the sunlight and 
reflected a multi-coloured patchwork that would have made the 
fingers of any artist worth his salt itch for paint and palette. 
Indeed there was an artist present, but he was not painting. 
Instead, disguised by overalls, boots and thick woolen headgear, he 
was strolling slowly up a wharf in the company of opticians, 
mechanics, builders, bakers, athletes, politicians, drunkards, 
teetotallers, layabouts and lay-parsons. In short, the collection of 
men from all walks of life who comprised the Buchanan Union of 
Waterside Workers. 
Michael Davis, The Watersiders 
In this section I will examine the role of the local unions and Port Employers 
Association in the process of recruiting workers, and I will identify the respective 
degree of control this yielded over who was subsequently registered. The extent to 
which the resulting recruitment practices conformed to patterns identified in 
studies of other countries will also be evaluated. 
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A common thread in studies of the waterfront is that waterfront labour markets, 
particularly during the break-bulk era, are insular, communal, and therefore 
'closed' (Kerr and Siegel 1954; Miller 1969; Hil11976; Mills 1979; Pilcher 1972). 
This pattem is explained, at least in part, by the fixed spatial location of ports, 
which together with the physical proximity of the workforce results in waterfront 
labour markets being embedded within occupational communities. Consequently, 
pattems of worker recruitment reflect the insularity or 'strong ties' (Granovetter 
1974) of these communities, such that kinship relations underpin the selection of 
workers. Philpott (1965 :25), for instance, draws attention to the pattems of 
kinship that underpinned worker recruitment within the hiring hall system 
operated by the IL WU in Vancouver. 
Kinship-based pattems of recruitment are closely linked to the mechanisms of skill 
transference on the waterfront. Because waterfront labour markets and work are 
often embedded within occupational communities skills are typically transmitted 
through traditional kinship-based forms of socialization rather than formal 
training. As Hill (1976:55) notes, these skills are "traditional in nature and have 
been passed down through generations of occupational members rather than by 
apprenticeships or other formal training." Although there are exceptional 
elements in Hill's case because of the existence of self-organized work groups in 
the Port of London (which resulted in recruitment to the work-group rather than 
the union), the studies by Pilcher (1972) and Philpott (1965) suggest that these 
pattems also exist on America's West Coast where it is the union that regulates 
the labour market. Both jobs and skills are transmitted intergenerationally and 
skills, as such, are typically acquired 'on the job' once entry to the labour market 
had been secured. Additionally, in the case of waterfront workers who had 
previously been seamen, there is a considerable element of 'positive transfer' 
between the skills acquired while at sea and those used on the waterfront. Indeed 
the high proportion of ex-seamen who are assumed to be located within the ranks 
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of waterside workers is a crucial component in the cross-national argument 
developed by Broeze (1991:169) regarding the homogeneity of 'maritime labour' 
such that it possessed "a clearly distinct socio-industrial and subcultural identity". 
I will now examine the nature of recruitment practices on the waterfront in New 
Zealand, and the extent to which they conformed to this pattern. Under the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1953 the local branches of the Port Employers 
Association were granted the sole right to recruit workers to the bureau register. 
To recap, this formally codified the arrangement that developed in the 1951 
dispute wherein the Government granted employers the right to recruit workers to 
fill the newly established port unions. This, in tum, disrupted the method of 
recruitment which previously had been controlled by the local branches of the 
Waterside Workers Union (see Green 1992:103). It marked a shift from a system 
of recruitment that was controlled by the union, and coupled with limits on· the 
size of the union membership, to employer control of access to an exclusive 
register wherein registration conferred the right to union membership. 
The local branches of the Port Employers Association were responsible for 
selecting candidates for registration. Prospective watersiders were required to fill 
out a standard application form which was then placed on file at the local PEA 
office in the port where they were seeking registration. The questions included on 
the form ranged from applicants' qualifications and previous work experience, to 
whether they had any relatives who worked in the industry. The names on file 
comprised a waiting list of men who were seeking registration. At some ports 
positions on the local registers were in demand. Captain Twyman, a retired 
Secretary of one of the branches of the PEA, commented that 
it was a well sought after job ... we had people coming up to the 
Port Employers office and putting in an application, which we 
filed. And we had literally about a thousand of them .... we didn't 
tum anyone away from filling out a form. (Interview) 
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However the crucial stage for prospective applicants was when a 'short-list' of 
men was drawn up. When a decision was made by the Port Conciliation 
Committee to increase the size of the bureau register a list was drawn up by the 
Secretary of the PEA of men who were regarded as suitable applicants and who 
would be interviewed for the vacant positions. A few more men were selected to 
be interviewed than positions available and a 'reserve list' was established that 
could be drawn upon in case of a shortfall. 
The actual criteria that were used for selection were diverse. Although on 
occasion individual employers recommended that a man be placed on the list, the 
PEA Secretary referred to above was largely able to exercise his own discretion in 
selecting men. Often candidates did not have references from previous employers 
and the information on the background of prospective watersiders that was 
available to the PEA was sometimes limited to the information supplied on the 
application forms. For this reason Captain Twyman made a point of giving the list 
to the police in order to screen out applicants who had a criminal record. As he 
recalls: 
I used to always take the list to the police, which is illegal. ... But 
they used to do it for me to help me, although they used to say they 
really shouldn't. ... But there weren't many that we rejected in this 
way. (Interview) 
An important supplement to the anecdotal material gleaned from interviews is 
quantitative data on the occupational backgrounds of newly registered waterside 
workers. The data, published in annual reports of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission, is available for the first five years after the bureau system was 
established and allows for the identification of industry-wide trends in recruitment 
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patterns. As such, it sheds light on the insularity or openness of the labour market 
in general. It can also be used to reflect on patterns of skill-transmission 
particularly with respect to Broeze's claim regarding the seafaring background of 
many waterfront workers. 
When gauged in terms of newly registered watersiders' previous occupations, the 
labour market that watersiders were drawn from was 'open' and diverse. The mix 
of occupations is eclectic and it appears that no one skill-set was favoured. The 
most striking feature of the Graph 4.1 is that the most common occupational 
background is that of 'labourer' (which is consistently between 32% and 42%). 
However, the next largest category is that of 'tradesmen' (between 10% and 20%), 
skilled workers who chose to forgo trades for work on the waterfront. This trend 
corresponds to the sentiments expressed by one of the recruitment officers in the 
interview cited above. The remaining 'new entrants' were drawn from an 
assortment of occupations. Interestingly enough, the proportion who were seamen 
was relatively small, ranging from 5% to 12%. These findings supply an 
important corrective to the view that an insular occupational community, largely 
comprised of ex-seamen, existed. Broeze (1991 :169) notes that "Although as yet 
no quantitative study has been made of the subject, it ... seems reasonable to 
accept that many dockers had served at sea before settling down ashore." In New 
Zealand, some new entrants to the bureau registers were ex -seamen but the 
majority were from other occupational backgrounds. This finding is all the more 
important given that New Zealand is one of the countries to which Broeze applies 
his generic concept of 'maritime labour'. At least on entering the labour market, 
water siders did not constitute a homogeneous group. 
Although it is not possible from the data presented to assess in detail the degree of 
intergenerational job transfer or the importance of kinship ties (any number of 
watersiders' relatives could have worked in other occupations before applying to 
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the register), one of the typical paths for them would have been to work on the 
waterfront as a casual labourer with a view to becoming registered.3 However, 
the number of non-registered workers who eventually became registered was 
relatively small; not many newly registered waterfront workers had prior 
experience of having casually worked on the waterfront. 
While the labour market that newly registered water siders were drawn from was 
relatively open, Graph 4.2 demonstrates that mobility between ports was limited in 
that consistently less than 5% of those who were newly registered were men who 
had been previously registered at, and transferred from, other ports. Hence, once 
registered, watersiders constituted a geographically immobile labour force. This 
indicates that the 'labour market', as such, was in fact composed of a series of 
loeallabour markets. 
This analysis of recruitment practices reveals a somewhat different pattern than 
the kinship-based insular occupational labour markets identified in British and 
American studies. The profile of the new entrants to the labour market is that of a 
diverse, in some cases skilled, and occupationally mobile group of individuals. 
This portrait also challenges the notion that of those who were skilled, the 
majority had a background in seafaring (the occupation which is typically assumed 
to have the greatest degree of 'positive transfer' of skills). More tradesmen than 
seamen were present among the new entrants to the industry. The only element of 
immobility in the labour market was geographical (rather than occupational), in 
the sense that watersiders tended to stay at the port where they were first 
registered. 
3 Philpott (1965) noted this pattern in his study. 
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To a large degree, the differences between this pattern and the one identified in 
other countries can be explained via the differences between the respective 
systems of labour administration. On America' s West Coast, for instance, the 
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union controlled recruitment 
and access to registration. Union membership was the prerequisite of working on 
the waterfront, and such membership took considerable time to achieve. Thus in a 
sense prospective longshoremen had to apply to the union for a job; this was an 
involved process wherein kinship ties, interpersonal networks and subcultural 
codes were crucial (see Philpott (1965) for a detailed account). The union 
controlled access to the waiting list in a manner which gave it control both of 
numbers men and of the individuals concerned. 
In New Zealand, however, the state-sponsored occupational registration system 
that was created by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 abolished the union-
controlled method of recruitment which had existed prior to the 1951 waterfront 
dispute. The informal ties which previously regulated the points of entry to the 
labour market were dismantled and replaced by a system which gave employers 
formal control over recruitment. Under this arrangement the port unions exercised 
no formal control over access to the local bureau register, or over the composition 
of their membership. Shortly after the Act was passed the General Secretary of the 
South Island Federation Jim Roberts commented that: 
the Union should have a voice in the selection of the men who were 
to obtain employment in the industry. In the old days, the Union 
itself decided that question .... Now we have gone to the other 
extreme - the employers decided who should join the Union and 
also who should not be a member of the Union by refusing him 
employment.4 
4 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference, 30111/54. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box liB (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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This arrangement militated against kinship-based patterns of "preferential hiring" 
(Caplow and McGee 1958:115) and manifested itself in the diverse occupational 
backgrounds of the new entrants to the local labour markets, which possessed a 
considerable degree of 'openness' .5 
The port unions had to accept all individuals who were registered; but equally the 
other side of the coin was that the union form was legally underwritten in the 
sense that all registered watersiders were required to become members of their 
local port union. Although the unions did not formally control recruitment, 
because the union form was secured legally the potentially negative effects of this 
situation (unstable or acquiescent unions) did not result. Instead, as we shall see 
in subsequent sections, unionism thrived which, in turn, was to lead to the port 
unions gaining an element of informal control over recruitment. These 
developments were mutually reinforcing as the unions selected, in the words of 
South Island Federation General Secretary Jim Roberts, "men who were good 
unionists and good cooperators with the union."6 
The manner in which local unions were gradually able to regain an element of 
informal control over recruitment during the 1950s was through informal 
agreements with the local branches of the PEA regarding the selection of men to 
be short-listed, and thus over who was [mally registered. Typically, a process of 
informal negotiation between the PEA Secretary and the union occurred over the 
men who should be on the list. A former Secretary explains: 
we used to make out the initial list and then gave it to the wharfies. 
And then if they felt that there was somebody I'd missed out then 
they'd let me know. And it was quite amicable .... they'd have a 
5 Cap low and McGee identify "two types of hiring in general use - 'open', or competitive, hiring 
and 'closed', or preferential hiring" (1958: 115). They continue: "In the closed market ... there is 
preferential treatment of candidates and limited circulation of information about vacancies" (ibid). 
6 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 4/12/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
look at it, then they would come back and say 'well how about so 
and so', and I'd say 'okay then we'll pop him in as well'. And 'oh 
we don't think much of him, can we leave him off. (Interview) 
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One of the things that was bargained over was the number of registered 
watersiders' relatives who should be allowed on the list. 
And in the list of course, I always used to put it in because I knew 
the union would want it anyway, were sons and relatives of 
watersiders. I had a note of that. They used to have that on the 
application form, 'Any relative in the industry' .... It became a sort 
of saying on the waterfront 'oh you'll never get in there unless you 
were a son or a relative of a waterside worker', but that wasn't 
quite right. I know I said to the union several times 'okay but not 
everybody, other people have the right, other than waterside 
workers relatives'. So I said, you know, they can have a third or so. 
Of course, they would have preferred to have all sons of wharfies. 
(Interview) 
These informal agreements were significant insofar as they allowed the local 
unions a certain degree of control over the selection of men to be interviewed and 
thus over who was finally registered. Men who were short-listed, at least at this 
port, could be reasonably sure of becoming registered insofar as only "one or two" 
more than the number of vacancies on the register were interviewed. 
This type of arrangement was not unique to just one or two ports. As early as 
1956 there are indications that many of the port unions had achieved at least a 
modicum of informal control over recruitment. For example, at the South Island 
Federation Conference in 1956 President Paddy Weith commented, with respect to 
employer control of recruitment, that: 
7 Ibid. 
there has been an easing off of the rigid rule which existed four or 
five years ago .... the only Union that has serious complaints ... 
appeared to be Lyttelton, and this was due mainly to the attitude 
taken by the employer' representative at that port.7 
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There are two reasons for the employers not exercising their rights under the Act. 
First, for all intents and purposes, new recruits were 'standard labour units' in the 
sense that all were required to become union members anyway, and all were 
automatically subject to the industrial agreement which took wage rates out of 
competition. In this sense, there was nothing to be gained by the employers from 
selecting particular individuals. Undoubtedly employers still had an interest in 
excluding 'good unionists' (to use Jim Roberts' phrase) but they did not have as 
much to gain by using their powers under the Act to completely control 
recruitment as they did during the 1951 dispute (during which employer control of 
recruitment originated), when they actively excluded many deregistered 
watersiders from the new port unions. 
Moreover, as the port unions were rebuilt and regained a modicum of industrial 
strength at the port level, the local branches of the Port Employers Association 
sought to cooperate and consult with the union. This was particularly so in the 
context of joint control of setting register strengths and making of bureau rules (as 
I will explain in the next sections), which meant they had to consult in some areas 
anyway. These informal arrangements, and degree of union influence in this area, 
were reflected in the fact that the industrial agreement settled in 1960 (General 
Principal Order 156) incorporated a provision that required the PEA to consult 
with the port unions over the recruitment process.8 By the 1960s informal joint 
control over recruitment had become standard practice at ports throughout the 
country. 
8 Clause 36(a) of the GPO states that: "Workers to be enrolled on the Bureau Register at any port 
shall be as directed by the New Zealand Port Employers' Association and the Association will meet 
the representatives of the Union to receive any representations from the Union regarding the men to 
be enrolled." 
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(4) Register Strengths 
Whereas the preceding section examined how prospective watersiders were 
selected for registration, in this section I will deal with the way that the size of the 
local bureau registers was determined. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
the bureau system took the labour supply out of competition nationally by 
establishing a legally constituted occupational registration system which granted 
watersiders permanent status in the labour market. Under this system firms did 
not compete for labour and waterside workers did not compete for jobs. Instead, 
the size of the labour pool that employers at each port were allocated watersiders 
from was determined by bargaining at the local port level. Unlike the recruitment 
of watersiders, register strengths were set jointly by the port unions and the Port 
Employers Association in negotiations through the medium of the Port 
Conciliation Committees. 
The bureau register limitations set by the local Port Conciliation Committees 
reflected the different interests of, and pressures on, the port unions and the local 
branches of the PEA. It is necessary to identify both the mediate influences and 
the proximate influences upon register limitations. The mediate influences which 
circumscribed the broad limits within which register limitations were set relate 
primarily to the conditions that obtained in the labour market generally. The 
period under consideration, which was the heyday of the labour-intensive break-
bulk method of handling cargo, coincided with the postwar 'long boom' - the most 
sustained period of economic growth in New Zealand's history (see Roper 1993). 
This period was characterized by rising levels of trade which were reflected in 
increasing levels of (albeit seasonal) shipping activity within New Zealand ports. 
Similarly, during this period the demand for labour exceeded the supply of labour, 
resulting in a low rate of unemployment (which did not exceed 1.5% of the 
economically active population). As Pearson and Thoms (1983:54) observe, 
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"Unemployment does not emerge as a major feature of the New Zealand 
employment structure in the post-war period of the 1950s and 1960s. It was rather 
labour shOltages that dominated rather than labour surplus." It was against this 
backdrop that register limitations were determined. I will provide an empirical 
sketch of these limitations nationally, prior to identifying the proximate factors 
that shaped them. 
As Graph 4.3 indicates, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the total bureau register 
limitations gradually increased from the level set prior to 1953.9 It is important to 
note that the actual bureau register strengths did not correspond exactly to the 
limitations set by the Port Conciliation Committees. By virtue of a clause in the 
General Principal Order (the national industrial agreement), the actual bureau 
register strengths could vary by five per cent above or below the limitation set by 
the PCCs. The five per cent 'tolerance', as it was called, allowed for decreases in 
the register due to natural attrition (retirements, resignations, deaths and so forth), 
and was used to deal with situations where employers needed more workers than 
were registered, without register strengths having to be continually referred back 
the PCCs. In practice, however, the limitation acted as a 'ceiling' above which 
actual register strengths usually did not climb (although local registers 
occasionally were greater than limitations). It is important to note that in the years 
up to 1968 limitations and strengths were 'synchronized' (i.e. increases or 
decreases of more than 5% could only be achieved by formally renegotiating 
register strengths). Thereafter, limitations and strengths became 'desynchronized' 
as the 5% tolerance was held in abeyance prior to, and during, the term of the 
Waterfront Conference (see Chapter 7). I will restrict the following discussion to 
the former period and deal with developments after 1968 in Chapter 10. 
9 At most ports bureau register limitations had been carried over from the previous system of 
labour administration, which existed prior to the passage of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. 
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Attempts to formally increase or decrease bureau register limitations at the port 
level were usually in response to changes in the level of shipping activity. In 
many cases the port union and the local branch of the PEA agreed to increases or 
decreases in the register and the decision of the PCC was a fait accompli. In the 
case of disagreements over numbers, however, the Chairman would be required to 
rule either for or against the proposed change. Not only were there instances of 
disagreements where the PCC Chairman had to make such a decision, a few cases 
were even appealed to the Waterfront Industry TribunaL 10 These latter are the 
most interesting from the point of view of casting light on the proximate factors 
that were influential in the setting of register levels. 
Paradoxically, there were occasions when the employers sought an increase in 
register numbers, but were opposed by the local union. The following example is 
a case in point. In 1960, in anticipation of increased cargo and shipping resulting 
from the opening of a new harbour at the Port of Bluff, the Port Employers 
Association applied to the local Port Conciliation Committee to increase the 
register from 300 to 350 men. The local union, however, offered an increase of 
only an additional 25 men at the Committee hearing, which the PCC Chairman 
granted. The PEA then appealed the Chairman's decision to the Waterfront 
Industry TribunaL The Tribunal in its ruling (which upheld the employers' 
appeal) noted that: 
The Union's opposition to the appeal was based on the proposition 
that no increase in excess of 25 should be approved until the 
inability of a Union of 325 to handle the work had been proved by 
experience. . . . While the Union's viewpoint would usually be 
acceptable in the case of a well-established port we are of the 
opinion that the position at Bluff is unusual. . . . Here is a port 
whose capacity is to be virtually doubled in a very short space of 
time .... The high average earnings and average hours of work of 
10 Such appeals, however, were rare. Of the 900 decisions issued by the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal from 1953 until 1989 that I reviewed, I could frud only three that related to appeals over 
bureau register limitations. 
the members of the Union suggest that they have little to fear from 
a reasonable increase in Union membership.l! 
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The Tribunal's decision is worthy of note for two reasons. The comment on the 
'viewpoint' of the Union suggests that it was erring on the side of caution with 
respect to register strengths. Furthermore, the Union's viewpoint was deemed by 
the Tribunal in normal circumstances to be 'acceptable', which in practice meant 
employers had to wait until labour shortages actually occurred before seeking 
increased register strengths. 
The more fundamental point is that, given the occupational registration system, the 
port unions had no interest in increasing the sheer size of their membership. 
Although increased register strengths resulted in increased employment on the 
waterfront, and more union members, the local unions had an interest in limiting 
the size of the register in order to ensure sufficiently high average earnings and 
hours of work for registered watersiders. This was the case because work was 
equally shared among watersiders, and when no work was available they received 
guaranteed payments only. Thus the port unions sought to equilibrate bureau 
register strengths (and hence numbers of union members) with the supply of 
"collective job opportunity" (Periman 1928:9). The unions, in effect, 'traded off' 
members (or jobs) against wages. Consequently, the local unions typically made 
some effort to ensure that there was enough work to 'go around' for the numbers 
on the register. 
At the North Island Federation's conference in 1956 a discussion took place over 
register strengths which illustrates this latter point. The conference minutes note 
that a delegate from the Tauranga Union (C. Williams): 
11 WIT Decision 303, 10/12/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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stated that he had made several attempts to get his Union to 
increase its register strength, but to no avail, as many of the 
members feared that an increase in the register would mean a 
reduction in their earnings. 12 
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This comment indicates the degree to which attempts by unlOns to restrict 
numbers were driven 'from below' by the interests of the rank and file. Local 
union officials had to take account of these interests in negotiating with the 
employers over register numbers. The conference minutes also record the 
following comment by a representative of the Whangarei Union (E. Flower) who: 
stated his ... port was not opposed to a buildup in membership but 
it was not the wish of the Union to reduce the earnings of [the] 
present membership by a substantial increase. 13 
pee minutes also indicate that there were numerous instances when the local 
unions sought or agreed to an increase in register limitations. However, as the 
preceding cases demonstrate, such decisions were always balanced against the 
perceived availability of work. 
Insofar as it was impossible to equilibrate the supply of labour and the demand for 
labour on a daily basis, frequent shortages and surpluses developed at all ports. 
The extent of labour shortages and surpluses in the time period under 
consideration is plotted in Graph 4.4. It is apparent from the graph that firms were 
by no means guaranteed a supply of labour. On the other hand, watersiders were 
not always assured of regular work. If the unions sought to err on the side of 
caution in negotiating register limitations in order to avoid frequent labour 
surpluses, the employers on the other hand had an interest in maintaining the 
registers at a level that would prevent labour shortages. 
12 Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 6/11/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/15 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
13 Ibid. 
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There are numerous examples of local branches of the PEA seeking to keep 
register strengths up in order ensure an adequate supply of labour. In 1957 the 
Auckland Union sought to limit the numbers of men on the register because the 
amount of work at the POlt had declined. The PEA Annual Report states that: 
"The local employers are . . . watching the position to ensure that the strength of 
the Bureau Register is maintained at a figure sufficient to meet the regular 
requirements of the port."14 Once again, in 1964, the Auckland Union appealed to 
the Tribunal a decision of the pee (which the local branch of the employers' 
association had supported) against their proposal for a reduction in the local 
bureau register strength. As the Tribunal noted, "the Union seeks a reduction in 
Bureau strength because large numbers of men are sent horne in the slack season 
of the year."15 This case further illustrates that the employers attempted to 
maintain register strengths despite substantial fluctuations in the availability of 
work which led the port unions to seek reductions. However the employers had to 
balance the projected labour requirements of ports against the cost of paying 
guaranteed wages to watersiders when work was unavailable. 
A crucial variable in dealing with the problem of synchronizing the supply of and 
demand for labour, in the context of a 'closed' labour market and a fixed supply of 
labour, was the use of casual labour. Under the preference clause incorporated 
within the first General Principal Order (GPO 24) non-registered workers were 
able to be used, as a supplementary labour force, when registered watersiders were 
not available. 16 This clause also stipulated that non-registered workers who were 
14 PEA Annual Report, 31/3/58. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
15 WIT Decision 430,3/6/64. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National 
Archives). 
16 The fIrst General Principal Order to be made under the provisions of the Waterfront Industry Act 
1953 was Number 24. It was so numbered because the Tribunal also issued Principal Orders which 
incorporated agreements relating to local conditions at specific ports. The GPO's were numbered 
consecutively in accordance with the Principal Orders. 
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engaged to complete gangs had to be replaced by registered watersiders if they 
became available and there was no other work for them to be allocated to. 
The casual watersiders, or 'seagulls' as they were colloquially known, were in the 
main workers from seasonal industries (such as meatworkers and agricultural 
labourers), fishermen, itinerant or unemployed workers, and at the ports in close 
proximity to a university a significant proportion of the casual workforce in the 
summer months were students. 17 The prospective seagulls would typically 
present themselves on a daily basis for work and be selected by company 
timekeepers or foremen, or in some ports by Bureau staff. Estimates of the 
absolute numbers of casual workers used on the waterfront are only available for 
the first five years after the bureau system was established. However a reasonably 
accurate indication of the extent to which casual labour was used in the 1960s can 
be gained by examining the percentage of wages paid to casual workers relative to 
total wages paid by the Waterfront Industry Commission. It is apparent from 
Graph 4.5 and Graph 4.6 that the proportion of casual labour used was relatively 
constant throughout the period under consideration. 
The fact that casual labour could be used to supplement the registered workforce 
at each port was not merely a product of 'employer preference' in having available 
an adequate supply of labour. Rather casual labour also benefitted the port unions 
and their members, and was therefore tolerated by them. Insofar as casual labour 
acted as a 'pressure valve' for registers, as a supplementary workforce, it assisted 
the port unions in keeping register numbers down and wage levels up. The ability 
of employers to use casuals also afforded watersiders flexibility regarding when 
they worked, allowing them to take days off when they wished (which was 
permitted under bureau rules) and to take holidays in busy periods. 
17 Under this agreements ships' crews could be also be used as casual workers. 
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Each of these aspects of the flexibility provided by casual labour to the port unions 
and their members overlapped. This overlap was succinctly identified in a 
comment by the Waterfront Commissioner himself in 1960, in explaining why 
more watersiders did not wish to become foremen-stevedores (who were 
permanently employed by companies). He stated that "the average watersider 
preferred the casual nature of the work - a decent income and days off."18 The 
provision for employers to use casual labour was crucial both to ensuring 
watersiders had 'a decent income' and in allowing them to take 'days off. The 
centrality of casual labour to this arrangement was such that some of the port 
unions were at odds with their Federation regarding the use of casuals. At the 
North Island Federation conference in 1956, President Hynes stated in his opening 
address that: 
At some ports there is reason for concern as to the large proportion 
of non-union labour regularly employed, and the failure of the 
unions concerned to face up to the question. In one port in 
particular, the number of non-union men regularly engaged is out 
of all proportion to the union men. It has not yet been possible to 
get the Union to agree to a reasonable number of new men being 
taken onto the register, as the rank and file members are absolutely 
convinced that any new men taken into their union automatically 
reduces their own earnings. One point that the rank and file do not 
seem to realize is that such a large force of regular 'seagulls' could 
... be used against the Union in a major dispute. 19 
Irrespective of this tension between the port unions and their summit 
organizations, casual labour functioned as an important source of 'flexibility' for 
watersiders, as well as for their employers. However it must be emphasized that 
the reason why the unions and their members were able to tolerate the use of 
casual labour was because watersiders had permanent tenure in the labour market, 
18 Minutes of Meeting Between New Zealand Foremen-Stevedores Union and Minister of Labour, 
17/5/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 (National Archives). 
19 Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 6/11/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/15 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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through the occupational registration system, which meant that casuals could not 
be used to displace registered watersiders. Despite the preceding comment by 
President Hynes, casual workers were therefore not a threat to the immediate job 
security of watersiders. 
Together with the fact that casual labour was used as a supplement to rather than a 
substitute for registered watersiders, insofar as the port unions sought to prevent 
register strengths from outstripping the capacity of ports to provide regular work 
for their members, the use of casual labour was not disadvantageous. Indeed a 
former North Island Federation official commented that: "We milked the industry 
along for a number of years using the provision for itinerant workers, or seagulls 
as they were called" (interview). In any case, casual labour did not become a 
contentious issue nationally until the late 1960s (see Chapter 10). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, however, there were some absolute limits to the use 
of casual labour to supplement the registered workforce. Some technical 
limitations existed such as the need for a certain number of skilled deckmen 
(winchmen and hatchmen) to form the core of gangs which would then be 'shored 
up' with casuals. Indeed at some ports during the 1950s the shortage of deckmen 
was such that training schemes (funded by the Commission from the NAF levy) 
were introduced.2o Equally as important, however, were absolute labour 
shortages that occurred when the number of casual workers who presented 
themselves was less than the number that were required. This development is 
largely to be accounted for in terms of the buoyant conditions in the labour market 
referred to earlier: principally the fact that this was a period of full employment. If 
the 'push' factors were somewhat weak, it was likewise difficult to attract workers 
in full-time or casual employment in other industries to do casual work on the 
20 WIC Report (1955:7). 
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waterfront (despite relatively high wages) because jobs were of short duration and 
casual work did not automatically lead to registration or carry with it any 
guarantee of future employment. 
At some ports shortages of casuals were not infrequent, particularly in the summer 
months at the height of the export season. At the Port of Lyttelton, for instance, 
the majority of casual workers were students. However the university holidays did 
not coincide exactly with the peak of the export season, and consequently there 
was a period of one to two months when shortages of casual labour occurred.21 
The distance between the closest city (Christchurch) and the port exacerbated this 
situation. Similar conditions obtained at the Port of Wellington where the port 
was geographically separated from the labour force and where transport costs were 
considerable. The PEA's Annual Report for 1958 indicates shortages of casual 
workers also occurred at the ports ofWanganui, Napier and Bluff. 
It was partly in response to the preceding limitations that employers formulated 
their own rules of labour allocation which were given to the local Bureau Offices 
and used to determine the local 'priorities' of labour allocation in times of labour 
shortages. At such times there was considerable potential for disagreements 
between firms that comprised the local branches of the PEA particularly insofar as 
they were in competition with each other. The rules, which were intended to 
eliminate such disagreements, specified the order in which labour was to be 
allocated, such as filling vacancies in "existing working gangs", the types of 
vessels that had priority (those carrying perishable cargoes such as fruit were 
usually deemed to be 'priority ships'), and priorities associated with the order of 
arrival of vessels and when requisitions for labour were lodged with the bureau. 
21 This information has been gleaned from an interview with the former secretary of the local Port 
Employers Association. It is corroborated by the PEA Annual RepOlt for 1957 which states that: 
"The availability of non-registered labour at the port is restricted." Typically, only 50 or so casuals 
were available at the Port of Lyttelton outside of university holidays. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 129 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Despite the formulation of these rules problems and disagreements still developed 
during periods of labour shortage.22 A former Secretary of the Lyttelton branch of 
the PEA (John), while reflecting on his role on the waterfront, made the following 
comment: 
I used to have more trouble with the employers than I did with the 
union at times, specifically when the port was busy and some ships 
wanted priority of labour for the goods. (Interview) 
Although the branch committee was formally charged with making a decision in 
cases where problems or disagreements arose, often it was left to the branch 
Secretary to decide which companies should receive priority status. John 
commented further: 
we gave a copy [of the rules] ... to the Bureau and they adhered to 
it and if there was any problem the Bureau used to ring me. You 
know, because there were all sorts of problems used to come up. 
Sometimes you'd have two priority ships in, and they used to ring 
me up and say 'what should I do'? And I used to have to make a 
decision. (Interview) 
This role often put him in the difficult position of having to decide ad hoc between 
two competing companies, one of which would have to go without labour. When 
asked how he made his decision, he said that he did so: 
just by experience, you know. And of course one company 
obviously didn't like it. ... Because they were all in opposition to 
each other of course. And sometimes I used to be popular with 
some companies and unpopular with the others .... But they all 
accepted it eventually. It wasn't supposed to be done that way, they 
were supposed to get a meeting of the Committee. And they'd go 
22 The bureau itself was put under pressure during times of labour shortage. Watersiders had the 
right to refuse a transfer to a new job once the job that they were working on had ended. In 1957 
the branch manager of the Tauranga bureau suggested to the Waterfront Industry Commission's 
general manager that labour shortages would be alleviated if the Union and the Employers would 
agree to compulsory transferring of workers between jobs. However such an agreement was never 
reached. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 173, 5/473/31 (National 
Archives). 
through and get an agreement on who should get the labour. But 
you just couldn't do that in practice. At seven o'clock you started 
and that was it. (Interview) 
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To the extent that seasonal fluctuations in the labour requirements of ports were 
not able to be dealt with through the use of casual labour, the local branches of the 
Port Employers Association often attempted to incorporate them into register 
strengths. However, in this endeavour they were limited by the existence of 
formal joint control of the size of bureau registers. Furthermore, unlike the port 
unions, the local branches of the PEA were subject to the authority of their 
national organization. Whereas the port unions could and (as the examples 
provided earlier indicate) frequently did act independently of their respective 
Federation with respect to setting register strengths, the local branches of the PEA 
had to apply to the PEA Management Committee for permission to seek an 
increase in the size of the bureau registers. Sometimes an increase was not 
granted, as the following example demonstrates. In 1967 the Napier Branch 
Committee sought an increase in the register, but the Management Committee (in 
weighing up the potential cost with respect to the payment of guaranteed wages) 
declined the request, stating that the employers at this port should "make the 
fullest use of non-registered labour rather than to increase the present strength."23 
In short, the local employers were forced to tolerate labour shortages. 
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that in negotiating over the size of 
bureau registers the port unions and the PEA engaged in a 'balancing act' based on 
the interests of their respective member 'constituencies'. In the case of the port 
unions, numbers of members (and thus jobs) were traded off against wage levels. 
For the Port Employers Association, on the other hand, the trade-off involved 
balancing the labour requirements at each port (allowing for seasonal fluctuations) 
23 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 427, 15111167. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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against the cost of guaranteed wages that watersiders were paid when work was 
unavailable. As I have shown, casual labour was a crucial variable in this 
'balancing act'. The relative success of each party in achieving the desired 
balance, in times of disagreement, depended on the decision of the local PCC 
Chairman. However, in such cases one factor that the Chairman had to consider 
was the average hours and earnings of the registered watersiders. 
It is not possible to construct an absolute measure or index of which of the key 
actors got the 'upper hand', or which the register strengths suited. Undoubtedly 
there were differences from one port to another regarding the extent to which a 
'balance' was able to be achieved. Nonetheless, in the next chapter I will 
demonstrate that, despite the existence of frequent labour surpluses (and hence 
'slack' periods for watersiders) wage levels on the waterfront were considerably 
higher than those of workers in the manufacturing sector. This provides some 
indication of the extent to which this 'balance' benefitted watersiders, and shows 
that the port unions were relatively successful in equilibrating numbers of 
members with the supply of 'work opportunity' . 
The more fundamental point regarding power relations between the key actors is 
that formal joint control over the size of bureau registers (and hence over the 
numbers of union members) was a crucial source of strength for the port unions. 
Insofar as the occupational registration system gave watersiders permanent tenure 
in the labour market, and also gave them 'preference' in performing waterfront 
work, the port unions had no reason to attempt to increase the sheer size of their 
membership. Indeed, in the context of the bureau system, the port unions had 
good reason to restrict the numbers of registered watersiders. Formal joint control 
over the size of the labour supply, coupled with informal joint control over 
recruitment which developed in the late 1950s, allowed the port unions to 
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consolidate their position as exclusive and tightly-knit organizations whose 
members were well-paid. 
(5) Allocation to Work 
In an industry in which the loading and unloading of particular 
ships is universally of limited duration, uncertain in time, and 
performed with varying degrees of specialization, the procedures 
and the rules determining the allocation of men to work are 
decisive to management and to workers and their representatives. 
John T. Dunlop 
In this section I shift from issues of entry to the labour market, and the size and 
composition of the labour supply, to examine the 'internal' organization of the 
labour market. Dunlop's statement rings as true of ports in New Zealand as it 
does of ports the world over. This section will highlight the specific 'procedures 
and rules' that were developed within the bureau system of labour administration 
to regulate the' allocation of men to work' . 
Under the procedural requirements of the Waterfront Industry Act (1953), bureau 
rules were negotiated at the local port level by the unions and the PEA through 
Port Conciliation Committees. Although the Act did not specify the form or 
actual content of the bureau rules, there were certain background assumptions 
regarding what they should cover, which assumed the status of a 'given' in 
formulating the rules at each port. In order to understand the bureau rules that 
were formulated under the Act, and what they regulated, it is necessary to briefly 
examine the historical origins of the method of labour allocation that waS utilized 
under the bureau system. 
The ongms of bureau rules are to be found in early attempts by the former 
Waterside Workers Union to decasualize the industry in the 1930s. Although the 
'auction-block' system of casual hiring was notoriously prone to corruption and 
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iniquity in the allocation of work, some groups of watersiders did very well out of 
it. This is because even at the peak of this system, the labour market was not 
completely casualized. Instead there existed regular gangs (called 'bull gangs'), 
composed of physically strong and skilled watersiders, that were assured of 
regular employment (see Pettit 1948:17-20; Roth 1993:42-3). The members of 
these gangs benefitted from the casual system, and therefore had little interest in 
decasualizing the labour market. As in Britain (see Turnbull et al. 1992:10-11; 
Hill 1976:15; Phillips and Whiteside 1985:33), the Union was placed in a position 
of pushing for decasualization despite the fact that a considerable proportion of its 
members opposed this strategy. 
Along with decasualization, the Union also sought to introduce a system which 
'equalized' the distribution of work among watersiders. It pushed for the 
formation of rules of labour allocation to ensure the compulsory equalization of 
the distribution of work among the individuals who comprised the workforce at 
each port. Right from its inception, in the late 1930s, a significant proportion of 
watersiders qua individuals were opposed to the equalization of work. 
Consequently a system of 'penalties' was introduced at the insistence of the Union 
in order to force watersiders to accept this method of work allocation. 
This contradiction, between the interests of the Union and those of its members, is 
a case in point of the perennial dilemma facing labour organizations which Selig 
Perlman identified in the 1920s in his classic Theory of the Labour Movement. 
The crux of Perlman's argument, which he formulated in an American milieu, is 
that unions needed to achieve job control in order to allocate work to their 
members via 'working rules', so as to engender solidarity. Solidarity is secured by 
trading off individual interests against collective interests, by ensuring that no-one 
is able to take more than their fair share of the "collective job opportunity" 
(Perlman 1928:9). Thus unions are involved in "collectively controlling the extent 
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of the individual's appropriation of opportunity" (ibid:241-2). Stated simply, 
unions engage in a 'rationing' of opportunity. 24 
To be sure, the port unions (like all unions in New Zealand) were legally secured, 
and hence unlike their American counterparts did not need to ration opportunity in 
order to secure their existence. However they still had to deal with the problems, 
which centered on a tension between the interests of the individual and the 
interests of the group, that were posed by the allocation of work. It was for this 
reason that the bureau rules of labour allocation, and the penalty system, were 
originally formulated by the Union. 
The penalty system originated in Lyttelton under a local system of labour 
administration introduced there in 1936. Baden Norris, the author of the history of 
the Lyttelton branch of the Union and himself a former watersider, writes: "Quite 
a few members of the union were against the system as the work of the port now 
had to be shared evenly among all members whereas, under the old auction block 
system, the same men were getting most of the work while the others missed out" 
(Norris 1980:99). He continues: 
Many men refused to cooperate with the system at first and they 
often refused to lift their discs [to signify acceptance of work]. The 
general [union] meeting in July decided to penalize all those who 
refused to co-operate and to penalize them eight hours . . . [which] 
meant that ... [they] would have eight hours' pay deducted from ... 
[their] wages. It is revealing that the penalty clause in the bureau 
rules was put there by the union and not the employers (ibid:95). 
24 Perlman writes: "The group . . . asserts its collective ownership over the whole amount of 
opportunity, and, having determined who are entitled to claim a share in that opportunity, 
undertakes to parcel it out fairly, directly or indirectly, among its recognized members, permitting 
them to avail themselves of such opportunities, job or market, only on the basis of a 'common 
rule'" (1928:242, emphasis his). 
99 
Other branches of the Waterside Workers Union, such as Auckland, then followed 
suit (see Roth 1993:73). The following comment by E. Threadwell (a union 
representative from Lyttelton) at the South Island Federation conference in 1953 
speaks to this issue: 
We found that the employers had put their own interpretations on 
the rules, and they applied penalties which the Union thought were 
not justified. It must be admitted that these rules were drafted in 
the first place by the Union in order to compel the membership to 
play the game when the Bureau system was introduced. They were 
being utilized today to impose unjust penalties on the men.25 
This comment is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it alludes to the fact that, 
although the rules of labour allocation and the penalty system they incorporated 
were first introduced by the Union, two types of penalties emerged. One set of 
penalties related to the 'engagement' oflabour and were sponsored by the Union, 
whereas the second set related to conduct on the job and were introduced by the 
employers. Baden Norris commented in an interview that: "The whole of the 
penalty system was introduced by the Union. And [it was] taken up very 
enthusiastically by the employers of course." Secondly, the system of bureau rules 
and penalties was carried over into the system of labour administration that was 
established in 1953. 
This, then, was the background to the rules of labour allocation that were formed 
after the passage of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. At some ports (such as 
Lyttelton) entire sets of bureau rules were carried over from the previous system, 
but at other ports (such as Tauranga, Bluff and New Plymouth) they were 
formulated anew. In each case, however, the principle of work equalization and 
the penalty system were embodied within the rules that were formulated in 1953. 
25 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 25/11/53. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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As we shall see below, differences between ports only occurred over the types of 
bureau rules and penalties that were formulated. 
Bureau rules dealt with the classification and engagement of registered waterside 
workers, the order of their allocation to work in accordance with the principle of 
work equalization, and the penalties that constituted the core of the system of 
industrial discipline on the waterfront. The foundation of the system of work 
allocation was equalization among individual watersiders at each port (rather than 
for gangs or groups of watersiders). The use of the individual as the 'unit' of work 
equalization was vehemently sought and supported by the former Waterside 
Workers Union both nationally and locally. As a former bureau allocator (who 
was involved in the day-to-day operation of a labour bureau) recalls: 
the union were the strongest advocators of saying we want every 
man treated equal . . . See when they had gangs [under the auction 
block system], gangs were competing against one another and there 
were good gangs, and indifferent gangs, and bloody awful gangs. 
And at that stage the bosses could have said 'well we want this 
gang', but they didn't [under the Bureau System]. Every man was 
treated equal, even the sluggards and the dullards, they were 
exactly the same as the best workers. (Interview) 
With respect to work equalization, 'individualization' appears to have been an in-
built assumption that was carried over from the system of labour administration 
which developed in the 1940s. This principle was not open to contention, or 
negotiation, within the Port Conciliation Committees; rather it was afforded the 
status of a background 'given' condition. This principle was formally enshrined in 
the wording of equalization provisions within all sets of bureau rules (see the 
examples cited below). 
As a result, the whole process of work allocation by the Waterfront Industry 
Commission was geared to 'individuation'. The constitution of certain 
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'categories' of waterside workers, the use of symbols to represent identities, and 
the keeping of files (regarding individual work-records) - all of these are hallmarks 
of the bureaucratic techniques of 'individuation' (see Abercrombie et al. 1986). 
The process of registration involved the classification of individuals as particular 
'categories' of watersiders which corresponded to various rights, privileges and 
priorities in the distribution of work. The bureau rules at all ports provided for the 
classification of watersiders into 'A' and 'B' categories, which was to be carried 
out following an examination by the PEA's medical officer. The distinction was 
that the 'A' category men were entitled to weekly and daily guaranteed minimum 
payments, whereas 'B' grade workers were entitled only to a ( smaller) weekly 
guarantee. Similarly the rules usually stipulated requirements for watersiders to 
attend 'the call' each day, and the procedures to be followed by employers when 
requisitioning labour. 
Each watersider was assigned a tag (or 'disc') with their bureau register number 
on it, along with any endorsement symbols regarding the types of work that they 
were qualified to perform (such as operating winches). The bureau rules at each 
port specified procedures regarding the engagement of labour. Principally, 
watersiders were required to signify their acceptance of work by 'turning' or 
'lifting' their discs which were displayed by the bureau on 'engagement boards', 
along with the ship, hatch and position within a gang that they had been assigned 
to. This had to be done within a certain time period.26 Similar procedures existed 
whereby watersiders who had not been allocated to work were able to indicate that 
they had attended 'the call'. 
Watersiders who failed to accept the job that they had been allocated to were 
placed 'on penalty' by the bureau. This type of penalty was one of the two main 
26 This period differed between ports. For example, at New Plymouth watersiders were given 
fifteen minutes to lift their disc, whereas at the Port of Napier they were allowed only three minutes 
to do so. 
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types that were set out in each port's bureau rules, namely penalties relating to the 
engagement of labour. Other actions by watersiders which resulted in them 
receiving penalties of this type included lifting another watersider's disc, not 
attending the call, refusal to work overtime, and accepting engagement but failing 
to start work. These penalties were meted out automatically by the bureau itself 
and typically involved the penalized watersider being 'stood down', and hence 
rendered ineligible for employment, for a certain number of days. Watersiders 
who failed to lift their discs were typically suspended for two to three days 
(depending on the port). 
As I noted earlier, the other type of penalty related to conduct on the job. These 
were given by the foremen-stevedores or supervisors of the companies that 
watersiders had been allocated to. In these cases the watersider in question was 
dismissed from the job by the employer which, as in the case of penalties relating 
to engagement, would automatically result in the worker being stood down for a 
specified number of days, depending on the severity of their 'offence'. The nature 
of 'offences' differed between ports. For example, while the rules of most ports 
specified instant removal from the register for theft or 'pillaging', the Bluff bureau 
rules specifically included 'urinating in the hold' in this category. Some ports 
(such as New Plymouth) had specific penalties for abusing foremen, whereas 
others did not. Similarly the severity of the penalty differed between ports. 
Whereas under the bureau rules at the ports of Port Chalmers, New Plymouth, and 
Auckland watersiders 'employed' on a job as deckmen (winch operators and 
hatchmen, that is) who were dismissed for drunkenness were prohibited from 
carrying out such work for six months, at Tauranga they were automatically 
removed from the 'panel' of workers who were qualified to perform this type of 
work. A third dismissal for misbehavior earned seven days suspension at Port 
Chalmers but only four days at Lyttelton. Numerous examples of this type could 
be provided but the preceding ones should suffice to demonstrate that penalties 
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differed between ports, and were forged in the context of local conditions and 
agreements between the parties within the PCCs. This discussion also highlights 
the fact that the local bureaux played a crucial role in meting out industrial 
discipline by enforcing bureau rules which had a disciplinary component. 
As I noted above, the other main category of rules dealt with the allocation of 
work to watersiders in accordance with the principle of work equalization. 
Individuation aside, the formal principle of work allocation was that of equalizing 
work hours. By the mid-1950s rules regarding the equalization of hours had been 
developed at all ports, as the following extracts from sets of rules indicate: 
The Commission's representative shall keep a record of all hours 
worked or credited to each 'A' grade worker so that ... each man 
registered shall have an equal number of hours. 
Port of Tauranga (1957) 
The Bureau Office shall keep a record of all hours worked by or 
credited to each registered worker, for the purpose of equalization 
of hours. 
Port of Napier (1955) 
Bureau Managers shall keep a record of all hours worked or 
credited to each man so that each man registered shall have . . . an 
equal number of hours each week. The Bureau shall ... roster all 
classes of jobs and work among the men on the Bureau Register so 
as to give all men an equal share of jobs both on the ship and the 
wharf. 
Port of Lyttelton (1955) 
Labour is to be allocated daily or in accordance with the basic 
principle of equalization of hours i.e. lowest houred men at times of 
allocation to be sent to jobs. 
Port of Auckland (1957) 
Bureau Managers shall keep a record of all hours worked or 
credited through the bureau to each man so that each man 
registered shall have as far as it is possible an equal number of 
hours. 
Port of Otago (1961) 
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Given that equalization of hours was the norm within ports, several observations 
can be made about the system of work allocation. Firstly, this was a system of 
enforced equality (between registered workers). Secondly, it precluded the 
existence of any element of seniority or hierarchy in the allocation of work. 
Rather than the bureaucratic techniques of keeping files and enforcing impersonal 
rules producing a hierarchically organized labour market, the result was a labour 
market that was structured horizontally.27 Thirdly, while equalization required 
detailed records to be kept of hours worked by each watersider, some discretion 
had to be given to bureau staff to make decisions in relation to the actual 
allocation of work. However, this discretion frequently served to undermine the 
'principles' (of horizontal rather than hierarchical organization) of the labour 
market. 
In a study of bureaucratic systems of administration Reed writes of: 
the inability of general principles and mechanisms to cover every 
eventuality and the corresponding need for supplementary 
assumptions and understandings which undermine the consistency 
and integrity of formal control structures (1985:136). 
In order to understand the types of 'supplementary assumptions' that were 
required in relation to the allocation of work, it is necessary to examine this 
process in some detail. The former head clerk of the bureau office at the Port of 
Lyttelton (Bert) describes the way that equalization occurred in practice: 
Well what we had was a big long table and it was the hours for the 
period (they used to go by a four-weekly period) and the hours for 
the week. So you'd have something like two, four, six, eight, ten, 
twelve that way [indicating], and then you'd have an unlimited 
amount of numbers running along from 126 to 250 or something. 
And you'd sort them. We had timing sheets that we recorded every 
hour that they worked, every day .... So the ship would finish and 
27 I elaborate on this point in the fmal section of the chapter. 
there'd be, say, forty men on the ship. And you'd have all of these 
list of numbers and someone would call out 'number 6', that was 
Tommy Austin, 'he's 42 and 12' - he'd worked twelve hours for 
the week, he was 42 [on the board], and you'd put him there .... 
And the biggest job, it could be say the Rangitani that had six days' 
discharge and a fortnight's loading, and that was the longest job 
that was going to be the constant one. You'd take the lowest men 
and hang them [their numbers] on that job .... And that, sort of, 
was the equalization of hours. That was about the fairest way that 
you could do it. (Interview) 
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Obviously this system required a considerable degree of discretion on the part of 
the bureau officials. They had to estimate the length of each job, and then balance 
this against the hours of the men who were available to be allocated. This process 
was complicated by the fact that some men were qualified for particular types of 
work (such as winch driving) and others were not. Consequently, the bureau 
allocators were required to have an encyclopedic knowledge of the bureau rules 
and the prevailing industrial agreements (which specified gang sizes), as well as 
the bureau numbers and qualifications of the men in question. Despite the use of 
an impersonal numbering system, which was supposed to render the allocation 
system impersonal and hence fair, in practice the bureau manager and clerical staff 
had a detailed knowledge of watersiders' identities. Although he ceased to work 
for the bureau some 28 years prior to being interviewed, Bert was still able to 
recall the bureau numbers of every former watersider who I was able to name (a 
not insubstantial number). As he recollects: 
Well when I was doing the ship side, there were 532 men there, and 
I knew the first names of seven-eigths of them, every bureau 
number, and where they lived. Because quite often you'd get, like 
tying up ships in the morning with a six or seven 0' clock start 
you'd get locals because they just had to jump out of bed. Whereas 
if you got townies they had to get the a train to come down. It was 
best if the locals did the lines. (Interview) 
Because aspects of the allocation process were a "source of uncertainty", they 
served as the basis for "parallel power relations" (Reed 1985: 170) which centered 
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on the role of bureau managers and clerks themselves. Although bureau rules 
equalized work hours for individuals, they did not state what type of work men 
should be allocated to, e.g. light work, heavy or dirty cargoes such as lamp black 
(in the vernacular of waterside workers, the 'shit jobs'), work with high bonus 
payments and so forth. This particular aspect of work allocation was decided by 
the bureau staff themselves. 
Given that bureau rules did not guarantee equality of earnings, and that different 
types of cargo had different bonus rates attached to them, the particular jobs that 
watersiders were allocated to affected their income substantially. As an ex-
watersider explains: 
cars come in great big cases, and cargo is worked out on 
measurement not weight, for the purpose of the bonus. So its 
obvious the men working, say you get a full shipment of knocked 
down cars, you could practically discharge 10,000 ton in about a 
day and a half. But on the other hand if your handling glass, which 
used to come in little panes, you had an enormous job to make a 
bonus at all. (Interview) 
The bureau staff were themselves acutely aware of the anomalies that arose, given 
that the equalization of hours system took no account of watersiders' earnings. 
Bert maintained that: 
you could have a man that worked 900 hours and he could be 300 
pounds behind someone whose worked a thousand hours. The 
bonus was the whole thing. . . . It used to be paid out separately 
when I was in the bureau. I can remember when the bonus came 
out and everyone was looking over one another's shoulder and 
having a look. And the bonus would be something like 250 
pounds, which was a lot of money in those days. And someone 
else, if he just worked the ferry he'd be on a bonus of 120 pounds 
or something. (Interview) 
The issue of corruption in relation to the allocation of work was mentioned 
frequently by the watersiders who I interviewed. Given the considerable 
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discretion of bureau officials the potential existed for them to make surreptitious 
'deals' with watersiders. One watersider who I interviewed said he knew of 
instances where baskets of crayfish had been left by a watersideI' at the back door 
of one of the bureau offices, to ensure allocation to a job that paid a large bonus. 
Another watersider, who had been the Union's disputes officer at the Port of 
Wellington, spoke with more than a touch of irony about a favoured group of 
watersiders at this port: 
Like all systems, they inevitably end up corrupt. There was a group 
at Wellington called the magnificent seven who always seemed to 
get the high bonus paying jobs like unloading car cases. 
(Fieldnotes) 
The consequences of these 'areas of uncertainty', from the point view of some 
watersiders, was expressed by one interviewee in the following manner: 
that's where the bureau system fell down in the eyes of many, 
because although you were getting, the equation was on the hours 
of work, not the type of work. So if you had your favourites in the 
bureau, and they did, they would channel men to the knocked down 
cars, and other men to small coastal vessels handling tiny little 
packages. They'd still have the same number of hours, and that 
was all the bureau was obliged to do, but one man would be taking 
home a great deal more than the other. . . . If you made fuss of the 
Bureau Manager you could get all sorts of perks. (Interview) 
Similarly, Norris in his yearly chronicle of Lyttelton Union notes that at this port 
in 1963: 
Most members were very dissatisfied with the way the bureau 
system was working and the opinion was that, while hours were 
equated, no attempt was made to share the type of work. Many 
men were working fewer hours for more money, as a result of a 
favoured section getting placed consistently on the jobs that 
traditionally paid a large bonus, i.e. bulk phosphate, scrap iron etc 
(1980:193-94). 
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At some ports, such as Lyttelton, this tension was a not insubstantial source of 
friction between the bureau and the watersiders. Consequently, the local unions 
actively monitored the equalization of hours. Bert (the former bureau allocator) 
said that often walking delegates used to complain to the bureau about 
equalization practices: 
they [the allocators] were watched very carefully and the walking 
delegate would come in and say this bloke's complaining that he's 
not getting a decent run, and you'd have to produce all the time-
sheets and say 'well there's what his hours have been in the last 
three months', or something. (Interview) 
Indeed the Wellington Union actually employed one of its members on a full-time 
basis to oversee the allocation of work. However, it was not possible for union 
officials to monitor individuals' earnings. 
Nonetheless, this latter issue was addressed in part at the Port of Auckland through 
a bureau rule that was passed in 1957 to the effect that if water siders felt that they 
are getting "a preponderance of work at a certain type of job, the worker has the 
right of appeal". On two occasions port unions actually took cases to the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal regarding the allocation of work to their members. 
The first case was brought by the Auckland Union in 1962 on behalf of two men 
who allegedly suffered a loss in wages through 'mistakes' being made by the 
bureau in allocating work. However the Tribunal disallowed the claim, stating 
that: "There is considerable doubt whether this Tribunal has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon what seems to be, in law, a civil claim against the 
Commission".28 Similarly, in a case brought by the Taranaki Union in 1965 
regarding a loss of wages to watersiders who it claimed had not been employed in 
conformity with the principle of equalization of hours, the Tribunal noted: "The 
28 WIT Decision 367, 11/7/62. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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principle of equalization extends only to hours of work and does not guarantee an 
equality of earnings."29 
This issue, in its entirety, indicates the problems that surrounded the union-
sponsored system of compulsory equalization of work. Principally, the 'areas of 
uncertainty', which resulted in discretion being given to administrative personnel 
within the bureau system, had the potential to undermine the formal 'horizontal' 
organization of the labour market. The port unions 'policed' the system as 
vigilantly as possible, in order to eliminate the potential for corruption. In so 
doing, they minimized the potential of these 'areas of uncertainty' to undermine 
the formal principles that the system of labour allocation was based on 
(equalization of hours of work, that is). However this approach was not available 
to the unions in their attempts to eliminate the significant disparities in 
watersiders' earnings which resulted from allocation to work with differing levels 
of bonus payments. Instead, the port unions eliminated the potential of earning 
differences to erode the horizontal organization of the labour market by securing 
agreement from their members to collectively pool all bonus payments. I provide 
a detailed discussion of this process in Chapter 6. 
(6) Further Observations About the Organization of the Labour Market 
In this section, I will characterize in a conceptual manner the 'type' of labour 
market that emerged on the waterfront, based on the discussion in the preceding 
sections of the internal dynamics of the labour market. I will take Littler's 
analysis of Taylorism as my point of departure. Littler (1978:185) defines 
Taylorism as the "bureaucratization of the structure of control, but not the 
employment relationship." He argues that two of the crucial hallmarks of 
29 WIT Decision 473, 3/12/65. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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bureaucratized employment relationships (namely a 'career system' and 'fixed 
salaries') are absent under Taylorism. Rather Taylorism is characterized by what 
he terms a "minimum interaction" employment relationship.3D Of course, an 
assumption implicit within Littler's analysis is that the site of bureaucracy is the 
firm, insofar as he argues that the bureaucratic model implies direct employment. 
Similarly he assumes, following Weber, that bureaucracy operates to create a 
hierarchy (a career system, that is). 
The first observation that I wish to make about the waterfront labour market is as 
follows. The bureau system produced a form of 'inverted Taylorism' (using 
Littler's definition): it bureaucratized the employment relationship but not the 
structure of control. This comment on the structure of control anticipates an 
argument that I will develop in Chapter 6. At this point, however, I will restrict 
the discussion to reflecting on the 'bureaucratized' employment relationship, a 
claim which I must immediately quality. For this relationship did not contain all 
of the elements of the Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy (as outlined by Littler). 
As is the case with Taylorism, a 'career structure' was notably absent from the 
waterfront (insofar as there was no seniority for individuals or access to positions 
higher up the ladder). Rather it blended elements of a bureaucratic system (except 
the existence of a career structure) with a 'minimum interaction' employment 
relationship (which was a result of state regulation rather than managerial choice), 
wherein waterside workers were not permanently employed by firms, to produce a 
distinct 'hybrid' form of employment relationship. 
Rather than the bureaucratic techniques of keeping files and enforcing impersonal 
rules producing a hierarchically organized labour market, they resulted in a labour 
market which was structured horizontally around the principle of work 
3D Littler takes this term from the work of L.E. Davis, who defmes it as "a minimal connection 
between the individual and the organization in terms of skill, training, involvement and the 
complexity of his contribution". 
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equalization. A system of work equalization (based on averaging) took the place 
of the hierarchically organized internal markets characteristic of the central sites of 
Weberian bureaucracy that Littler refers to (namely government departments such 
as the railways and the police). Thus the problem of commitment of individual 
workers was solved not through supplying a 'career structure' and 'career 
motivation', but rather through the principles of enforced averaging and 
equalization, which had a 'levelling' effect. This 'hybrid' employment 
relationship centered on the use of exclusive registers as 'administrative tools' in 
order to equalize the distribution of work. 
However, like all systems that are composed of bureaucratic elements, this hybrid 
employment relationship contained within it 'areas of uncertainty' which served as 
the basis for 'parallel power relations'. These latter, in turn, threatened to 
undermine the principles that the employment relationship was based on. The fact 
that the system of labour allocation was based on rules, which necessarily could 
not deal with all eventualities, meant that it was not a static system. As I argued in 
the preceding section, bureau staff necessarily had some discretion in allocating 
work. Consequently the local unions had to continually monitor this system to 
ensure fairness, which resulted in them seeking to pool the bonus at each port. 
Paradoxically, then, the fact that the system contained bureaucratic elements 
rendered it dynamic rather than static. Analytically, this requires a sensitivity to 
process as much as to structure. 
I will conclude this section by briefly reflecting on a set of debates which 
replicate, in the context of discussions about 'flexibility', the assumptions about 
the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic arrangements which characterize studies 
located in the labour process tradition (such as Littler's). According to the 
'flexibility literature', flexibility is only achieved by eliminating bureaucratic 
forms. For Piore and Sabel (1984) this is achieved by developing a reinvigorated 
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'craft' tradition, based on the use of computer-based technology, in opposition to 
the hitherto dominant bureaucratic modes of organization. For Atkinson (1984, 
1985, 1987), who developed the 'flexible firm' model, flexibility is achieved by 
introducing casual labour into the bureaucratic form of the modern industrial 
capitalist firm. This involves renegotiating the boundary between the internal and 
external labour markets. Within the bureau system, however, bureaucratic forms 
within the labour market 'equalized' and hence produced horizontal rather than 
hierarchical sets of relationships. More importantly from the point of view of 
critiquing this literature, however, is the fact that a bureaucratic form which 
secured and regulated a type of 'internal' labour market itself produced a form of 
flexibility. However it was flexibility for labour as much as for employers. 
(6) Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the pattern of power relations between the key actors 
within the sphere of employment relations. By emphasizing that the structure of 
labour markets is a result of the 'power resources' that the key actors can secure 
control of within them, Fligstein and Fernandez's model provided a useful 
starting-point for the analysis. I demonstrated that the degree of control the port 
unions exercised over certain key resources resulted in them developing 
considerable power within the labour market. 
First and foremost, the labour market took an occupational form organized around 
exclusive registers at the port level which limited the size of the labour supply. 
Union membership was linked to registration such that all registered workers had 
to belong to the local port union. Formal joint control of register strengths gave 
the unions the ability to constrain the size of the workforce and ipso facto the size 
of their own membership. Furthermore, a 'minimum interaction' employment 
relationship was grafted to a set of rules jointly negotiated by the unions which 
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formally encoded the principles of work equalization. Internally, the labour 
market was therefore organized horizontally, rather than hierarchically. 
Although the occupational registration significantly strengthened the position of 
the port unions relative to the employers, the resulting labour market was not 
characterized by completely prefigured power relations which automatically 
resulted from the labour supply being taken out of competition. I have attempted 
to provide a detailed analysis which points to more subtle and nuanced sets of 
power relations, which the establishment of exclusive registers did not 
predetermine. Hence the emphasis in this chapter on social process as much as on 
structure: at a level beneath the structural 'givens', power relations crystallized 
over time. In each case the unions were able to further secure control over aspects 
of the labour supply: by securing informal control over recruitment; by managing 
register strengths and the use of casual labour such that high average earnings 
resulted; by seeking to ensure that work was fairly distributed by bureau officials 
in accordance with bureau rules; and eventually by pooling bonus payments to 
ensure that earnings were evenly distributed among their members. 
Overall, the organization of the labour market produced an environment within 
which unionism thrived, and provided an important source of union strength 
which impacted on patterns of industrial relations and work relations during the 
195 Os and 1960s. It is to examining these patterns that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 5 : INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1953-1971 
(1) Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, which dealt with employment relations, I examined how 
the state institutionalized an occupational registration system on the waterfront. I 
then explored how this system, in turn, shaped the pattern of power relations 
which emerged within the labour market, based on the power resources that the 
respective institutional actors could gain control of within it. In this chapter I will 
shift from the realm of employment relations, which comprised recruitment (entry 
to the labour market), register strengths (the size of the labour supply) and bureau 
rules (how labour was allocated to employers), to how the rules governing work 
were negotiated, and how the practice of industrial relations was conducted. 
To recapitulate, the distinction between employment relations and industrial 
relations does not merely have analytical purchase, rather it corresponds to a real 
set of arrangements which existed on the waterfront. The labour market was 
organized in a manner which systematically separated it from the way that work 
was regulated and controlled, and a separate set of rules regulated each of these 
spheres. Not only were bureau rules completely separate from the rules governing 
work, the manner in and level at which each of these sets of rules were negotiated 
differed. Bureau rules were the outcome of negotiations between unions and 
employers at the port level, as were agreements over register strengths and 
informal agreements over recruitment. Within industrial relations, however, there 
were two other levels where bargaining took place: firstly the national level, and 
secondly a level lower than the port in the form of bargaining between port unions 
and individual employers. 
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Nonetheless, despite the differences between these spheres, the pattern of power 
relations within employment relations affected the pattern that emerged within 
industrial relations. For example, within employment relations the unions had 
joint control over certain levers, particularly the size of the labour supply which, 
against the backdrop of general economic prosperity and labour shortages, one 
would expect to translate into considerable gains at the level of bargaining over 
wages and conditions. However, the extent to which the unions were collectively 
able to exert pressure upon these levers to extract such gains was shaped and 
constrained by the regulatory framework which governed industrial relations. 
Consequently, control of these 'resources' within the labour market did not 
automatically and unambiguously translate into sheer 'bargaining power' within 
the realm of industrial relations. Rather, it was refracted through the state-
regulated industrial relations system which facilitated some courses of action, but 
closed off others. 
This chapter will perform two (not unrelated) tasks. First, it will provide an 
overview of patterns of bargaining along with an assessment, in broad 
brushstrokes, of what was achieved by the unions in terms of wages and 
conditions. This will largely be a chronicle of the unions gradually 'clawing back' 
much of what had been lost as a result of the dispute in 1951. Second, the intra-
and inter-organizational dimensions to the practice of industrial relations will be 
examined. As in the previous chapters, I will elaborate the theme of the 
constraining, but also constitutive effects of legal regulation with respect to the 
'institutional constitution of actors and interests'. Indeed, this chapter will be as 
much about the way that the relationships between these actors were played out in 
a series of tensions between the national and the local, between centralized and 
decentralized forms of organization, bargaining, and modes of action, as it will be 
about the outcomes of actual bargaining processes in terms of wages and 
conditions. 
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(2) Industrial Relations and the State 
Historically, it is in the realm of industrial relations, perhaps more so than in any 
other, that the role of the state in New Zealand is unique. From its origins in the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1894), the New Zealand state 
established a system of industrial relations which has been approximated only by 
Australia. Through this system, state-appointed agencies mediated power 
relations between employers and unions. In no sense did 'labour' and 'capital' 
confront each other unmediated, as already organized 'blocs'; rather there were a 
series of institutions which constituted actors and interests. As Walsh and 
Fougere (1987:192) observe: 
The arbitration system was as much about the making of groups 
and the structuring of relationships among them as it was about the 
setting of wages or conditions. 
Although with respect to the waterfront the issues of legal regulation extend well 
beyond industrial relations to the system of labour administration as a whole, their 
point is consonant with the argument I developed earlier, that actors and sets of 
interests were institutionally constituted through legal regulation. My argument is 
in accord with that of Walsh, an insightful commentator on industrial relations in 
New Zealand, who draws on the 'new institutionalism' to fashion an analysis of 
the state's role: 
The institutional structure established by the State not only brings 
union and employer organizations into existence, but its rules and 
procedures define their interests . . . . Once the structure is in place, 
the interests of unions and employers, the strategies they follow and 
how they relate to each other and the State, become to a significant 
degree defined in terms of what can and cannot be done under that 
structure. . . . [T]he relationship between unions and employers 
unfolds in the context of the institutional structure of the State's 
industrial relations policies (Walsh 1993: 174). 
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In addressing the effects of the state-regulated arbitration system upon power 
relations between unions and employers, therefore, it must be recognized that, 
with respect to sets of actors and interests and possible courses of action, this 
system was both constraining and constitutive. 
With respect to sets of actors, the framework of legal regulation and the arbitration 
system was such that New Zealand would appear to be a classic example of a 
'collectivistic' system that was based on forms of organization which were 
'externalized'. The term 'externalization' was coined by Gospel to refer to a 
particular management strategy: "a firm can be said to externalize its industrial 
relations when it hands its dealings with a trade union over to an association of 
employers outside the firm" (1992:9). However this concept can equally be 
applied to labour, such as when local workplace-based unions hand their dealings 
with employers over to a national organization. Each case "represents a form of 
delegation to an outside body" (ibid:9). 
But whether 'externalization' occurs is not merely a matter of employer or worker 
strategy. Instead it is crucially affected by the institutional framework within 
which the practice of industrial relations is conducted. For instance, New 
Zealand's state-regulated system is typically regarded as having promoted 
externalization, by fostering the formation of national unions and employers' 
organizations. The New Zealand system, post-1936, is usually depicted as a 
centralized and homogeneous system wherein the main actors were these national 
organizations which acted in and through the legally enforceable national award 
system. This system not only guaranteed unions a membership (through 
compulsory unionism), it extended the coverage of national awards to all 
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employers of workers within the occupational grouping specified in the award, 
irrespective of whether they were actually involved in the negotiations which 
secured these agreements (see Roth 1974:100-2). This arrangement took wages 
and conditions out of competition nationally, and individual employers could only 
reintroduce competition by 'bidding up' the minimums enshrined in their 
respective national award. 
The hegemony of the arbitration system is generally assumed to be so great that it 
has gone largely un-noticed that industrial relations in New Zealand's ports, an 
important site of blue-collar work comprising workers and unions which 
historically have been central to the labour movement, were from 1940 until 1989 
regulated by a specialized legally constituted institutional framework located 
outside this system.1 To be sure, industry-specific studies (e.g. Fernandez 1969; 
Turkington 1976), and the more perceptive and detailed studies of labour markets 
and unions (e.g. Young 1974; Roth 1993), along with legal texts (Geare 1983), 
recognize the unique arrangements on the waterfront. But the authors who 
provide general overviews of historical patterns of industrial relations in New 
Zealand (such as Boston 1984; Deeks and Boxall 1989; Hill 1994) tend to 
overlook this fact. This oversight occurs because these latter authors usually 
attempt to characterize New Zealand as having an homogeneous system. But 
rather than there being a single hermetically sealed 'system of industrial relations' 
(Dunlop 1958), legal regulation - which was the hallmark of arrangements in New 
Zealand - sustained many diverse patterns which varied considerably between 
occupations and industries. 
1 The establishment of the Waterfront Control Commission in 1940 marked the exit of the 
waterfront industry from the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court. The institutions which took the 
place of the Court were altered both in name and in function several times during the 1940s (see 
Bassett 1972:13-33) until the Waterfront Industry Commission and Waterfront Industry Tribunal 
were fmally locked in place by means of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. Given the time period 
covered by this thesis, the discussion of industrial relations in this chapter will be restricted to the 
period after the Waterfront IndustlY Act was passed. For a discussion of industrial relations in the 
period 1940-52 the reader is directed to Green (1989), Bassett (1972) and Scott (1952). 
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As I alluded to earlier, New Zealand's state-regulated arbitration system was part 
of a unique Australasian system. In a path-breaking article on the effects of the 
Australian variant of this system, Littler et al. write: 
The conventional view in the literature is that arbitration has had a 
centralizing effect, whereby wage and work control struggles have 
been drawn away from the workplace. This, in turn, is seen to have 
resulted in Australia having comparatively under-developed 
industrial relations structures and processes at the workplace 
(1989:510). 
This statement regarding the 'conventional view' applies equally to New Zealand. 
However, in this chapter I will reject the characterization of New Zealand's 
'system' as standardized and homogenous, which automatically guaranteed 
national bargaining and national agreements, and subordinated the local to the 
national. Instead I will demonstrate that the effects of the state-sponsored 
waterfront arbitration system contradict the 'conventional view', that industrial 
relations on the waterfront were as much decentralized as centralized, as much 
driven 'from below' (by port unions and employers) as 'from above' (by national 
organizations), and that this was one of the principal sources of tension within the 
system. 
But first it is necessary to deal in some detail with the framework of legal 
regulation on the waterfront in order, as Zeitlin urges, to tease out the actual 
"constraints that specific systems of legal and administrative regulation ... impose 
on union [and employer] activity under particular circumstances" (1985:4). The 
legally constituted occupational registration system established by the Waterfront 
Industry Act (1953) had its concomitant in the legal regulation of industrial 
relations. In effect, the Act created a 'mini-arbitration system' specific to 
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waterside workers and their employers. 2 The fact that the three other main 
occupational groups on the waterfront (harbour workers, foremen-stevedores and 
tally clerks) remained within the arbitration system, and subject to the rulings of 
the Arbitration Court rather than the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, further 
illustrates my argument that the bureau system of labour administration, as it was 
originally conceived, was a system of occupational rather than industrial 
governance.3 
Although the 1953 Waterfront Industry Act institutionalized an occupational 
registration system, this system extended registration only to individuals and not to 
their unions.4 Thus the only part of the legal framework of the arbitration system 
generally that applied to waterside workers and their employers were the clauses 
in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act relating to the registration of 
union and employer organizations and, moreover, which limited the capacity of 
unions to take industrial action. 5 Although the occupation of waterfront work was 
located outside the arbitration system proper, the legal framework which regulated 
it shared the same basic tenets of this system with respect to abrogating "the 
traditional trade union principle of the right to strike" (Roth 1974:100). By 
registering under the IC&A Act waterfront unions were, ipso jacto, required to 
abide by an implicit commitment to conciliation (through Port Conciliation 
2 Very few industries in the private sector had specialized institutions that approximated the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal, which was established by the 1953 Act. More recent examples are 
the Tribunals created under the Aircrew Industrial Tribunal Act 1971 and the Agricultural Workers 
Act 1977 (see Geare 1983:52). 
3 These peripheral occupations were part of the conventional arbitration system until an amended 
form of the Waterfront Industry Act was passed in 1976 which brought these occupations within 
the ambit of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. The Act and its effects will be dealt with in the 
chapters in Section 5 of the thesis. 
4 Indeed, the Act defines a 'union' as "an industrial union of waterside workers registered under the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1925." 
5 Compulsory unionism, which the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1936 established, 
was automatically guaranteed on the waterfront even after it was abolished in by an amendment to 
this latter Act in 1961. Section 28(3) of the 1953 Waterfront Industty Act required all workers to 
join a union no more than seven days after having their name placed on a bureau register, and all 
registered workers had the automatic right to join the union at the port where they were registered. 
That is one of the reasons why the POlt unions pushed for 'joint control' ofrecruittnent, because all 
registered watersiders automatically became union members. 
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Committees and the National Conciliation Committee) and compulsory arbitration 
(by the Tribunal) during the course of an order and during bargaining for a new 
All strikes by registered unions were therefore illegal (see Roth 
1974:100).7 Although under the Act union registration was voluntary, with non-
registered unions retaining the right to strike (Bretten 1968:760), there was 
considerable incentive to register insofar as non-registered or deregistered unions 
could be displaced by newly registered unions (Roth 1974:104).8 The experience 
of waterfront unions following the 1951 dispute is a case in point. 
Insofar as waterfront UnIons were registered under the IC&A Act, they were 
required to "surrender . . . the right to strike" in return for "access to the 
conciliation and arbitration machinery" (Roth 1974: 10 1 ). Once again, there was 
both a constraining and constitutive element to this arrangement. As Littler et al. 
note regarding Australia: 
the very existence of the arbitration system will influence the 
strategic choices of the parties by providing an additional 
mechanism for pursuing their objectives and by affecting their 
capacity to employ other methods (1989:514). 
6 As Bretten points out, "the primary purpose of registration is to secure an agreement or award 
which will be binding upon the employers, union and workers concerned, and which, 
notwithstanding the expiration of its currency, will be deemed to continue in force until a new 
award or industrial agreement has been duly made and has come into operation. It follows that 
from the time when the members of a particular industrial union are first bound by an agreement or 
award, any strike action which they take will inevitably be unlawful unless the Minister has 
cancelled the award or agreement so far as it relates to that union" (1968:754, emphasis added). 
7 As well as providing for substantial fmes that could be imposed on union members, the IC&A Act 
allowed the Minister of Labour to deregister a union (Bretten 1968:756). The preparedness of 
governments to use this latter provision was most graphically demonstrated by the alacrity with 
which the Waterside Workers' Union was deregistered during the dispute in 1951. Whether or not 
this was in fact a 'strike' as such or a 'lockout' was, and continues to be, a matter of contention. 
8 Roth (1974: 104) writes that "Dual unionism is not only possible where a union has cancelled or 
lost its registration under the Arbitration Act, but it works in such a way that it will invariably drive 
the unregistered union from the field and kill it." Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated 
than at the Port of Wellington after the 1951 waterfront dispute (see Chapter 3). "This had been 
proved time and again", Roth continues, "and it makes nonsense of the oft-repeated claim that 
registration under the Act is voluntary (which is of course technically conect) and that there is a 
legal right to strike in New Zealand, which the great majority of unions have surrendered of their 
own free will by registering" (ibid: 104). 
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However, as we shall subsequently see graphically illustrated in comments by 
union officials in the following section, New Zealand's waterfront unions in the 
main regarded compulsory arbitration as a constraint rather than a resource. 
In every other respect, however, the legal framework which regulated industrial 
relations on the waterfront was established by the 1953 Waterfront Industry Act. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, there was a certain degree of indeterminacy within the 
Act. Consequently patterns of bargaining, whether national or local, cannot 
merely be 'read off from, and were not unambiguously prefigured by the 
legislative provisions it contained. To some extent, therefore, the effects of the 
Act can only be gauged from the actual pattern of bargaining which it supported. 
Although I will briefly deal with the main provisions of the Act as they pertain to 
bargaining, rather than engaging in a detailed analysis of jurisprudence my 
emphasis will be on supplying examples of how these provisions worked out in 
practice. 
It is significant that, as well as recogruzmg national organizations, the Act 
formally constituted port unions and individual employers as actors within the 
realm of industrial relations. The 1953 Act explicitly states that "Any union or 
association or the New Zealand Port Employers Association Incorporated or any 
employer of waterside workers may at any time apply to the Tribunal in the 
prescribed form for a principal order or other order.,,9 In effect, this provision 
potentially allowed a tier of bargaining and agreements at the port level and the 
company level to evolve and coexist alongside bargaining over wages and 
conditions at a national level and a national agreement. 
9 Waterfront Industry Act 1953, s 14(1) (emphasis added). This arrangement contrasts with the 
realm of employment relations, where port unions and the Port Employers Association were 
formally designated as the actors (thereby subordinating firms). 
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Although the Act does not make explicit reference to national agreements as such, 
it does refer to the capacity of the Tribunal to make 'principal orders as to pay and 
conditions of work', wherein some sort of national agreement was undoubtedly 
envisaged. The national agreements which subsequently were settled were termed 
General Principal Orders. To be sure, a state-sponsored forum for national 
bargaining (through a specially constituted National Conciliation Committee) was 
provided, together with ultimate recourse to the compulsory arbitration (via the 
Tribunal) if agreement could not be reached. However, bargaining at this level 
was not automatic or inevitable. Indeed in setting out the provision for the 
Minister of Labour to appoint a National Conciliation Committee, national 
bargaining was not mentioned; rather the stipulation was merely that such a 
Committee had to be constituted to deal with "any specified application relating to 
two or more ports" (s 37(1), emphasis added). The conciliation forum for 
applications from unions and employers at a single port, on the other hand, was 
the local Port Conciliation Committee. 
While the Act does contain a type of 'subsequent parties' clause, its effects were 
in practice limited. Section 25(1) of the Act states that "Every order and decision 
made by the Tribunal under this Act shall be binding on all persons whom the 
order or decision purports to affect, whether or not any such person, in the case of 
an employer, is a member of the New Zealand Port Employers' Association 
Incorporated or, in the case of a worker, is a member of any union." Thus national 
agreements seemingly applied to all employers (including, for example, shipping 
companies that ilTegularly visited New Zealand and were not members of the 
PEA) and all waterside workers (including casuals). In practice, however, national 
agreements applied to these parties only at the specific ports which were named in 
the order. In other words, all employers and workers at named ports had to abide 
by the agreement. And national agreements never 'purported to affect' any port 
where the local union was not a signatory to the agreement. 
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The difficulties associated with bargaining at the national level were exacerbated 
by the fact that the unions' national organization was in fact a 'Joint Council' 
comprised of two regionally based federations of local port unions (rather than a 
national union as SUCh).lO Together with being empowered by the Act as 'actors', 
this organizational structure gave port unions considerable autonomy and latitude 
to act within the realm of industrial relations. In practice, the Federations would 
not bargain on behalf of non-members, and national agreements did not apply to 
ports where the union was not a signatory. This was graphically illustrated in 
1953 when the Picton Union withdrew from the South Island Federation, 
negotiated its own agreement with the port employers and its members proceeded 
to work outside of the newly negotiated national agreement (GPO 24). Even for 
unions that were members of a Federation, a GPO could not be implemented at a 
port until it was ratified by the local union by ballot. Once again, this was vividly 
demonstrated in 1970 when for a period of seven months the Auckland Union 
refused to ratify a national agreement (GPO 305), and sought instead to 
renegotiate its own port order. Similarly national agreements, in practice, did not 
automatically apply to ports which were not named. This became apparent in 
1958 when the Port of Kaiapoi reopened and the South Island Federation was 
forced, in the face of opposition from workers there, to seek an agreement relating 
specifically to this port. 
These examples will be dealt with in greater depth in this chapter, but for the 
moment they illustrate the fragile nature of bargaining at the national level, which 
10 To recap, the two union organizations were respectively called the North Island Waterfront 
Workers Industrial Association and the South Island Waterside Workers Federation. Following the 
Lyttelton Union's decision to join the North Island Association, the Association changed its name 
in 1964 to the Northern, Taranaki, Wellington, and Canterbury Federation of Waterside Unions. It 
changed its name once more in 1966, when Port Chalmers joined, to the Northern, Taranaki, 
Wellington, Canterbury, Otago and Southland Federation of Waterside Unions. As in the 
preceding chapters, I will refer to the two organizations as the North Island Federation and the 
South Island Federation. 
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involved a quest to negotiate an agreement which was acceptable to all on both 
sides. And, as the preceding examples indicate, the barrier to achieving a truly 
national agreement was more often not the Port Employers Association, but rather 
individual port unions. To reiterate, whatever the formal provisions and 
requirements of the Act, this is how the system worked in practice. 
As well as national bargaining to establish General Principal Orders (as national 
agreements were called), there were two other levels where formal bargaining took 
place and codified agreements were made. The first of these is the level of the 
port, where Supplementary Principal Orders were negotiated. Although this tier of 
bargaining largely evolved by agreement between the Federations and the PEA, 
and port orders were usually appended to the national document, procedurally this 
type of agreement did not require the involvement of the national organizations. 
The second level was that of agreements between particular companies and port 
unions at either the company or site levels which were codified in Principal 
Orders. 11 
That the Act explicitly allowed for such local bargaining was, however, a 
somewhat exceptional situation when compared to industries within the 
jurisdiction of the arbitration system proper. During this period decentralized 
bargaining, which resulted in 'second tier' agreements, was characteristic also of 
these industries. Walsh (1993: 190) argues that the arbitration system generally 
was 'in decline' because of "the actions of unions and employers from the 1950s 
and 1960s onwards, as they shifted to direct bargaining outside the system.,,12 He 
continues: 
II It should be noted that this is only one type of Principal Order issued by the Tribunal. Other 
types dealt with modifications to the GPO, and agreements between the Federations and the PEA 
on issues that affected all ports. 
12 Walsh argues that "A number of factors contributed to the development of second-tier 
bargaining. A long period of labour scarcity gave unions and workers a bargaining advantage and 
employers an interest in buying labour and industrial peace. New patterns of industrialization 
brought into existence large and often geographically isolated sites with new technologies and 
Agreements negotiated on either a plant, company or regional 
basis, which came to be called second-tier agreements, for the most 
part stood outside the arbitration system. They set wages and 
conditions of employment superior to those in the award that would 
otherwise have applied. (ibid: 181). 
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But such agreements, as 'voluntary collective agreements', were not until 1973 
able to be legally registered. 13 
Because the Waterfront Industry Act, unlike the Arbitration System generally, 
expressly permitted the negotiation of legally enforceable local (port, company 
and site) agreements which procedurally did not require the involvement of the 
national organizations, tensions arose regarding who was the 'collective actor': the 
unions or the Federation, the PEA or individual employers. The institutional 
resources the Act made available to individual unions and employers at the port 
level meant that they did not have to rely upon the national organization because 
they could negotiate locally and had independent recourse to the Tribunal to 
adjudicate disputes and to ratify local agreements. Because port unions and 
individual employers were formally constituted in this manner as actors within 
industrial relations, the propensity towards centralization or decentralization was 
therefore mediated by the organizational capacities of the PEA and the Waterside 
Workers' Federations. This centered on the ability of each of these organizations 
to ensure that their members observed their respective policies. Bargaining at the 
national level required some sort of national organization which, in turn, implied 
some degree of centralization of decision-making and action at a national level 
working conditions that were better covered by their own site agreement rather than the various 
occupational awards" (1993:181). 
13 The Industrial Relations Act 1973, which modified the Arbitration System, "recognized a trend 
toward direct bargaining" by allowing for "voluntary collective agreements" to be registered, "to 
bring this fonll of activity within the formal system" (Hince 1993:8). Walsh (1993: 183) argues that 
the 1973 Act, together with the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970, 
"sought to restore the primacy of awards and establish an orderly relationship between awards and 
second-tier bargaining." 
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both on the pat1 of the umons and the employers' association (a degree of 
'externalization', that is). If this 'delegation' or 'externalization' broke down, the 
whole process of negotiating national agreements could also break down. 
Industrial relations on the waterfront were, therefore, simultaneously centralized 
and decentralized, contra the 'conventional view' regarding the effects of state-
regulated arbitration systems. However this was not a 'functional' or dovetailed 
division between centralized and decentralized bargaining and industrial 
agreements. Rather, the tension and shifting balance between centralization and 
decentralization was a key dynamic which structured industrial relations in the 
period under consideration. This tension was expressed both within and between 
the unions and employers national organizations. It was the complex (and 
contingent) interplay between the options provided, and constraints imposed by 
the state-regulated system, in concert with the shifting balance between 
centralization and decentralization (both of organizational form and of 
bargaining), which resulted in the distinctive pattern of industrial relations on the 
waterfront during the period under consideration. 
(3) Union Strategies and Employer Strategies 
Which of the complex matrix of bargaining 'options' provided by the Waterfront 
Industry Act were taken up was shaped by the respective strategies of the unions 
and of the employers, and their organizational capacities to realize these strategies. 
In this section I will sketch in the main elements of the strategy of each set of 
actors, with respect to the level at which negotiations were conducted and how 
agreements were actually secured (whether 'by consent' or by means of 
compulsory arbitration). Then in the next section I will discuss in detail the 
pattern of bargaining which crystallized over time, and the bargaining outcomes 
which actually resulted. 
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(3.1) Union Strategies 
An unusual combination of arrangements, with respect to union organizational 
form, bargaining procedures and industrial agreements, existed on the waterfront 
during the 1950s and for most of the 1960s. On the one hand, the waterside 
workers' national organization was until 1967 split between a North Island 
Federation and a South Island Federation of local port unions, which were 
organized in an exclusive (almost craft-like) manner around exclusive registers, 
and both the port and the workplace were central to bargaining. Yet the unions 
were also party to a national agreement (the General Principal Order) and 
collective bargaining with the Port Employers Association at the national level 
was central to the practice of industrial relations. 
The key to these seemingly paradoxical arrangements, as I noted above, is that the 
system was simultaneously centralized and decentralized. A state-sponsored 
forum for national bargaining (the National Conciliation Committee) was 
provided, together with ultimate recourse to compulsory arbitration via the 
Tribunal if an agreement could not be reached. Nonetheless, bargaining at this 
level was not automatic or inevitable, particularly insofar as the unions were split 
between two regionally-based federations whose individual member unions 
differed both in outlook and militancy. For instance, in 1964 the members of the 
Bluff Union passed the following remit "That the South Island Federation 
investigate the possibility of negotiating a separate Principal Order.,,14 Although 
such negotiations were never entered into, this example (together with those 
mentioned in the preceding section) illustrates the precariously balanced nature of 
bargaining at the national level. 
14 Letter from Bluff Union Secretary to South Island Waterside Workers Federation Secretary, 
12/11/64. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 211 (Alexander Turnbull 
Library, NLNZ). 
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To successfully negotiate at this level, the unions had to overcome a number of 
organizational difficulties. Collective bargaining at the national level required a 
degree of "centralization of authority" (Zeitlin 1987: 162) within the national 
organization. Negotiating a national document was fundamental to the practice of 
trade unionism by the Federations. Indeed, the main reason why the South Island 
Federation forced the formation of a union at the Port of Kaiapoi in 1960, against 
the wishes of some of the workers there, was so that they would not work outside 
of the General Principal Order. 15 General Secretary Jim Roberts wrote in a letter 
to a sympathetic worker at Kaiapoi that: 
our National Executive ... are very anxious to get the Union 
established and obtain an agreement in line with the GPO of the 
waterside workers for your port. 16 
That such a small group of workers was perceived as a possible threat to the 
integrity of the national agreement also underscores the importance to the 
Federations of the GPO as the 'cornerstone', or foundation, of industrial relations 
on the waterfront. The GPO was used by the federations to set minimum wages 
and conditions - it took wages out of competition nationally by setting hourly 
rates, establishing guaranteed payments, rates for special cargoes (which in 
practice were the minimum rates, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter) and so 
forth; it did the same with respect to hours of work, gang sizes, holidays and other 
conditions of work. 
15 An exceptional situation existed at this port, which was located at the mouth of the Kaiapoi 
River: "The Port of Kaiapoi was reopened to coastal shipping in November 1958 after being closed 
for 22 years. . . . Two coastal shipping companies are providing a regular service between 
Wellington and Kaiapoi" (WIC Report 1962:5-6). This was a very small port, and the main 
employer was the Collingwood Shipping Company. Not only was there no union, the bureau 
system was not in operation there either. The men largely worked on a casual basis and a union 
had not been formed. Furthermore, there was no industrial agreement, award, or order in force at 
this port. The bureau system was never established at this port, and the number of members of the 
union fluctuated between zero and fourteen during the 1960s. 
16 Letter fi'om Jim Roberts to John Lloyd, 9/11/59. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 2/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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The claims for the GPO regarding wages and conditions were compiled via remits 
at national conferences which were submitted by the port unions and then voted 
upon, and then sought in negotiations by a negotiating committee comprising 
representatives of the North Island and South Island Federations. Following the 
satisfactory settlement of an agreement, a ballot of each port union was then 
conducted by the Federations to ratify the new GPO. In effect, this balloting 
process meant that the executive members of the Federations had to 'sell' the 
national document both to the executive members of the port unions and, 
moreover, to the rank and file. They frequently visited the ports with the 
document in tow, and actively canvassed support for it. As we shall see in the 
next section, it was by no means certain that the rank and file would lend their 
support; towards the end of the 1960s it became more difficult to get the large port 
unions to accept the document than the employers. Even when a document was 
accepted, the Federations were sensitive to, and maintained a keen interest in the 
extent to which the GPO satisfied local unions. For instance, General Secretary 
Roberts made a point of stressing at the 1954 South Island Federation conference 
that the Federation should obtain the opinion of the local unions as to how the 
newly negotiated GPO was working out at each port. 17 
The strategies employed by the Federations, with respect to the manner in which 
national and local negotiations should be conducted, also must be located in the 
context of the hostile attitude of the national level officials towards compulsory 
arbitration. In relation to Australia, Littler et al. write: 
it has been suggested that arbitration encourages a dichotomous set 
of union strategies. One is based around centralized negotiations 
heavily dependent on tribunals and with associated union structures 
and policies which de-emphasize workplace organization and 
bargaining .... The other extreme, significantly, does not eschew 
17 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference, 30/11/54. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
arbitration entirely, but uses it as a baseline (which needs raising 
through industrial action), while placing strong emphasis on the 
benefits of direct negotiation and semi-autonomous shopfloor 
organization. It tends to be associated with more decentralized 
union goveming structures (1989:514). 
131 
Although this notion of a dichotomization of union strategies may be too stark to 
fully capture the complexity of the effects of the arbitration system in New 
Zealand, it does broadly correspond to the historic bifurcation between the 
'arbitrationist' unions and the 'industrial' unions and their respective strategies 
(see Nolan and Walsh 1994).18 Furthermore, the latter set of strategies identified 
by Littler et al. does approximate that of the Waterside Workers Federations 
during the 1950s and 1960s.19 
As Walsh (1993:175) notes, traditionally there have been two roles played by 
labour courts in New Zealand: "as national tribunals determining wages and 
conditions of employment, and as adjudicators in disputes over the employment 
relationship." I will deal with the Federations approach to bargaining over wages 
and conditions in the next section. But for the moment I will briefly examine their 
approach to settling disputes because it illustrates not only the degree to which the 
Federations sought to circumvent the formal mechanisms of conciliation and 
arbitration, but also their attempts to constrain and channel the actions of the local 
port unions. 
One of the first decisions of the Federations at the Joint Conference which was 
held in 1952 was to seek to establish an institution which would facilitate the 
circumvention of the formal mechanisms of conciliation and arbitration in the 
18 The former (deregistered) Waterside Workers Union had a long history of antipathy towards 
compulsory arbitration which has been well-documented (see Holt 1986; Bassett 1972; Roth 1974). 
Indeed this antipathy is generally regarded as having been an important precipitating factor in the 
1951 waterfront dispute (see Bassett 1972). 
19 Interestingly enough, Littler brackets the Australian Waterside Workers Federation as 
conforming to this pattern. 
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settling of disputes. As a result, the National Joint Interpretation Committee was 
established in 1953 by agreement with the Port Employers Association. The 
Committee comprised four employers' representatives and two representatives 
from each Federation of watersiders?O Its role was that of interpreting existing 
Principal Orders and resolving disputes that arose without referring them to the 
Tribunal. 2 I That the Federations' reasons for seeking the establishment of the 
Committee was for it to act as an alternative to the formal institutions is indicated 
by comments of union officials at the time. The General Secretary of the South 
Island Federation, Jim Roberts, stated at the annual conference in 1953 that: 
we had set up an Interpretation Committee which, if successful, 
would to some extent eliminate the work of the PCCs and the 
Tribunal as far as the settlement of disputes was concerned.22 
This attempt to circumvent the formal mechanisms established under the 1953 
Waterfront IndustlY Act reflects the anti-arbitrationist sentiment which was 
expressed further by Roberts in the following statement: 
wherever it was practical, we should aim to adjust disputes 
ourselves .... On occasions disputes would arise which we may not 
be able to settle, and we would then require the services of the 
Tribunal. However, experience had shown that such Tribunals -
whether the Court of Arbitration, the WIT or any other such body -
had not been too liberal in their interpretations insofar as the claims 
of waterside workers were concerned.23 
Similar sentiments were also apparent within the North Island Federation. 
20 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference 25/11/53. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
21 Thus the disputes in question are 'disputes of rights', namely disputes "arising out of the 
interpretation or application of an existing collective agreement", as opposed to 'disputes of 
interest' which are disputes "arising either out of the negotiation of a new collective arrangement 
setting terms and conditions, or out of the renewal of an existing arrangement" (Geare 1983:196). 
22 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference, 25/11/53. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
23 Ibid. 
133 
Because individual unions had recourse to the Tribunal for settling disputes (and 
in making local agreements), the Federations had to try to regulate their activities, 
by making it mandatory that all claims be channelled through the national 
organization. At the third annual conference of the South Island Federation in 
1954, Federation President Weith observed that: 
There had been a number of meetings of the National Interpretation 
Committee held during the year, and in the main we had been fairly 
successful in getting decisions in favour of the members - more so 
than the decisions given by the WIT .... Arising from this, it 
should be clearly accepted that the decision to take any dispute to 
the WIT was one that should be made by the Joint Council and not 
left to each Union to decide?4 
Similarly, at the first annual conference of the North Island Federation in 1953, 
General Secretary Napier maintained that the local port unions were required to 
inform the Association of all matters submitted to the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal, because its decisions could affect all ports. 
This clearly indicates attempts by the Federations, using organizational pressure, 
to limit the port unions' autonomy and capacity to act which they had as a result of 
being formally constituted as actors within the field of industrial relations 
established by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. There was always the danger 
that a local union would 'break ranks' and make a local agreement, or submit a 
case to the Tribunal, that the national organization did not agree with. Attempts to 
limit the port unions' 'field of play', both with respect to disputes and bargaining, 
were characteristic of the Federations' approach throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
24 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference, 30/11/54. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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(3.2) Employer Strategies 
The employers' industrial relations strategy had to be formulated on more than one 
front. This is because the Port Employers Association, unlike the watersiders' 
Federations, also had to negotiate through the arbitration system proper with the 
peripheral occupational groups (principally the foremen-stevedores and tally 
clerks) employed by its members.25 Insofar as they were outside the jurisdiction 
of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, these negotiations were conducted on a 
completely separate basis from those with waterside workers. But insofar as the 
watersiders were the central and numerically most significant occupational group 
'employed' by members of the PEA, negotiations with this particular occupational 
grouping were the central ones that the PEA engaged in. Indeed, in many respects 
negotiations with watersiders set the scene for negotiations with these other 
occupational groups. For instance, the wage rate paid to foremen-stevedores was 
simply set at 38.5% above the basic ordinary time wage rate of water siders. 
Throughout the period in question, the PEA engaged in national level 
negotiations, and also negotiations at the port level. Indeed, there appears to have 
been a considerable degree of cooperation between the PEA and the Federations 
with respect to the order and manner in which these negotiations took place. The 
PEA also was prepared, for a large part of this period, to engage in direct 
negotiations with the Federations and then to 'apply by consent' for the documents 
to be registered by the Tribunal. In the 1960s, however, there was an increase in 
the number of applications to the Tribunal by the employers, and a consequent 
decrease in the number of 'consent' applications. 
25 The third group, the harbour workers, were employed by harbour boards which were represented 
in a separate employers' association (the Harbour Board Employers Union). In general, harbour 
boards did not retain waterside workers from the bureaux. There were however a few exceptions to 
this rule, and it should be noted that the harbour boards always had one representative on the 
National Conciliation Committee. This arrangement changed in 1976 when an amended 
Waterfront Industry Act brought the other three main occupational groups under the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal. 
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In general, the PEA sought to keep unions within the legal constraints which 
limited the right to strike by requiring a commitment to conciliation and 
arbitration. In effect, it sought to use the formal machinery of compulsory 
arbitration to establish industrial discipline, by preventing the unions from taking 
industrial action. Once again, the PEA had only limited success in this endeavour. 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the PEA was different from the watersiders' 
Federations in that it was a centralized national organization with branches at the 
port level which had only a limited amount of independence from the national 
body. Industrial relations policy, both in relation to bargaining and the manner in 
which disputes were handled, was therefore easier to formulate and enforce than 
within the Federations which were a relatively loose grouping of local unions. 
Although employers were not compulsorily required to join the PEA (and some of 
the itinerant shipping companies which visited New Zealand irregularly, as well as 
some of the smaller stevedoring companies, were not members), during the 1960s 
the majority of firms did in fact belong to this organization. 
However the PEA was by no means comprised of an homogeneous set of interests. 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that the Association was split between the Overseas 
Shipowners (which included the Conference Lines) and the New Zealand 
Shipowners Federation, each with their own respective sets of interests. These 
divisions, however, were largely submerged until the lead-up to containerization 
in the mid-1960s. Around this time, internal rifts started to appear over the 
different terms and conditions that each of these interest-groups wanted the PEA 
to pursue in national negotiations with the Federations. A notable example here is 
shiftwork. 
Furthermore, the PEA faced problems similar to the Federations regarding the 
status of its members as actors within industrial relations. Individual firms could 
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(and did) negotiate locally with unions for principal orders, and could also submit 
matters to the Tribunal. Thus the PEA sought to exercise control over its 
members, through its local branches, with respect to bargaining at the local level. 
Because of the nature of the organization, the PEA was by and large successful in 
coordinating nationally the activities of its members with respect to tactics, 
bargaining and the practice of industrial relations generally. However, the rifts 
that appeared within this organization in the late 1960s called into question the 
ability of the employers to confront the Federations as a united 'bloc'. 
Another crucial part of the employers' strategy was to monitor, through its local 
port branches, the organizational activities, power struggles and divisions within 
the Federations. This was, in effect, comparable to industrial espionage. The PEA 
engaged in this 'intelligence gathering' activity in order to attempt to exploit the 
divisions between the two Federations, particularly the moderating effect of the 
more conservative element which existed in unions within the South Island 
Federation. A number of the PEA Annual Reports during the 1960s explicitly 
referred to the perceived power balance within the Federations. In particular, the 
PEA did not want the 'more militant' North Island Federation to gain the upper 
hand. However they were not to get this wish. 
(4) The Pattern of Bargaining: Trends and Outcomes 
To recapitulate, the resulting pattern of bargaining was a product of the strategies 
of the respective actors, along with their capacities to implement these strategies, 
refracted through the constraints imposed by the legally regulated system. One 
aspect of this pattern is illustrated in Graph 5.1 (compiled from data published in 
the annual Waterfront Industry Commission reports on Tribunal decisions), which 
demonstrates that throughout the 1950s the majority of Principal Orders were 
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established by means of 'Applications By Consent' of both parties?6 The overall 
pattern reflects the general unwillingness of the unions to submit claims to the 
Tribunal, and also evidences the willingness of the employers to settle agreements 
by negotiation. A closer examination, however, reveals some variation in this 
pattern, particularly a fleeting relaxation on the part of the Federations of this 
approach. As we shall see, this was coupled with an increasing willingness and 
capacity to engage in industrial action. 
Graph 5.1 demonstrates that there were some orders applied for by the unions and 
employers during this period, but that the number of applications by the unions 
increased in the late 1950s. Similarly the number of orders applied for by the 
employers increased in the 1960s. However one cannot ascertain from these data 
whether the orders in question were General Principal Orders (national 
agreements, that is) applied for by the Federations and the Port Employers 
Association, or merely Principal Orders (relating to specific ports, companies or 
sites) applied for by port unions or individual employers. Nor can the extent to 
which umesolved issues in national negotiations were referred by either the 
employers or the unions to the Tribunal be determined. But by using WIC Annual 
Reports and archival records, it is possible to reconstruct year-by-year how each 
General Principal Order was settled. 
A detailed examination of this nature reveals that the manner in which national 
agreements were settled was subject to some variation during this period. 
Significantly, in the late 1950s the Federations did not strictly adhere to a policy of 
not submitting claims to the Tribunal. However, by the early 1960s their attitudes 
towards the Tribunal had once again hardened, which manifested itself in their 
approach to negotiations during the remainder of the decade. Because of the time-
26 This means that the unions and employers fully agreed to the provisions of the Principal Orders 
in conciliation proceedings, and that Tribunal was not required to rule on them. 
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period involved, and the shifting patterns within it, I will deal with these issues in 
two periods: 1953-61 and 1962-70. 
(4.1) 1953-1961 
(4.1.1) National Bargaining: General Principal Orders 
Negotiations for new national agreements (General Principal Orders) were carried 
out through a specially constituted National Conciliation Committee (NCC), 
which was charged solely with a conciliation function with respect to collective 
bargaining. Each NCC comprised eight employers representatives and eight union 
representatives (in practice, four from each Federation) and an independent 
Chairman. The NCC was convened only while negotiations for a new agreement 
were being carried out and would then be disbanded following the settlement of 
the agreement. A new NCC would then be convened in the next round of 'summit 
bargaining' . However in 1964 an amendment to the Waterfront Industry Act 
provided for a National Conciliation Committee to be appointed by the Minister of 
Labour for a period of up to two years. 
The first General Principal Order (GPO 24) was fully agreed upon by the 
Federations and the PEA in conciliation proceedings, and was established by the 
Tribunal via an 'Application By Consent' in 1953.27 Roth (1993:159) points out 
that this was, in the history of industrial relations on the waterfront, "the first time 
ever that complete agreement was reached in conciliation." This was at least 
partly (if not largely) the result of a conscious strategy on the part of the 
Federations to negotiate a full agreement and not to submit any claims to the 
Tribunal. South Island Federation President Weith commented that, during the 
negotiations for this Order, "many times we were discouraged, but the thought of 
27 As I noted in Chapter 4, the fIrst GPO made following the establishment of the 1953 Waterfront 
Industry Act was registered as GPO 24 because prior to it being settled the Tribunal had issued a 
number of Principal Orders relating to conditions at specifIc ports. The GPOs were numbered 
consecutively in accordance with the Principal Orders issued by the Tribunal. Thus the next GPO 
was Number 70. 
139 
going back to the Tribunal spurred the Federation representatives on to greater 
efforts. ,,28 
The desire not to submit claims to the Tribunal, coupled with having to abide by 
the legal constraints imposed by conciliation and arbitration, resulted in the 
Federations representatives losing some ground on conditions of work. In his 
history of the Auckland Union, Roth argues that: 
The union negotiators made concessions on major issues, such as 
mobility of labour, the wet and windy weather clause and work in 
meal hours. They gained no increase in the basic hourly rate ... 
but an increase in the guaranteed weekly minimum payment . . . 
some changes in allowance rates, and an 'equity payment' of an 
extra 3d an hour for accepting 'the modification of clauses 
previously existing which may have restricted the efficiency of the 
industry'. This payment was subject however to good behaviour: 
the port employers retained the right to withhold it in any week as 
punishment for a stoppage or failure to comply with the terms of 
the order (1993: 159). 
It must be emphasized, however, that the unions were negotiating from a position 
of considerable weakness in the wake of the 1951 dispute. At the South Island 
Federation's Annual Conference in 1953, General Secretary Jim Roberts 
commented with respect to the 'bargaining power' of the unions in these 
negotiations, that: "All the Unions had been well defeated two years previous. 
Many were only struggling to regain their former influence.,,29 It will be recalled 
that the events of 1951 which formed the backdrop to these negotiations included 
the deregistration of the national union, the formation of 'new' unions and the 
exclusion of active unionists, together with the loss of joint control over 
recruitment. Although some measure of national unity had been achieved through 
the 'Joint Council' of the two Federations, I have in previous sections 
28 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference 25111153. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1113 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
29 Ibid. 
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demonstrated the fragile nature of this unity. The Port Employers Association, on 
the other hand entered these negotiations having won - with considerable 
assistance from the state - what still rates as the most significant victory by 
employers in the whole of the postwar period. 
The fragility both of the unity of the Federations and the national agreement was 
clearly illustrated by the fact that the (albeit small) Picton Union was not party to 
it. In the early 1950s, problems occurred in securing the adherence of all local 
unions to the Federations' policies regarding the negotiation of local agreements. 
For example, in 1953 the Picton Union negotiated an agreement with the local 
employers without the authority of the national executive of the South Island 
Federation. General Secretary Roberts criticized the Union for this action: 
affiliations [sic] should remember that while they were affiliated to 
the South Island Federation they should remain loyal and cooperate 
with the Federation by at least having an officer present at the 
meeting when an important agreement was being made.3o 
The Picton Union subsequently withdrew from the South Island Federation. 
Although the union subsequently rejoined the Federation in 1959, it was not party 
to a GPO until 1964?1 
A similar attitude on the part of the Federations toward the Tribunal was evident 
in the negotiations for the second GPO which was negotiated in 1955. Prior to the 
negotiations through the National Conciliation Committee for this agreement, 
South Island Federation General Secretary Roberts sought and secured agreement 
from the Federation "that everything possible be done to obtain a complete 
30 Ibid. 
31 A former Federation executive member explained to me that the Picton Union had been allowed 
to rejoin the Federation in order to bring it back into the fold, but that the Federations did not want 
to force the issue of the union becoming party to the GPO (interview). 
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agreement without recourse to the WIT".32 And, as the 1956 WIC Report notes, 
"a substantial measure of agreement was reached" with the Port Employers 
Association (1956:6). Nonetheless, there were two significant 'matters in dispute' 
that were submitted to the Tribunal by the Federations: a claim for an increase in 
the hourly rate of pay (of 9d. per hour) and the introduction of a superannuation 
scheme. Although the Tribunal refused to "impose on the industry a subsidized 
superannuation or pension scheme", it did award a 3d. per hour increase in the 
basic rate of pay (ibid:6). 
It is apparent that the attitudes of the Federations' officials towards the Tribunal 
ebbed and flowed to a certain degree, depending on the recent decisions which it 
had handed down. In the late 1950s, buoyed by some favourable decisions, the 
Federations submitted an increasing number of claims arising out of attempts to 
negotiate new General Principal Orders.33 It should also be noted that this 
coincided with the period (1957-60) in which there were no applications for 
Principal Orders by the PEA, and in which the employers regarded the Tribunal as 
having ruled in favour of the unions. The 1957 PEA Report contained the 
comment that "we have felt that there is a tendency on the part of the Tribunal to 
make some concessions to the Unions in major claims" which, it claimed, resulted 
in the Federations exaggerating their claims in the hope of gaining something.34 
During negotiations for GPO 109 in 1957, the Federations were able to secure 
agreement with the PEA on some major issues, the most significant of which was 
the decision to establish a jointly funded superannuation scheme (the 'Endowment 
32 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Executive Meeting, Lyttelton, 20/7/54. 
New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/12 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
33 It should be noted that this development is not altogether apparent in Graph 5.1 because, as I 
noted previously, applications relating specifically to General Principal Orders cannot be 
distinguished from applications for Principal Orders. 
34 PEA Annual Report (1957:3). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Assurance Scheme,).35 However a number of matters in dispute, relating 
primarily to rates of pay, were referred by the Federations to the Tribunal. The 
upshot of this application was that the Tribunal granted increases in daily and 
weekly minimum payments, meal money and the special rate for freezer work 
(WIC Report 1958:7). Indeed, General Secretary Napier remarked at the North 
Island Federation's Biennial Conference in 1958 that "the General Order 
applications ... are far in advance of what we were able to gain direct from the 
Employers,,?6 This indicates that the Federations were prepared to make 
pragmatic use of the Tribunal when they thought it was likely to return favourable 
rulings. However, that this approach did not extend to reliance upon the Tribunal 
was graphically illustrated by the fact that the following year industrial action was 
used (for the first time since 1951) to secure an increase in the hourly rate of pay. 
Although the Tribunal had increased a number of rates in GPO 109, it had not 
increased the basic hourly rate of pay, which remained at the level set in 1955 
under GPO 70. The Tribunal did, however, add the provision that the rate could 
be reviewed after twelve months. Consequently, in 1959 the Federations sought 
from the PEA an increase in the hourly rate through the mechanisms of 
conciliation. The refusal of the employers to grant this increase resulted in 
stoppages by the unions at six North Island ports which comprised the main 
members of the more militant North Island Federation. The centers of the action 
were the ports of Auckland and Wellington which, along with Mount Maunganui 
and Tauranga stopped for two full working days, but included the ports of New 
Plymouth and Whangarei which each stopped for one day. 
35 The account of these negotiations is based on information provided in Waterfront Industry 
Commission's annual report for 1958. 
36 Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers Industrial Association Biennial Conference, 
18111158. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/16 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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This action was significant for a number of reasons. It was the first time any of 
the port unions had acted in concert in this manner in relation to a dispute since 
the passing of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. Moreover, it was the first time 
unions had used industrial action in a 'dispute of interest' (a dispute related to 
bargaining, that is) during this period. In effect, this action contravened the legal 
restrictions on the right to strike during the course of an agreement, thereby taking 
the unions outside of the legal constraints established by the Waterfront Industry 
Act, namely "the written undertakings given by all registered waterside workers to 
accept the principle of conciliation and arbitration in the settlement of disputes" 
(WIC Report 1961:7). Although the Federations did apply to the Tribunal in the 
wake of this dispute for an increase in the hourly rate, which was granted, the 
Tribunal censured the unions involved: 
We think it our duty to express our grave disapproval of the 
conduct of the unions which participated in these flagrant breaches 
of Principal Order 109 . . . We are glad to note that no union 
affiliated with the South Island Federation was involved in the 
stoppage.3? 
The significance of this action for the unions involved was, however, more than 
that of securing a wage increase. There was also a sense of 'testing the waters', as 
is indicated in a comment by the North Island Federation President, Eddie Isbey, at 
its biennial conference in 1960: 
In this action which was the first of its kind since 1951, although in 
the main successful, certain weaknesses were revealed from which 
it is hoped we all learned, but these weaknesses were 
understandable in a young organization just learning to flex its 
muscles.38 
37 WIC Report (1970:8). 
38 Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers' Industrial Association Biennial Conference, 
15/11/60. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/17 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Prior to this latter dispute, stoppages had been largely limited to unauthorized 
stop-work meetings and unauthorized extensions of such meetings. Graph 5.2 
shows that the level of stoppages was very low during this period. Indeed, the 
1959 PEA Annual RepOli states that: 
The direct relationship between employers and union officials, on a 
national basis, and at most ports, continues to be reasonably good 
but it is at Auckland and Wellington in particular - where direct 
action has crept in - that the absence of cooperation is most 
marked. 39 
The militancy of the ports in the North Island Federation was recognized in the 
1958 PEA Annual Report which stated that the South Island Federation "has 
proved a moderate and stabilizing force.,,4o It is also significant in that the former 
organization gradually took the lead in national bargaining (particularly after the 
secession of the Lyttelton and Port Chalmers union in the 1960s). Roth 
(1993: 162) demonstrates that a certain section of the Auckland Union had 
advocated direct action right from 1953, and that there had been a number of 
incidents where the Union had itself 'tested the waters', including discussion of a 
port-wide strike in 1954. And as early as 1956 the PEA noted that the Wellington 
Union was "exploiting every possible technicality during a period of non-
cooperation.,,41 This trend had been recognized in the 1957 PEA Report which 
stated: 
It is ... clearly in the interests of the Employers that the control of 
the waterfront workers' organizations should be kept on its present 
basis and not allowed to drift into the hands of the more militant 
element ... in the North Island.42 
39 PEA Annual Report (1959:15). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
40 Ibid (1959:6). 
41 PEA Annual Report (1957:3). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
42 Ibid (1957:5). 
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However industrial action was not limited to unions in the North Island. For 
example, after holding a secret ballot, watersiders at the Port of Bluff stopped 
work in 1957 to attend a rugby match between Fiji and the Southland provincial 
team (WIC Report 1958:6). Undoubtedly this stoppage can partly be explained in 
terms of the importance of rugby within New Zealand (see Phillips 1984; Fougere 
1990). Even the Commission noted that the stoppage was "understandable in 
view of the enthusiasm of Southland rugby supporters to see a popular overseas 
visiting teanl" (WIC Report 1958:6). But it can also be regarded as an (albeit 
limited) expression of the degree of control that the unions were once again 
beginning to assert on the waterfront. Another such example was a stoppage 
which occurred on a vessel at Lyttelton in 1960 over a three minute difference 
between the watch of the hatchman and that of the foreman. This stoppage 
prompted the Tribunal to comment: "It is to be regretted that a Union with so good 
a record as the Lyttelton Union should in this instance have chosen to act so 
precipitously and to rely on direct action.,,43 
The efficacy of both strike action and the threat of such action relates to the fact, 
which is acknowledged in studies internationally (Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly 
1992; Kimeldorf 1988; Finlay 1988), that ships' time in port is the most critical 
cost to shipping companies. As Turnbull et al. (1994:5) succinctly put it, "even if 
the ship's cargo is not perishable, the ship's time in port certainly is." This, in 
turn, confers a considerable advantage in bargaining to waterfront unions that are 
realistically able to threaten and to actually effect work stoppages. A former 
Waterfront Industry Commission Branch Manager, who witnessed many disputes 
in his 38 years on the waterfront, confirmed this effect in an interview: 
the only thing that a company wants is for their ship to be 
discharged and loaded and out to sea. So when it comes to a 
43 WIT Decision 281, 30/6/60. Waterfiont Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
dispute, and the employer quite rightly takes a stand when some 
things get out of hand, and if they [the watersiders] knock off work 
it then comes to the stage that the costs take over and they [the 
employers] have to back down. And this was the weapon that the 
watersiders had all this time. If its going to cost you so may 
thousand per day, and there's no work being done, it becomes 
colossal. ... Its not just easy for a shipping company to stand up to 
the watersiders. They can always do it collectively if its your ship 
and you haven't got a ship in port. Everybody was always very 
firm as long as they haven't got a ship in port. (Interview) 
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Although the PEA sought to keep the unions within the legal constraints of the 
system, and usually withheld the 3d per hour 'equity pay' during stoppages, such 
pressures rendered it difficult for individual employers to maintain their resolve in 
the face of direct action. Although in the next round of national negotiations, the 
unions did not engage in such action, in the period from 1962-70 this type of 
activity became more common. 
Following the expiry of the GPO 109 in January 1960, and undoubtedly buoyed by 
the favourable decisions handed down by the Tribunal in the previous round of 
negotiations, the Federations made applications for a new General Principal Order 
(which was subsequently granted in May 1960 as GPO 156). Once again, this 
resulted in some very favourable results accruing to the unions. These results 
were significant to the point that the Waterfront Industry Commission, in its 
annual report, made the following statement: 
The Tribunal increased the ordinary time rate of pay to 6s. 9d. per 
hour, granted full incorporation in contract rates of the 24 per cent 
wage increase made from 4 January 1960 and improved other 
conditions of employment. The total benefits granted to the 
workers under the new general principal order were estimated to 
cost £346,000 per annum or £1 Is. per man per week (WIC Report 
1961:7). 
At the South Federation conference later in 1960 a number of favourable 
comments were made by members of the executive about this ruling, and the 
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general consensus among the unions in both Federations was that the Tribunal's 
decision was favourable. 
It must be noted, however, that these results cannot be totally separated from the 
broader industrial relations 'climate', insofar as the 24% increase mentioned in the 
quotation relates to a General Wage Order. This was the result of a 'flow on' 
effect of the centralized wage-fixing system which existed in New Zealand in this 
period. These orders were periodically handed down by the Arbitration Court 
between 1922 and 1970 (Walsh 1993:177). Typically, the FOL applied to the 
Arbitration Court for a General Wage Order, in what Bremer (1993:123-4) 
describes as the "annual ritual of General Wage Order hearings in the 1950s and 
1960s." Although the waterside workers were under the jurisdiction not of the 
Arbitration Court but rather the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, they too received 
the equivalent of GWOs for, as Roth (1974:145) points out, "these orders are 
usually extended to workers outside the Court's jurisdiction.,,44 Numerous 
Principal Orders incorporating such in increases in the GPO were issued by the 
Tribunal during this period. Similarly, the Federations often held over wage-
claims, in order to wait for a GWO negotiated by the Federation of Labour. 
Despite the gains achieved by the unions in the late 1950s, by the early 1960s the 
enthusiasm displayed by the Federations' officials for the decisions of the Tribunal 
had largely evaporated. The anti-arbitrationist sentiment was once again evident 
as the unions confronted the legal constraints of the system, but this time they did 
so with an increased degree of organizational unity. I will deal with these 
deVelopments in a subsequent section, but for the moment I will shift to examine 
the process of local bargaining. 
44 These orders ceased in 1970 as a result of the passage of the General Wage Orders Act 1969 and 
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970, which fundamentally altered the 
centralized wage-fixing system (Walsh 1993: 177). 
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(4.1.2) Local bargaining: Supplementary Principal Orders and Principal Orders 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, the practice of industrial relations on the 
waterfront was both centralized and decentralized, and the tension and shifting 
balance between these tendencies were manifested intra-organizationally (within 
the Federations and the Port Employers Association) and were expressed in the 
patterns of bargaining which resulted. The national document could never 
encompass all of the local differences at the port level, if for no other reason than 
the different circumstances of each port. As a former North Island Federation 
official noted, 
What they primarily concerned themselves with, was local 
conditions which applied at that particular port. . . . Its no good 
writing something into an order that would apply to every port 
when in fact it could only have application to one or two .... Some 
ports had ropemen, others never. So that went into a local order for 
that particular port. (Interview) 
The example provided, that of ropemen, were only employed at 'railway ports' 
(see Chapter 3). But the 'local conditions' related not only to the 'technical' 
features of ports, but also the 'custom and practice' of each port. Different 
workplace practices evolved at ports over time in the context of different 
constituencies of employers and the character of local port unions. Although, as I 
will demonstrate, not all such practices were incorporated in an Supplementary 
Principal Order or a Principal Order, some undoubtedly were. 
In the case of Supplementary Principal Orders, the tension between centralization 
and decentralization manifested itself in the extent to which the system was driven 
'from above' (by the Federations and the PEA) or from below (by the port unions 
and the local employers). This tension hinges on the extent to which the national 
organizations controlled collective bargaining at this level, or to put it differently, 
on the extent to which this was an externalized system in the sense of local unions 
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and employers delegating their responsibilities in bargaining to the national 
organization. These relationships were registered in the importance of the SPO 
relative to the GPO, and extent to which this relationship changed through time, 
particularly at ports (such as Auckland) where the larger, more powerful unions 
had the bargaining power to negotiate independent of their Federation. 
It appears, however, that a 'stable balance' between bargaining at the national and 
local level did develop in the 1950s. During the ten years from 1955 until 1965 a 
pattern emerged whereby the Federations and Port Employers Association took the 
lead in negotiating Supplementary Principal Orders. This was particularly so with 
respect to the Federations. Apart from early dissenters like the Picton Union, 
during this period the local unions took their lead in bargaining from the national 
organization and local conditions were negotiated under the 'umbrella' of the 
national agreement. This pattern was consolidated as the North Island Federation 
began to take the lead both in national and local bargaining. 
During this period, the GPO typically would be used as the platform upon which 
the local port unions, with the assistance of their respective Federation, negotiated 
with the local branch of the PEA on issues specific to the port. After each GPO 
was negotiated, the Supplementary Principal Order at each port would then be 
negotiated. Typically, the local unions submitted claims to their respective 
Federations, which then compiled the claims and submitted them to the national 
Port Employers Association. An application was then made to the Chairman of 
the local Port Conciliation Committee who convened a date for conciliation 
proceedings to begin. Each of the Federations had a 'negotiating committee' 
which travelled to the various ports, along with national representatives of the 
PEA. The national representatives of the PEA and the Federations would then 
negotiate in concert with the local unions and employers. Ted Thompson, who as 
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a representative of the North Island Federation was involved in these negotiations 
during the 1960s, offered in an interview the following personal reflection: 
They [the SPOs] were negotiated by the national federation .... But 
you'd have meetings first at the local port, and they would come 
into the negotiations. You'd go round the ports. And on many 
occasions, we might quite often even travel in the same rental car, 
the employers and ourselves. You had a job to do, and while we 
were sworn enemies on a business and industrial basis, that wasn't 
so in your private life. (Interview) 
This set of arrangements meant that both the Federation officials and the national 
PEA representatives were in a position to at least monitor the negotiations for 
agreements at all of the ports, and undoubtedly to have some control over what 
was sought and / or conceded. It also evidences considerable cooperation at the 
national level between the PEA and the Federations. 
The SPOs that were negotiated in the wake of GPO 24 in 1953 included a diverse 
range of provisions. The larger ports, such as Auckland and Wellington, had more 
extensive provisions (including hours of labour engagement, travelling time, gang 
strengths over and above the minimum set in the GPO, sling load weights and so 
forth). Indeed, as Roth (1993:159) points out, the Auckland Union was able to 
retrieve some conditions which were lost at the national level (significantly, the 
rights to refuse to work after 6pm and to refuse a transfer to another job after 
working continuously for seven days). However, the SPOs of the smaller ports 
(such as Nelson and Bluff) had only a few clauses. But, over time, the SPOs at 
many ports (particularly the larger ones) evolved into more detailed documents. It 
is important to note that in the case of conflicts with provisions in the GPO, the 
Supplementary Principal Order had priority. 
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The manner in which negotiations over SPOs were conducted tended to follow the 
pattern established in national bargaining. For instance, the SPOs negotiated in 
the wake of GPO 24, like this latter agreement, were all established 'By Consent'. 
At various other times, however, matters which could not be agreed upon were 
submitted to the Tribuna1.45 This is particularly so, given that the Federations 
sought to limit the freedom of port unions to submit claims to the Tribunal (as in 
the case of disputes, which was discussed in the section on union strategy). The 
overall pattern, however, reflected the fact that, as I noted above, the majority of 
Principal Orders were made through 'Applications By Consent'. This, in tum, 
reflects the fact that apart from a brief period in the late 1950s, the attitude of the 
national officials towards the Tribunal was one of hostility. 
The preceding discussion suggests that in the negotiation of port agreements there 
emerged during the 1950s an element of centralization, which in tum was based 
on 'externalization' (the delegation of responsibility to the national organizations). 
The GPO formed the 'mainstay' of the bargaining process, and the SPOs were 
negotiated after them by the respective national organizations. Although the 
claims were submitted from the port unions, and counterclaims were undoubtedly 
submitted by local employers, negotiations were conducted by national 
representatives of each organization. In the case of the Federations at least, as the 
case of the Picton Union demonstrates, this was not just the unions relying on the 
expertise and organizational capacities of the Federation; rather the Federations 
actively sought to be involved in such negotiations. 
This arrangement would tend to support the arguments about the centralizing 
tendencies of arbitration systems. It must, however, be reiterated that this pattern 
was a contingent development, and not inevitable, particularly given unions which 
45 Supplementary Principal Orders, like the General Principal Order, were generally renegotiated 
biennially. 
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were 'embedded' at the port level, some of which had substantially different 
outlook and character. As I demonstrated in the discussion of union politics in 
Chapter 3, there was a divergence between the stronger and more militant North 
Island unions (such as Wellington and Auckland), and the smaller and more 
conservative South Island unions (such as Picton and OamalU). Although the Port 
Employers Association during this period was a much more unified 'bloc', it too 
comprised different interests. Thus any such centralizing tendencies were 
refracted through the organizations themselves, and this stable balance was based 
upon the employers, but more importantly the Federations achieving a measure of 
organizational unity at the national level. This stable balance was subsequently to 
falter in 1970, when the unions at Auckland and Wellington refused to ratify a 
national agreement. 
But even during this period of the 'stable balance', with respect to the role of the 
national organizations in the negotiation of Orders at the port level, there was 
another level at which agreements could be made between unions and employers: 
one-off agreements made via Principal Orders which the national organizations 
were not necessarily involved in. As was the case with GPOs and SPOs, such 
agreements could either be made by 'Applications By Consent' to Tribunal, or by 
one of the parties seeking a lUling in the case of a dispute. In some cases these 
were the equivalent of 'site agreements', relating to only a particular issue such as 
employers' incentive schemes, particular cargoes, new technology and so forth.46 
46 For example, in 1957 the Tauranga Union applied to the Tribunal for, and was granted, a 
Principal Order (Number 107) fixing maximum sling loads of paper pulp and minimum gang 
strengths for this cargo (WIT Decision 163, 10/6/57). Similarly the Tauranga Union and Mount 
Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores (a stevedoring company) applied by consent to the Tribunal 
in 1958 for an order (which was subsequently granted as Principal Order 115) to prescribe contract 
rates and conditions for the discharge of bulk sulphur (WIT Decision 185, 15/4/58). There are 
numerous examples of such agreements in the Waterfront Industry Tribunal records. Waterfront 
Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National Archives). 
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To reiterate, any union and any employer could enter into negotiations, and then 
apply to the Tribunal for a Principal Order.47 Although there was nothing to 
prevent the involvement of the national organizations, procedurally they were not 
required to be involved in these negotiations. On the side of labour, individual 
port unions had the right to negotiate and apply for Principal Orders. To be sure, 
this still involved an element of 'externalization' (albeit at a lower level than the 
Federations) in that the actor was the local port union rather than the gangs or the 
watersiders themselves. It will be recalled from the discussion of employment 
relations in Chapter 4 that the unions were similarly empowered with respect to 
agreements over the labour supply (specifically, in the negotiation of register 
strengths and bureau rules). 
In the case of the employers, however, as well as the Port Employers Association, 
individual firms were formally constituted as actors in industrial relations at· the 
local level. In the sphere of industrial relations, as opposed to employment 
relations, the order was therefore reversed. In employment relations individual 
firms were displaced as actors because the legally constituted occupational 
registration system forced competing firms to cooperate and to 'externalize' 
decisions over the supply of labour (regarding recruitment, register strengths and 
bureau rules) to the local branch of the Port Employers Association. 
Consequently, individual employers could only exert influence in this sphere 
organizationally, by lobbying and seeking to affect the decisions and policy of the 
local PEA. Conversely, in the sphere of industrial relations individual employers 
were legally empowered to negotiate with the local union and either secure 
agreement or apply to the Tribunal for a Principal Order, courses of action which 
47 To be sure, the Federations and the Port Employers Association often applied to the Tribunal 
(either by consent or to get a ruling) for Principal Orders that related to all ports. Examples include 
Principal Orders that amended the GPO during its course to incorporate General Wage Orders. 
But the point is that the port unions and individual employers also were able to make such 
agreements. 
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the PEA could only try to control through organizational means (by not 
supporting them, that is). 
Thus, while competing firms had to cooperate with respect to issues of labour 
supply, in the sphere of industrial relations individual firms could seek agreements 
with the union, and often did so in attempting to gain a competitive edge. For 
instance, in 1961 the Inter-Island Shipping Company at Wellington sought the 
national Port Employers Association's suppOli in applying to the Tribunal for an 
Order to allow for the use of a permanent gang. In this case, the Wellington 
Branch of the Port Employers Association did not agree, and the PEA 
Management Committee declined this request on the grounds that it could provoke 
'industrial unrest'. Furthermore, the Committee directed the local PEA to try to 
convince the Company not to make such an application to the Tribunal, but that if 
it did so, the Association would not support it and would not make any resources 
available or represent the Company at the Tribunal hearing.48 This is a clear 
example of the point I made above: the PEA trying to limit by organizational 
means (which were the only means available to them) the right of individual 
employers to make application to the Tribunal for Principal Orders. 
For the national organizations, however, the considerable potential for 
decentralized bargaining and agreements at the level of ports and companies was 
both a constraint and a resource. It was a constraint, as I have noted, because local 
unions and employers could themselves apply for such orders (as evidenced by the 
case of the Picton Union and the preceding example of permanent gangs) without 
the involvement of the national organization. But it could also be a resource 
because the national organizations could, with the cooperation of their member 
organizations, apply at the local port level for conditions which then would 
48 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 298, 16/9/61. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 202 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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establish precedents that would enable similar conditions to be sought at other 
ports. For example, in 1960 the Port Employers Association attempted (albeit 
unsuccessfully) to change the basis of cooperative contracts (incentive contracts 
administered by the Commission, that is) at the Port of Lyttelton, in order to take 
this to the Tribunal as the basis for changing the cooperative contracting system 
nationally.49 Similarly, the Federations frequently sought to extend favourable 
decisions of the Tribunal obtained by individual port unions, and in a number of 
cases relating to new technology did so successfully (see Chapter 7). 
But, once again, favourable agreements at a particular port were not only sought to 
be extended by the Federations. Principal Orders were also the means by which 
local unions often sought to get the conditions which applied at other ports. In 
1961, the Lyttelton Union attempted to gain a Principal Order giving it the reduced 
hours which were worked at Bluff. 50 The Tribunal, in issuing its decision, 
remarked that 
It is ... a weakness in the Lyttelton Union's case that so far as we 
are aware there has been no general demand for a similar change in 
other ports, or made by the North Island or South Island 
Federations of Waterfront Unions. 51 
Yet, on the other hand, a union could enter into agreements which compromised 
other port unions by settling for substandard wages or conditions on matters which 
were not covered by the GPO. For instance, the Mount Maunganui Union entered 
into such an agreement in 1964 with a company over the loading of logs for 
export, and the company then sought to insist that similar conditions applied at 
49 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Biennial Conference, 2112/60. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
50 An agreement had been reached at Bluff in 1956 whereby the standard 11 hour day had been 
reduced to 10 hours. 
51 WIT Decision 356, 18/12/61. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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Lyttelton.52 Norris (1980: 196) maintains that the "Mount Maunganui watersiders 
had placed the rest of the country's waterfront workers in a very embarrassing 
position by agreeing to work under such a backward agreement." 
Given that the 1953 Act allowed different 'corporate' actors access to the same 
'legal machinery', whether the constraining or enabling elements of this system 
came into play depended on the organizational unity and capacities of the unions 
and employers at a national level. As in the case of SPOs, it appears that with 
respect to the negotiation of Principal Orders something of a 'stable balance' 
existed. The Federations sought to ensure that the local unions informed them of 
all matters submitted to the Tribunal. The PEA exerted a similar sort of 
organizational pressure (as evidenced by the case of the company seeking a 
permanent gang), and a number of Principal Orders were applied for by the PEA 
on behalf of companies, which implies support for what the companies were 
seeking. Furthermore, union and employer records indicate that there was a 
considerable degree of cooperation within, but also between their respective 
national organizations during this period regarding the manner in which 
bargaining took place. And an upsurge in the numbers of principal orders, in the 
form of company-union agreements, did not occur until the onset of 
containerization in the 1970s (see Chapter 11). 
It would be a mistake however to believe that, even under a legalistic, state-
regulated system, all practices which could potentially be codified were in fact 
codified - many were not. Of course, it would be equally wrong to believe that all 
practices can in fact be codified in the first place. This latter point anticipates an 
argument which will be developed more fully in the following chapter on work 
relations. Drawing on the classic study by Baldamus (1961), I will subsequently 
52 This agreement is mentioned by Baden Norris in his history of the Lyttelton Union. "This 
document", he writes, "allowed the employers to work 24 hours a day, reduce gangs strength from 
eight to six and only two men [were] employed on the shore" (Norris 1980: 196). 
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argue that employment contracts are by their very nature 'incomplete' or 'open-
ended', particularly in an industry like the waterfront which is characterized by 
high levels of 'process uncertainty', which in effect means that work cannot be 
Taylorized (see Kelly 1978). As Edwards (1989:189) argues, "the conventional 
distinction between formal and informal rules" is not particularly useful because it 
assume[s] a complete and unambiguous set of formal or official 
rules against which informal practices can be measured. But the 
employment contract cannot be specified so precisely, for its 
essential characteristic is that workers' creative capacities are being 
deployed: it is impossible to specify a complete set of formal rules . 
Drawing on Baldamus and Edwards, I will argue that it is this contractual 
indeterminacy which results in on-the-job negotiations over the terms of the wage-
effort bargain. 
However for the moment I will restrict myself to the practices which could 
potentially be codified but, for some reason or other, were not (for instance, actual 
gang strengths on certain jobs over and above the minimum set by the GPO). 
These practices, which were usually specific to particular ports as 'local practices', 
blur the boundaries of the formal and the informal. They were not of the order of 
completely informal practices, some of which (such as 'spelling') actually 
contravened the GPO. Indeed some of these practices were actually sanctioned 
and agreed to by the local Port Conciliation Committee, but they were not 
formally codified in legally-enforcable Principal Orders. The examples I will 
provide have been drawn from cases submitted to the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal. It was during disputes that these local practices, bargains, and deals 
usually came to light and, after being ruled on by the Tribunal, often became 
formally recognized and codified. 
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The first example came to light during a dispute at the Port of Lyttelton in 1955 
over the number of 'truck men' per gang on flat-top trucks (as opposed to tip-
trucks) while loading bales of wool. In its decision, the Tribunal made the 
following statement: 
We are informed that the number of men to be employed in various 
capacities on the Lyttelton waterfront has in the past been governed 
by custom, subject always to the provisions of [General] Principal 
Order 24, and that there is no written 'manning scale' and none has 
been sought from the Tribunal. It would appear, therefore, that 
differences as to manning have in the past been settled between the 
parties, or by the Port Conciliation Committee. 53 
The Tribunal refused in this case to specify the number of men that should be 
employed. In this case, the informal agreement was underpinned by the minimum 
conditions established in the GPO. And, although the SPOs had priority over the 
GPO, 'local practices' as such could not conflict with the national agreement. 
This is evidenced in a decision made by the Tribunal in 1961, following a dispute 
being referred to it by the Gisborne PCC. The Tribunal stated "Where the GPO 
makes provision for a matter in clear terms a contrary local practice cannot prevail 
against the terms of the Order.,,54 But, as the next example demonstrates, some 
informal agreements related to complex situations not specified in the Order. 
In this case, a dispute relating to the manning scale on a particular vessel loading 
cargo for overseas destinations occurred at the Port of Auckland in 1962. The 
company in question deployed 12 man gangs in each of the two holds loading 
goods for overseas, but only six in another hold loading cargo which had been 
shipped to Auckland by another overseas vessel. The Port Conciliation 
Committee ruled that the company had to employ a 12 man gang in this hold as 
53 WIT Decision 101, 29/4/55. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
54WIT Decision 349, 17/10/61. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
159 
well, and the PEA appealed this decision to the Tribunal. This somewhat complex 
situation was not provided for in any Order, and in rendering its decision (against 
the appeal) the Tribunal stated: "The real question we have to consider is how 
many men are customarily employed in Auckland in circumstances such as 
these.,,55 In this case, the Tribunal based its decision on the customary practice. 
There are numerous other cases where the Tribunal, in making its decisions, 
sought to ascertain what the local practice had been. This was also the approach 
taken by Port Conciliation Committees. For instance, in a dispute at Wellington 
over the number of gangs required in a ship's hold when cargo was being 
discharged by two sets of ship's gear, the PCC Chairman noted: "In the absence of 
any specific provision in the Order covering this method of working, I 
endeavoured to determine what [the] port practice had been. ,,56 
Although the Tribunal and the PCCs took into account local port 'custom and 
practice' in making decisions, such practices were not afforded the status of 
binding agreements. Nonetheless, sometimes either side attempted to afford 
'informal practices' the status of formal agreements. In this sense, elements of the 
formal and the informal could be used in different ways, in a manner which is 
succinctly expressed by Edwards: 
The rules cannot, by definition, establish precise levels of 
performance. All that they can do is try to lay down the broad 
principles to be applied. They constitute resources which either 
side can use in struggles over the effort bargain. It is not a matter 
of managerial formality and worker informality but of a continuing 
struggle in which elements of the formal and the informal are 
necessarily intertwined, for formal requirements cannot cover every 
eventuality (1986:81). 
55 WIT Decision 357, 7/3/62. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National 
Archives). 
56 The PCC Chairman's decision was subsequently appealed to the Tribunal, and this statement is 
recorded in WIT Decision 146,27/9/56. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 
55 (National Archives). 
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What should be taken from this quotation is not so much the comment on the 
effort-bargain (which will be taken up in the next chapter), but rather the notion of 
rules as 'resources' and the intertwining of the formal and the informal. Either 
side could invoke 'the rules', but because of the necessary limitations of rules the 
parties often made informal agreements which were not codified. But, equally, 
sometimes one side tried to recast these 'informal practices' as 'rules'; i.e. tried to 
elevate informal agreements to the status of binding agreements. 
For instance, in 1961 the Gisborne Union appealed a PCC decision to the Tribunal 
which related to a local practice that the local employers tried to invoke as a rule. 
A common work practice at this port was for gangs to commence work at 5 :OOam 
for loading frozen produce into a cool store. This was done with the knowledge of 
the union and the agreement of the men in question, but was not codified in any 
agreement. In this case the employers tried to force men to undertake this work. 
The Tribunal made the following ruling: 
There is nothing to prevent the carrying out of the work by 
voluntary agreement between the parties, but the Employers are not 
entitled to invoke the supposed practice as a ground for requiring 
the men to undertake the work. 57 
In this case, the employers were unsuccessful in their attempt to claim informal 
arrangements as formal ones, but in the last example I will provide a port union 
succeeded. This example is also interesting in that the Tribunal attempted to 
distinguish legally between a 'practice' and an 'agreement'. 
The dispute in question occUlTed towards the end of the period under 
consideration, in 1969, at Port Chalmers. It was, in effect, a 'demarcation dispute' 
which centered on whether watersider workers or harbour workers should have the 
57 WlT Decision 348, 17/10/61. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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right to drive tractors owned by the local harbour board used in the 'butting up' of 
logs. This also supplies an example where a 'local practice' differed substantially 
between ports. The Tribunal acknowledged the "employment of watersiders by 
agreement for 'butting up' logs in several ports, though not usually when Harbour 
Board tractors have been used.,,58 However at Port Chalmers a different practice 
existed. As the Tribunal noted: 
The watersiders' claim arises from a long-standing practice 
whereby watersiders have been employed to drive Harbour Board 
tractors at Port Chalmers. The existence of this practice is 
acknowledged by the Harbour Board and the Harbour Employees 
Union, who agree that it has been in operation for many years. 59 
The issue was whether this 'practice' should be extended to the work of 'butting 
up'. The Tribunal, in rendering its decision, attempted to differentiate between a 
'practice' and an 'agreement' in order to recast local 'custom and practice' into a 
form which 'enabled these arrangements to be made sense of and interpreted within 
a legal framework: 
Having regard to the acknowledgment by all parties that the 
practice of employing water siders to drive tractors at Port Chalmers 
. . . is to continue, the question arises whether this was a mere 
practice, or whether it amounted to a binding agreement. A 
practice may come into being without the approval of all interested 
parties. An agreement, on the other hand, requires their knowledge 
and approval, though that approval need not be expressed in a 
formal manner. 60 
In this particular case, the 'practice' was deemed to be an 'agreement', and the 
watersiders were given coverage of this type of work. 
58 WIT Decision 575, 22/8/69. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 56 
(National Archives). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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As I have argued, despite the legal regulation of industrial relations, many 
arrangements at the port level were not in fact codified, instead taking the form of 
informal agreements. But this latter case supplies an interesting example of how 
such 'practices' could come to be regarded, interpreted and used within a legalistic 
system. I am not claiming that the law was 'hegemonic' in automatically 
overriding or eliminating all elements of the 'informal' from the realm of 
industrial relations, but rather that informal agreements could be 'reworked' using 
the legalistic system as a resource. The system was increasingly used in this 
manner, particularly by the unions in dealing with technological change. 
(4.1.3) Summary 
At the 1960 South Island Federation Conference General Secretary Jim Roberts 
remarked, regarding wages and conditions, that: "I am of the opinion that we have 
made reasonable progress in the last 8 years - more progress than had been made 
in a quarter of a century prior to 1953.,,61 These gains included inter alia a jointly 
funded superannuation scheme, increased ordinary wages and guaranteed 
payments, increases in cooperative contracting (incentive bonus) rates, increased 
meal allowances and so on. That not insubstantial improvements in wages and 
conditions were achieved at a national level during the 1950s is all the more 
remarkable considering there was not a national organization in existence during 
this period. 
These gams were achieved through a blend of negotiations in conciliation 
proceedings, submitting 'matters in dispute' to the Tribunal, and a modicum of 
industrial action by unions in the North Island Federation, characteristic of "a 
young organization just learning to flex its muscles" (to repeat North Island 
Federation President Eddie Isbey). Despite the differences between the port 
61 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Biennial Conference, 2/12/60. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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unions, and between the two Federations, a considerable measure of national unity 
had been achieved. The Federations, through their Joint Council, led bargaining 
both nationally and at the port level. There was also a considerable degree of 
cooperation with the national PEA with respect to the order in which bargaining 
took place. Throughout this period, the Federations gradually began to 'claw 
back' much of what they had lost in 1951. As we shall see, these gains were 
consolidated during the 1960s. 
(4.2) 1962-70 
(4.2.1) National Bargaining 
Developments in the latter part of this period were overshadowed by technological 
change, in the form of containerization, and negotiations over a period of two 
years through a specially constituted national conciliation forum (the Waterfront 
Conference). The following discussion will present an overview of these 
developments (which will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 7), but I will 
focus largely upon broad trends in the pattern of bargaining, and the outcomes of 
bargaining processes. Of particular interest is the tension between centralization 
and decentralization which manifested itself within the newly formed national 
Waterside Workers Federation in the late 1960s. 
Although I have identified 1962 as something of a 'turning point', negotiations 
that year for a new GPO (Number 198) were characterized by a similar approach 
to the previous round of negotiations. A number of issues were settled through 
negotiations in the National Conciliation Committee, including an increase in the 
ordinary time hourly rate, a subsidy for each watersider to purchase safety 
footwear, and the provision of bereavement leave. Several 'matters in dispute' 
were also submitted to the Tribunal which produced favourable results for the 
unions, namely increases in equity pay, meal money and guaranteed weekly 
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payments. 62 Furthermore, in a landmark decision, the Tribunal established wage 
relativity between watersiders and carpenters.63 However in the short space of 
two years, the swing by the Federations was dramatic. One of the reasons for this 
shift is that, in the intervening period, almost all of the Tribunal's decisions on 
'disputes of right' went against the unions. 
In the same year as GPO 198 was settled, partly through recourse to the Tribunal, 
a burgeoning anti-arbitration sentiment was apparent within the Federations. 
Together with increasing frustration at the legal constraints imposed by the 
system, this was graphically illustrated in remarks made by the General Secretary 
of the North Island Federation, Jim Napier, at its 1962 Conference: 
Decision after decision has gone against us. . . . When Harry 
Holland, the militant leader of the N.Z. Labour Party ... wrote that 
the whole of the legal arbitration system imposed on the trade 
union movement had the effect of leg-ironing labour, never was it 
more true than when applied to the present day legal stranglehold 
on the waterfront unions .... the sooner we can return to the free 
atmosphere of collective bargaining when the Trade Union 
Movement can negotiate as free men, based on their industrial 
strength, the better. 64 
The extent to which compulsory arbitration was regarded as a constraint is further 
evident in the following statement by Napier: 
Many difficulties arise from the fact that Waterside Workers are so 
ham-strung by the law regarding the Tribunal and Port Conciliation 
Committee Chairmen, a system introduced for the sole purpose of 
making any industrial action illegal . . . and with the Employers 
62 This discussion of the negotiations for the new GPO is based on the summary presented in the 
WIC Report for 1963. 
63 This decision was in keeping with the broader framework of occupational wage relativities which 
existed within New Zealand at that time. During the 1960s, carpenters were a key group of craft 
workers whose wage settlements established the trend for a number of other occupational groups 
(see Boston 1984:61). 
64Minutes of North Island Waterside Workers Association Conference, 20111162. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/18 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
happy in the knowledge that they have efficient allies III the 
combined forces of Tribunals, PCCs and the law.65 
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These statements are of more than passing interest, particularly given that the 
North Island Federation took the lead industrially during the 1960s. They evince a 
characteristic unwillingness to submit claims to the Tribunal because of the 
decisions it had rendered, and a desire to confront employers unfettered by the 
limitations on the right to take industrial action during the course of bargaining. 
They also presaged a greater preparedness and capacity to engage in industrial 
action at the port level. 
The anti-arbitrationist attitude expressed in the statements by Jim Napier was, of 
course, based on achieving a degree of national unity and industrial strength. This 
was based, in turn, on the port unions being able to 'rebuild' themselves at an 
organizational level, but in a way that was also conducive to national organization 
- albeit split between the two Federations. In contrast to the first round of national 
negotiations (which occurred in 1953) after the waterfront crisis when, to repeat 
the comment by South Island General Secretary Jim Roberts, most of the port 
unions were "only struggling to regain their former influence", by the early 1960s 
unions were well on the way if not to regaining then at least to approximating this 
influence. 
At an organizational level, this process was assisted by the stabilization of labour 
turnover rates during the 1960s, and the fact that unions at most ports increasingly 
gained a modicum of informal control over recruitment practices. If the criterion 
suggested by Jim Roberts is any indication, this resulted in the selection of "men 
who were good unionists, and good cooperators with the union".66 A further 
65 Ibid. 
66Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 7112/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
Table 5.1 : Strikes By Port 1953-70 
Ports 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Auckland 2 1 2 - 2 2 2 - - - 1 1 - - - - 2 5 
Wellington 1 1 1 I - - 2 3 - 1 - 5 - 2 1 - 6 7 
Lyttelton I - - - 1 - 1 1 - I I I 2 - 2 - - I 3 
Dunedin « - « - - - - - - - « - - - - - - -
Port Chalmers « - - - « - - - - - « - - - - - « « 
Whangarei - - - - « - I - - - - - I - - « - I 
Mount Maung. - - - - « - I « « « - I « 3 « « 4 4 
Gisbome « - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Napier - - - - - - - - - - - I - I - - I I 
Onehunga - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 
New Plymouth - - - - - - 2 i - - - - - - - - - - -
Wanganui - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Nelson - - - - - - - - « - - - - - - - - -
Picton - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - « 
Timaru - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Oamaru - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bluff - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 1 I - I - - -
Westport - - - - - - - - - - « - - - - - - -
Greymouth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Taranaki - - - - - - - I - - - I 2 I I - - I 2 
Source: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports 
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indication of the growth of 'collectivism' within the port unions is the increasing 
number of ports where bonus payments were pooled, despite the trenchant 
opposition of the PEA (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, labour shortages were still in 
evidence at a number of ports. These conditions strengthened port unions and, 
despite the legal restrictions on the right to strike, this strength manifested in the 
increasingly frequent use of direct industrial action at the port level. As Graph 5.2 
shows, this trend fluctuated throughout the 1960s, peaking at a total of 26 
stoppages in 1970. 
Equally, however, this strength and influence of unions at the port level often 
manifested itself in the form of a 'strike threat', rather than actual industrial 
action. As Walsh and Fougere (1987:190) germanely remark, "Creating a credible 
strike threat depends upon the degree to which union members can be mobilized 
for co-ordinated action that threatens employer interests." It appears that this 
threat was increasingly deployed by port unions during the 1960s. Indeed, the 
situation was such that the Chairman of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, Judge 
Archer, was prompted to make the following comment at a Harbour Boards 
conference in 1966: "It gives me some concern ... that port employers ... though 
freely advocating stronger disciplinary action in respect of misconduct on the 
waterfront, consistently give way in the face of a threat of strike action.,,67 
Nonetheless for a strike threat to be potent, it has to be backed up by a willingness 
and demonstrable capacity to actually engage in industrial action. As the statistics 
on stoppages demonstrate, union members at a good many ports were mobilized in 
this manner. But strike action varied considerably between ports. Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 demonstrate that some port unions were more militant than others. Considered 
in terms of the number and intensity of stoppages, the ports where the majority of 
67 Minutes of Harbour Boards' Conference, 16/3/66. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, 
Box 73 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
Table 5.2: Man-hours Lost Per Stoppage 1953-70 
Port 1953 1954 1955 11956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Auckland 4730 2395 13025 - 21847 25637 16030 - -
Wellington 1574 1179 240 2928 - - 17265 12160 -
Lyttelton - - - 1406 - 1292 332 - 7816 
Dunedin - - - - - - - - -
Port Chalmers - - - - - - - - -
Whangarei - - - - - - 716 - -
Mount Maung. - - - - - - 1285 - -
Gisbome - - - - - - - -
Napier - - - - - - - -
Onehunga - - - - - - - - -
New Plymouth - - - - - - 7277 - -
Wanganui - - - - - - - - -
Nelson - - - - - - - - -
Picton - - - - - - - - -
Timaru - - - - - - - -
Oamaru - - - - - - - -
Bluff - - 2453 - 970 - - - -
Westport - - - - - - - - -
Greymouth - - - - - - -
Taranaki - - - - - - - - -
Port 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Auckland - 58720 3260 - - - 28497 8552 
Wellington 24803 - 108801 - 115785 139 - 31597 33618 
Lyttelton 7186 10169 38332 - 4945 - - 5714 17050 
Dunedin - - - - - - - - -
Port Chalmers - - - - - - - - -
Whangarei - - - 1461 - - - 326 
Mount Maung. - - 3111 - 57197 - - 15960 20639 
Gisbome - - - - - - - - -
Napier - - 1508 - 1997 - - 6184 1905 
Onehunga - - - - - - - - 1314 
New Plymouth - - - - - - - - -
Wanganui - - - - - - - - -
Nelson - - - - - - - - -
Picton - - - - - - - - -
Timaru - - - - - - - - -
Oamaru - - - - - - - - -
Bluff - - 3630 3860 - 9850 - - -
Westport - - -
;349 I 
- - - - -
Greymouth - - - - - - - -
Taranaki - 7315 9830 1960 - - 594 2968 
Source: Waterfront Industry CommIssIOn Annual Reports 
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industrial action occurred were invariably the larger pOlis, both of the North Island 
(Auckland and Wellington) and the South Island (Lyttelton). Smaller ports (such 
as Bluff and Mount Maunganui) were also active, but despite the fact that some of 
the smaller port unions stopped work over particular issues, the unions at the 
larger ports consistently were at the forefront of industrial action.68 
There is undoubtedly an element in this pattern which relates to the size of ports 
where the port unions were located, both with respect to the sheer number of 
watersiders and the scale and amount of work, and hence the greater potential for 
disputes at these ports. Turkington (1976:293-8), who notes that the 
overwhelming majority of stoppages between 1968-73 were at the larger ports 
(which conforms to the pattern I have identified in the 1950s and 1960s), argues 
that the 'bargaining power' of each port union was crucially related not only to the 
size, but also to the level of trade and vulnerability of the port to having trade 
permanently diverted elsewhere. He argues that this effect militated against some 
unions capitalizing upon the advantage which results from the 'perishability' to 
shipping companies of the time a ship spends in port.69 
Undoubtedly there was a considerable degree of flexibility in the degree to which 
shipping companies could choose between ports - a report subsequently published 
in 1984 found that under half of the cargoes at most ports were 'captive trades' .70 
Nonetheless there were absolute limits to the extent to which cargo could be 
diverted from one port to another during this period which Turkington overlooks. 
68 Interestingly enough, this pattern corresponds to the British experience, as identified by Turnbull 
et al. (1994:4): "The pattern of industrial conflict on the docks was indeed one of persistent 
militancy in the major ports which dominated the industry's strike pattern, in contrast to the 
majority of (smaller) ports where dockers, like colliers of a previous era and their contemporaries 
in the manufacturing sector, rarely struck work." 
69 Turkington (1976:294) writes: "At a declining port the bargaining power of workers may be low, 
in that a stoppage may hasten the port's decline". Furthermore, he tentatively suggests that "there 
are least two types of ports. On the one hand are those large and busy ones where the workers' 
bargaining power is high and, on the other, those with a declining or spasmodic trade where the 
workers' bargaining power is low" (ibid:294). 
70 Ministry of Transport (1984:167). 
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Geographically, the 'elongated' shape of the country and relatively high internal 
transport costs imposed constraints on shippers. 
More importantly, however, Turkington's hypothesis does not explain why ports 
of roughly the same size and with similar levels of trade within both the waxing 
ports and the waning ports differed markedly in levels of disputes - why there 
were more stoppages at Mount Maunganui than Dunedin, why there were more 
stoppages at Taranaki than Timaru. Thus ceteris paribus the differing size or 
circumstances of ports was, at most, a mediate rather than a proximate cause. As 
Turnbull et al. observe, in an insightful article on strikes on the waterfront in 
Britain: 
While size is clearly an important variable, as has been noted in the 
case of manufacturing it cannot explain why one plant (port) 
experiences many more strikes than another of comparable size ... 
. Strike activity ... is not simply determined by size, as questions 
of militancy, mobilization and a wide range of other variables 
intervene (1994: 14). 
Indeed, I would argue that issues of militancy and mobilization are among the 
most important of the proximate factors in explaining differences in levels of 
stoppages between ports of a similar size in New Zealand. For instance, among 
the smaller ports Mount Maunganui and Taranaki stand out, as against the more 
conservative and parochial South Island unions such as Nelson and Timaru. 
To return to the larger ports, the levels of solidarity and militancy on the part of 
the unions at the Auckland and Wellington were considerable. Indeed, a 
Federation executive member was able to announce to the WWF conference in 
1968 that the "Wellington Union has a reputation for militancy. They have several 
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hundred militant class conscious workers."?! Similarly, the 1966 Port Employers 
Association Annual Report stated that: "We have almost come to regard it as 
inevitable that industrial relations at Wellington will be poor."n It should be 
noted that these were not merely isolated 'pockets' of militancy - the Auckland 
and Wellington unions together consistently comprised more than 40 percent of 
the total number of watersiders. The militancy and independence of these, the two 
largest port unions, was to foreshadow their subsequent role in rejecting a 
watershed GPO negotiated in 1970 in the wake of the Waterfront Conference. 
The increasing organizational capacity of individual port unions to take industrial 
action, however, was accompanied by attempts by the Federations to centralize the 
coordination of industrial action. To be sure, the port unions could (and frequently 
did) call upon the assistance of their respective Federation in the case of disputes. 
A former member of the North Island Federation executive recalled numerous 
occasions when this occurred: 
The national union would be handed the dispute by the port union, 
if it couldn't fix it. If it was dissatisfied with the Port Committee, it 
would then go to the Tribunal, and by that time you had to argue 
and prepare and present and argue the case .... Or if they didn't 
want it to go to the Port Committee, wanted to handle it as a 
dispute, they would of course let you have the details and that. And 
on many occasions the local officers would say 'well look, this 
looks as if its going to get out of hand, we're not happy with the 
thought of it going to the Port Committee, what about coming and 
having a look at it'. And so what would happen, it depended what 
port it was, we'd hop in a plane or jump in the car, and go there. 
Have a look at the circumstances and situation, and assess it, have a 
meeting with the local union or the local executive, sometimes 
have a lengthy argument about it, and see if you could arrive at a 
solution that you could put to the local employers, to see if a 
settlement could be achieved. Many times it was. (Interview) 
71 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/11/68. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 13/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
72 PEA Annual Report (1966:8). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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However, at least in the North Island Federation, a procedure was formalized 
during 1964 whereby port unions were formally required to inform and follow the 
instructions of the Federation in the case of disputes which had the potential to 
'spread' beyond one port. Formally, the remit passed by the North Island 
Federation reads as follows: 
That when any dispute involving stoppages of work that could 
extend and involve any other ports occur all relevant information 
shall be forwarded to the Head Office who in turn shall notify 
affiliates of the actual position and give instructions accordingly.73 
The fact that in 1962 the Lyttelton Union was censured by the South Island 
Federation for engaging in direct action without advising the Federation suggests 
that this type of control was not merely restricted to the North Island Federation.74 
The type of control that this remit sought to establish, in curtailing the autonomy 
of the port unions, gradually evolved to the point where, particularly after the 
national Federation was formed in 1967, industrial tactics both with respect to 
disputes of interest and disputes of right could be coordinated nationally. But as I 
will subsequently demonstrate, the cooperation of the port unions in 'handing 
over' disputes to the Federation was not guaranteed. 
To be sure, the Port Employers Association also coordinated at a national level its 
members' responses to industrial action. There are numerous examples in the 
minutes of the PEA Management Committee meetings of policy being formulated 
with respect to disputes, not only relating to bargaining over agreements but also 
disputes which emerged on particular vessels during the course of an Order. Often 
this policy was established as disputes arose, in anticipation of the gangs on a 
vessel stopping work. The policy (such as the imposition of collective penalties) 
73 Minutes of the North Island Waterside Workers Association Conference, 17111/64. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
74 An account of this incident is provided by Norris (1980:192). 
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was then implemented by the branch of the PEA at the port level and by the 
companies in question. There are many instances in the records of local branches 
of the PEA (and their members) 'awaiting instructions' after having forwarded the 
details of a dispute to the national office. The form of organization of the PEA, as 
a national body, also made it somewhat easier than the Federations to ensure that 
its members acted in accordance with the Association's policy. 
Given that the Port Employers Association sought to keep UnIons to the 
procedures of conciliation and arbitration, and that the Tribunal frequently 
censured unions for taking 'direct action', why were port unions that effected 
stoppages not prosecuted? Conceivably, the employers could have taken legal 
action, but this did not occur largely because of developments in the broader realm 
of industrial relations. As Roth incisively commented: 
For all practical purposes the penalty provisions against unlawful 
strikes are a dead letter, because both the Labour Department and 
the employers are aware that to take strikers to Court can only 
worsen industrial relations and would probably rally the local 
Trades Council and the Federation of Labour in support of the 
traditional trade union principle of the right to strike (1974:100). 
The fact that members of port unions were never prosecuted provides an insight on 
the limitations of the law as a form of industrial regulation. 
Despite the more militant stance of the unions, there were no national stoppages 
during this period, and full-blown industrial action did not occur until 1971. 
There were, however, several 'multi-port' disputes (particularly in the late 1960s). 
And although a strike threat often formed the backdrop to national negotiations, 
strikes were not typically used in the course of bargaining during this period. 
Although there were no national stoppages, nor stoppages during the course of 
bargaining, there were numerous stoppages at various ports in 1964-5 in the wake 
Table 5.3 : Waterfront Strikes 1953-75 
Year Strikes Firms Workers Working Wages 
Affected Involved Days Lost Lost ($) 
1953 1 13 1008 188 2408 
1954 3 33 3544 522 7908 
1955 5 30 4173 1450 13510 
1956 3 19 2394 634 5246 
1957 3 29 4871 2111 20900 
1958 3 31 3757 2509 24316 
1959 5 41 40Ll,0 4001 37550 
1960 1 10 1256 1134 15530 
1961 1 5 51 ] 729 10550 
1962 ! 2 4 1551 3210 27064 
1963 I 3 27 2648 7104 89974 
1964 17 152 15165 15736 171420 
1965 I 3 6 745 768 9834 
1966 13 51 5119 18408 202522 
1967 ,2 5 346 999 11560 
1969 12 79 10961 8913 127860 
1970 31 168 23018 17944 237880 
1971 33 214 28826 28040 410730 ----1972 31 106 13733 11821 185062 
1973 15 57 7310 10453 192140 
1974 8 80 9266 12915 239500 
1975 5 12 1019 927 13300 
Source: Monthly Abstract of Statistics 
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of the Streamlining Report and in the lead-up to the next round of national 
negotiations. Indeed in 1964, as a WIC Report (1965:9) observed, "The number 
of stoppages . . . and the lost time . . . are greater than they have been in any year 
since 1951." This upsurge in industrial activity is registered in Table 5.3.75 It was 
the larger unions particularly (Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton) that took the 
lead during the employers' offensive in the wake of this report being published. 
The Streamlining Report was of considerable importance as an element in the 
industrial relations 'climate' on the waterfront during this period.76 The report 
was jointly commissioned by the Producer Boards and the shipping companies 
that shipped their produce, and it was released early in 1964.77 Its brief was to: 
"Examine all factors likely to affect economies in the turn round of shipping" in 
New Zealand, and in ports in Britain and North America which serviced vessels 
carrying New Zealand exports. The Report recommended various measures in 
order to, as its title suggests, 'streamline' the turn-around time of ships and to 
expedite the flow of cargo through the ports. Significantly, it made a number of 
recommendations about waterfront labour in New Zealand. It recommended inter 
alia the introduction of permanent gangs, modifications to incentive schemes and, 
most importantly, that "the hours of work should be reduced to a more normal 
75 This table was compiled from information contained within the Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 
published by the Department of Statistics. Although it is not as reliable as the data contained in the 
Waterfront Industry Commission's Annual Reports used to compile Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it has the 
advantage of providing figures on the number of firms affected by each stoppage and the number of 
workers involved, which gives greater indication of the scope and intensity of the strikes. Any 
discrepancy between this table and the information presented in this chapter which has been 
derived from WIC reports can be explained largely in terms of the limitations of stoppage statistics 
compiled by the Depmiment of Statistics (see Harbridge 1987). It should also be noted that data 
for 1968 was not published. 
76 I have drawn the concept of an industrial relations 'climate' from the work ofDastmalchian et ai. 
(1991). 
77 The producer boards were the Meat Board, the Dairy Board and the Apple and Pear Board. 
These boards formed the Producer Boards Shipping Utilization Committee. The four shipping 
lines, which formed the New Zealand Trade Streamlining Committee, were as follows: the New 
Zealand Shipping Company, Shaw Savill and Albion, Port Line and Blue Star. The so-called 
'Streamlining Report' was jointly written by the two committees, and was entitled 'New Zealand 
Overseas Trade: Report on Shipping, Ports, Transport and Other Services'. 
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working day and that to enable this to be done shift working should be introduced" 
(1964:105). 
It appears that some degree of consultation occUlTed between the Federations and 
the PEA to discuss the interim fmdings of the Committee, and in anticipation of 
the Committee releasing its full report.78 For instance, the parties met in October 
1963 and number of matters were discussed, including changes in cooperative 
(incentive) contracts sought by the employers, the introduction of mechanical 
equipment, and the employers' proposals to introduce shiftwork.79 Indeed, a 
statement by one employers' representative was recorded thus: "Speaking for the 
overseas companies, he expressed the view that shift work was inevitable in some 
form or other on the waterfront. ,,80 It should be noted that this comment was 
made on behalf of one particular sub-group of employers, and that the PEA was 
divided on this issue (see below). The union representatives, on the other hand; all 
firmly opposed the introduction of shiftwork. 
At this meeting, South Island Federation General Secretary Weith stated that: 
A meeting of minds would show that there was often very little 
between the parties and that it was much better that these 
differences were resolved directly between those concerned rather 
than referred to the Tribunal. 81 
This comment foreshadowed the approach adopted by the Federations in the next 
round of national negotiations in 1965, and further consultation occurred after the 
78 The Committee had released ''joint interim reports in December 1962 and April 1963 
recommending a change of dates for the import licensing year ... , the introduction of shift work 
on the waterfront and a system of two port loading and discharging" (WIC Report 1964:6). 
79 The account of this meeting has been reconstructed from a report of what was discussed, which 
was in records of the South Island Federation's correspondence with the PEA. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 2114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
80 Minutes of Special Meeting Between PEA and North Island Federation and South Island 
Federation Representatives, 9110/63. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, 
Box 2114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
81 Ibid. 
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Committee had released its report. For instance, a meeting was held between the 
two Federations, as well as representatives of the Federation of Labour, with the 
Streamlining Committee in February 1964 to discuss the recommendations it had 
made. 82 The PEA records indicate that the Association decided not to proceed 
with the claim to introduce shiftwork, despite the fact that the Report had 
recommended its introduction and - more significantly - that one of the two main 
sub-groups of employers (the Overseas Shipowners) wanted it.s3 Roth notes that: 
"The unions vigorously resisted employer attempts to bring in the 24-hour round-
the-clock shiftwork on the waterfront. Instead they took up the Streamlining 
Report's case for a reduced working day" (1993: 170). 
In the next round of negotiations for a national agreement in 1965, largely as a 
result of the developments associated with the Streamlining Report, an exceptional 
situation developed in that two new GPOs were negotiated in the space of just 
seven months (GPO 230 and GPO 247). Together they ushered in some very 
significant changes on the waterfront and incorporated substantial gains achieved 
by the Federations. The negotiations for each agreement reflected the approach, 
which the Federations adopted in the eady in the preceding period, of trying to 
wring as many concessions as possible out of the Port Employers Association in 
conciliation proceedings. Indeed, the negotiations in the National Conciliation 
Committee which had been appointed to deal with claims for GPO 247 were very 
lengthy (some 52 days in total), and North Island Federation President Isbey stated 
that: 
The wisdom of staying as long as we did at the negotiating table 
and extracting as much as possible from the Employer was readily 
evident when the few other matters on which there was no 
82 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 29/11/66. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
83 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 394, 20/4/66. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
agreement was [sic] taken to the WIT. We received practically 
nothing. 84 
General Secretary Napier commented further: 
all of the major matters of our [General] Principal Order were 
decided in conciliation and not by the Tribunal. . . . We must, at 
all times, endeavour to reach agreements with the Port Employers, 
before relying on the Tribunal to decide any issue of importance to 
us.85 
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Perhaps the most notable achievement was the negotiation of the ten hour day 
which was introduced by GPO 230. Previously, the length of the standard 
working day on the waterfront had been 11 hours. 86 Roth (1993: 170) writes that: 
Acceptance of the ten-hour working day on the waterfront in two 
shifts was hailed as the largest change in the New Zealand way of 
life since the introduction of the 40-hour week in 1936. It affected 
all workers supplying the waterfront - drivers, railwaymen, 
tallymen, harbour board employees, as well as watersiders - and 
was estimated to put an extra million pounds into workers' pay 
packets. 
Together with an increase in the ordinary time hourly rate, GPO 230 
provided for the payment of eight hours in the day at ordinary time 
and two hours at double time and for the payment of meal money .. 
. to workers required to work after I p.m. Mondays to Fridays. This 
ensured that waterside workers received not less in a lO-hour day, 
worked 7a.m. to 7p.m. at times agreed to at each port, than they 
would have received in an II-hour day worked between 8a.m. and 
9p.m (WIC Report 1965:8). 
84 Minutes of the North Island Waterside Workers Association Conference, 16/11/66. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 4/2 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
85 Ibid. 
86 These were the actual hours of work which were worked within a period of 13 hours, interspersed 
with two meal breaks. It should be noted here that the exception was the Port of Bluff where 
agreement had been secured in 1956 to work only 10 hours. Despite the attempts of other port 
unions (such as LytteJton) to secure these hours, the Port Employers always maintained that this 
arrangement related to exceptional conditions at Bluff. 
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That the Federations were able to wnng considerable conceSSIOns out of the 
employers in this period is significant (and also a testimony to their 'bargaining 
power' at the national level), but it was also achieved at the cost of supposedly 
allowing greater 'flexibility' in some areas. A good example IS the 
'Modernization Fund', financed by a levy on employers collected by the 
Commission, which was introduced by GPO 247. The fund provided substantial 
retirement benefits to watersiders of 65 years and over who had at least ten years 
continuous service (WIC Report 1966:8). However this fund was introduced as 
part of a quid pro quo with the Federations regarding the conditions surrounding 
the introduction of mechanical equipment. Although the unions had in 1961 
largely secured control of the occupational boundaries which were threatened by 
pre-container technological change through an agreement with the PEA (see 
Chapter 7), this agreement traded off the Modernization Fund against the retention 
of gang sizes. The Commission's 1966 Report makes this quid pro quo explicit: 
The establishment of this Modernization Fund is conditional upon 
the port unions and their members undertaking to give their full 
cooperation in the observance of the conditions of employment 
with particular reference to the rights of employers to increase sling 
loads and reduce gang strengths through mechanization. The 
agreement made between waterfront employers and workers 
enables steps to be taken with the cooperation of both parties to 
increase mechanization and reduce costs (WIC Report 1966:8). 
Around this time, a division within the PEA emerged over the terms and 
conditions that should be pursued in negotiations with the Federation.S? The point 
at issue was the introduction of shiftwork which, as I noted earlier, the PEA had 
decided not to pursue in the round of negotiations following the publication of the 
Streamlining Report. However, in 1966 the Overseas Shipowners wanted the 
issue revived, and sought to have the PEA expeditiously achieve an agreement on 
87 This division is apparent in the minutes of PEA Management Committee Meetings 394 (20/4/66) 
and 396 (1516166). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull 
Library, NLNZ). 
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its introduction. The representatives of the New Zealand Shipowners Federation, 
on the other hand, were equivocal in their support of shiftwork. At a PEA 
Management Committee meeting they acknowledged that some of the coastal 
shipping companies would be interested in introducing shiftwork but, as one 
representative stated, "The coastal interests could not accept any arrangements for 
shift work if it meant that the normal basic day was likely to be reduced to 8 
hours.,,88 Yet at the same time as rifts were beginning to appear within the PEA 
in the lead-up to containerization, the unions united in January 1967 to form a 
national organization, the Waterside Workers Federation. But, as we shall see, 
while the PEA was largely able to reconcile the different interests of its members, 
developments in the late 1960s called into question the ability of the Federation to 
do so. 
Negotiations for GPO 279 in 1967, wherein the unions secured increases in daily 
and weekly minimum payments as well as in the ordinary time rate, were to some 
degree overshadowed by the establishment of the Waterfront Conference in 
December of that year. Although the Conference - a specially constituted 
conciliation forum - was established by the Government, and the Federations 
never asked for it to be convened, President Isbey said at the first biennial 
conference of the new national Federation in 1968 that "These are probably the 
most critical talks that watersiders have ever embarked upon."S9 Developments 
arising out of the Conference, which lasted for two years, were intertwined with 
impending containerization. I will provide a fuller account of these events in 
Chapter 7. 
88 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 396, 15/6/66. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
89 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation First Biennial Conference, 18/11/68. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box l3/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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The broader industrial relations climate within which the Waterfront Conference 
took place was one of considerable volatility. As I noted in the preceding section, 
the pattern of wage-bargaining on the waterfront was influenced by the centralized 
wage-setting arrangements within the Arbitration system generally. The Tribunal, 
on application from the unions, typically incorporated the General Wage Orders 
issued by the Arbitration Court in their agreements. Often this was effected by 
means of a Principal Order during the course of a GPO. However, in 1968, the 
Court issued a nil general wage order. As Roth (1974: 146) notes, "This decision 
was greeted with a storm of protests, thousands of workers took part in stop-work 
meetings and demonstrations." While on the waterfront only the Wellington 
Union stopped work, the WWF executive vehemently supported the Federation of 
Labour's efforts to reverse this decision.9o Federation President Wasley made the 
following retrospective remark about these developments at the WWF Conference 
in 1970: 
The successful campaign organized by the FOL to defeat the 
infamous Court of Arbitration nil decision in 1968 is now past 
history, but in effect is [ sic] sparked off a new virile mood of 
militancy within our movement. 91 
It was in this broader context of industrial militancy, together with the impending 
arrival of full-scale containerization, that there was an upsurge in levels of 
90 Walsh writes "To forestall impending industrial chaos, the FOL and the Employers' Federation 
subsequently made a joint application to the Court, where the worker and employer representatives 
joined forces to outvote the Judge of the Court, and issue a 5 per cent increase" (1993: 182). 
Boston elaborates further: "The nil-wage order had four immediate effects: it shattered the labour 
movement's confidence in the Comt as an honest broker in the industrial relations arena; it sparked 
a wave of protest action; it further encouraged the move towards direct negotiations between 
employers and employees; and it eventually prompted a new approach to the Court by the FOL and 
the Employers' Federation. On this occasion the employer representative on the Court voted with 
the worker representative and by a majority decision (with Judge Blair dissenting) the Court 
awarded a 5 percent GWO" (1984:91). 
91 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Second Biennial Conference, 23111170. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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industrial conflict on the waterfront during the course of the Waterfront 
Conference. This upsurge is evident in Table 5.1. 
Much of what was agreed to through the Waterfront Conference was ultimately 
encoded in GPO 305 in 1970. Briefly, the employers sought four main things 
through the Conference to be incorporated in the new GPO. As the 1970 WIC 
Report states, 
The employers' proposals for a new general principal order 
constitute a "package deal" and require the unions to accept them in 
full. The main objectives of the proposals are: (1) Permanent 
employment in 12 major ports. (2) The working of supplementary 
hours at these ports. (3) Work in wet weather. (4) A completely 
revised incentive contract scheme (1970:17). 
It should be noted that the phrase 'permanent employment', in this usage, meant 
not direct employment of watersiders by shipping and stevedoring companies, but 
rather the payment to watersiders of a standard 40 hour weekly wage irrespective 
of whether work was available for them to perform. 
These conditions were finally accepted by the Federations, but at the expense to 
the employers of a number of significant concessions. The 1971 WIC Report 
provides a useful summary of the main features of the new Order: 
It provided generally for the continuation of work to the fullest 
extent possible irrespective of weather conditions; a new incentive 
contract scheme; telephone notification to the men of advice of 
transfer from one job to another, and benefits to the workers of 
increased rates of pay, retirement and sickness benefits, and other 
monetary benefits . . . . At ports not large enough to warrant 
permanent employment, watersiders continue to receive similar 
guarantees to those applying prior to the new order, while at the 
larger ports they receive a weekly wage equally to 40 hours per 
week at ordinary time. At the latter ports the provision is also 
made for a supplementary work period which effectively increases 
the span of working hours from 55 to 80 hours per week (1971: 17). 
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The precise features of this agreement, and how they related to containerization, 
will be dealt with in Chapter 7. What is more important to deal with at this point, 
is the break -down of the 'stable balance' with respect to bargaining at the national 
and port levels which emerged when the port unions were asked to ratify the new 
Order. It was precisely at a time when the unions were attempting to achieve 
national unity, in the face of containerization, that problems arose. But this time it 
was not a weak, conservative union (like the Picton Union) which broke ranks, but 
rather the largest and one of the most militant unions. 
(4.2.2) Local Bargaining 
The process of negotiating Supplementary Principal Orders remained 
synchronized with GPOs until the late 1960s. For instance, following the 
negotiation of GPO 230 in 1965, the unions and employers at almost all ports 
applied for SPOs. In 1966 a series of meetings were held between the South 
Island Federation and the port unions within its constituency over local conditions. 
General Secretary Weith wrote in a circular to the port unions that 
These meetings which are customarily held after a new GPO is 
made, are to agree on the local conditions that will operate at each 
port and are then made into a supplementary order relating to that 
port. . . . These then prevail if there is any conflict with the 
provisions ofthe GPO.92 
Thus there are strong indications that the Federations were still taking the lead in 
the process of local bargaining, and that the 'stable balance' was still in existence. 
But despite the formation of a national organization by the port unions in 1967, 
this centralized and 'externalized' form of bargaining almost foundered in 1970. 
92 South Island Federation Circular to Port Unions, 17/3/66. 
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The breakdown of the 'stable balance' which had hitherto existed on the 
waterfront, and the role of the unions at Wellington and Auckland in this 
development, was to some extent foreshadowed in a demarcation dispute which 
occurred in 1969 at the Port of Wellington over the packing and unpacking of 
containers. This dispute will be described in greater detail in Chapter 7 (which 
deals with technological change), but briefly it can be noted that the dispute 
involved the Storemen and Packers Union and resulted in the Wellington Union 
imposing a 'black ban' on container handling. What is significant about the 
dispute is that the Wellington Union refused to obey directions of the Federation 
executive, by not lifting the ban, and furthermore refused to 'hand over' the 
dispute to the Federation. A representative of the Wellington Union stated at the 
time that: 
Some ports have not been too interested in this matter. . . . 
Membership of [the] Wellington Union [is] reducing rapidly, no 
future [is] seen, nobody is doing anything about the matter .... The 
Black Ban has resulted in people wanting to talk to US.93 
The Wellington Union received an endorsement of their actions from the union at 
the Port of Auckland, where containerization was occurring apace, and the 
Lyttelton Union also lent its support. Ultimately, the Federation was forced to 
support the Wellington Union largely because it had the support of the other two 
largest unions. 
Although this dispute was subsequently resolved, it raised some very important 
issues particularly with respect to the Union acting independently and the 
Federation being unable to 'rein it in', which presaged the GPO troubles in 1970. 
A member of the WWF executive summed the situation up when he stated: "We 
are a Federation, not a National Union and can only appeal to a trade union 
93 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Executive Meeting, 8/12/69. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
182 
conscious approach from our member affiliates. ,,94 Irrespective of the degree to 
which the Wellington Union's approach conformed to or departed from the 
principles of trade unionism, its actions certainly demonstrated the willingness and 
capacity of a large and militant port union to act independently, and the incapacity 
of the Federation to formally prevent this type of action. 
The breakdown of the process of establishing national agreements occurred in 
1970.95 As I noted above, a new GPO (Number 305) had been negotiated which 
incorporated matters agreed to in the Waterfront Conference. WWF executive 
members then travelled to Wellington and Auckland to explain the provisions of 
the new order. This effort was part of the usual process whereby the executive had 
to attempt to 'sell' the national document, which had been agreed to with the Port 
Employers Association, to the individual port unions which then conducted a 
ballot on it. Members of the Wellington Union had attended the Auckland 
meeting and vice-versa. Federation President Wasley was verbally attacked by the 
rank and file at both meetings, both for agreeing to the new document and 
particularly regarding how decisions were made within the Federation.96 General 
Secretary Napier was later to comment (at the 1970 WWF conference) that "Your 
officers have been subjected to vilification and abuse of the worst industrial type . 
. . at an Auckland meeting which they attended.,,97 
The upshot of these meetings was that the members of the Auckland and 
Wellington unions refused to participate in the ballot to ratify the GPO. Although, 
94 Ibid. 
95 I have reconstructed these events from minutes of WWF Biennial Conferences and National 
Executive Meetings. Roth (1993: 175-6) provides a brief account of the same developments in his 
history of the Auckland Union. 
96 This account of the dispute and meetings is taken from the minutes of a WWF Executive meeting 
on 8112/69. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
97 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Second Biennial Conference, 23111170. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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as I noted above, the new national agreement contained many benefits to the 
unions, the Auckland and Wellington unions were dissatisfied with, inter alia, the 
wet weather work provision and the mandatory working of supplementary hours. 
The minutes of a WWF executive meeting in 1970 provide the following record of 
a comment by a representative of the Auckland Union: 
the Auckland Union worked regular and lengthy hours compared to 
many other ports .... The position at his port was such that a local 
set of improved conditions was well warranted. He accepted that 
there was [sic] considerable improvements in the new GPO -
particularly for smaller ports, but certain of the conditions in that 
Order were not acceptable to his union.98 
At this point, it was harder for the Federation to get all of the local unions to 
accept the new national agreement than the employers. This development caused 
considerable concern within the executive of the Federation. As President Wasley 
remarked, 
Both these big unions have stated they did not wish to disaffiliate 
from the Federation, neither can the Federation afford to have this 
occur, but we cannot continue to function as a Federation if we 
succumb to this type of pressure from the Auckland and Wellington 
unions.99 
Consequently, the Federation requested the Port Employers Association to 
implement the GPO at the ports which had agreed to it, thereby leaving 
Wellington and Auckland outside the national agreement. But the employers 
initially refused to do so without the agreement of these (the largest) unions. 
The Federation then convened a special conference to discuss the situation. The 
result was that members of the national executive met with the PEA to discuss the 
98 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Executive Meeting, 16/7/70. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
99 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Executive Meeting, 18/5/70. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Librruy, NLNZ). 
184 
issues which had led to the Auckland and Wellington unions not endorsing the 
GPO. Some minor improvements were negotiated, which the Wellington Union 
accepted. A Wellington representative later commented that "The Wellington 
Union adopted Order 305 with the intention of improving it."lOO But the 
Auckland Union continued to refuse to be bound by the agreement and sought to 
renegotiate its own Supplementary Principal Order. In effect, it sought to invert 
the order in which agreements were usually negotiated by bargaining for a 
Supplementary Order before the national agreement was settled. The Auckland 
President, Jack Clare, justified this position by stating that "what Auckland was 
attempting to achieve was to negotiate a local agreement before a national one. 
This is a Trade Union approach."lOl Irrespective of the trade union merits of this 
approach, by reversing the order in which negotiations were usually conducted, it 
marked a substantial departure from and challenge to the way negotiations had 
traditionally been carried out during this period. 
The Auckland Union initially sought the assistance of the Federation in 
renegotiating its SPO. Auckland representatives attended a Federation executive 
meeting and requested "that an approach be made to the Employers through the 
Federation for an improvement in the local conditions for the Auckland 
Union."I02 Not surprisingly, this support was not forthcoming. The Federation's 
position, formally registered in a motion passed by the National Executive in July 
1970, was that the Union had to accept the national agreement before any local 
negotiations with the PEA could be entered into on the Union's behalf by the 
Federation's officers. At this point the stakes were raised. 
100 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Second Biennial Conference, 23111/70. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Executive Meeting, 16/7/70. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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At the 1970 WWF Conference the issue was thoroughly discussed and the 
Auckland representatives were once again pressured to accept the new GPO, 
which the national executive trenchantly defended, and that had been implemented 
at all other ports in August of that year. General Secretary Napier maintained that: 
"The question of retaining national unity depends on observance of national 
agreements", and President Wasley stated: "I appeal to the Auckland Union to 
accept the new GPO ... we have a National Agreement, and we can only make 
policy for the future on amending this Order.,,103 The Auckland delegates, 
however, were not to be swayed. The minutes record that Jack Clare, the 
Auckland Union President, "stated the whole of Order 305 was repugnant to the 
Auckland Union especially the provision of working in wet weather.,,104 
In September 1970 Principal Order 506 was passed. This Order was jointly 
negotiated between the national PEA and Federation, based on an agreement 
reached in the Waterfront Conference, and replaced the cooperative contracts 
system and employers incentives schemes with a new system of incentive 
contracts at all ports throughout New Zealand. The Auckland Union, however, 
elected to continue working under GPO 279 which allowed for incentive schemes 
negotiated between unions and employers. Furthermore, early in 1971 the 
Auckland Union sent a letter to the Federation National Executive, stating: 
That we of the Auckland Union intend to proceed alone with our 
negotiations with the PEA regarding Auckland local conditions, as 
we have no intention of accepting GPO 305, which is part of the 
deal if the National Officers are to be allowed to negotiate on our 
behalf. lOS 
\03 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Second Biennial Conference, 23111170. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
104 Ibid. 
\05 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Executive Meeting, 412171. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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The Auckland delegates resigned from the national executive early in 1971, and 
for all intents and purposes the Auckland Union withdrew from the Federation 
until September that year. These developments reflected a significant breakdown 
within the Federation of the system of representation and delegation at the national 
level, which was rendered even more serious by the size and industrial strength of 
the dissenting union. In short, the 'externalized' system of summit bargaining was 
seriously challenged. 
Although it appears that the Auckland Union had some difficulty in securing the 
consent of the national PEA to negotiate in this manner, it subsequently entered 
into local negotiations. However, these negotiations stalled when the employers 
refused to accede to the Union's demands. In response, the Union stopped work 
for five days in February which resulted in the loss of 50,036 man-hours (WIC 
Report, 1971:95). In total, Auckland refused to accept the new GPO for seven 
months. But without active support from other unions and the national 
organization, and in the face of resistance from the PEA to their demands, the 
Auckland Union was to finally accept the new GPO in March 1971. Because the 
Union had not ratified GPO 305, which had subsequently been implemented, a 
separate Principal Order (Number 310) was required to bring Auckland under the 
national agreement. 
Later that year representatives of the Auckland Union attended a WWF executive 
meeting and sought to regain representation on the executive. It appears that part 
of their decision to seek a rapprochement with the Federation was in response to 
the uncertainties sUlTounding containerization - threats of redundancies, loss of 
work coverage and so forth. The National Executive compromised by passing a 
remit to the effect that the Auckland Union could send observers to national 
executive meetings, which signalled their reincorporation within the national 
organization. But even at this point an Auckland representative who attended the 
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meeting stated that: "The situation in Auckland is explosive.,,106 However, the 
fact that the Auckland Union cooperated with the Federation by participating in a 
national stoppage (the first since 1951) in August 1971, in support of a wage 
increase, indicates their more moderate position with respect to the national 
organization. 
This development, in its entirety, demonstrates the fragility and contingency of 
bargaining at the national level. This is a picture not of a stable, functional, 
agreed-upon 'split' between the national and the local, but rather of a more-or-Iess 
fragile set of group alliances and trade-offs. There was always the potential that 
these arrangements would break down during the search for a national agreement 
which was acceptable to all on both sides. 
As a result of difficulties resulting from attempts to ratify GPO 305, together with 
the period of turmoil ushered in by containerization, a remit was passed at the 
1970 WWF conference which represented an attempt to restrict the autonomy of 
port unions. It took the form of an agreement that a report would be prepared for 
the 1972 Conference on the feasibility of transforming the organization from a 
national federation into a national union. In support of the remit, one of the 
Wellington representatives stated that: 
There can be no room for local autonomy in the near future. A 
national union with responsible national leadership is the only 
sound form of organization to protect our members in the future. 107 
In his history of the Auckland Union, Roth argues that the Union's acceptance of 
the GPO marked the restoration of national unity within the Federation. And, 
106 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Executive Meeting, 28/9171. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1217 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
107 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Second Biennial Conference, 23/11170. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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indeed, the national industrial action in 1971 would tend to support this argument. 
But even then the local port unions and their members had to agree to the tactics 
which were proposed. The following example indicates that there was still some 
degree of tension within the Federation with respect to the national organization 
coordinating, and the port unions implementing, industrial action on a national 
basis. But this time it was the unions at the smaller ports that were the dissenters. 
Despite the Federation effecting a national two-day stoppage in August 1971, the 
employers continued to refuse a wage adjustment. The executive of the Waterside 
Workers' Federation responded by authorizing the port unions to implement go-
slows. The effectiveness of this action was discussed at an executive meeting in 
December 1971, and a remit was passed to the effect that "the policy of 
harassment be continued in an intelligent way and the Federation officials seek to 
re-open wage negotiations with the PEA.,,108 In support of this policy, Federation 
President Fergus argued that go-slows could be more effective than a short 
stoppage. 
It seems that this tactic was indeed effective at some of the larger ports. A 
representative of the LytteIton Union noted that immediately after the directive 
had been issued to implement the 'policy of harassment', 
A go-slow was instituted, ships were delayed, work practically 
came to a standstill .... Employers squealed immediately ... [and] 
demanded Port Committee meetings which we avoided. We have 
imposed and lifted go-slows as has been pertinent and convenient. 
This situation see-sawed for 10 days and has been most popular 
with the members. 109 
108 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Executive Meeting, 16/12171. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1217 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
109 Ibid. 
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However, as this latter comment indicates, this type of action required the 
cooperation not only of the local union officials, but also the union members. And 
at this meeting, some of the port union representatives (particularly from the 
smaller ports) expressed their disagreement with this policy and noted that they 
had had difficulty in getting their members to implement go-slows. For instance, a 
representative of the New Plymouth Union stated that: 
We have discussed the question of policy and our members are not 
too happy with the policy .... Go-slows are not popular, stoppages 
are preferred and will be considered. 1 10 
A representative of the Dunedin Union agreed that go-slows were not very 
effective. In an interesting tum of events, the President of the Auckland Union 
(Jack Clare) attempted to reconcile these differences by arguing that go-slows 
were more effective at the larger ports which had continuity of shipping. He 
remarked: 
It appears that only the main ports can really fully implement our 
policy of harassment. Some of our members have made the go-
slow too effective and to some degree we have applied the go-slow 
to every ship working. In some cases we may have to relax a little . 
. . . We have advised our Employers to get back in discussions with 
. I I III our natlOna peop e on wages. 
Despite Clare's attempt at reconciliation between the unions at the large and small 
ports, Federation President Wasley is recorded in the meeting's minutes as having 
said that he was: 
110 Ibid. 
III Ibid. 
disturbed to hear that some ports say they do not agree with the 
policy. As a policy it has been properly decided and should be 
accepted as such. He required ports whose members are not too 
enthusiastic to tty again to convince their members . . . of the 
intention and long term view of the Federation policy.l12 
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The Assistant-Secretary of the Federation lent his suppOli to this position, 
commenting that: 
we are obliged to protect our members' interests and this can be 
accomplished more effectively [by] working as a unified body than 
through splinter groups of a small number of ports. I I3 
Apart from showing that tactics other than stoppages were used by the unions 
during the course of national negotiations, II4 this example is significant in 
demonstrating that although the Federation could instruct port unions to carry out 
certain forms of industrial action, it could force neither the local union officials or 
members to carry them out. To the extent that a degree of national unity was 
regained after the problem with the Auckland Union, it certainly was not built 
upon unanimity. 
Like the issue of shiftwork, which divided the PEA in the mid-60s, this case 
demonstrates the divisions within the national organizations which posed 
particular problems for the practice of industrial relations, particularly given that 
the local actors had access to the same legal machinery as the national 
organizations themselves. National agreements were not merely guaranteed by act 
of law, and the system did not automatically subordinate the local to the national. 
To the extent that this was achieved, it was effected by organizational means. To 
be successful, national bargaining required a reconciliation of the different sets of 
(local) interests within the national organizations on each side, which often was 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Turkington (1976:250) is therefore incorrect in suggesting (albeit tentatively) that "go slows 
have been uncommon on the waterfront." It was the case merely that they were less common at the 
smaller pOlis. 
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more difficult to achieve than agreement between these organizations. The goal 
was a document that was acceptable to all on both sides. 
(5) Conclusion 
This chapter has performed two (not unrelated) tasks: it has provided an account 
of patterns of bargaining and the intra- and inter-organizational dimensions to the 
practice of industrial relations; it has also provided an overview of what was 
achieved by the unions in terms of wages and conditions. With respect to the 
latter, a concatenation of factors produced good results for the unions. This was a 
period of favourable conditions for unions generally, which was reflected in the 
broader climate of industrial relations: "Rapid economic growth, general 
prosperity and a severe shortage of labour combined to strengthen the bargaining 
power of unions, and by relying on their industrial strength rather than on the 
generosity of the Court, unions achieved 'substantial wage escalation'" (Roth 
1974:145). On the waterfront, particularly good results were gained. As Graph 
5.3 demonstrates, the average hourly rate (which functions as a useful synthetic 
index of wage gains) was throughout this period considerably higher on the 
waterfront than in manufacturing. 
Apart from what was achieved in terms of wages and conditions, this chapter has 
brought to light a pattern of industrial relations which does not conform to the 
typical characterization of the New Zealand 'system' of industrial relations. Not 
only does this call into question the degree to which a homogenous 'system' did in 
fact exist in New Zealand, the pattern which has been uncovered appears markedly 
different from the one that characterized industries within the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Court. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the fragility and contingency of bargaining at 
the national level. The process of national bargaining involved concerted attempts 
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to 'weld together' a senes of disparate and different ports under a national 
document which was acceptable to all on both sides; as the developments in 1970 
illustrate, agreement between the respective national organizations did not 
automatically confer acceptance of a document at the port level. This does not 
conform to the image of the centralized, stable system that some authors use to 
depict industrial relations in this period in New Zealand. Although, as Walsh 
(1993) points out, the arbitration system was itself 'in decline' because of the 
proliferation of infonnal 'second tier' bargaining, this type of bargaining was 
underpinned by national agreements. But such bargaining was explicitly allowed 
for under the 1953 Waterfront Industry Act and it could, by law, take precedence 
over and substitute for national bargaining. There was nothing in law to prevent a 
union such as Auckland from refusing to ratify a GPO and seeking to (re)negotiate 
its own local agreement. To the extent that bargaining arrangements at the 
national level were stable, it was not the automatic result of legal regulation,but 
rather was a contingent development which was dependent on a more-or-Iess 
fragile set of group alliances and trade-offs. National agreements were always in 
danger of being undennined at the local level. Cases such as Picton and 
Auckland, far from being mere exceptions, demonstrate the weakness around the 
edges of these arrangements, that they could be eroded and that they were subject 
to change through time. 
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CHAPTER 6 : WORK RELATIONS IN THE BREAK BULK ERA 
(1) Introduction 
How systems of labour administration institutionalize gang systems of work is of 
crucial importance on the waterfront. Taking this statement as its point of 
departure, this chapter focuses specifically upon the intersection between 
employment relations, which I analysed in detail in Chapter 4, and the pattern of 
work relations that developed in the portion of the break-bulk era which coincides 
with this study. I demonstrate that the bureau system of labour administration 
crucially affected the organization of waterfront work in this period. 
The British and American literature which I reviewed in Chapter 1 identifies the 
waterfront in the break-bulk era as a site of resistance to the dynamic of employer 
control of work which, according to authors within the labour process tradition, 
characterizes industries within the manufacturing sector. However, there is no 
'logic' to the labour process which automatically and unambiguously generates 
this resistance. Although high levels of "process uncertainty" (Kelly 1978:1081) 
generally result in gang systems of work being utilized by waterfront employers 
worldwide, the terms on which gangs actually work are diverse. Significantly, 
levels of autonomy, which hinge on the relationship between foremen and gangs, 
are a variable rather than a constant property. 
In light of this indeterminacy, the principal question that this chapter addresses is 
as follows: What impact did the bureau system of labour administration have upon 
power relations at the level of work? This hinges on the problems for employers 
that were thrown up by this system which exacerbated the inherent problems of 
control associated with gang systems of work, and the ways that these were 
resolved, which combined to produce a distinctive pattern of work relations. 
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Insofar as the issue of worker autonomy turns largely on the relationship between 
gangs and foremen (on the nature of supervision, that is), in the account of the 
social organization of work provided in this chapter, an analysis of the role of the 
foreman-stevedore will be central. 
"Work relations", Edwards writes, "are the relations between employers and 
employees at the point of production which govern how work is carried out" 
(1986: 1). In this chapter, I will attempt to identify, not the approximation of the 
pattern of work relations to an abstract typology of control or work organization, 
but rather the terms on which labour actually worked. In doing so, it is hard to 
underestimate the importance of the legally enforceable national agreement (the 
General Principal Order) and the locally negotiated agreements appended to it (the 
Supplementary Principal Orders) as forming the basis of job regulation on the 
waterfront. But the rules governing work do not exhaust the possibilities of how 
work is actually carried out. For, as Baldamus notes, 
the formal wage contract is never precise in stipulating how much 
effort is expected for a given wage (and vice versa). The details of 
the arrangement are left to be worked out through the direct 
interaction between the partners of the contract. If a worker 
slackens his effort at one moment, the foreman's job is to remind 
him, as it were, that he departs from his obligations, and, in certain 
circumstances, it is quite possible that there may be some haggling 
between the two as to what is a 'fair' degree of effort in relation to 
the wages paid (1961:35-6). 
This fundamental indeterminacy, and the way that it is resolved, is central to the 
particular pattern of work relations which emerges. Edwards observes that: 
Workplace behavior involves social relationships around the effort 
bargain, that is the continuous negotiation that occurs in the 
workplace over how much effort, of what quality, shall be 
expended for a given reward (1986:74). 
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Furthermore, these social relationships are not merely the outcome of particular 
combinations of control or resistance (the standard theme of the Marxist-inspired 
labour process literature). As Edwards elaborates: 
the organization of work . . . is not the product of a deliberate 
managerial strategy counterbalanced by workers' resistance. It is 
created by the day-to-day activities of both sides as they try to deal 
with particular sets of circumstances, and adaptation and 
accommodation are as important as deliberate efforts to assert or 
resist 'control' (ibid:77). 
Despite the fundamental differences and sources of conflict inherent within the 
capitalist labour process, there is a level at which the pattern of work relations is a 
'negotiated' outcome (see Brown 1992:231-8). Thus this chapter will focus as 
much upon patterns of 'adaptation and accommodation', as sources of control and 
resistance, during the years 1953-1971, the portion of the break-bulk period which 
coincides with this study. Indeed, one of the principal exogenous sources of 
conflict in this period, technological change, which, although it was by no means 
as important as containerization, was nevertheless significant, will be held in 
abeyance and dealt with in the following chapter. 
(2) The Problems of 'Management' 
In this section I argue that the set of employment relations which evolved within 
the bureau system of labour administration rendered it difficult for employers to 
secure and maintain consistent levels of effort from gangs. To recapitulate, the 
bureau system abrogated the traditional rights of employers: control over hiring 
and dismissal. Employers in individual firms did not have control over hiring 
because watersiders were allocated to them by the local bureau from exclusive 
registers, the entry to which was regulated by the Port Employers Association 
(although often in consultation with the local unions). Equally, managers and 
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foremen could not permanently dismiss men who they regarded as performing 
inadequately; the most they could do was to place watersiders on penalty and 
return them to the bureau, which after a brief stand-down period would simply 
reallocate them to another employer. The concomitant of employers not being 
able to permanently dismiss watersiders, was that they were unable to permanently 
retain the men who they preferred. Furthermore, employers could not use 
promotions or seniority to engender commitment because the labour market was 
organized horizontally, rather than vertically, around the principle of averaging 
and work equalization. 
Indeed, the problem for waterfront employers in New Zealand was almost 
identical to the one identified by Finlay that employers faced on America's West 
Coast, where a union hiring hall system operated: how to "control job performance 
without the conventional rewards and sanctions of the employment relationship -
hirings, firings and promotions" (1988:44). But whereas Finlay argues that only a 
single (informal) arrangement centering on the effort bargain (the ubiquitous 
'deal') developed in response to this problem, I will argue that in New Zealand a 
number of arrangements (both formal and informal) evolved to 'compensate' for 
the indirect employment relationship. And, as we shall subsequently see, these 
arrangements centered as much on the wage-structure as on 'deals' of the type that 
are identified in Finlay's study. 
I turn now to elaborating further the difficulties that employers faced at the level 
of work relations as a result of the bureau system of labour administration. I will 
illustrate these problems with comments from the actors themselves (primarily 
employers, but also the Waterfront Commissioner) drawn from interviews and 
archival records. I will begin with a brief description of how gangs of watersiders 
were requisitioned by, and allocated to, employers. 
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Under the bureau system, employers could not select their workers, and workers 
could not select their employers. Instead, the labour bureaux assigned watersiders 
to employers in accordance with the broad principles of work equalization. 
Requisitions for gangs of watersiders were submitted to the local bureau office 
usually by a company's wharf superintendent or a supervisor the day before ajob 
was due to begin. A specific number of gangs would be requisitioned, which had 
been determined while planning the job. The bureau staff then constituted the 
gangs in accordance with the procedures that I described in Chapter 4. They 
arranged the designated watersiders' discs on the labour allocation board, and also 
drew up a labour allocation list on a standard 'Allocation of Labour Form' . 
As well as specifying the company, ship, and berth, each labour allocation form 
had three columns in which the bureau staff wrote respectively the names of the 
water siders who had been allocated, their bureau register numbers, and· the 
position in the gang that they had been allocated to. The bureau also specified the 
'hatch' (the cargo compartment in the ship's hold) that the gang had been assigned 
to) Each 'hatch' was assigned a hold gang and a corresponding wharf gang.2 
Consequently, two allocation forms were usually completed, one for the gangs in 
the hold, and another for the corresponding gangs on the wharf.3 Each hold gang 
was typically made up of one winchman (who operated a shipboard winch), one 
hatchman (who directed the winch operator) and several holdmen (who worked in 
1 Mills notes that: "The hold of a vessel is the area below the weather deck (or main deck) which is 
designed to accommodate cargo. The hold is divided into 'hatches' by watertight bulkheads" 
(1979: 128). 
2 The type of allocation that I am describing is for break-bulk jobs. Bulk cargoes, such as wheat, 
did not have a gang in the hold. Instead, a hatchman directed a crane with a scoop into the hold. 
Also, on break-bulk jobs, a very large hatch could have a gang allocated to either end of it. 
3 Strictly speaking, a 'gang' comprised both the watersiders on the wharf and the watersiders in the 
hold at a particular hatch. However, each of these groups were frequently referred to by 
watersiders, bureau staff and managers as 'gangs'. Furthermore, each group worked 
independently, were usually supervised by separate foremen, and once allocated the positions 
between them were not interchangeable. For these reasons, I will retain the convention of referring 
to them as 'gangs'. 
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the ship's hold breaking down or stowing cargo).4 Each wharf gang was made up 
of several wharf hands. The actual gang sizes were stipulated in the relevant 
principal order, and varied according to the type of cargo being worked. A few 
'spare men' (who were on hand to relieve men who had to temporarily absent 
themselves from work) and shipwrights (carpenters who specialize in erecting and 
dismantling dunnage) would also be allocated to gangs.s Thus each gang was 
composed of a series of precisely specified positions, each filled by a designated 
watersider. The size of the gang could not be changed, nor could its position on 
the ship be altered. 
As well as gangs of watersiders, a small number of individuals from peripheral 
occupations would also be sent to ships. One tally clerk would be assigned to 
each hatch, and a 'signing up' tally clerk, who aggregated the tallies from all of the 
hatches, would be assigned to each vesse1.6 Also, ships were often worked with a 
combination of ship's own gear and shore-based winches. Insofar as these 
winches were usually owned by harbour boards, the board in question would 
supply their own winch operator. Finally, one union timekeeper was allocated to 
each vessel to record all delays to work (see the discussion of the bonus system 
below). 
4 Another position that was sometimes utilized in hold gangs was the 'call boy', on vessels with 
'blind spots' where neither the winch operator or the hatchman were able to see the position of the 
cargo sling. 
S At railways ports (such as LytteJton) in the 1950s, 'ropemen' and 'capstan men' were also 
allocated. These watersiders were responsible for shunting railway wagons up and down the wharf 
using electric capstans. 
6 Like the shipwright, the tally clerk is an occupation that has roots in antiquity (see Casson 
1991:141-50). In New Zealand the tally clerk originally constituted a separate occupation from 
that of the watersider. Tally clerks were organized in their own union and were not subject to the 
bureau system for a number of years. At Lyttelton, for example, employers had to request a tally 
clerk from the clerk's own office. In later years, however, tally clerks were accepted into the 
watersiders' union and were incorporated into the bureau system of labour allocation. This 
occupational stlUcture is interesting for it demonstrates that how work is organized through 
particular occupations, rather than being prefigured by the labour process, is in fact a social 
process subject to how unions influence and organize labour markets, within the broad limits of 
legal regulation. 
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The master-stevedore, supervisors and foremen did not know the identities of the 
men who they would be allocated for any particular job. Generally, they would 
only find this out when they were given the 'Allocation of Labour Forms' by the 
bureau on the day that work was due to commence, although company managers 
frequently used their automatic right of entry to the bureau office to inspect the 
numbers of the watersiders they had been allocated (see below). These forms 
were then given to the foremen (the wharf foreman was given the wharf list and 
the ship foreman the ship list), along with the details of the vessel, and the cargo 
plan. 
The master stevedore or supervisor would go to the bureau to advise whether the 
ship had arrived and hence whether the requisitioned gangs were in fact required. 
As a retired supervisor explained: 
when you went to the bureau you would see a board hanging up 
with all of the numbers on it. These were the men's bureau 
numbers, facing into the bureau. Now the men were on the other 
side. So then if you knew the ship was coming, and you wanted the 
men, then you told them to turn the board around. So that then the 
numbers went around and the men on the other side could see their 
numbers. (Interview) 
Watersiders accepted their allocation by turning or lifting their discs which were 
displayed on engagement boards by the bureau, together with the ship, hatch and 
position in the gang that they had been assigned to. As I noted in Chapter 4, 
watersiders had to 'lift' or turn their discs within a certain time period which was 
stipulated in the port's bureau rules. Similar procedures existed for watersiders 
who had not been allocated to work to signify their attendance. At the Port of 
Lyttelton, for example, separate 'Not Wanted' boards displayed the discs of the 
men who had not been offered work. Acceptance of work was compulsory at all 
p01is, and watersiders who failed to 'accept engagement were penalized, usually 
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by being suspended for a period of two to three days (depending on the port). 
Consequently, watersiders could not choose the employer that they were allocated 
to, and were not able to 'pick and choose' jobs. 
Keeping the identities of the men obscured by having the engagement board 
turned inwards, together with the short period within which watersiders could 
signal their acceptance of work, was intended to prevent men from absenting 
themselves from undesirable work that they had been allocated to. This type of 
alTangement, intended to ensure work attendance, was not uncommon within 
waterfront systems of labour administration. While absenteeism is a perennial 
problem within industry generally (see Edwards and Whitston 1993), it was 
exacerbated on the waterfront by systems of work allocation that required workers 
to signal their acceptance of work, which to some degree allowed them to 'pick 
and choose' jobs (on Britain, see Turnbull and Sapsford 1992). Within such 
systems, this problem has been combatted in a variety of ways. For instance, 
Jensen (1964:170) describes a procedure that developed in Liverpool under the 
National Dock Labour Scheme whereby dockers were actually locked in hiring 
centers until the process of selecting men was completed. 
In New Zealand, however, this system of engagement was not merely the result of 
the bureau or employers attempting to ensure work attendance. Rather, it had the 
support of the unions, as a necessary part of the work equalization process. As I 
noted in Chapter 4, the unions were responsible for introducing the penalty system 
to ensure compulsory acceptance of work, which was a crucial part of the process 
of enforced equalization of work. This union-sponsored and supported system of 
compulsory acceptance of work frequently was at variance with the interests of 
individual watersiders who wanted particular types of work, such as jobs that paid 
a high bonus rate, or wanted to avoid what watersiders refelTed to as the 'shit 
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jobs'. A former bureau allocator (Bert) at the Port of Lyttelton recalled the 
dissatisfaction of some watersiders with the job they had been allocated to: 
you just turned the board round and they'd take them [the discs] 
off. And once they took their number off the board, that was 
accepting the job. You could hear the numbers clattering into the 
tins, 'bloody bastards' and they'd be throwing them in. You know, 
some of the jobs they didn't like, if it was lamp black or something. 
(Interview) 
Indeed some watersiders went to great lengths to circumvent the allocation system. 
Bert recalled the following attempt at circumvention: 
We used to hang the numbers up on the board on the Saturday for 
the Monday morning. And they'd [watersiders] come down and 
look through the cracks in the window and see if they had a good 
job or not. And if there was a bad job, say it was a cement job or 
something, they'd get their wife to ring up on Monday morning and 
say they can't come in. And then we used to hang sheets of 
newspaper over the boards and that would stop them from seeing it. 
(Interview) 
To be sure, the unions' attempts to equalize the allocation of the 'collective job 
opportunity' were usually relaxed in the case of sick, injured or older members, 
for whom they would seek a special allocation. Indeed, some men could be 
permanently excused from performing certain types of work. A former 
Wellington Union official noted that: 
Within the Bureau System there was provision for adjustment and 
exemptions. . . . [Watersiders who] had some ailment or other ... 
on production of a medical support could be excused - by the rules 
or by decision of the WIC manager - from working in dusty or cold 
conditions. However if total exemption was required this was a 
different matter and would be determined by the Port Conciliation 
Committee or the particular worker could be classified as B grade. 7 
7 Personal communication. 
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Provisions also existed for men to legitimately take the day off in cases where they 
were indisposed through illness or injury. Additionally, men were able to take the 
day off for other reasons through prior notification of the bureau. As I noted in 
Chapter 4, there was a certain degree of 'flexibility' in this area because casual 
labour was able to be used to supplement the registered workforce. But because of 
the engagement system, men could not 'take the day off' after finding out the job 
that they were allocated to. Generally, when men took a day off, they gambled 
that they would not be allocated to a job that paid a high bonus rate, and hoped 
that they missed a 'shit job'. Conversely, some men took days off in anticipation 
of getting a better job the next day (i.e. attempted to turn the odds in their favour). 
For instance, in 1966 Waterfront Commissioner Bockett made the following 
comment in a letter to the General Secretary of the PEA (in relation to a situation 
at the Port of Whang are i): 
The variation in bonus and incentive payments made to each 
worker is, I understand, due entirely to 'the luck of the draw'. . . . 
We have had the situation where individual workers have 
deliberately taken a day off to avoid a small bonus job with the 
object of obtaining work on a high bonus job the following day.8 
The more general point is that there are a variety of hiring systems that have 
developed in different industries to prevent employers having choice in who they 
hire, usually in the interests of equity in the distribution of work. These 
arrangements were not unique to the waterfront, the case of coal mining supplying 
a good example (see Beynon and Austrin 1994:149-53). But in the New Zealand 
context, the system was such that individual workers themselves could not choose 
which job (and employer) they were allocated to. This system of compulsory 
acceptance of work stands in stark contrast with the hiring-hall system which 
operates on America's West Coast where longshoremen have the right to choose 
and refuse jobs (see Kimeldorf 1988:111-112; and Finlay 1988:43-4). This 
8 Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 173, 5/473 (National Archives). 
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comparison highlights the specificity of the union-sponsored registration system 
which was institutionalized by the state in New Zealand. It also illustrates that the 
problems thrown up by this system were by no means common to all registration 
systems. In particular, these problems centered on the divergence of interests 
between the union and its members over the distribution of the "collective job 
opportunity" (Perlman 1928:9), which resulted from compulsory acceptance of 
work. As we shall see, these problems came to a head over the issue of bonus 
payments. 
Because neither employers or workers had any choice in the allocation of labour, 
in a sense, they were randomly 'thrown together' at the point of production. In 
some cases, the actual allocation did not match the preferences of the employers or 
the watersiders, which resulted in some workers who did not want to be on a job 
(especially a 'shit job', like carbon black) and employers who did not want them 
there either. The dissatisfaction of watersiders with some of the jobs they were 
allocated to was mirrored by the employers' attitude towards some of the men. 
Although employers had no control over the men who they were actually 
allocated, company managers had automatic right of entry to the bureau and on 
occasion checked who they were being allocated. As Bert (the former bureau 
allocator) commented: 
Some of the bosses would come in and they'd have a look . . . 
because they knew the bureau numbers as well as we did, they were 
used to them, and they'd have a look and say 'Oh Jesus, we got 
him, he's useless, he's a drunk'. (Interview) 
When I asked Bert what a typical reply would be to such negative comments 
towards a water sider that he was in the process of allocating, he remarked that he 
would say something like: "Well his hours mean he's entitled to that job, so he 
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bloody gets it!". As I noted in the previous chapter, employers could do little 
formally to alter the allocation process, because it was administered by bureau 
officials who they had no control over. 
Coupled with the inability to permanently sack men, the lack of control over who 
they were allocated was a source of acute frustration for some managers and 
foremen. A former manager of a small stevedoring company expressed his 
vexation in the following manner: 
there was no way you could sack anybody unless they fell off the 
winch blind drunk, there was little you could do about getting rid of 
them. You just had to put up with them .... They just went back to 
the bureau and got another job and so on. And you'd look at the 
labour sheet in the morning and think 'Ohh God, I've got him 
again'. And you knew before you went near it that there was going 
to be trouble. (Interview) 
This allocation system also affected the relationship between companies and the 
workforce. Management, in the sense of management of labour, did not exist, 
because there was no labour to 'manage' except when gangs were 'employed' on a 
job. The sporadic nature of this relationship limited any attempt by managers and 
foremen to develop a rapport with their workers. 
The fact that the bureau system precluded the employment of a permanent 
workforce by firms, and did not permit the existence of permanent gangs, gave 
rise to a constant 'reordering' of the workforce. Reconstituted at the beginning of 
every job, gangs were in a permanent state of flux; shipping and stevedoring 
companies, on the other hand, had a constant turnover of labour between jobs. 
Because of this 'randomizing' effect of the system of labour allocation, the only 
institutions that had any permanency or stability in relation to labour, apart from 
the Commission itself, were the unions. Neither the work-group or the firm 
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possessed this stability. The position of the union relative to individual firms was 
expressed in the following manner by a former manager of a stevedoring 
company: 
you had a casual labour force, with very powerful unions, who were 
working for faceless employers really. I mean they'd work for you 
today and someone else tomorrow, and so the common 
denominator was really the union. So everything that went wrong 
or every damn thing they went to the union. (Interview) 
As this statement indicates, indirect employment resulted in a lack of 
identification with particular companies and identification instead with the local 
port union. Similarly, at a meeting of the Waterfront Industry Commission 
Captain Lawrence, an employers' representative, commented that: 
Sharing of labour made it difficult for any individual employer to 
get close to the men who work his ship.9 
On the same issue, another employers' representative present at this meeting 
remarked that: 
permanent employment would be the answer but for a variety of 
reasons this had not come about . . . [because of] the existence of 
the Commission.1O 
Apart from non-permanent employment, the use of the individual, rather than the 
gang, as the 'unit' of work equalization resulted in an additional element of 
uncertainty and randomization for employers in that it prevented the existence of 
permanently constituted gangs. Work equalization schemes per se do not preclude 
the existence of permanent gangs. Within such schemes, entire gangs - rather than 
individuals - can be rotated between employers in accordance with the principles 
9 This comment was made at a meeting (held on 14/2/78) of the Waterfront Industry Commission 
which had been reconstituted into a representative form by the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 (see 
Chapter 9). Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
10 Ibid. 
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of work equalization. For instance, a 'low man out' and a 'low gang out' method 
of work allocation coexisted on the San Francisco waterfront (see Mills 1979:129-
30). As Finlay (1988:108) notes, these stable, self-selected gangs were predictable 
- foremen knew the gangs and where they would work most effectively on 
particular types of jobs. 
However, under the union-sponsored method of 'individuating' the allocation (and 
equalization) of work within the bureau system, the gangs themselves were 
randomized. ll Between jobs (and employers), gangs were constantly in the 
process of being composed, broken down and then recomposed. Each gang, 
therefore, was an 'unknown quantity' with respect to the levels of skill and effort 
that its members were collectively able or prepared to supply (although managers 
and foremen might be familiar with particular individuals). The position of 
watersiders within the gang could not be altered, and the gang itself could not be 
moved from the hatch that it was assigned to.12 A foreman I interviewed 
expressed the difficulties which resulted as a variant of 'Murphy's Law': "the 
gang you wanted to work hard invariably would be the wrong one." Furthermore, 
insofar as they were neither self-selected or permanent, gangs in a sense were 
'atomized' with respect to the internal dynamics of the workgroup. Gang leaders 
did not naturally 'emerge' over time, and the appointment of leading hands on 
II The broader point is that the actual organization of gangs as work groups was not predetermined 
by the nature of the labour process on the waterfront. Rather it was mediated by the manner in 
which unions sought to institutionalize system of labour administration which decasualized the 
labour market. In the case of New Zealand, decasualization was enforced as a form of work 
equalization which, as I demonstrate, had significant consequences for the structure of gangs. 
12 There were, however, three minor exceptions to this rule. When a gang had fmished all of the 
work at a hatch, the foreman could transfer it to another hatch that was still working, so that there 
would be two gangs in one hatch. Also when the meal hour was being worked, a foreman could 
transfer a gang to another hatch until the assigned gang returned from their break. A limited degree 
of flexibility also existed in unloading cargo on deck. If the foreman wanted to send a gang down 
into the hold immediately at the beginning ofajob, he could assign another gang to move the cargo 
on top of its own hatch as well as on top of the hatch of the gang that been sent down below. 
However, once gangs commenced work in the hold, the positions on the labour allocation list had 
to be rigidly adhered to. 
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some jobs by foremen was often a source of tension within gangs (see section 
four). 
Parenthetically, it can also be noted that constantly rotating workers between jobs 
and positions did not support 'occupational subcultures' (Trice 1993) - such as the 
ship / shore distinction - to the same degree as in other countries. This distinction 
was typically based on the varying levels of skill required for the different types of 
waterfront work, and in Britain it formed the basis for different types of gangs (see 
Lovell 1969:37-57; and Turnbull et al. 1992:38). In Japan, historically, it even 
came to be expressed in and through specific cultural codes of the different groups 
of waterfront workers (see Leupp 1992:133-4). The bureau system, however, 
militated against such distinctions because workers were allocated to different 
positions on different jobs, which to a certain degree had a 'homogenizing' effect 
with respect to levels of skill. Apart from differences in qualifications of 
watersiders within the bureau system (such as winchmen and hatchmen), to the 
extent that there were differences in levels of skill between individuals this was 
not taken into consideration in the allocation process. As Bert (the former bureau 
allocator) put it, "Every man was treated equal, even the sluggards and the 
dullards, they were exactly the same as the best workers." (Interview) 
Although this system of work rotation may have been important in fostering and 
perpetuating a sense of 'community' within a port as a whole, in the manner that 
Mills (1976, 1979) argues occurred on the San Francisco waterfront, the 
familiarity of the men with each other (the 'nodding acquaintance' as Mills puts it) 
did not guarantee that the gangs cohered on the job. While work rotation was 
undoubtedly a source of solidarity amongst the workforce as a whole, it did not 
automatically translate into workgroup coherence. This was particularly the case at 
ports such as Wellington, which had high rates of labour turnover. Furthermore, 
the sheer size of the workforce at some ports meant that the same men did not 
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work together very often. While at smaller pOlis (such as Whangarei and Picton) 
there would be the same men in gangs all the time, at the larger ports (such as 
Auckland and Lyttelton) men would work together only infrequently. The 
following anecdotal example nicely illustrates this point: a watersider who I 
interviewed said that he had worked with a friend of his only once in his thirty 
years on the Lyttelton waterfront. 
However, the fact that the employers did not systematically challenge the use of 
the individual as the 'unit' of work equalization suggests that, with respect to 
control of work, permanently constituted gangs were not as much an issue for the 
employers as the indirect employment relationship itself (as the comments cited 
above attest to). It appears that the more fundamental problem, from the 
employers point of view, was work rotation per se rather than the rotation of 
individuals as such. A former General Secretary of the Waterside Workers 
Federation, Ted Thompson, commented that: 
There was no move to want a gang system of any significance. The 
employers often wanted permanent work but on greatly inferior 
conditions, and if this had been agreed regular gangs within such a 
system would probably have eventuated .... The question of 
permanent gangs on ordinary waterside work was never an issue 
within my experience 1946-1980 and certainly never a dispute 
matter. 13 
This latter point is borne out by the fact that no disputes over this matter appear in 
the decisions of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. 
Nonetheless, the Waterfront Commissioner himself was prompted to comment on 
this matter at a meeting between the Foremen-Stevedores Union and the Minister 
of Labour in 1960. Commissioner Bockett remarked that: 
13 Personal communication. 
The method of contracting for the work would be better if the 
watersiders were working in gangs. If the leader of the gang said at 
the start of the job 'Here is your cheque' now the shipowner would 
be very pleased with the quick turnaround of his ship instead of the 
job stretching out so many more days. The contracting system 
would not carry any 'drones' .14 
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Furthermore, despite the fact that the Port Employers Association did not mount a 
concerted challenge to non-permanent gangs, they did pose problems for 
individual employers, managers, and foremen. For instance, in 1961 the Inter-
Island Shipping Company at Wellington sought the PEA's support in securing an 
agreement for a permanent gang. However the PEA Management Committee 
declined this request, stating: 
it was felt that any attempt by the Company to apply to the Tribunal 
with a view to obtaining permanent gangs would be liable to cause 
industrial unrest. That while the Association agreed with the 
principle of permanent employment by individual companies it had 
long recognized that it would be impracticable for all to follow this 
course. 15 
This case is also interesting insofar as it suggests that part of the reason why there 
never was a concerted challenge to non-permanent gangs was because of the fear 
of the disputes that it would be likely to provoke. Because of their trenchant 
support of the system of individualizing the allocation of work, the unions ipso 
facto were opposed to any move to introduce permanent gangs. Hence the 
employment arrangements under the bureau system were accepted by the 
employers as afait accompli. 
Any attempt to deal with how employers resolved the difficulties of labour control 
referred to above necessitates confronting the thorny issue of 'strategy': whether 
14 Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67,9/5/8 (National Archives). 
15 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 298, 16/9/61. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 202 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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employers' actions in securing effort were part of some fully formulated design or 
simply pragmatic responses to situations and events. Indeed the very existence of 
a strategy cannot be taken for granted because, as Edwards germanely observes, 
Any employing organization will use a range of ways of persuading 
workers to work, some of which, moreover, may stem from a series 
of 'ad hoc' adjustments and not from any deliberate policy; the 
extent to which anyone firm has an articulated strategy of labour 
control is thus questionable, and the idea that all firms of a similar 
type are characterized by the same strategy is even more 
questionable (1986:3). 
Discerning whether actions by employers are part of a 'strategy', or merely 'ad hoc 
adjustments' to circumstances, is beset by the same problems as any sociological 
attempt to attribute motives and meanings to actions (for an extended discussion 
of employer strategy, see Marchington and Parker 1990:57-75). Although 
Edwards' caveat should be heeded, I will argue that such 'ad hoc adjustments' and 
approaches to the problem of 'labour control', while they may not have been fully 
formulated and coherent, did over time crystallize into, if not a full-fledged 
'strategy', then at least a 'pattern' which characterized the actions of waterfront 
employers at the level of work relations. 
Furthermore, although securing the desired levels of effort was the province of 
individual firms, most did not confront these problems as atomized actors, but 
rather as members of the Port Employers' Association. However, as the example 
regarding permanent gangs demonstrates, this type of 'externalization' (or 
'delegation' of responsibility to an organization "outside the firm" (Gospel 
1992:9)) was both constraining as well as enabling. Employers all faced similar 
problems of securing worker performance, but attempted to resolve this in 
different ways at the local port level, and in some cases their 'strategies' were 
blocked by the PEA (as in the move to secure permanent gangs referred to above). 
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This dimension of 'strategy', the extent to which it was formulated at the national 
level and shaped and set limits upon individual employers' actions at the local port 
level, is one of the issues that will be addressed in the sections which follow. 
(3) Management Through the Wages System 
In the main, the problems that employers faced in securing effort were resolved 
not through supervision, but rather through the wage-form, with employers 
displaying a preference for measures such as incentive schemes over direct 
supervision. As Rubery (writing in another context) comments, this strategy 
broadly centers on the use of "pay instead of supervision to maintain output 
standards" (1988:253) or what Trist et al. (1963:36) refer to as "management 
through the wages system". However, to the extent that the wage-form strategy 
met only limited success, the issue of work performance did largely resolve itself 
into the relationship between foremen and gangs. Central to this relationship were 
negotiations over "the terms of the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:74). This is not 
surprising for, as Baldamus (1961:36) argues, "it is possible to visualize the 
process of supervision as a method of bargaining between workers and supervisors 
(or managers)". For foremen, however, this process had many pitfalls. As I will 
demonstrate, the foreman was the actor on the employers' side that the tensions 
generated by the resulting pattern of work relations were refracted through. 
Consequently, the foreman on the waterfront occupied a position reminiscent of 
the "man in the middle" (Child 1975:72) in manufacturing. 
The payment system was based on time-wages at a standard hourly rate. 
However, attached to the time wage was a variable component which was 
composed of bonus payments, along with rates negotiated over and above the 
hourly rate, and allowances. To a certain degree, the inherent diversity and non-
standardized nature of break -bulk cargo (and the attendant labour process) is 
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conducive to the development of complex payment systems. I am not claiming 
that there is a 'logic' to the labour process that predetermines the nature of 
payment systems, merely that the nature of the labour process provides the 
opportunity for such arrangements. The degree to which they develop is the 
outcome of a social process, conditioned by the relationship between employers 
and workers. It is to specifying this relationship with respect to one particular 
aspect of the wage-structure - the bonus system - that I now turn. 
(3.1) The Bonus System 
The bonus system is the first of the arrangements that I will deal with which was 
introduced by employers to 'compensate' for the indirect employment 
relationship. I will deal with this first because it was logically prior in the order in 
which work was organized. Bonus rates were determined prior to ajob beginning 
and before watersiders were allocated to employers; hence they were not amenable 
to negotiation or alteration. However, despite fixed bonus rates, there was an 
element of bargaining that crept into this system regarding the length of delays, 
which crucially affected bonus payments. I will begin with a description of the 
bonus system and then proceed to an analysis of its effects. 
Two types of bonus systems operated on the waterfront during the 1950s and 
1960s. The first had its origins in the system of 'cooperative contracting' 
introduced by the Waterfront Control Commission (the wartime antecedent of the 
Waterfront Industry Commission) in 1940 (see Baker 1965:396-7). Some 
employers (both at the port level and individually) subsequently supplemented this 
system by introducing their own incentive schemes.!6 Both Waterfront Industry 
Commission cooperative contracts and employers' incentive schemes were 
intended to 'compensate' for the indirect employment relationship. These systems 
16 The cooperative contracting system persisted with some minor alterations until 1970 when, 
along with employers' incentive schemes, it was replaced with a new incentive contract system 
provided for in Principal Order 306. 
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were intended to combat the levelling and averaging effects of a system of work 
equalization by reintroducing differences in pecuniary reward into the employment 
relationship. In short, the bonus (in its various forms) was an element in an 
employer strategy to elicit effort which centered on the wage-form. 
However this latter claim must be elaborated upon in relation to cooperative 
contracts, because the cooperative contracting system introduced by the 
Waterfront Control Commission had the former Waterside Workers Union's 
support. 17 Furthermore, the employers were largely critical of this system. How, 
then, could the cooperative contracting system be part of an employer strategy 
which was ultimately designed to achieve higher levels of effort? The key to this 
paradox is the employer-sponsored modifications to this system which occurred in 
the wake of the 1951 waterfront dispute. These changes resulted in the cessation 
of the practice of 'pooling' bonus payments at the port level. Hence while the 
Union supported the cooperative contracting system, and the employers neither 
introduced it nor supported it, modifications that were made to this system after 
1951 brought it within the ambit of the employers' strategy which centered on the 
wage-form. A brief description of this bonus system is warranted before 
considering these modifications in greater depth. 
Cooperative contracts were administered by the Commission and operated at all 
except a few of the minor portS. 18 The cooperative contracting system was 
17 The Union had originally sought the establishment of a full-blown system of 'cooperative 
stevedoring', as is evident in a report of an executive sub-committee which was presented at the 
Union's conference in 1937 (see Fernandez 1969:96). Under this system, the Union's local 
branches would contract for the work of loading and unloading vessels, supply from labour from 
their own ranks, along with watersiders who would act as foremen, and the profits earned would be 
distributed amongst their members (see Roth 1993:71). However, as Roth (ibid:79) notes, the 
cooperative contracting system established by the Waterfront Control Commission "was not the 
cooperative stevedoring by union members visualized earlier, but a sort of halfway house between 
that and payment by results." Nonetheless, the Union was generally suppOltive of this system (see 
Norris 1980:112). 
18 There were no cooperative contracts at the ports of Whangarei, Onehunga and Oamaru. 
However, there were employers' incentive contracts at these ports. 
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exceedingly complex. There were separate Commission staff, and at the larger 
ports (such as Lyttelton) separate offices, for the purposes of administering the 
system. The Commission administered the cooperative contracting system through 
a specially created fund (the Port Unions Stevedoring Fund). The Commission 
also administered employers' incentive schemes and 'equivalent contracts' 
through this fund. 19 There were three separate types of cooperative contracts: 
those for overseas vessels, contracts for Union Steam Ship Company vessels, and 
contracts for small coastal vessels. Under this system, cargo was grouped into 
broad classifications and a contract rate set for each class of cargo.20 The rate was 
calculated on the basis of average rates of work within a specified time period at 
each port. Because of inter-port differences in levels of productivity, contract 
rates for the same classes of cargo differed between ports. 
In essence, the Commission determined a contract rate for a job. Onthe 
completion of the job, the Commission billed the shipping (or stevedoring) 
company in question at the contract rate, along with the cost of basic wages, rates, 
overtime payments, levies and so forth. As the report of a Commission of Inquiry 
into the 1951 dispute noted: 
The ship pays the contract price plus overtime rates, mllllma, 
special payments and suchlike. The Commission then treated what 
remained, after deducting wages paid and some other items[,] ... 
as a profit or bonus payable to the workers (Royal Commission of 
Inquiry 1952:51). 
19 'Equivalent contracts' were contracts with agencies such as Harbour Boards and the Railways 
Department where "waterside workers were employed by these bodies to perform work in 
conjunction with vessels under direct contract" (WIC Report 1949:12). 
20 The actual classifications differed between the various types of contracts. For overseas vessels, 
as at 1954, the categories for discharged cargo were as follows: general cargo, basic slag, and 
cement. The categories for loaded cargo comprised the following items: general cargo, hides, 
tallow, wool, fruit, butter, cheese and meat (mutton and lamb). It is important to note that these 
categories were revised from time to time to take account of new commodities, such as bulk 
sulphur and bulk phosphate, which were subsequently added to the 'discharged' category. On the 
other hand, the contracts for Union Steam Ship vessels and coastal vessels comprised the single 
category of 'general cargo'. 
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The Commission of Inquiry noted with respect to the distribution of bonus 
payments in the period prior to the 1951 dispute, that "The Commission followed 
the instructions of the union." (ibid:51). This is because cooperative contracts, 
first and foremost, were based on an agreement between the Commission and the 
Union. Before the 1951 dispute, most of the Union's branches had been able to 
secure their members' consent to pool the bonus. However at the Port of Lyttelton 
in the 1940s agreement could not be reached to pool the bonus (see Norris 
1980:120-21). In this case, the Union branch (which sought to equalize the 
'distribution of opportunity') was pitted against a substantial portion of its rank 
and file members who, as individuals, supported the substantial variations in 
earnings which resulted from differences in bonus rates. 
The method of bonus payment is a key issue, because it was central to the strategy 
of employers at all ports after the 1951 dispute. The problems the Union 
experienced at Lyttelton prior to the dispute were by no means unique, because 
after the employers' move to cease the pooling of bonus payments it took a 
number of the (new) port unions several years to regain their members' consent to 
pooling arrangements. Before dealing with these deVelopments, however, I will 
outline some of the sources of employers' dissatisfaction with the cooperative 
contracting system. 
The crucial variables which affected bonus payments were 'winch time' and cargo 
volume (i.e. the volume of cargo moved 'over the rail' within a certain time 
period). Consequently, a system evolved for keeping a detailed record of delays 
('non-productive' time when cargo was not being 'worked'). As well as tally 
clerks who tallied the cargo, and were common to most ports worldwide, the 
bonus system resulted in the additional actuarial position of 'union timekeeper' 
(also known as the 'check timekeeper') who kept a record of all delays which 
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affected the bonus?l As their title suggests, timekeepers were selected by the 
local union. Generally they were experienced and trusted union members, which 
is understandable given that the records they kept crucially affected the level of 
bonus payments.22 Initially, in the 1940s, union timekeepers were paid from the 
bonus pool itself. As a former timekeeper recalled: 
it was the first call on the bonus at one time. In other words, the 
timekeeper's wages carne out of the bonus pool. Before any payout 
could be made, the wages had to be paid. So therefore the 
timekeeper had an interest in earning the bonus, virtually because 
he was earning his own wages. But that didn't last very long. 
(Interview) 
Subsequently umon timekeepers were paid from the Commission's general 
revenue, but they usually received a share of the bonus, along with any rates (such 
as dirt rates) negotiated on the job, which again gave them a material interest in 
bonus payments. 
Delays were classified into three types: management delays (which included items 
such as machinery breakdowns, and awaiting cargo or equipment), operational 
delays (which included rigging gear, removing and replacing hatches, cleaning, 
and dunnaging) and award (union) delays (such as weather delays and 'walking 
time'). An abbreviation was included for each patiicular type of delay within 
these broad categories which the union timekeeper had to enter in his time-book. 
A former timekeeper (Bernie) provided the following description of his job: 
We provided the times for those three categories, for every gang on 
the ship. So, in other words, say it starts at seven o'clock in the 
morning, you would have say five gangs, maybe seven gangs. And 
you had a separate page for each one, and you would note all the 
21 The 'union timekeeper' is not to be confused with the 'company timekeeper', whose role was to 
consult with the bureau over matters of labour allocation, and who played no role in the bonus 
system. 
22 Union monitoring of 'payment by results' systems is not uncommon. For the case of coal 
mining, see Beynon and Austrin (1994:95-100) 
delays over ten minutes, and you would assign them to the various 
categories which in turn were broadly embraced by those three 
[categories]. . . . The time that the cargo was going back and forth 
was regarded as working time, and any time where those winches 
weren't working was regarded as delay. (Interview) 
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The specific form that this bonus system took, particularly the detailed recording 
of delays which yielded the union timekeeper's role, was a consequence of the 
non-linear and non-standardized nature of the labour process which rendered it 
prone to delays. Similarly, specific types of problems and 'fiddles' (Lupton 1963) 
developed which were unique to this system. The Waterfront Industry 
Commission identified the main problem in one of its annual reports: 
Bonuses are only earned while cargo is being discharged or loaded, 
the non-productive time being paid for on a wage basis. There is, 
therefore, not only no incentive to the worker to assist in the 
reduction of non-productive time but an incentive for the union 
timekeeper to meticulously record non-productive time which 
reduces the cargo working or winch time and has the effect of 
increasing bonus payments (WIC Report 1967:7).23 
Indeed, the most common way of 'fiddling' the bonus system was by exaggerating 
delays. A retired foreman I interviewed was adamant that some timekeepers went 
beyond 'meticulously recording' to actually exaggerating delays. The foreman 
had to validate the delays by signing the union timekeeper's time book at the end 
of the day, which often left him in the difficult position of having to accept delays 
which he felt had been exaggerated. He said that: 
the foreman had to sign it if he could say that delay was justified. 
Well if you've got six gangs working and you're down this hatch, 
and then you're down that hatch and you're doing something else. 
And somewhere in there its added in that there's been four half 
hour delays .... They could say 'waiting for gear' or 'breakage', or 
23 Indeed during the 1950s and 1960s the Commission consistently advocated "a review of the 
existing co-operative contracting and incentive payment schemes to provide a contract rate for non-
productive time and thus provide an incentive to the worker to reduce non-productive time within 
his control" (ibid:7-8). 
something like that, and you knew it happened but you're sure it 
wasn't half an hour. (Interview) 
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While he would be unlikely to admit to exaggerating delays, Bernie (the former 
timekeeper) recalled frequent disagreements over delays: 
at the end of the day a company official had to sign your list of 
delays, so he had to agree with them. So that led to many an 
argument. They would refuse to sign them, then it went to 
mediation. (Interview) 
The Port Employers Association took the same view as the foreman quoted above, 
that delays were in fact exaggerated: 
There is little doubt, in our view, that the presence of the men's 
own Check Timekeepers on the job, and the careful coaching they 
have received in building up delays, which, in many cases are 
fictitious, had been one of the most iniquitous features of the 
present contracting system.24 
As a result, the PEA sent their own observers to record delays at Auckland, 
Wellington and Lyttelton in 1957, and it was reported that the delays recorded by 
the check timekeepers were "appreciably higher" than those recorded by the 
observers.25 
Thus the employers were critical of this system largely because of the 'fiddles' 
that it supported. Such problems were one of the reasons that employers preferred 
their own incentive schemes to cooperative contracts. But despite these fiddles 
and problems, employers sought to improve this system by ceasing the pooling of 
bonus payments, thereby rendering them more 'visible' to individual watersiders. 
This is how, despite the employers' preference for their own schemes, cooperative 
24 PEA Annual Report (1957:5). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
25 Ibid. 
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contracts became part of their strategy which centered on reintroducing differences 
in monetary reward into the employment relationship. 
The debates over the relative merits and weaknesses of the cooperative contracting 
system were rehearsed at length in the report of the Commission of Inquiry in 
1952. Primary among its findings was that "the pooling of the bonus destroyed 
individual incentive" (Royal Commission of Inquiry 1952:55). The pooling 
arrangements were the result of an agreement between the Waterside Workers 
Union and the Waterfront Industry Commission. Consequently, the establishment 
of 'new' unions in the aftermath of the 1951 waterfront dispute provided a 
'window of opportunity' for the Waterfront Industry Commission, acting on the 
findings of the Commission of Inquiry and with the support of the PEA, to 
eliminate the pooling of bonus payments. Under the new arrangement, the bonus 
was generally paid weekly to watersiders for the ships they worked on in that 
period.26 
However, some ports 'slipped through the net' after the new unIOns were 
established. The employers' opposition to pooling bonus payments was 
complicated by the role of the Commissioner who, without consulting the PEA, 
authorized pooling at a few of the smaller ports where the local unions had 
secured an agreement amongst their members to reintroduce this practice. At a 
meeting at the Port of Tauranga, which was convened in 1964 to discuss a call for 
pooling from the Tauranga Union, the General Secretary of the PEA Viv Blakeley 
commented: 
26 It must be noted, however, that the bonus paid to the individual was a share of the total bonus 
earned by all gangs on each vessel. In a sense, then, the bonus was still 'pooled' but only for each 
vessel (and not the whole port); thus it was a group bonus system (the 'group' being all gangs on 
the ship). As I note below, the employers attempted to reduce even further the level at which the 
bonus was aggregated, to that of the gang. 
I accept that it [the bonus] has been pooled in a number of ports 
against the wishes of the Port Employers by reason of the fact that 
under WIC Contract - in the administration they are able to do it.27 
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For instance, shortly after the 1951 dispute the Timaru branch of the PEA declined 
the local union's request to pool bonus payments, but the Commissioner became 
involved and the matter was referred to the Port Conciliation Committee which 
ultimately resulted in a decision in favour of pooling (despite the local employers' 
opposition). Similarly, by 1956 the local unions had managed to secure pooling 
arrangements at Dunedin, New Plymouth, Greymouth and Gisbome. Again this 
was carried out despite the opposition of the PEA and its local branches. As the 
PEA's 1958 Annual Report states: 
The Association has . . . always been opposed to the pooling of 
bonuses because it destroys the incentive to the individual to 
perform better work. 28 
The PEA then attempted to prevent pooling at any more ports, particularly at the 
three main ports of Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton. Employers' 
representatives even met with the Waterfront Commissioner to seek an agreement 
that he would not act in this matter without first consulting them.29 
Conversely, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the local unions continually sought to 
get their members to accept pooling and numerous secret ballots were held on this 
issue at the remaining ports.30 The ports where the majority of watersiders 
27 POlt Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 29 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
28 PEA Annual Report (1958:4). POlt Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
29 On the issue of how bonuses should be paid, the General Principal Order (the national 
agreement, that is) was silent. To be sure, GPO 23 contained a clause which allowed for the 
continuance of the cooperative contracting system and for other incentive schemes to be 
introduced. However, it did not stipulate how these systems should be organized. 
30 At the larger ports, the results of these ballots clearly demonstrated that the majority of 
watersiders did not favour pooling. A secret ballot held in Auckland in 1960 resulted in 570 votes 
'for', and 970 votes 'against' pooling. Another ballot held in 1962 produced a similar result. 
Similarly, a ballot held at Lyttelton in 1961 resulted in pooling being defeated by 2:1. When 
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consistently opposed included the three largest, but also a number of the smaller 
portS.3l The following extract from the Waterfront Worker (the South Island 
Federation's journal), written by a union member at the Port of Napier, provides 
the rationale for the pooling of bonus payments. He begins by noting that some 
water siders at this port received substantially more money that others: 
This was not because one man worked harder than the next, but 
because some had 'runs' of work on ships which had types of cargo 
that earned more by incentive. This caused those who were on 
lesser paying ships to be envious of the others. . . . It was not a 
good state of affairs to have one member jealous of the next. As 
the Bureau allocates the jobs on hours worked, it was not possible 
to even up this monetary imbalance through that source. Logic 
then had it that the men working on one ship, in fact pool that 
ship's bonus ... [and] that if all these profits from all ships were 
held for a period and then paid to each man on the bureau register 
equally for the time he had been available for work, all would 
receive ajust share.32 
Thus the issue in question was similar to the one identified by Sayles (1957) in his 
classic study of incentives (albeit in a factory setting): attempts by unions to 
eliminate the rivalry amongst workers under incentive bonus schemes which 
resulted from disparities in the 'relative earnings' of workers. As Sayles 
(ibid:I01) insightfully observed, "relative earnings are as important if not more 
important than the absolute level of earnings." 
As I noted above, the PEA was vehement in its opposition to bonus pooling. At 
the time of a secret ballot at Lyttelton in 1963, Viv Blakeley (the PEA General 
Secretary) wrote in a letter to the Secretary of the local PEA branch, that: "1 can 
only hope that the move to pool bonuses in your port will meet with the same fate 
pooling was fmally accepted, at most pOliS it was only by a narrow margin. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 92 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
31 The smaller ports were as follows: Tauranga, Whangarei, Napier, Opua, Picton, Raglan, 
Onehunga and Oamam. Pooling was achieved in Napier in 1959 and in Whangarei in 1967. At the 
remaining ports, including the three largest, bonus payments were not pooled until 1968. 
32 New Zealand Waterfront Worker, August 1965. 
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that it encountered on previous occasions."33 Even after ballots in favour of 
pooling, the PEA sought to stall its introduction, as the following quotation from a 
letter from Blakeley to the Tauranga PEA Branch Secretary indicates: 
We shall, of course, at this end do all we can to oppose 
implementation of the Union's vote in favour of pooling bonuses, 
and we will rely on you to do likewise at your end.34 
The employers also sought to retain a minimum of time between watersiders 
earning and receiving bonus payments. For example, in 1957 the union at the Port 
of Oamaru requested that bonuses be paid three monthly rather than weekly. The 
Industrial Superintendent of the Union Steam Ship Company wrote to the 
Company's Branch Manager, stating that: 
We prefer the payment to be weekly so that the men will relate 
their bonuses to the particular job of work performed .... If the 
men are unanimous about wanting the quarterly payment we would 
accept the position provided that some arrangement is made by 
posting a list or advising each man of the bonus accruing on each 
job as soon as it is worked OUt.35 
What this case demonstrates is that, from the point of view of individual 
employers, it was the 'visibility' of bonus payments that was important. Similarly, 
the local branch of the PEA accepted the Company's proposal, as long as it did not 
lead to the pooling of bonus payments. At the national level, however, the PEA 
took a much firmer line, and wrote a letter to its Oamaru branch declining the 
proposal. It stated: 
The NZPEA prefers these payments to be made . . . as soon as 
possible after the job has been done .... It is essential of a true 
incentive scheme that the men who actually perform the work 
33 Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 92 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
should be able to associate the extra work done and receive the 
direct reward for their efforts as soon as possible after the event.36 
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This is a case in point of 'externalization' at work, of 'strategy' being formulated 
at the level of the national organization, rather than the firm or even the pOlio 
As well as opposing the port-wide pooling of bonus payments, the employers also 
sought to reduce even further the level at which bonus payments were aggregated, 
from the vessel down to the level of the gang. The following comment by Viv 
Blakeley was recorded in the minutes of a meeting with the Tauranga Union in 
1964: 
Though you would like the pooling of a bonus, the policy of the 
PEA has been to try and bring it down to a gang basis, rather than a 
ship basis . . . as closely as possible to individual effort. . . . We 
believe in incentive and the whole fundamental basis of incentive is 
to try to reward the fellow who puts his best foot forward. We do 
get as close as we can to it - would like to get closer.3? 
Indeed, the whole aim of the changes that employers sought to make to the bonus 
system was to increase the "transparency" (Littler 1978:197) of bonus payments to 
the individual, to make more "explicit the relationship between effort and 
rewards" (Edwards 1986:239). In this sense, the employers tried to render the 
cooperative contracting system more like a piece-rate system, in terms of its 
'visibility' as an incentive, but without the ability to negotiate on the job over 
rates. 
As I noted above, employers generally preferred their own incentive schemes to 
the cooperative contracting system. Initially, employers' incentive schemes 
operated only at Auckland and a few of the minor ports where there were no 
36 Ibid. 
3? Ibid. 
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cooperative contracts. However, as Commissioner Bockett remarked in 1960, 
"The shipping companies were anxious to introduce incentive payment schemes at 
all ports and for payment of profits to be made on a hatch or ship basis each 
day."38 By 1964 these schemes had been extended to Auckland, Wellington, Port 
Chalmers, Opua, Tauranga, Whangarei, Onehunga, Raglan and Oamaru. In the 
absence of records on the absolute number of employers' incentive schemes, some 
indication can be gained by comparing the proportion of money paid out under 
them relative to other types of incentive contracts (see Graph 6.1). Employers' 
schemes varied considerably and were not subject to the same arrangements as 
cooperative contracts (regarding the union timekeeper and so forth). For instance, 
at the Port of Tauranga in 1956 the Union Shipping Company had its own scheme 
where bonus payments were calculated on a tonnage rate and paid per vessel. 
Other schemes related to specific types of cargo. In 1968 a scheme was 
established (under Principal Order 298) by employers at Tauranga for the loading 
of butter. Others, such as the schemes at the minor ports, related to the port as a 
whole. 
At some ports, however, even these schemes became subject to the union drive to 
pool the bonus (although, unlike the cooperative contracts, agreement had to be 
secured with the PEA before pooling could occur). Not surprisingly, the 
employers resisted this move. For example, an employers' representative 
maintained that: 
At Tauranga the Employers' Incentive Scheme provides a good 
incentive to the men, more so than the co-operative contract system 
operating at other ports. . . . If the bonuses are pooled then the 
incentive is destroyed, which would result in a lower rate of 
work. 39 
38 Commissioner Bockett made this remark while addressing the South Island Waterfront Workers 
Federation Conference in 1960. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 
1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
39 Memo from J. Twomey to PEA Management Committee, 22/1/64. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 92 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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However, in 1967 the PEA was forced to accept pooling of the bonus at this port 
because of a threat by the local union to attempt to displace the employers' 
incentive scheme by seeking from the Commission the introduction of cooperative 
contracting. A manager of one of the local stevedoring companies wrote to the 
local PEA Chairman, stating: 
I have no need to remind you of the evils attendant on the 
cooperative contract system. In the first place we will have a 
Union timekeeper whose full-time job will be to record delays.40 
The fact that the local employers were prepared to trade off the pooling of bonus 
payments to prevent cooperative contracts from being introduced indicates the 
extent to which they preferred their own incentive schemes, and the lengths that 
they were prepared to go to in order to retain these schemes intact. 
In 1967 the unions at the three largest ports (Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton) 
secured agreement from their members to pool all bonus payments. The PEA's 
Management Committee, realizing it was fighting a losing battle, sought opinions 
from its local branches at the ports where the bonus was pooled as to its effects on 
effort. Interestingly enough, it received mixed reports about the effects of bonus 
pooling. While pooling may have weakened the level of individual incentive at 
some ports, at a few of the smaller ports (such as Nelson and Timaru), it appears 
that pooling resulted in the local union acting as a 'collective foreman' , 
collectively regulating the levels of effort supplied by its members. Indeed, in his 
letter to the national Chairman, the Secretary of the Timaru PEA stated that "the 
Union as a whole oppose slackness in the individual workers who might adversely 
affect the bonus eamed."41 However the collective regulation of effort by the 
40 Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 92 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
41 Ibid. 
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union does appear to have been largely limited to just a few of the smaller ports. 
In any case, a PEA Management Committee meeting in December 1967 resolved 
that, although the PEA opposed pooling, in view of the favourable union ballots at 
the large ports local PEA representatives were authorized to agree to the pooling 
of bonus payments.42 
Summary 
Despite employers' attempts to render the bonus system more 'transparent', in 
order to more clearly relate "effort to earnings" (Littler 1978: 197), the bonus 
system at best worked unevenly to promote effort. The fact that it only met with 
limited success and, at least in the case of cooperative contracts was 'fiddled', is 
not surprising - particularly in view of the findings of the classic sociological 
studies of incentive schemes (Roy 1952, 1953, 1954; Whyte 1955; Lupton 1963) 
which demonstrated that these schemes usually do not work as they were intended. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the degree to which it promoted effort, the bonus 
system introduced a set of tensions at another level. As part of an employer 
strategy centering on the wage-form which reintroduced pecuniary difference into 
the employment relationship, it cut across the unions' attempt (through a system of 
compulsory acceptance of work allocation enforced by a penalty system) to 
equalize the share of 'collective job opportunity' (to use Perlman's phrase). This 
introduced tensions between the unions and their members insofar as the unions 
did not control the amount of bonus payments received by individuals, and 
individuals actively sought to maximize their "opportunity to earn bonus" (Whyte 
1955:79). The local unions were only able to resolve the tension by pushing for 
the pooling of bonus payments. To recap, this was a particular problem which 
arose from the way that an indirect employment relationship was institutionalized 
42 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 428, 13/12/67. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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under the bureau system, the specific problems of control that this mode of 
institutionalization engendered, and the attempts by employers to resolve them. 
Although the bonus system was the most significant element in the employers' 
strategy of carrying out 'management through the wages system', workplace 
bargaining over rates constituted another part of their attempt to secure effort 
through the payment system. In the next section I will examine the process of 
informal wage bargaining which took place on the job. 
(3.2) Workplace Bargaining and Rates 
While the bonus system was 'non-negotiable' (apart from delays), there was 
considerable scope for bargaining by gangs over 'rates' for 'special cargoes'. 
Because wages were taken out of competition nationally via the national document 
(the GPO), apart from bonus payments individual firms could only introduce wage 
differences by increasing payments over and above the standard hourly rate. Over 
time, there evolved a detailed set of standardized rates for 'special cargoes' which 
were incorporated into the GPO.43 Despite standardized rates being codified in 
the General Principal Order, there was still considerable room for workplace 
bargaining. 
The rationale for standardizing rates and codifying them in the national industrial 
agreement, as in the case of all standardized wage-payment systems, was 
undoubtedly to eliminate on-the-job haggling over rates by leaving nothing to 
bargain over. . To this end, the standard 'book rate' was automatically granted 
whenever a particular class of cargo was being worked by a gang, with the 
43 The relevant section in GPO 24 (which came into force in 1953) states that 'Special Cargo 
Rates' were intended "to cover all inconveniences due to dust, dirt, discomfort or other incidentals 
in connection with the loading or discharging of . . . [special] cargoes". There were over 1 00 
separate items listed, along with a rate for each, ranging from barbed wire, carbon black and coal, 
to pigs, pumice and wheat. By the time that GPO 198 was negotiated in 1962 there were more than 
200 types of cargo that had a rate attached to them. 
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provision that the rate could not be departed from save in "exceptional 
circumstances". In practice, however, book rates became only the starting point in 
negotiating a rate for a job, which resulted in the 'worst of both worlds' with 
respect to codification and informal on-the-job bargaining. Indeed, the negotiation 
of additional rates, over and above the book rate, for particular classes of cargo 
became the primary means by which negotiations occurred over the '''wage' 
aspect of the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:259). This process was akin to 
workplace bargaining over piece-rates, although the rates in question were based 
on time-wages (the time worked on a particular class of cargo) rather than output 
as such. 
Negotiations over rates usually occurred at the beginning of a job, or when a gang 
shifted to working a different type of cargo within a hatch. As I noted above, the 
requisite condition for a rate to be negotiated was an 'exceptional circumstance'. 
For instance, standard rates existed for bags of particular types of cargo (such as 
carbon black, cement, coke, and superphosphate) but an extra rate would be 
sought by the gangs if the bags were split. Additionally, rates could be negotiated 
which related to working conditions in general (such as rats in the hold, headroom 
and so forth). A former watersider spoke of the dirty conditions that he had 
worked in where a rate was negotiated: 
if there were some exceptional conditions, and some of course just 
a bit but others were very, very filthy. I've seen myself working in 
a hatch in a lower hold with four hundred ton of alkali in bags, and 
alkali is the corrosive substance that goes into soap powders, an 
awful job. Well those would be fixed up, workers would want 
extra payments, cleaning time, provision of masks or goggles. 
(Interview) 
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Other watersiders spoke of having to haul bags of foul-smelling hides, of inhaling 
cement dust, and of working in rat-infested holds.44 But overwhelmingly the 
cargo that was regarded as the worst was carbon black: 
if the stuff was in good nick then it wasn't too bad. But if some of 
the bags were broken . . . well it was just a black cloud. And you 
could shower and bathe, and as soon as you started to perspire out 
comes the black again. (Interview) 
However negotiations over rates were about more than the (not insubstantial) 
discomfort or inconvenience that gangs were subjected to by the conditions of 
working particular cargoes - they became an accepted and indeed expected part of 
the wage-effort bargain, and were tolerated (albeit reluctantly) by employers. A 
watersider I interviewed, who had worked on the Lyttelton waterfront from 1959 
until 1983 (when he became the local union secretary) did not recall one instance 
of receiving merely a standard 'book rate', which is significant considering that 
the majority of the various types of cargo had a book rate attached to them. 
Another watersider described the book rate as "the minimum rate". He said that 
"it would seem very seldom in the end the book rate would apply. I mean you'd 
always find some reason why you wanted a bit more" (interview). Several 
watersiders I interviewed made comments to the effect that they would not work 
'without a rate' being negotiated, or if they could not get one they would be 
disgruntled and this would affect their work. Similarly, foremen said that jobs 
would not run as smoothly without rates. One foreman (Gordon) said "It was 
blackmail, or it was bordering on that. If you were going to stick to the book-rate 
they wouldn't work properly, or they might take it to the pee which could delay 
the job" (interview). 
44 In his social history of smell, Corbin (1994:48-9) observes that historically ship's holds have 
been one of the prime sites of filth and offensive odours. 
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Because of the sheer number of cargo types which were incorporated into the 
'special cargoes' schedule, rates applied on most jobs. And on the rare occasion 
when a job did not have an attendant rate, a tactic employed by some gangs of 
watersiders was to attempt to 'manufacture' a condition for a rate to apply, or to 
provide the 'exceptional circumstance' for an additional sum to be negotiated. 
Although I only have anecdotal evidence to this effect, and hence cannot ascertain 
the extent of this practice, undoubtedly it did occur on some jobs. Some of the 
more common practices included deliberately splitting bags. Indeed, Gordon (the 
foreman quoted above) was certain that men would do this (albeit infrequently) 
and then put dirt on themselves. He said that, as a foreman, he always tried to 
ascertain whether claims for rates were legitimate or not. Another example was 
the jacking up of cargoes to decrease the headroom (which was alan to the 
deliberate 'blinding off of cargo) in the hold. Such practices were also the source 
of some speculation on the part of employers generally. One purported practice at 
the Port of Lyttelton which almost assumed the status of an 'urban myth' , and was 
told to me with great mirth by the local Union Secretary, was that some 
watersiders carried a rat in a bag with them onto a job. A foremen later told me 
that even he thought this was merely a story. The extent of these practices, 
together with workplace bargaining over rates in general, undoubtedly depended 
on the individuals within the gangs, but the point is that the practices themselves 
were not merely an individualistic manifestation of greed, but rather were part of a 
system of effort-bargaining at the workplace leve1.45 
Before examining how rates were actually negotiated, it is important to understand 
how the gang as a 'bargaining unit' was constituted, and how the work-group's 
claims for rates were refracted through job-delegates. The delegates were an 
important part of the highly developed system of workplace industrial relations 
45 See Edwards (1986:74-77) on the 'individual' and the 'collective' dimensions of effort-
bargaining. 
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and bargaining on the waterfront. But because gangs were continually being 
reconstituted, delegates were only appointed for the duration of a job.46 Like the 
workgroup, then, delegates were themselves non-permanent and interchangeable. 
At the beginning of each job, a process of appointing a delegate to represent the 
gangs on the ship and one to represent the gangs on the wharf occurred. As an ex-
watersider who had frequently acted as delegate explained: 
The ship appoints a delegate .... They'd assemble at the bottom of 
the gangway at the beginning of the job, not the beginning of the 
day but the beginning of the job, and they would elect a delegate ... 
. The men on the wharf, now they appoint a man that's their 
spokesman. Now the philosophy behind that is that nobody can be 
sorted out. You are officially their spokesman. The company 
recognizes that, therefore they must listen to you, they must talk to 
you, and they can't victimize you because you may not even agree 
with [the dispute]. (Interview) 
The ship's delegate and the wharf delegate were simply watersiders in gangs, who 
performed their work as per usual, except when called upon to act in their 
nominated capacity as job-delegates.47 The other actor at the level of the 
workgroup who could be involved in negotiations over rates was the gang leading 
hand, who also acted as a type of delegate. 
A watersider (Bernie) provided me with the following account of the process of 
negotiating rates, on a job where a leading hand had been appointed: 
The men would say to the leading hand 'we think this is worth 
more than the book rate', and the leading hand, if he disagreed, 
then that would be about the end of the matter. But if he agreed, 
and generally they would agree, because he's going to get the 
money as well, he then approaches the delegate. And he's the only 
46 The 'job-delegates' were separate from the permanent delegates who comprised the local union 
executive or committee. 
47 At some ports the process of appointing delegates became formalized in the 1960s. For 
example, as a result of a proposal by a union member in 1961, a 'panel' of thirty ship's delegates, 
nominated by the Union, was established at Lyttelton and the bureau allocated delegates to each 
job from this panel (Norris 1980:184). 
one who can go up really and get the delegate, who's an ordinary 
working guy in some other hatch. So he has to call him up, and he 
would say 'look that lamp black's got a lot of broken bags and it's 
all over the place, I think we're entitled to two shillings', or 
whatever he might say. Well then the delegate then goes to the 
foreman initially, and the foreman by virtue of his position always 
says no. In fact, I've never known a foreman to agree at all, it was 
part of the drill I guess. (Interview) 
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However, this latter statement contrasts with Gordon (the retired foreman) who 
said that he frequently allowed a rate above the book rate: "The foreman could 
negotiate a cent or two, but if it was exorbitant then he'd say 'no, hand that over to 
the supervisor'. So then you would contact the office and say 'will you come 
down and sort out a rate with these blokes"'. Generally, however, foremen were 
empowered to act in these negotiations only to a limited degree. In the case of 
disagreements the request would then be passed on to the supervisor. As Bernie 
explained: 
So then the delegate would go back and tell the leading hand 'the 
foreman does not agree', and they would say 'well what's he 
offering' and generally they would say 'nothing'. So then the 
delegate would either approach a supervisor, that's the man in 
charge of the overall operation of the ship, the foreman are directly 
under his control. And if he failed to agree to any increase that the 
men would accept, then the walking delegate comes down and they 
take it over from there. And he would then negotiate with the 
company itself. . . . The philosophy behind all this, is while all this 
is going on, the work's still going on, nobody's stopped. 
(Interview) 
In cases where a leading hand was not appointed, an ordinary member of the gang 
would usually relay the claim for a rate to the ship's delegate. The watersiders on 
the wharf also negotiated rates, which sometimes differed from the rate for the 
hold gangs (generally they were lower), but in other cases the two sets of rates 
were negotiated together.48 
48 The walking delegate kept a record of all rates negotiated, which was signed at the end of the 
day by the foreman and then was given to the bureau. On the employers' side, the foreman kept a 
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One effect of not having permanent gangs is that employers were not confronted 
by already well-organized work-groups qua bargaining units. However, this 
arrangement cut both ways in that unstable bargaining units, if they could achieve 
agreement, may have been more prone to making greater demands than gangs 
accustomed to workplace bargaining.49 Also it did not just affect employers, in 
that the local unions did not want workplace demands to escalate too frequently 
into disputes, and hence sought to enforce union discipline on gangs. It is 
apparent that the walking delegate was often a moderating influence in 
negotiations over rates, both facilitating and informally setting limits upon 
workplace bargaining. 50 
By the time negotiations were passed to the walking delegate, on the employers' 
side they were usually carried out at the level of the supervisor, master-stevedore 
or the company's senior managers. A former walking delegate at the Port of 
Wellington reflected on his role thus: 
And of course the walking delegate was usually an experienced 
person, and could sift the realms of fantasy away and come down to 
realities, and over a period of time would have a business-like talk 
with the representative of the shipowner, who would know just 
how far they could go or what would happen if they didn't. There 
could be arbitration, and if it was bad enough there could be job 
stoppages and so on. But mostly a manager would know, a 
practical stevedore manager would know, 'well if this bloke's 
going to take it on and we have an arbitrator come in here, I'm 
going to get done, I've got to give something'. And, of course, if 
that was reasonable it would go back down the chain, and be 
represented 'well this seems reasonable, have a look at it'. And the 
fellas nearly always, although not always, but nearly always would 
record of the rates and then passed them on to the company timekeeper who then confIrmed the 
rates with the bureau. 
49 For a general discussion of the dynamics of work groups with respect to informal bargaining, see 
Hill (1974). 
50 At the smaller ports which did not have a walking delegate, the union secretary would usually 
play this role. Also, the establishment of permanent job delegates at some ports during the 1960s 
acted as a stabilizing (and moderating) influence. 
accept the recommendation that come from their paid official. . . . 
Generally it would be accepted, and if it wasn't it might go on and 
be argued in the Port [Conciliation] Committee. (Interview) 
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However the moderating influence of the walking delegate relative to the demands 
of gangs only extended so far. In circumstances where the gangs did not agree 
with their recommendations, and when the dispute escalated to the level of the 
Port Conciliation Committee, the walking delegate sometimes experienced acute 
pressure. The following quotation from Norris's history of the Lyttelton Union 
(regarding the year 1953) illustrates this point: 
Eric Jones was having a hard time as Walking Delegate and 
received much abuse .... He was in the hot seat when a cargo of 
Potassium Chlorate arrived on the S.S. Waitaki. The men 
demanded 5/- per hour extra but, after protracted negotiation, the 
P.C.C. awarded 6d. which was refused but later accepted, after a 
15% increase on the 6d was obtained (Norris 1980:166). 
The 'contradictory location' of the walking delegate in the process of negotiating 
rates is a particular instance of the more general pressures associated with this 
position, which was the lynchpin between the union hierarchy and the rank and 
file members. 
The process of negotiating rates was thus filtered through the job-delegates and the 
walking delegate; if agreement was not secured at each point, then the negotiations 
would be pushed higher both within the union and management hierarchies, with 
ultimate recourse to the Port Conciliation Committee. Disputes over rates could 
be referred by either party to a formal meeting of the PCC or, alternatively, the 
PCC Chairman could be brought in to rule at the ship's side. Whether the union 
or the employer representatives referred a dispute over rates to the PCC Chailman 
depended largely on how they thought he was going to rule. This did not just 
depend on the specifics of the matter in dispute; at some ports disputes were only 
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infrequently referred to the PCC because of a lack of confidence on the part of 
employers or the union (or both) in the Chairman generally.51 
However, the mere possibility of recourse to the PCC could itself be used as a 
resource in workplace bargaining. The following example from the Port of 
Lyttelton, where the possibility of recourse to the PCC structured the situation, is a 
case in point. 52 In this case, a supervisor offered a rate and stated that if the union 
delegates wanted more they would have to call in the Chairman; but they refused 
the Chairman, and made a slightly amended counterclaim, which was accepted. 
Numerous other examples could be cited, but this one will suffice to demonstrate 
that PCC was not merely an avenue of the last resort when union delegates and 
company representatives could not agree over a rate (its effect was not merely in 
resolving disputes, that is). As part of the legally regulated industrial relations 
system, it shaped the whole process of workplace bargaining. But far from 
fettering this type of bargaining, this system actually supported a highly developed 
system of workplace industrial relations. 
The degree to which the negotiation of rates became standard practice, and 
represented a form of accommodation between employers and workers is indicated 
by the existence of 'fiddles'. These centered on the apportionment of an agreed 
rate between rates per se, and clothing allowances which were not taxed, thereby 
increasing the net rate which was paid. I was alerted to this particular fiddle when 
a former walking delegate at the Port of Wellington told me that "At least half the 
rates were always put into clothing allowances" (fieldnotes). Indeed the Lyttelton 
51 The PCC at Auckland did not function for seven weeks in 1956 because the Union had 
withdrawn its representatives in protest at the reappointment of the Chairman of the committee 
(PEA Annual Report 1957:5). Similarly in during the late 1950s the Wellington Union only 
submitted matters to the local PCC when they were confident that the Deputy Chairman would not 
be officiating (PEA Annual Report 1959:8). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 
129 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
52 At Lyttelton the walking delegate recorded all rates negotiated above the book rate in a log-
book, which in some cases contains brief summaries of the negotiations involved. The example is 
drawn from the one of these summaries. 
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Union's log-book confirms that the practice at this port was for half the rate to be 
granted as a clothing allowance. Furthermore, I uncovered an example where this 
fiddle was carried out at the Port of Tauranga with the knowledge of the local 
bureau manager. The manager (R. Dobbie) wrote in a letter to the Commission's 
General Manager: 
I enclose a copy of a letter from N.Z. Marshalling Ltd advising of 
an additional tax free allowance to be known as 'clothing 
allowance' of 10 cents per hour .... I understand this rate is partly 
to compensate for fumes from the fork hoists operating in the 
shed.53 
This is a classic example of "fiddles around an effort bargain between an employer 
and an employee" (Edwards 1986:212). It indicates the extent to which rates did 
become an accepted and tolerated part of the wage-effort bargain. 
There are two elements which combined to produce this accommodation regarding 
negotiations over the wage component of the effort bargain. The first relates to 
the location of the 'frontier of control' (Batstone 1988), and its effects on the 
wage-effort bargain, a frontier which was pushed further and further in favour of 
waterfront workers during the 1960s. The second element is that individual 
employers were prepared to pay higher rates to get the work done. Undoubtedly, 
this preparedness and capacity differed between companies. However the 
employers did not rely just on targeting the wage component of the effort bargain; 
as we shall see in the next section, informal work practices were also a crucial part 
of this bargain. 
53 Letter from R. Dobbie to J. Gray, 18/8/75. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, 
Box 53, 5/608 (National Archives). 
(4) Supervision and Effort-Bargaining 
The management problem appears at its acutest in the work of the 
supervisor. No longer does the supervisor work with a team of 
persons that he has known for many years or perhaps a lifetime; he 
is leader of a group of individuals that forms and disappears 
almost as he watches it. 
Elton Mayo (1945:75) 
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To the extent that management through the payment system at best only partially 
resolved the problem of securing and maintaining consistent levels of effort from 
gangs, this problem ultimately became the responsibility of the foremen-
stevedores which, in tum, hinged on their relationship with gangs. Foremen, as 
the first point of 'management' contact with the gangs, were left to 'fill the gap' in 
the management system as best they could. Although direct supervision generally 
was not relied upon by employers, foremen did, by default, have a considerable 
'labour control' function. The PEA, in its 1957 Annual Report, was clear about 
this role: 
In addition to a knowledge of cargo handling and of the orders of 
the WIT, it is also important that Foremen should have a proper 
appreciation of the skill of man management.54 
In practice, this was an ambiguous position because of the number of gangs that 
foremen were required to supervise, and the fact that they had to balance this role 
against the other tasks that they were responsible for carrying out. That the 
position of foreman possessed many of the hallmarks of the 'man in the middle' 
(Whyte and Gardner 1945) is indicative not only of their role in 'labour control', 
but also the ambiguity and indeterminacy associated with this role. 
54 PEA Annual Report (1957: 10-11). Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 129 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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The following quotation from one of the Waterfront Industly Commission's 
annual reports encapsulates the main problems faced by foremen: 
Because of the scattered nature of the work discipline on the 
waterfront is a difficult problem. Each gang works largely on its 
own and the foreman or supervisor cannot be everywhere at once. 
To obtain efficient supervision it is first necessary to have well 
trained, capable, loyal, and contented foremen. Foremen should 
receive the necessary support from both sides of the industry in 
carrying out their duties (WIC Report 1960:9). 
The foremen on the ship could be supervising anywhere from two gangs of eight 
men each (such as on a small coastal vessel), to as many as five gangs oftwenty or 
more men on an export meat job. A retired foreman (Gordon) commented that: 
you could go on a ship and have as many as over a hundred men 
working there, because a meat gang was about twenty-four men, 
twelve men, twenty men, whatever. (Interview) 
On small vessels, sometimes only one foreman would be assigned, who would 
have to monitor work both on the ship and the wharf. In each case, direct 
supervision of all gangs under the foreman's control was not possible. Yet, at the 
same time, supervision of gangs was largely devolved to the level of the foreman. 
Consequently, as the Commission's statement alludes to, the foreman was subject 
to pressures both from managers and from workers (the 'man in the middle' 
phenomenon). To further develop these points, it is necessary to locate foremen 
within the typical management hierarchy of firms on the waterfront. 
Within the waterfront 'system of supervision' (Thurley and Wirdenius 1973), 
foremen-stevedores were the bottom rung of a middle-management hierarchy, as 
follows: 
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• Master-Stevedore / Wharf Superintendent 
• Cargo Supervisor 
~ Foreman-Stevedore 
This type of hierarchy was common to most stevedoring companies, and also to 
shipping companies which had their own stevedoring department. It corresponded 
closely with positions and qualifications within shipping. The master-stevedore 
(who in some companies was called the wharf superintendent) was usually a 
qualified ship's master. Even the Union Steam Ship Company, which had one of 
the largest stevedoring operations in the country, employed only one master-
stevedore per branch at the port level. The cargo supervisor, on the other hand, 
was usually a qualified ship's mate, or sometimes a second or third officer. Large 
companies typically employed two or three supervisors at the port level, but in the 
smaller companies (such as Canterbury Shipping) this position was combined with 
that of the foreman. Foremen-stevedores were usually seamen, or in some cases, 
ex-watersiders with a sea-faring background. The largest companies employed 
about twenty or so foreman at the port level. The foreman-stevedores were 
organized into their own union (the Foreman Stevedores, Timekeepers and 
Permanent Hands Union), and unionization generally stopped at this level 
(although Master-Stevedores Associations were formed at Auckland and 
Wellington in the early 1970s). 
One of the reasons that a relatively complex middle management hierarchy 
evolved was in order to deal with the amount of planning, coordination and 
organization required within an industry that was characterized by high levels of 
'process uncertainty' and 'production discontinuity'. There was a constant flow of 
'new' information (details of contracts, cargo plans, labour lists and so on) and 
service tasks which had to be performed. Furthermore, because of the hiring 
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arrangements under the bureau system, there was an additional component of 
planning and administration associated with requisitioning gangs from the bureau. 
Consequently, the master-stevedore was primarily office-based and was 
responsible for overall planning and administration. Cargo plans for ships to be 
unloaded were continually arriving, along with the details of cargo to be loaded 
(which required that a cargo plan be drawn up). It was the job of the master-
stevedore to be constantly planning ahead for new jobs, working out how many 
gangs were going to be needed, how long a job was likely to take, the equipment 
required and so forth. Supervisors, on the other hand, were partly office-based and 
partly wharf-based. Like the master-stevedore, they were involved in planning 
and coordinating, before ships arrived and after they departed. Their responsibility 
in this area included liaising with agencies outside the company (like 
requisitioning labour from the bureau, and arranging with the harbour board berths 
for ships and cranes). However, supervisors also monitored ships at berth that 
were being worked, sometimes having responsibility for two or three ships at 
once. 
Foremen had considerable responsibility for "service" tasks (Hill 1973:208). In 
this area they were key actors by exercising skills, typically acquired at sea, within 
the workflow system. SpecifYing what had to be done (the amount and type of 
cargo to be stowed and unloaded), was the responsibility of the master-stevedore 
and the supervisors, but how it was to be done (the rigging of gear, methods of 
work, and placement of cargo) was largely left to the foremen. Thus foremen 
required an almost encyclopedic knowledge with respect to the rigging of gear and 
winches, the weights that could be safely lifted at certain angles, shear stresses of 
pins and so forth. Another task performed by the foreman that required 
considerable skill and discretion was the interpretation of the stowage plan. 
Although the cargo plan was formulated by the master stevedore or supervisor, it 
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was subject to alteration by the foremen. Putting the plan into action often meant 
modifying it, such as in cases where stanchions in the ship's hold presented an 
obstacle to the loading of cargo. Also, the cargo plan was often altered by the 
foreman-stevedore in consultation with the ship's mate, to ensure that the trim of 
the ship was maintained. These alterations meant that foremen needed detailed 
knowledge of the different types of cargo, such as dangerous cargoes, and cargoes 
that could not be stored together. 
Having to balance the 'service' with the 'labour control' tasks was compounded 
by the fact that the foreman faced, on a day-to-day basis, all of the problems of 
control which resulted from the system of employment relations. The foreman 
was the lynchpin between system of work equalization and the attendant indirectly 
employed and 'randomized' gangs. Although there was a formal system of work-
discipline based on penalties, this did not assist foremen in obtaining effort from 
gangs. As one foreman commented: 
You could penalize them certainly if they refused to work, or if they 
were absent . . . and you could penalize them certainly if they were 
deliberately doing something that would cause breakage or leakage .. 
. [but] not while they were working .... As long as they were 
working, you couldn't drive them and say 'go faster'. Well, you 
could say it but its not going to achieve anything. (Interview) 
I noted earlier in the chapter that foremen were also limited in organizing work by 
their inability to move gangs between hatches or even the position of men within 
gangs. Furthermore, at ports that had a high rate of labour turnover, such as 
Wellington, foreman practically had to train watersiders. This was source of great 
frustration for foremen at this port. In 1960, one foreman said that they were 
handling "a floating turnover of humanity all the time".55 Another commented 
55 This comment was made at a meeting between representatives of the Foreman Stevedores Union 
and the Minister of Labour on 3118/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 
9/5/8, (National Archives). 
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that "A foreman must not only supervise the stowage of cargoes, but must be on 
supervision all the time, more or less educating men who had never seen a vessel 
in some cases, let alone a ship's hold."56 
Although there was the provision for foreman to appoint leading hands, this could 
only be done on overseas vessels and required the consent of the foreman's 
superiors. 57 Furthermore the policy of some companies was not to appoint 
leading hands. A foreman I interviewed said that, in his (not insubstantial) 
experience, the Union Steam Ship Company never appointed a leading hand. 
Even in cases where leading hands were appointed, this was often a source of 
resentment within gangs not least because they received a rate for this duty. 
Indeed one watersideI' I interviewed described the rate paid to leading hands as 
'blood money'. Another source of resentment resulted from the fact that they were 
appointed, rather than being selected by the gangs themselves; this was 
particularly the case when younger water siders were appointed ahead of older, 
more experienced men. Because leading hands were appointed, and only for the 
duration of a job, they did not 'lead' in the gang in any stable sense and did not 
necessarily command the respect of the gang. Indeed an employers' representative 
at the Port of Bluff commented at a meeting with the local union that "the best 
men, with a few exceptions, will not accept the position."58 Rather than 
functioning in a manner which, to use the Commission's words, served as a "link 
between the foremen and the men", the appointment of leading hands was often 
counterproductive. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The first leading hands were formally appointed at Wellington in 1951, in the aftermath of the 
waterfront dispute, on the 'Ngaio' (WIC Report 1952:13). The Commission had recommended 
that "the workers themselves should be given some greater responsibility in the management of the 
job by the appointment of leading hands, such leading hands to be members of the gang and to act 
as a linlc between the foremen and the men" (ibid). As a result, a clause to this effect was 
incorporated into GPO 24 in 1953. 
58 Minutes of meeting between the Bluff Waterside Workers Union and the Port Employers 
Association, 6/12/66. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull 
Library, NLNZ). 
243 
Because foreman had to supervise a considerable number of gangs, which was 
compounded by the problems mentioned above and the need to balance these 
responsibilities against their 'service' tasks, the process of 'man-management' 
typically involved negotiating at the beginning of a job over how work was going 
to be carried out. This involved negotiations over rates in which foreman were 
involved in a limited capacity. But it also involved "informal practices that affect 
the terms of the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:74). To the extent that these 
practices were 'negotiated', they were usually brokered through the foreman. 
However, as we shall see, knowledge and tolerance of these practices in some 
cases extended as far up the management hierarchy as company managers. It is 
precisely because they were tolerated by managers, but also because they were 
tolerated to different degrees, that rather than providing a solution for foremen to 
the problems of 'labour control', agreements over informal practices sometimes 
exacerbated their position as 'men in the middle'. 
The most common form of informal practice that affected the "terms of the effort-
bargain" was 'spelling', which involved only part of a gang working at anyone 
time, while the other members of the gang took 'a spell' .59 Although this practice 
occurs in other industries (for manufacturing, see Beynon 1977; Hamper 1991), it 
is particularly common on the waterfront (see Turnbull and Sapsford 1992:306-7). 
Indeed, Finlay (1988) bases his whole argument on informal agreements over 
working 'on and off' (the American equivalent of 'spelling'). Accounts of when 
the practice of spelling first emerged on New Zealand's waterfront vary 
considerably (for an attempt to date this practice, see Green 1992:106-7). Its 
origins, however, are immaterial. What is important is how spelling came to be 
used, and how it affected the terms of effort-bargain. As is the case with all 
59 In New Zealand idiom, the phrase 'taking a spell' means to have a rest. 
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informal practices, spelling can be an expression of two things (see Edwards 
1986:42-3). As an informal practice it can represent the extent of outright worker 
control of the labour process, a fOlID of resistance which indexes the 'frontier of 
control' (Batstone 1988), and is forced upon rather than accepted by foremen and 
managers. Conversely, such practices can be an explicit part of the effort-
bargaining process between managers and workers.60 
In a study of work on New Zealand's waterfront prior to 1951, Green (1992:106-
9) strongly asserts that 'spelling', along with other informal practices, was a 
manifest expression of water siders' control on the job. While she notes that some 
foremen "sanctioned" spelling (ibid: 1 07), the general tenor of her argument is that 
it was largely forced upon them. This, she argues, was particularly the case after 
the first moves to decasualize the industry in 1936: "Once work was impartially 
shared out, the foreman's specific instructions upon when to spell became less 
important, and the men increasingly used the custom of spelling for their own 
purposes" (ibid: 113). However, not only does this pattern not obtain in the post-
1951 period (as I will subsequently demonstrate), there are good reasons to doubt 
the validity of her claim even in the period prior to 1951, not least because, as she 
herself notes, the Waterside Workers Union itself did not approve of, and actively 
sought to eliminate this practice. 
In the 1950s and 1960s there is velY clear evidence of spelling being explicitly 
negotiated over, and not simply forced upon foreman and managers. In these 
cases, this informal practice was the subject of agreements and understandings 
about the terms of the effort bargain. This was particularly so given that not only 
did the Port Employers Association reprove this practice, so too did the Waterside 
60 A third option, using Burawoy's (1979) argument, is that such practices can serve to 
'manufacture' consent to exploitation at work. However, this argument is unsatisfactory insofar as 
it is tinged with an element of functionalism: 'the game' (which comprised the informal practices 
that Burawoy identified) fulfils the 'latent function' (to use a Mertonian metaphor) of perpetuating 
exploitation. 
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Workers Federation and the local port unions. If gangs were forcing the issue 
upon employers, they had ultimate recourse to the union, which at some ports 
went as far as to impose substantial fines upon gangs caught spelling (see below). 
Furthermore, to the extent that individual employers 'authorized' spelling - contra 
Green's claim - it was not merely the foreman alone who acted as the 'agent'. As 
we shall see, supervisors, master-stevedores and managers tolerated and 
perpetuated spelling. 
While the prevalence of this practice differed between ports, and between 
companies within ports, it is clear that at some ports spelling was standard 
practice. Although the Port Employers Association's official policy was that it did 
not condone spelling, it is clear that many of their individual member companies 
tolerated it. For instance, at a meeting of the PEA Management Committee in 
1966 a Committee member remarked that at the Port of Bluff spelling on freezer 
gangs had been practiced for many years. He was particularly critical of the local 
employers for tolerating this, commenting that: 
it was most unfortunate that the employers should have condoned 
the system of work which allowed 4 out of the 12 holdmen being 
out of the hold at anyone time.61 
Part of the reason why employers allowed such 'negotiations' was that gangs 
expected to be able to spell. As one watersideI' (Brian) put it, "The foremen knew 
that, at the end of the day, you're not going to do well if they all have to be here" 
(interview). For watersiders, this arrangement represented a quid pro quo wherein 
increased levels of effort were offset against free time. Generally, the base-line 
level of effort that was required had to be enough to keep 'the hook' moving. 
Brian said "When your mates went off, you had to work like a dog to keep the 
61 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 408, 14112/66. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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hook going, it wasn't allowed to hang. Instead of carrying one lamb, you'd have 
to carry two" (interview). 
In cases where spelling was rendered an explicit part of the effort bargain, 
agreements were usually struck (as in the case of bargaining over rates) when the 
foreman 'set up' the job. However, as I will demonstrate below, this process 
could also involve the supervisor, master-stevedore, or even the company 
manager. A retired foreman (Gordon) made the following comment about what 
was involved in 'setting up' ajob: 
If you went to say a meat job, which was going to last for a week or 
a fortnight, the first half-day you'd probably be sorting out the men 
and laying down the ground-rules, and making sure that they would 
stick to the ground rules, and making sure that everybody's in the 
right place and the right number of men and that sort of thing. 
(Interview) 
When I asked whether the 'ground-rules' included informal practices like spelling, 
he replied: 
Yeah exactly, yeah. And whether there's not going to be any 
smoking, and there's nobody going to sit on deck, and reduce the 
number down below, and all of this sort of thing. (Interview) 
Gordon provided the following description of the form that spelling typically took 
in the case of a gang working general cargo on a coastal vessel, which at each 
hatch had six watersiders in the hold and four on the wharf: 
It was usually the case that they divided into pairs. Because the 
usual way they worked in a hatch, the hook would corne in with a 
sling of cargo and it would land on that side, and then those two 
men would attack it. And then the hook would go and then these 
two men would attack. That left two men spare. . . . It was 
supposed to be four and two .... there were four men ... [on the 
wharf], and it was usually the case that they would have one man in 
the truck and two on the wharf and the other one would be off 
somewhere. . . . And even with the meat gangs, which were a lot 
bigger, we had twelve men down below or more, then it was 
usually eight and four, so it was two thirds of the gang. (Interview) 
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If a job was 'set up' correctly, foremen were usually able to concentrate on 
performing their 'service' tasks. Gordon commented: "once you've got the job 
started and everybody is in the right place and it started swinging, you didn't have 
to supervise the labour as much as supervising where the cargo was, so you didn't 
take the wrong stuff out or put the wrong stuff in, or put it in the wrong place" 
(interview). In practice, particularly when monitoring several hatches and gangs at 
one time, foremen continually watched 'the hook' to ensure that it was moving, 
and only descended into the hold when it stopped (to see what was wrong). 
The fact that spelling was 'supposed' to be done in a particular way (as the 
comments above regarding numbers and keeping the hook moving suggest) 
indicates that it was the subject of an agreement between foremen and gangs; but 
it was not merely an arrangement brokered by foremen themselves. Indeed, the 
pattern of bargaining corresponded closely to one identified by Finlay (1988) in 
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, where arrangements involving 'on and 
off were not merely 'shadow deals' negotiated by foremen without the knowledge 
of senior managers. Rather "company managers are also partners in the deal, for 
they too appreciate its benefits" (ibid: 118). But despite managers being partners 
in the deal, foremen are still, as Finlay notes, "the central actors. They negotiate 
the deal and ensure that it works" (ibid: 1 06). 
In New Zealand, however, this informal practice was even more blatantly accepted 
by the foreman's superiors. This involved supervisors, the master-stevedores and, 
in a case cited below, a company manager was himself involved in arranging 
spelling. Indeed, the foremen's superiors could be involved in this process even to 
the point of 'cutting them out' of the negotiations. At a meeting between the 
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Foreman's Union and the Minister of Labour in 1960, which was convened so 
foremen could air their grievances, Union President Faulkner stated: 
Another thing about spelling was that it was the job of the foreman 
in charge of a hatch or a ship to run the labour, but in many cases 
the foreman did not know what was going on because someone else 
was giving the instructions, and this did not make for harmony .... 
It had got to the stage that the watersiders would take notice of the 
supervisor just to belittle the foreman.62 
Union representative Mullin concurred: "One of the most frustrating things that 
could happen was for a foreman, with 6 men discharging a ship, to have the 
supervisor come along and stop them and then alter everything - gear, hatches. 
The wharfies are put out of stride and everything collapses."63 Problems for 
foremen arising out of arrangements over spelling appear to be a particular 
instance of a more general condition associated with the foreman's position as a 
'man in the middle'. One need look no further than the minutes of a similar 
meeting the previous year to find evidence of this condition: 
Mr Faulkner said their members were in the unfortunate position of 
being the middle men. They were between the Employers on the 
one side and the watersiders on the other, both 'having a go' and so 
their powers were limited.64 
Even the Waterfront Industry Commissioner (who attended this meeting) 
acknowledged that: "The foreman easily became the 'butt' between the workers on 
the one side and the employers on the other."65 The record of a comment by a 
Foremen-Stevedores Union representative succinctly summarized the problems 
62 Minutes of Meeting, 31/8/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 
(National Archives). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Minutes of Meeting, 8/7/59. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 
(National Archives). 
65 Ibid. 
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that foremen faced: "How could they maintain authority if their 'bosses' were 
going to countelmand their instructions?"66 
The fact that foremen could be circumvented in arranging spelling (and work 
generally) through the intervention of more senior managers meant that, contra 
Finlay's case, foreman were periodically caught 'in the 'middle'. Far from the 
functional division of labour that Finlay purports characterizes the management 
hierarchy on the American waterfront, in New Zealand the boundaries were 
permeable. Cutting foremen out was further compounded when employers gave 
foremen directives to eliminate spelling (see below). 
The following example is a case in point of spelling as an explicitly 'negotiated' 
practice, which was arranged by a company manager. The company in question 
was the Pacific Stevedoring Company and the operation was scrap metal loading. 
In a letter (dated 16/9/60) to the WIC General Manager, the Wellington Branch 
Manager wrote that: 
it is common knowledge on the Wellington waterfront that this 
company sanctions spelling by the men. Captain Ellis, who is in 
charge of the Company's stevedoring operations in N.Z., tells the 
men that he does not want any 5 0' clock replacements. Captain 
Ellis has told me himself that at the start of a job he calls the two 
delegates together and tells them that he wants the hook kept going 
and no stoppages, and that the rest is up to the men themselves. I 
would say that the spelling sanctioned by Captain Ellis is a 
deliberate policy and that he believes that in this way he will get the 
quickest dispatch, keep clear of industrial trouble, and avoid undue 
claims.67 
That some of the gangs were working one day on and one day off, and were still 
achieving good results, testifies to the 'success' (from the Company's point of 
view) of this quid pro quo arrangement in securing consistent levels of effort. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67,9/5/8 (National Archives). 
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This 'renegade' manager was the cause of some concern, to the extent that 
Commissioner Bockett was prompted to remark (at one of the meetings between 
the Foremen Stevedores Union and the Minister of Labour): "When he goes to the 
job he says 'We don't want 5 o'clockers; I want half the gang here, the rest can do 
what they like.' He reckons he gets better tonnage. But he is breaking down the 
whole system of supervision in the port ... I have said, 'You have to stop this 
man'. I have spoken to Mr Blakeley through the PEA."68 
This example illustrates another problem for employers which arose from the 
rotation of watersiders between companies. As the Wellington Branch Manager 
noted in his letter: 
There is no doubt . . . that the spelling sanctioned by Captain Ellis 
creates difficulties for any other Company loading scrap metal, 
more especially if one of Captain Ellis's ships is working at the 
same time. At the start of ajob the men will ask the stevedore ifhe 
is going to work Captain Ellis's way, and when the answer is 'No' 
they express their dissatisfaction and many of them say they will be 
5 0' clockers. 69 
When different employers varied in the degree to which they tolerated spelling, 
this caused problems because workers came to expect the same levels of 
indulgency from all employers. 
This case also illustrates the difficulty that the PEA faced in eliminating spelling 
given that some company managers themselves allowed it. Furthermore, Captain 
Ellis's company did not belong to the PEA. Nonetheless, the PEA found it 
particularly difficult to eliminate this practice even amongst its members. At the 
1964 Annual General Meeting of the PEA, one representative reported that an 
68 Minutes of Meeting, 31/8/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 
(National Archives). 
69 Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67,9/5/8 (National Archives). 
251 
incident aboard a Union Steam Ship Company vessel indicated that spelling was 
occurring, and that this practice had to be stopped. In response, PEA Chairman 
Viv Blakeley is reported as having said that: 
He felt that it was particularly important that there should be a 
standard application of discipline, otherwise one employer would 
merely be played off against another as had been the case in the 
past. 70 
As the case of Captain Ellis demonstrates, inter-port differences in indulgency 
patterns with respect to spelling were perhaps less of a problem than differences 
between employers within ports. 
Despite the difficulties it faced with respect to obtaining the support of its own 
members, the Port Employers Association periodically attempted to eradicate 
spelling. However the PEA's attempts to 'tighten up' provoked considerable 
opposition amongst watersiders.71 Attempts to eliminate spelling resulted in go-
slows and even stoppages of work. Furthermore, some company managers were 
themselves ambivalent about the PEA's directives in this area. The former 
Manager of the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company made the following comment 
about a dispute that stopped work during a period of 'tightening up': 
the shipping companies had one of their biennial purges and 
decided to stamp out spelling, without the least idea of how to go 
about it. So everybody had to stand around with their fingers up 
their arses simply and solely because they wouldn't tackle the 
question that they [the watersiders] were redundant at any rate. The 
only answer was to get rid of them rather than try and keep them on 
the job. Its no good keeping a man on the job if there's nothing for 
him to do. You're better off without him, he's just in the way. 
(Interview) 
70 Minutes of PEA Annual General Meeting, 16110/64. Port Employers Association Records, 89-
395, Box 203 (Alexander Tumbull Library, NLNZ). 
71 Alvin Gouldner, in his classic study of a gypsum plant (Gouldner 1954), identified a similar 
pattern of worker resistance to attempts by employers to change the 'indulgency pattern' . 
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Thus the more fundamental issue, from this manager's point of view, was gang 
sizes which occasioned spelling, rather than spelling per se. 
It was precisely because of the ambivalence of employers towards PEA directives 
to clamp down on spelling, particularly given that managers in some companies 
tolerated, accepted and even fostered spelling, that foremen once again found 
themselves in the position of the 'middle men' during such 'purges'. Gordon (a 
retired foreman) commented that: 
The one who mainly kept the spelling going was the employer, 
because I can think of several times when all the foremen were 
gathered together to get a pep talk from the employers' 
representative, the Port Employers Association representative, 
saying that they were going to stop it, stamp out spelling. No more. 
And telling the foreman, nobody's allowed to spell, everybody's 
got to be there. So okay, we'll do that. So we kept them all there, 
and so then the watersiders had a go slow. And usually they picked 
a certain type of ship for a go slow, like a passenger ship or a big 
frozen meat job, and the employers became so frustrated, and also 
charter ships where the ship is running near the end of a charter and 
if she's not empty on that day then you start paying extra for the 
charter. So when the employer could see this happening, a ship 
near the end of a charter or a passenger ship that wasn't going to 
sail on time or a meat job that wasn't going to finish on time, and 
they would say 'forget about that, just scrub that, let them carry on 
with spelling, we've got to get it going'. So the spelling would 
carry on, and the work would resume the normal speed and back to 
square one. And this happened several times. Now if they had 
stuck at it and said irrespective of what ship is held up we are going 
to stop spelling, it could have been done, but then it was going to 
be a very costly exercise. (Interview) 
Although foremen were required to prevent spelling, they were frequently not 
supported by employers when a dispute arose. Gordon recalled that: 
there were times when in order to try and stop spelling, or to stop 
something else, you had a hatch stop and the foremen was doing 
what the company wanted, and he got hauled over the coals by the 
company for stopping the job. (Interview) 
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Indeed at one of the meetings with Minister of Labour in 1960, Foreman's Union 
President Faulkner said that foremen "were very dubious about sacking a man, 
who may be reinstated; they had to be sure that they would have some backing 
afterwards"J2 Moreover, at an earlier meeting, another foreman (Mr Laywood) 
said that: "In the case of the Union Company a foreman who had judged it 
necessary to sack a gang had been told that he would be sacked himself. "73 
Citing the studies by Roy (1954), Burawoy (1979) and others as evidence, Fortado 
(1994:254) observes that it has been "documented how managers will sporadically 
tighten things up, i.e. a crackdown", but "Once management's point had been 
made, things would return to normal, in no small part because the informal 
practices are often a key part of how things get done." This succinctly expresses 
the point in question: spelling was a crucial part of how work was performed. 
This latter point helps explain why the Waterside Workers Federations (both of 
which eschewed this practice) and the local port unions had difficulty in 
eliminating spelling. Generally, union opposition to spelling was based on the 
argument that it provided employers with the rationale for reducing gang sizes. 
The following examples indicate the seriousness with which it was regarded. At 
the South Island Federation conference in 1960, the representative from 
Greymouth (A. Panther) is reported in the minutes as having said that he: "Read a 
report in 'Truth' about an old abuse creeping in at Auckland - spelling. This is an 
old malpractice that ruined us. It is a good argument for the employer to cut down 
72 Minutes of Meeting, 31/8/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 
(National Archives). 
73 Minutes of Meeting, 17/5/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 67, 9/5/8 
(National Archives). 
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the manning scale."74 The North Island Federation Secretary, Eddie Isbey (who 
attended the meeting as an observer) told the conference that the Auckland Union 
was meting out heavy fines to men caught spelling. The Auckland Union was not 
alone in attempting to use its disciplinary powers to eliminate spelling. For 
instance, in 1965 the Lyttelton Union attempted to eliminate spelling by having 
the walking delegate police it and imposing fines (Norris 1980:199). As in the 
case of the PEA not being able to eliminate tolerance of spelling by its members, 
the reason that spelling could not be eliminated by the unions was precisely 
because this practice was a form of accommodation between individual employers 
and gangs over the 'terms of the effort bargain' (to use Edwards' phrase). 
The pattern of effort-bargaining discussed in this section is similar in many 
respects to the one observed by Finlay (1988) in the Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach, with respect to negotiations between employers and gangs over the 
amount of time worked relative to effort provided. However, while agreements 
over spelling were the most prevalent of the informal practices that affected the 
effort-bargain in New Zealand, other mechanisms (which centered on wage 
payment systems) also evolved to compensate for the effects of the system of 
employment relations. As a supplement to monetary incentives, negotiations over 
this practice did not assume the same significance as Finlay purports was the case 
in the American ports that he studied. Unlike the American case, the securing of 
effort by employers in New Zealand did not hinge solely on informal agreements 
over spelling. 
Another very important difference between the two countries relates to the role of 
the foreman. The fact that foremen could be circumvented in arranging spelling 
(and work generally) through the intervention of more senior managers meant that, 
74 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 19/11160. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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contra Finlay's case, foreman were periodically 'caught in the middle'. I will end 
this section by briefly reflecting on the role of the foreman on New Zealand's 
waterfront in the break-bulk era, and comparing it to the pattern identified by Hill 
in the Port of London during the same period. 
According to Hill (1976:39-40), in the 1960s the foremen in the Port of London 
were not 'men in the middle' but rather were key actors in their own right. This, 
he argues, was largely because the role of the foreman did not conform to the 
orthodox 'productivist' conception of 'men management'. Instead, the 'primary 
task' of foremen was to monitor and coordinate the flow of work to gangs (Hill 
1976:39). In turn, this was because the dockers' insecure position in the labour 
market, meant that the principal "source of supervisory control over the men '" 
[was] the actual employment relationship itself'(ibid:28). Because "foremen and 
men act [ ed] in the place of management" (ibid:95), foremen on the London 
waterfront were not subject to the same pressures as foremen within factories. 
Although one can make the general observation that in industries like the 
waterfront, where work is discontinuous and inherently variable, the foreman 
works as much in a technical service capacity as that of controlling labour, I 
believe that the case of foremen on New Zealand's waterfront demonstrates that 
there is no 'logic of the labour process' operating with respect to the role of 
foremen. What the foreman does (i.e. the balance between service and labour 
control tasks) is a result of the way that systems of labour administration 
institutionalize gangs systems of working. And it is precisely because of the 
variety of ways that gang systems of work can be organized on the waterfront 
(gangs can be self-selected or assigned, permanent or temporary, directly or 
indirectly employed), that the balance between the 'service' and 'labour control' 
functions of the foreman on the waterfront is an empirical question. 
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As a result of the specific problems created by the bureau system, foremen did 
have a considerable role to play in labour control, which resulted in foremen 
occupying the position of 'middle men' (Whyte and Gardner 1945). Thus the 
pattern was more like the one observed in the literature on manufacturing 
(Roethlisberger 1943; Child 1975). However, the role of the foreman in labour 
control, and their resulting 'men in the middle' status, was not a result of the 
'evolutionary logic' which underpins the account of the foreman's changing 
fortunes that this literature provides. Rather, it was a contingent development, the 
result of the impact of a particular configuration of employment relations on work 
relations. 
(5) Conclusion 
To recap, the system of employment relations which developed within the bureau 
system of labour administration rendered it difficult for employers to secure 
consistent levels of effort from gangs, principally because they were stripped of 
"their power to hire and fire" (to use the words of Edwards 1979:16). 
Furthermore, the union-sponsored and state-secured work allocation system, 
which was based on the principle of equalizing the 'share of opportunity', 
produced an 'averaging' effect that resulted in a horizontal rather than a 
hierarchical type .of labour market. Consequently, employers sought to reintroduce 
differences in reward into the employment relationship, to use monetary incentives 
to secure the desired levels of effort. The bonus system further illustrates the 
complex interplay between the labour market and work. In this case, an employer 
strategy at the level of work relations to secure effort conflicted with the unions' 
strategy of 'equalizing work opportunity' at the level of employment relations. 
To the extent that monetary incentives which focused upon the '''wage' aspect of 
the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:259) met only limited success in securing 
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effort, individual employers frequently reached infOlmal agreements with gangs 
over the way in which effort itself was supplied. Rather than attempting to 
directly supervise men in order to control their behaviour and to limit their 
autonomy, foremen were involved in allowing informal practices, often with the 
knowledge of managers, which increased watersiders' control over how work was 
performed. 
SECTION THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 
CHAPTER 7: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE 
(RE)NEGOTIATION OF OCCUPATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
Another distinguishing feature of an occupation is that it has 
control over its specific set of tasks and the distinct body of 
knowledge about how those tasks are to be performed In dynamic 
terms, these tasks and who performs them can and often do 
change: other occupations may claim a right to do some of them, 
new occupations may emerge via a recombination of some of them, 
or the tasks themselves may become obsolete or transformed 
through the ever-present efforts of managers and employers to 
deskill them. 
Harrison Trice (1993:10) 
the items of activity and social function which make up any 
occupation are historical products. The composition of an 
occupation can be understood only in the frame of the pertinent 
social and institutional complex (which must in turn be discovered, 
not merely assumed). The allocating and grouping of activities is 
itself afundamental social process. 
Everett Hughes (1959:32) 
(1) Introduction 
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In 1960 the port union journal 'Quayside' heralded the arrival of a "New Era on 
the Watelfront."l The author was writing about technological change. While 
commentators in other countries often equate technological change with the 
'container revolution' of the 1960s, containers did not begin to arrive in New 
Zealand in any significant number until the late 1960s and the first fully cellular 
vessel did not arrive until 1971. Prior to this time, however, other technologies 
were introduced. These were to prove an important precursor to containerization. 
These other technologies involved the introduction of 'self-propelled' mechanical 
equipment such as bulldozers and forklifts, along with machines such as 
conveyors. They were referred to by the officials of the port unions through the 
1 'Quayside', Volume 1, Number 8, October 1960. 
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collective telTIl of 'mechanization'. Although the effects of this process were not 
as great as the effects of containerization, they were nonetheless significant. 
One of the points I want to stress in this chapter is that there was not an abrupt 
shift to containerization. Rather there was a gradual, incremental process of 
technological change beginning in the 1950s. Other studies (e.g. Finlay 1988; 
Wellman 1995) tend to neglect, or to 'gloss over' pre-container technological 
change. But in New Zealand, at least, it was very important - particularly in 
foreshadowing the approach of the unions to the introduction of containers. While 
there were elements of discontinuity, there were also continuities throughout the 
process of technological change, from the introduction of self-propelled 
mechanical equipment in the 1950s through until full scale containerization in the 
early 1970s. 
In this chapter I will outline the response of the watersiders' port unions, and the 
two Federations, to technological change, and to the threats posed by it. Apart 
from its potentially drastic impact on gang manning levels, new technology 
exacerbated the contestation of occupational jurisdictions on the waterfront. Some 
of the best literature in the area of inter-occupational disputes over job territories 
(a literature which is inspired by the work of Everett Hughes, who consistently 
stressed the inter-relatedness of occupations), focuses on professional work. In 
this field, Abbott writes of: 
how jurisdictions are opened, contested and closed. Jurisdictional 
disturbances often arise in the objective bases of professional work. 
While cultural and natural facts seldom change rapidly enough to 
force sudden readjustments, new technologies or organizations 
often create new areas for professional work (1986:192). 
In the case of the ports, it was precisely new technology that exacerbated an 
underlying tension between the different waterfront unions, and posed the greatest 
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threat to the boundaries of the watersiders' occupation. Although 
institutionalizing exclusive registers at the local port level restricted work to 
registered watersiders, it did not predetermine the nature of the work that 
watersiders actually performed. 
In the chapters in Section 2, which focused on relationships between watersiders 
and the employers, I held in abeyance the issues of inter-union disputes. This is 
one of the issues that I will address in this chapter. Abbot refers to "writing the 
history of a jurisdiction by investigating the disturbances that have marked its 
development" (ibid: 193). I will take a leaf from his book in examining how 
watersiders attempted to secure the boundaries of their occupation, by focusing 
upon the 'jurisdictional disturbances' that 'marked its development'. The best 
sources of information on these disturbances are documented disputes, as this is 
where latent or otherwise imperceptible challenges to jurisdictions often corne to 
light. Disputes of this nature constitute the primary source of information for this 
chapter. 
(2) The Approach of the Unions to New Technology 
The approach of the Federations in New Zealand was, far from resisting new 
technology, to promote its introduction. Significantly, during the 1950s the two 
Federations advocated the introduction of new technology, in order to improve the 
working conditions of watersiders. As early as 1954 the General Secretary of the 
South Island Federation, Paddy Weith, commented at a conference that: 
The time had arrived when we should take a lead in testing out any 
mechanical equipment that could be used both on the wharf and 
also in the ship to lighten the job for our members? 
2Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 25/11/53. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/13 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
261 
Similarly, the minutes of an address by Weith to the North Island Federation 
conference the following year record the following statement: 
F or too long in the past the attitude of workers had been one of fear 
that machinery would replace men. This he felt was wrong-
thinking and [he] said that the Unions should ask the Employers to 
be consulted when improvements of this nature were made.3 
The General SecretalY of the South Island Federation, Jim Roberts, commented at 
its conference in 1956 that: 
I believe the day must come in this countly when more machine 
aids will be given to the waterside workers than there are at present . 
. . . I believe too that the introduction of machinery, while it may 
possibly displace human labour power in the meantime, will in the 
end be of benefit to the waterside workers.4 
It should be noted, however, that the approach of the Federation was, in general, 
that new technology would only be accepted if it did not displace any labour. 
Similar sentiments were apparent amongst the executive of the North Island 
Federation. For instance, the following record of a statement by General Secretary 
Napier to a South Island Federation conference indicates this approach: 
Mechanization was a velY important matter, and from the point of 
view of policy the Waterside Workers Unions were not opposing it, 
but they were determined to get their fair share of the money saved 
by the employers.5 
3 Minutes of the North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 19/4/55. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
4 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 4/12/56. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
5 Minutes of the South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 29111160. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Although members of the Federation executive advocated the introduction of new 
technology, if watersiders too could reap the benefits, they did not really have a 
coherent national policy for managing its introduction along these lines. At least 
during the 1950s, there was not a coherent approach in terms of negotiating a 
national agreement which embodied this principle. 
In some ports in other countries the approach taken by waterfront unions was to 
negotiate an overarching agreement regarding the introduction of mechanical 
equipment. For example, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's 
Union, which had coverage of ports on America's West Coast, negotiated a 
'Mechanization and Modernization' (M&M) agreement in 1961. This agreement 
traded off the right of employers to introduce new technology and the "elimination 
of restrictive work rules" against a more secure and stable form of employment, 
and the establishment of a fund paid for by employers to compensate for lost 
earnings (Finlay 1988:6). 
However in New Zealand, rather than new technology being negotiated over at a 
'summit' level, the introduction of mechanical equipment was dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis at the local level by the port unions. The issues raised by 
mechanization (work coverage and manning levels) emerged at the workplace 
level and were dealt with, in the first instance, at the port level. The watersiders' 
local unions trenchantly defended task and occupational boundaries, together with 
gang strengths; this generated numerous disputes which were ruled on by the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal. Often arrangements emerged through favourable 
decisions of the Tribunal regarding a dispute at one pOli which the Federations 
then latched onto and sought to extend to other ports. In some respects, despite 
the proclamations by Federation officials on the need to be proactive, their 
reliance on favourable Tribunal decisions acted as a substitute for a fully-
formulated coherent policy and approach. An agreement comparable to the 
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American West Coast's M&M agreement was not achieved until 1966, some time 
after a series of disputes surrounding the introduction of mechanical equipment 
had already occurred. Even then, the agreement was by no means as wide-
reaching as its American counterpart. 
Part of the reason for this difference in approach was the essentially piecemeal 
way in which new technology was introduced onto New Zealand's waterfront, 
which was mirrored by the piecemeal way in which the Federations and port 
unions dealt with it. Furthermore, the issue of mechanization emerged during the 
mid-1950s when the unions and the Federations were only being rebuilt 
organizationally, and were only just beginning to regain in negotiations some of 
what had been lost in the aftermath ofthe 1951 dispute. 
Thus, in the following section, I will describe an essentially decentralized way of 
introducing and dealing with the effects of new technology, prior to the 
introduction of containers. To some extent, this approach mirrored the nature of 
industrial relations on the waterfront generally, which had a strong decentralized 
component (see Chapter 5). Although the approach of the port unions to new 
technology changed somewhat during the 1960s, which resulted in an agreement 
being made in 1966, there continued to be elements of continuity regarding how 
the introduction of containers was dealt with. 
(3) The Impact of Mechanization: Jurisdictional Disturbances and Manning 
Levels 
From the point of view of the unions, the deleterious consequences raised by 
technological change were twofold. Firstly, it impacted on manpower 
requirements. Because the introduction of mechanical equipment decreased the 
labour intensity of waterfront work, it had the potential to greatly diminish gang 
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strengths. Secondly, it had the potential to erode collective job tenitories and thus 
to diminish the share of 'work opportunity'. The introduction of new technology 
threatened watersiders' collective job territories for the following reason. 
Although the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 restricted the performance of 
waterside work to registered waterside workers (except at times of labour 
shortage, when casual workers could be used), the defInition of waterside work in 
s 2(1) was somewhat broad: 
'Waterside work' means the loading and unloading of ships, 
barges, lighters, and other vessels; and in relation to any port where 
the Harbour Board acts as a wharfInger, includes the work of 
receiving and delivering cargo customarily performed by waterside 
workers at that port. 
The breadth of this defInition meant that, in practice, it contained a number of 
'grey areas'. The other important clause regarding work coverage, s 11(2), stated 
that: "No principal order shall apply with respect to any work of a kind which 
immediately before the commencement of this Act was not customarily performed 
by waterside workers." According to a ruling of the Tribunal, this latter provision: 
was to protect the rights of members of other Unions who had been 
customarily employed on or about the waterfront prior to the 
passing of the Waterfront Industry Act. In that category would fall 
the employees of Harbour Boards and tradesmen whose work, 
although connected with shipping and the waterfront, was not the 
work of waterside workers. 6 
But despite the intention behind this provision, employers attempted to use it to 
exclude watersiders from some types of work. The grey areas in the defInition, 
together with the restriction on the types of work that Principal Orders could apply 
to, allowed for disputes to arise over 'jurisdictional claims' caused by the 
introduction of new technologies, wherein other unions (such as the Harbour 
6 WIT Decision 282, 2/6/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National 
Archives). 
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Workers Union) sought to lay claim to work that watersiders regarded as being 
traditionally 'theirs'. 
Of the mechanical equipment introduced onto the waterfront in the pre-container 
era, self-propelled equipment such as bulldozers and forklifts was among the first 
to pose a significant threat to the watersiders' unions and to prompt disputes. 
Although forklifts had been introduced onto the waterfront at the Port of Auckland 
as early as the 1940s by the American armed forces (see Roth 1993:84), they only 
became contentious after their more widespread introduction in the late 1950s. As 
we shall see, mechanization first became a contentious issue in relation to the use 
of bulldozers to work bulk cargo and, shortly after this, in the use of forklifts to 
move palletized cargo on board vessels. 
The introduction of new technology onto the waterfront was governed by Clause 
270), inserted into the General Principal Order 24 in 1953 (when the Federations 
were negotiating from a position of some considerable weakness). This provision 
acknowledged the: 
right of employers to introduce mechanical equipment for the 
greater expedition of cargo handling provided the gear is safe and 
there is prior consultation with the union in regard to the 
conditions, including, if necessary, arrangement for the removal 
and replacement of hatches outside the normal hours of work. 
This was a rather weak clause, from the point of view of the unions, as it did not 
stipulate the form that consultation should take. However, some of the larger 
unions were able to achieve slightly more detailed clauses in their Supplementary 
Principal Order (the main port level agreement, that is). For example, in 1955 the 
Auckland Union succeeded in having encoded in its SPO the following provision: 
"Before any new equipment is introduced, discussion and agreement shall be 
reached between the Union and the Employer" (my emphasis). 
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Subsequently, in 1960, as the Federations regained their organizational and 
industrial strength, they were able to negotiate a qualification to section 270) in 
the GPO. The clause stated that the conditions which had to be consulted over 
with the unions "shall include the fixing of the number of men necessary for 
employment in conjunction with the mechanical equipment." Furthermore, a 
provision was included whereby, in the case of the equipment leading to 
reductions in the number of watersiders below the standard gang strengths used to 
manually handle the cargo, the contract or incentive rates would be adjusted to 
"give fair and reasonable additional financial benefit to the waterside workers 
using the mechanical equipment in return for increased throughput." Recourse 
was to local Port Conciliation Committees and the Waterfront Industry Tribunal if 
agreement could not be reached. While this clause dealt with gang manning, it did 
not, however, deal with which union's members had the right to operate this 
equipment. As we shall see, work coverage became an increasingly contentious 
Issue. 
New technology was introduced onto the New Zealand waterfront in a piecemeal 
fashion at the port level under these provisions. There were agreements, some 
formal (which were encoded in Principal Orders) and some informal, regarding 
how it was introduced. In other cases, the employers simply asserted their right to 
introduce new technology (particularly prior to 1960). This was evident in the 
first notable (and recorded) dispute involving the use of mechanical equipment, 
which occurred in 1958, when the Colonial Sugar Refining Company won from 
the Waterfront Industry Tribunal an exemption from employing waterside workers 
in discharging bulk sugar at Chelsea. 7 Previously, sugar had been imported in 
bags. The new equipment, which allowed sugar to be discharged in bulk, both 
7 Cited in a Memorandum prepared by S. Bockett (General Manager of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission) for the Minister of Labour, dated 28/2/61. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, 
W3472, Box 142, 5/585, (National Archives). 
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substantially decreased the number of workers required and was used by the 
Company to challenge the right of watersiders to perform this work. The 
Auckland Union unsuccessfully applied to the Tribunal for an order restraining the 
Company from using this equipment, on the grounds that it contravened a clause 
in the port's Supplementary Principal Order which required negotiation over the 
introduction of new equipment.8 Although the Tribunal's ruling provoked a two-
day strike at the port (see Roth 1993:167), it did not prevent the equipment from 
being used by the Company. 
Similar disputes occurred in relation to the use of bulldozers to discharge bulk 
cargoes. For example, a dispute occurred at the Port of Auckland in 1959 when a 
stevedoring company (Leonard and Dingley) used bulldozers to assist in the 
discharge of bulk potash. The Auckland Union claimed that the company used this 
machinery without prior consultation, as required under Clause 27 G) of the GPO, 
and that it used workers other than watersiders to operate these machines. A 
decision by the Auckland Port Conciliation Committee supported the watersiders 
on this point, as did the Tribunal when the local branch of the Port Employers' 
Association appealed this decision. The employers attempted to invoke s 11 (2) of 
the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 to install other workers on this equipment, by 
maintaining that the work was not performed by water siders prior to the passage 
of the Act, and hence was outside the purview of 'waterside work'. However, the 
Tribunal ruled against the employers on the grounds that the use of bulldozers to 
discharge potash had begun in 1956, after the Act was passed. This was a 
significant victory for the Union, insofar as it not only limited the right of 
employers to encroach on waterside work, but also established a precedent. In its 
decision, the Tribunal stated: 
8 Waterfront Industry Tribunal Decision 175, 5/3/58. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, 
W3472, Box 55, (National Archives). 
The matter should now be one for enquiry and negotiation .... If 
the parties are unable to reach agreement, it is open to either party 
to bring the matter before the Tribunal when a new Order for local 
conditions is under negotiation.9 
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A similar dispute occurred at New Plymouth in 1960 when the local branch of the 
PEA appealed to the Tribunal a decision of the local PCC regarding the number of 
trimmers who had to be engaged in discharging bulk potash using bulldozers. In 
this case, it appears that the PCC had used an earlier (informal) agreement 
between one company and the New Plymouth Union as the basis for a decision 
relating to another company. In its decision, the Tribunal stated: 
There is nothing in [General] Principal Order 156 to prevent an 
employer from agreeing to employ a specified number of trimmers, 
as was done in Auckland, but it is a very different thing for a Port 
Conciliation Committee to require the employment of a particular 
number in all cases without the consent of the employer. lO 
In disputes over mechanization, where the disputed type of work had been done 
previously, customary port practices regarding manning levels and work coverage 
(which were, in effect, informal agreements regarding how the work had typically 
been performed) were crucial in the Tribunal's decisions. But, as this case 
demonstrates, these practices did not establish binding agreements. ll 
Furthermore, in this case the Tribunal actually criticized the attempt to settle such 
matters on a local basis through the Port Conciliation Committee: 
If special provisions are required in relation to the use of bulldozers 
for the unloading of bulk potash they should preferably be made in 
9 WIT Decision 282, 2/6/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National 
Archives). 
10 Waterfront Industry Tribunal Decision 301, 16/12/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, 
W3472, Box 55 (National Archives). 
11 In Chapter 5 I demonstrated that, despite the legal framework that regulated industrial relations, 
informal agreements still existed at the port level. The formal by no means triumphed over the 
informal. However I also pointed out that the legal framework could be used as a resource by 
either the employers or the unions in an attempt to elevate informal agreements to the status of 
binding formal agreements. 
relation to New Zealand, or at least the North Island, as a whole 
and the Tribunal does not think it is within the competence of Port 
Conciliation Committees to impose conditions not in accordance 
with the provisions of [General] Principal Order Number 156 in 
their particular ports. 12 
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Around this time similar disputes began to occur at a number of ports regarding 
the use of forklifts. For instance, in 1960 the Tribunal heard an appeal of a 
decision by the Auckland PCC regarding the number of men in wharf gangs on a 
job where newsprint was being handled using forklifts. 13 
With regard to mechanization, then, in some cases individual employers attempted 
to introduce new technology at the port level without 'consulting with' the local 
port union, and on terms which the unions opposed, whereas in other cases there 
were informal agreements between employers and port unions over its 
introduction. However there were also many cases where formal agreements were 
negotiated at the port level which regulated the introduction of new technology 
and manner in which it could be used. These agreements were either contained in 
the port's Supplementary Principal Order, or were encoded in a specially 
negotiated Principal Order which dealt just with the equipment in question. 
For example, an agreement regarding the use of conveyors was included in 
Auckland's Supplementary Principal Order in 1958. Similarly, at the Port of 
Tauranga in 1961 local conditions were established for a trial period of five 
months regarding the use of bulldozers in ships' holds to unload bulk sulphur. 
Under this agreement the machine was to be operated by a watersider, or if it was 
operated by a member of another union, a watersider had to be employed as well 
(to 'double-man' the machine). This provided a strong incentive for the company 
12WIT Decision 301, 16112/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
13 WIT Decision 290, 25/8/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
270 
to utilize a water sider for this job, and is a good example of the approach that the 
unions took to protecting gang maiming at the local level. 
But formal pOli agreements did not resolve all issues which emerged at the 
workplace level, and often there were disputes arising out of these agreements. 
For eXalllple, an agreement had been reached in 1958 at the Port of Wellington, 
through the Port Conciliation Committee, regarding the loading of palletized fmit 
using forklifts. But in 1961 a dispute flared over manning and task boundaries. 
The agreement provided for two watersiders to be employed by the stevedoring 
company, and two watersiders to be employed by the Harbour Board.14 The 
problem was that, for some undisclosed reason, the tasks performed by the 
watersiders who were employed by the Company kept them occupied, whereas the 
two watersiders employed by the Harbour Board had little work to perform. The 
PEA sought to have the two groups of watersiders integrate their tasks, which the 
men and the Wellington Watersiders Union objected to. In its decision, the 
Tribunal noted: 
While we agree that it would be a simple way out of the difficulty if 
the ship's side and Harbour Board men were prepared to work as a 
team ... we feel that weight must be given to the Union's objection 
to the Employers' proposal that the men should be required to work 
together to cany out such work as is required by either the ship's 
foreman or the Harbour Board foreman. The ship's side men and 
Harbour Board men are at present separately employed by different 
employers and the men in each category have well-recognized 
duties. If this system is to be changed it should be done upon a 
wider basis and not dealing piecemeal with individual cases where 
men in the two categories are working side by side. We are not at 
this stage prepared to direct the Harbour Board and the ship's side 
workers to integrate their work although it may be highly 
convenient for them to work together by agreement between 
themselves. 15 
14 In this context, 'to employ' simply means to requisition, and be allocated, watersiders from the 
local labour bureau. 
15 WIT Decision 344, 22/8/6l. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
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This case is interesting for two reasons. First, the Tribunal once again criticized 
the case-by-case way in which issues surrounding new technology were dealt with. 
Second, it indicates the extent to which the watersiders' local unions were 
prepared to police task boundaries, even on jobs where the tasks were performed 
merely by different groups of watersiders, by appealing cases to the Tribunal. I 
will demonstrate below that the issue of task boundaries became increasingly 
significant during the 1960s. 
(4) Agreements Regarding New Technology 
An interim summary is warranted at this point. The preceding disputes illustrate 
how new technology was first introduced, and how the issues it raised were dealt 
with. Rather than the introduction of new technology being negotiated over atthe 
national level, issues of technological change were in the first instance dealt with 
at the local port level, and often resulted in disputes which, in tum, were arbitrated 
by the Tribunal. As we have seen above, the port unions were willing and had the 
organizational capacity to be able to dispute the terms on which new technology 
was introduced and utilized (whether it was through employer prerogative, or by 
formal or informal agreement). A former Secretary of the Port Employers 
Association at the Port of Lyttelton recalls that: "With ... palletization, we were 
going to the PCC every two days at one stage" (interview). The preceding cases 
demonstrate that issues in dispute were frequently referred to Tribunal. And when 
a decision favourable to the port union in question was given, the Federations 
often sought to extend it to other ports. For example, in 1960 President Isbey of 
the North Island Federation highlighted a decision of the Tribunal: 
which ruled that the driving work on a potash boat ... belonged to 
watersiders. This decision should be acted upon by every Port 
Union in regard to mechanical work brought in after 1953.16 
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In an article on arbitration systems, Littler et al. (1989:515) write of a "tendency 
amongst some employers to use tribunals to develop policies rather than taking a 
more proactive stance." Substituting 'unions' for 'employers', this comment 
partly characterizes the approach of the Federations towards technological change: 
leaving matters to be addressed at the local port level, dealing with disputes as 
they arose, and using favourable rulings of the Tribunal as precedents. In a sense, 
this approach reflected the nature of the watersiders' organizations: two loosely 
knit Federations of organizationally distinct and autonomous port unions. It also 
mirrored the way in which new technology was being introduced. Under the terms 
of the GPO individual employers could introduce new technology, and thus the 
Port Employers Association did not seek for it to be addressed nationally. The 
Association was content to allow individual employers to deal with new 
technology on a case-by-case basis, and dealt with disputes as they arose. 
However, from the point of view of the Waterside Workers Federations, the 
problem raised by leaving these issues to be dealt with on a port-by-port basis, and 
following on the coat-tails of the port unions, was that practices surrounding new 
technology differed between ports. Often there was not a common approach to 
what port unions would dispute. Indeed at the North Island Federation's 1960 
Conference, a delegate from Auckland (Jack O'Brian) stated that: "This 
Conference must lay down policy on mechanization and delegates must tell local 
unions they must carry it out. ,,17 Prior to this conference, a fully-fledged 'policy', 
as such, did not exist. 
16 Minutes of the North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 15/11/60. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3/17 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
17 Ibid. 
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The Federations' reliance on the pol1 unions to deal with mechanization appeared 
to be not so problematic in the area of gang strengths, because this decentralized 
approach accorded with the fact that issues of gang manning had always dealt with 
locally anyway.I8 Indeed, it appears that the pol1 unions were relatively 
successful in protecting gang strengths in the face of mechanization. For example, 
the former PEA Secretary at the Pol1 of Lyttelton recalled many disputes in this 
area: 
At one time when what we called modernization stal1ed to come in, 
even in the form of pallets and forkhoists that were used to lift the 
pallets, and unitized wool and bulk tallow, whereas the drums used 
to be man-handled and you need far more men. I hadn't been there 
long . . . and the whole pol1 was stopped for 16 days because the 
Union just wouldn't accept that their gangs would be cut down 
from 20 men to about 3. And that was the beginning of 
modernization. And every time we had anything new we had 
stoppages. (Interview) 
But in the area of work coverage the Federations' reliance on the pol1 unions did 
pose problems. Although, in general, driving mechanical equipment on the ship 
was regarded as watersiders' work both by the Federations and the pol1 unions, 
there were some differences in pol1 practice on this issue, and even more 
differences regarding driving equipment on the wharf. Consequently, one of the 
outcomes of the 1960 Nol1h Island Federation Conference was that it passed the 
following remit: 
All mechanised equipment shall be operated by Waterside Union 
labour on the ship and on the shore where such operation entails the 
18 Even in the national agreement settled in 1962 (GPO 198) there were still no manning schedules 
for (or even mention of) forklifts, bulldozers and so f0l1h. These issues were all dealt with in local 
port agreements. 
loading or discharging of cargo direct from the ship or on shore or 
vice-versa. 19 
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It should be noted, however, that this remit was as much pushed for by delegates 
(like Jack O'Brian) from unions such as Auckland, who were proactive III 
defending these task boundaries, as by members of the Federation's executive. 
In terms of negotiations with employers over mechanical equipment, apart from 
achieving minor modifications to the GPO, the Federations did not act on a 
national basis until they were forced to do so by issues of work coverage. Unlike 
issues of gang strengths, which always differed between ports anyway, work 
coverage posed a threat to occupational boundaries as a whole. To be sure, not all 
issues of, and disputes over work coverage centered on new technology?O But, 
from my reading of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal's decisions, it appears that 
there was an increasing number of demarcation disputes in this area which did 
involve new technology. These jurisdictional disputes were over which unions' 
members should operate the machinery in question, usually watersiders or harbour 
workers (but on occasion other groups like 'permanent hands' were involved). 
New technology became the most common source of demarcation disputes, and 
was to pose the greatest threat to watersiders' occupational boundaries. 
As I noted above, the definition of 'waterside work' contained in the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1953 allowed for disputes to arise over 'jurisdictional claims', which 
were caused by the introduction of new technologies. The Federations' initial 
19Minutes of the North Island Waterfront Workers Association Conference, 15/11/60. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 3117 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
20 For example, in 1961 there was a jurisdictional dispute regarding whether watersiders or 
members of the Tally Clerks Union should do the work of tallying at the new wharves at the Port of 
Bluff (which was one of the few ports in the country where watersiders actually did tallying work). 
In this case, the Bluff Union was successful in retaining work coverage (WIT Decision 347, 
4110/61). Similarly in 1958 a dispute occurred at the Port of Auckland between watersiders and 
ships' carpenters over who had the right to remove ship's dunnage. Waterfront Indusuy 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 (National Archives). 
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response to this threat to watersiders' work coverage was an attempt to modify 
Clause 27 (j) of the GPO (which regulated the introduction of new technology) 
when it was renegotiated in 1960. They sought to add a provision to the effect that 
"all mechanized equipment used in the loading or discharge of cargo should in 
future be handled by [Waterfront] Union members." This amendment was 
rejected outright by the PEA's negotiators, who described it as an attempt "by the 
union to further restrict the rights of employers in relation to the use of mechanical 
equipment. ,,21 It was then submitted to the Tribunal as a 'matter in dispute'. 
However the Federations were unsuccessful because, despite the fact that the 
Tribunal had ruled on other similar matters prior to this time, the Tribunal invoked 
s 11(2) of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. The Tribunal interpreted the Act to 
the effect that it could not make a ruling on "new forms of mechanical equipment" 
because it had no power to make Principal Orders that applied to work which, 
prior to the Act, "was not customarily perfOlmed by waterside workers.,,22 
It was partly because of this ruling that there were further national negotiations on 
this issue. But these discussions were also prompted by a serious 'demarcation 
dispute' at Lyttelton in 1961, which centered on a local practice regarding the role 
of permanent hands in the driving of forklifts. These workers, who were not 
watersiders, were permanent employees of the Union Steam Ship Company and 
members of the Foremen-Stevedores, Timekeepers and Permanent Hands Union. 
They did various tasks such as working in the gear stores, cleaning and so forth. 
At Lyttelton (and most likely at other ports also) there always had been tensions 
between watersiders and the permanent hands. A foreman-stevedore (Ray), who 
had first worked on the waterfront as a permanent hand, explains: 
21 Cited in WIT Decision 282, 2/6/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
22 WIT Decision 280, 1115/60. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 55 
(National Archives). 
In those days we were sort of looked down on by the watersiders as 
being permanents, we were permanent men of the Union Company, 
and they frowned on that because we didn't have the clout they 
had. And any job they refused to do, we were given the job, the 
rough end of the stick, real dirty jobs. Any company business was 
our business, that's what we were told when we started. So we 
could be in a dinghy recovering a body out ofthe harbour, we could 
be dragging for lost cargo, we could do anything that no-one else 
would do. As work became a little tighter, a little scarcer, they 
claimed the work that we did. (Interview) 
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The area where the dispute erupted was in the driving of forklifts aboard vessels. 
Originally at Lyttelton permanent hands had driven forklifts. Ray said that: 
we drove the original forklifts on the wharves. The Union 
Company about 1957, I think, got two forklifts and they were the 
first company in the Port of Lyttelton to own forklifts. So the 
permanent hands drove them. And they were mainly used at the 
ferry for baggage, mail and the odd general purpose. . . . That's the 
thing most people don't realize, that the water siders weren't the 
original drivers in the Port of Lyttelton. They were Union 
Company men, they were company men. (Interview) 
It was when the Union Steam Ship Company began to use forklifts driven by 
permanent hands on board ships that the dispute occurred. Baden Norris, in his 
history of the Lyttelton Union, provides the following account: 
A major dispute flared up in February [1961] over the driving of 
fork lifts in the ship's hold. Up until this time, it had been done by 
company permanent hands and this practice had never been 
accepted by the Lyttelton Union, so matters came to a head when 
the Waipori was loading deep frozen products and a fork lift was 
employed. The watersiders refused to work with the machine 
unless it was manned by a member of the watersider's [sic] union. 
The Port Conciliation Committee sat and the chairman ruled in 
favour of the permanent hands continuing to operate. This decision 
was not accepted by the men and they walked off the job, followed 
by all the labour and that ship and one other Union Steam Ship 
Company Vessel (1980:184). 
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The dispute lasted for four days, and was only resolved by an agreement that a 
national conference of waterfront unions and employers would be held to deal 
with the issue. 
Thus it was disputes over local practices and agreements which resulted in the 
issue of work coverage having to be dealt with on a national basis. In a sense, this 
dispute forced both of the national organizations (of the unions and the employers) 
to take the issue up: by the Federations in an attempt to secure national coverage 
of this type of work, and by the PEA to forestall costly local disputes over this 
issue at other ports. As was often the case when demarcation disputes occurred, 
the unions involved referred the dispute to the Federation of Labour (FOL), and in 
March 1961 a conference was held involving representatives of the PEA, the 
Harbour Board Employers Union, the Harbour Workers Union, the Foremen 
Stevedores, Timekeepers and Permanent Hands Union, and the two Waterside 
Workers Federations.23 As Jim Roberts, the General Secretary of the South Island 
Federation, later stated: "They argued the subject for two days.,,24 However the 
FOL was unable to resolve the dispute and it was referred back to the parties 
involved. 
Subsequent meetings between the PEA and representatives of the two Federations 
were held, and later in March 1961 an agreement was reached regarding work 
coverage and manning levels. The approach of the Federations is succinctly 
summarized in a statement by one of the watersiders' representatives recorded in 
the minutes ofthe original conference: 
The Unions were not trying to stop the introduction of [mechanical] 
equipment but they must protect the gang strengths .... The Union 
23 See Roth (1973: 140) for a discussion of the role of the Federation of Labour in the settling of 
demarcation disputes. 
24 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 28/11161. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
had no argument with the Harbour Boards Employees Union or the 
Permanent Hands, but they could not allow any extension of their 
work.25 
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It was largely because watersiders and their local UnIons, supported by their 
respective Federations, were willing and had the organizational capacity to dispute 
in this area, that employers were forced to agree to work coverage for watersiders. 
Undoubtedly it also represented the 'lesser evil' for the PEA, as the issue 
threatened to escalate into a major dispute, which far outweighed the benefits to be 
gained from depriving watersiders of this work. 
Jim Roberts, in his report to the South Island Federation's annual conference, 
provided a summary of the terms of the agreement, which applied nationally: 
The employers agreed that all mechanical equipment aboard ship in 
conjunction with loading or discharging cargo should be 
recognized as waterside work. In the case of bulk cargoes where 
the mechanical equipment used was not owned by the employer or 
could not be hired without the owner's operator, it was agreed that 
an additional water sider be employed to equate this operator; 
forklifts or any other mechanical appliance on board vessels for 
handling other than bulk cargoes to be operated by waterside 
workers; the question of wharf work involving the operation of 
mechanical equipment to be discussed by the parties at the various 
portS?6 
The agreement also re-afirmed the exclusive right of watersiders to operate ship's 
cranes and stationary winches. Thus watersiders secured work coverage on 
relatively favourable terms (as indicated particularly by the 'double-manning' of 
bulldozers used to unload bulk cargoes). Under this agreement, however, the issue 
of wharf work remained umesolved. The agreement specifically stated that "in 
respect of wharf work involving operation of mechanical equipment, that any 
25 Minutes of Special Conference on Mechanical Equipment, 2/3/6l. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 142, 5/605 (National Archives). 
26 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 28/11/6l. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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problems ... shall, if possible, be resolved by discussion between all the parties 
concerned at the various ports in view of the different local circumstances at these 
portS.,,27 
This latter part of the agreement reflects the fact that practices in this area differed 
between ports; at some ports watersiders drove equipment owned or supplied by 
harbour boards (primarily forklifts), and at others this equipment was driven by 
harbour workers. But it also reflects the number of organizations that were 
marshalled against water siders in this particular jurisdictional dispute, and the 
degree of resistance they faced. Watersiders were confronted, not only by the 
PEA, but also by the Harbours' Association and the Harbour Workers (between 
which the FOL was unable to broker a deal). As Jim Roberts commented in late 
1961: "It would appear that the employers are determined to deprive the waterside 
workers of the work of operating these machines in the handling of cargo to and 
from vessels.,,28 Representatives of the two watersiders' Federations discussed 
this matter, and they subsequently amended their claims to exclude driving on the 
wharf equipment which was owned or supplied by harbour boards. The degree to 
which broader forces were allied against the water siders on this issue is indicated 
by the fact that this jurisdictional boundary was subsequently encoded in the 
Waterfront Industry Act when it was amended in 1964?9 
27 Agreement On Mechanical Equipment Between Port Employers' Association and the North 
Island Waterfront Workers' Association and the South Island Waterside Workers Federation, 1961. 
Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 142, 5/605 (National Archives). 
28Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Annual Conference, 28111161. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1114 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
29 Section 6(2)a of the Waterfront Industry Amendment Act 1964 states that: "No principal order 
shall apply with respect to work of driving or operating the controls (other than emergency 
controls) of any mechanical equipment on any land, premises or wharves controlled by a Harbour 
Board where that equipment is owned or provided by a Harbour Board and the work is done by 
persons employed by the Harbour Board ... unless the Tribunal is satisfied that every employer 
and every organization of employers or workers which will be affected by the order agree to it 
applying to that work." 
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It will be recalled that Federation officials, from the mid-1950s onwards, made 
pronouncements supporting the introduction of new technology in order to 
'lighten the load' of watersiders. While these officials supported the introduction 
of new technology, this was conditional upon watersiders receiving a share of its 
attendant benefits. However, until the Conference in 1961, the approach that was 
adopted by the Federations was to deal with this issue at the local level. A remark 
by a representative of the Waterside Workers Union at the Conference in 1961 
hints at the reason for this approach: 
It was not possible to treat the problem in the same way as had 
been done in other countries, because mechanization was only 
being introduced into New Zealand in bits and pieces.3o 
The way of dealing with mechanization that is being referred to is that of 
agreements such as the American West Coast's 'Mechanization and 
Modernization' agreement. As I noted above, part of the reason why the 
introduction of new technology onto the New Zealand waterfront was dealt with in 
an essentially decentralized manner, at the local level, was that the terms of the 
GPO already allowed some room for individual employers to introduce new 
machinery, and thus they did not need an overarching agreement (like M&M) to 
deal with this. It also reflected bargaining practices generally, which always had 
had a significant decentralized component. This decentralized approach to 
mechanization continued until a series of disputes built up to the point that the 
Federations and the employers were 'forced' to deal with it nationally in 1961. 
But unlike the American M&M agreement, the 1961 agreement was not part of 
any broader set of trade-offs regarding the introduction of new technology. 
30 Minutes of Special Conference on Mechanical Equipment, 2/3/61. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 142, 5/605, (National Archives). 
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(5) The Lead-up to Containerization 
The 1961 agreement by no means resolved all of the problems which 
mechanization engendered. Disputes over the use of new technology continued to 
arise during the 1960s, and came to a head with containerization. However, what 
pre-container technological change did was stimulate the Federations to develop 
and implement policies. For instance, in 1964 the Seaman's Union called a 
conference of all maritime and transport unions to discuss the effects of 
mechanization. The representatives at this conference agreed that the unions 
themselves would attempt to resolve disputes over work coverage, and that the 
Federation of Labour would mediate these discussions (although, as we will see 
below, this approach was not always accepted by watersiders). 
This latter conference was held at a time when the waterfront employers were 
agitating for greater flexibility in the use of new technology. It was also during the 
tenure of the Streamlining Committee which, as I demonstrated in Chapter 5, was 
a time of considerable uncertainty for the port unions.31 At a meeting between the 
PEA and the North and South Island Federations, which was held in late 1963 in 
anticipation of the Committee's findings, Viv Blakeley (the PEA Chairman) 
commented that "some companies were anxious that there should be more 
cooperation from the unions on the use of mechanical equipment.,,32 And when it 
was published in full, in 1964, the 'Streamlining Report' inter alia recommended 
the introduction of mechanical equipment.33 
31 For a discussion of the origins and significance of the Streamlining Committee, and the report it 
issued, see Chapter 5. 
32 Minutes of Meeting Between Representatives of the PEA and the North and South Island 
Watersiders Federations, 9/10/63. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 
2/14 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
33 Although the Streamlining Report did not recommend the introduction of containers, which it 
deemed to be "unsuitable for the New Zealand trade at present", it did recommend further 
palletization and use of conveyors: "The development of cargo handling which we think shows the 
best prospect of benefit for New Zealand is mechanical loading and unloading by conveyors" 
(1964: 135). 
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The other threat that was looming on the horizon was containerization. Records of 
the Federations and the port unions show that containers were being discussed by 
watersiders' representatives as early as 1963 (based on the overseas experience). 
The issues discussed were typically the possibility of redundancies and potential 
threats to work coverage. But despite these discussions, correspondence between 
the port unions and the Federations suggest that the Federations still were not 
entirely proactive on the issue of containerization. In 1964, shortly after the 
Streamlining Report was published, the Secretary of the Dunedin Union (M. 
Lawless) wrote on two occasions to the General Secretary of the South Island 
Federation (Paddy Weith). The first letter explained that two delegates from the 
Wellington Union had visited the port and addressed the members on the 
recommendations of the Streamlining Report, particularly with respect to 
technological change (including containerization). Lawless wrote: 
What they came for was to get support from the rank and file of our 
union to have a meeting off [sic] all concerned in the near future to 
discuss these problems and bring down an agenda to present to 
both Federations, and see if we can't get something to work on, and 
be ready for the next blows from the Streamlining Committee.34 
Although this could be construed as an attempt to motivate the rank and file over 
issues including technological change, it was largely done in order get the 
Federations to establish a policy. There are parallels here with the first round of 
technological change. I am not suggesting that Federation officials were 
shortsighted, but rather that there were continuities in approach in adopting a 
'reactive' stance, with issues of new technology being dealt with in the first 
instance by the port unions. 
34 Letter from M. Lawless to P. Weith, 1113/64. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 
92-305, Box 2/14 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Nonetheless, by the mid-1960s, the Federations' officials had recognized that 
containerization would place them in a very different position regarding 
bargaining. At the South Island Federation's conference in 1966, the President 
commented on the topic of containerization that: "we along with other workers in 
this country and indeed throughout the world are poised on the threshold of an 
industrial revolution far greater than any that has gone before.,,35 Central to the 
recognition of the dramatic consequences of containerization was the view that 
bargaining would mean that trade-offs were required in order to secure the benefits 
of the new technology. In 1966, under GPO 247, a 'Modernization Fund' was 
introduced. Briefly, it was an employer-funded measure which provided various 
benefits (retirement, death, sickness), long service leave, increased guaranteed 
minimum wages, as well as personal welfare and hardship grants. As I noted in 
Chapter 5, these monetary benefits were traded off against the revision of sling 
loads and gang strengths, in line with mechanization, and the provision that 
'special work' could be performed outside of the normal 10 hour day. The PEA's 
position was that: 
the Association's negotiators had been prepared to introduce a 
Modernization Fund but, at the same time, had been determined ... 
that they should be satisfied that good value was obtained in return 
by way of improved working conditions.36 
This was the first step towards a quid pro quo regarding mechanization, of the 
type that occurred around the world, which centered on what Turnbull et al. 
(1992:44) refer to as "a trade-off between 'modernization' and job andlor income 
security." But the New Zealand agreement was very limited, and by no means 
approximated the American M&M agreement wherein "the employers determined 
to 'buy-out' the union rule book" (ibid:45). It will be recalled from the preceding 
35 Minutes of South Island Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 29/11/66. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1/14 (Alexander Turnbull Libnuy, NLNZ). 
36 PEA Management Committee Meeting 380, 19/5/65. Port Employers Association Records, 89-
395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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chapter that at this time, bolstered by a very real and compelling strike threat, the 
Federations were negotiating from a position of some considerable strength. 
Consequently, it appears that, despite the employers' intentions, gang strengths did 
not decrease markedly (there were numerous disputes over this issue at the port 
level). 
Despite the quid pro quo associated with the Modernization Fund (and although 
the issue of driving machinery on the ship was resolved), issues of work coverage 
continued to be raised by mechanization. Containers were being introduced, much 
as in the first round of mechanization, in a sporadic fashion. The vessels 
introduced from the mid-1960s onwards were invariably ro-ros (as the first 
cellular vessel did not arrive in New Zealand until 1971). Notably, the Union 
Stearn Ship Company's 'Seacargo Terminals' were established initially at the 
ports of Auckland, Lyttelton, Wellington and Dunedin (see Chapter 8). These 
terminals were leased from the local harbour boards for the exclusive use of the 
Union Company's vessels. The port unions and the Federations supported the 
introduction of these terminals and in 1967 negotiated a special principal order to 
govern work within them. Under this agreement, the terminals had their own 
workforce of watersiders, secured from the local bureaux on a rotational basis for 
several weeks at a time.37 But, as will see below, this agreement did not resolve 
all of the issues regarding the containers that were moved through these terminals. 
Furthermore, other companies began to introduce ro-ro vessels; for example, by 
1967 Holm and Co. were operating such a vessel at the Port of Lyttelton, and the 
Northern Steamship Company was operating one at Auckland.38 The numbers of 
demarcation disputes increased, and these increasingly centered on container jobs 
37 The numbers of watersiders in toto employed at these terminals was relatively small, numbering 
only 81 in 1969 (WIC Report 1970:13). 
38 These vessels were worked under principal orders negotiated by the union at each port. 
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- as m 1966 at Lyttelton over the link-span for the ill-fated 'Wahine' (Norris 
1980:200).39 
In what were to become prophetic words the Waterfront Commissioner (A. 
Bockett), in a report jointly prepared with the Secretary of Labour (N. Woods) in 
1967, predicted increasing numbers of demarcation disputes over the issue of 
containerization: 
The introduction of mechanical methods of cargo handling and the 
carrying out of this work by workers other than watersiders who 
had previously done this work manually has been the cause of a 
number of union demarcation disputes, and this type of dispute is 
likely to increase in future with pending increases in the 
mechanization of cargo handling by the use of unit loads and 
containers.4o 
Similarly Judge Archer, the Chairman of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, 
remarked in an address to the Harbours' Association in 1966 that although the 
driving of mechanical equipment on the wharf by harbour workers had been given 
statutory recognition in 1964, and waterside workers had secured the work of 
driving this equipment aboard vessels in 1961, there were jobs which lay in the 
middle of this legally recognized jurisdictional settlement which were the subject 
of disputes: 
In such cases a Harbour Board will generally support the claims of 
its employees and in some cases handle their claims for them. 
Watersiders may find themselves opposed not only by the Harbour 
39 The 'Wahine' sank on April 10, 1968. 
40 A. Bockett and N. Woods, "Integration of Main Waterfi"ont Employers and Workers Under One 
Judicial Authority", April 1967. The report, which was submitted to the Minister of Labour, 
argued that as a result of increasing numbers of demarcation disputes associated with 
containerization "the conciliation and arbitration machinery of all main waterfront employers and 
employees should be brought under one special judicial authority". Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 237 (National Archives). 
Board Employees' Union but the Port Employers Association, the 
Harbour Board concerned, and by your Association.41 
Furthermore, he admonished the Association that: 
The hope that watersiders may be got rid of by new methods of 
cargo handling or their functions taken over by Harbour Boards' 
permanent staff seem to me to be illusory and ill-advised. It would 
be better in my view for Boards to encourage a greater degree of 
integration between the work of Harbour Boards' employees and 
that of watersiders .... Both Port Employers and Harbour Boards 
must learn to live with the men employed on the waterfront, to 
whatever union they may belong, and should seek by more active 
and imaginative methods to improve their relationships with 
them. 42 
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As we will see below, these too were prophetic words, for they foreshadowed the 
manner in which the workforce of container terminals was established - although 
not because of the foresight or forbearance of either group of employers. 
The possibility of a large-scale shift to containerization was one of the 
precipitating factors which gave rise to New Zealand's 'Waterfront Conference', 
which I will deal with in the next section. The Molyneaux Committee had in its 
1967 report recommended the introduction of a container service between New 
Zealand and Britain.43 The need for attendant changes in the terms and conditions 
of watersiders was at least implied, if not explicitly recommended, in the Report. 
However, while the Conference started off with a brief to examine inter alia the 
effects of containers, as we shall see, it ended up not doing so. 
41 Speech by Judge K. Archer to the Harbours' Association Conference, 16/3/66. Waterfront 
Industry Connnission Records, W3472, Box 14 (National Archives). 
42 Ibid. 
43 This ConnnitIee was established in 1966 by the four British Conference Lines to examine the 
feasibility of introducing new mechanized methods of cargo-handling. The ConnnitIee was made 
up of a representative of each line, with W. Molyneaux as the independent chairman. As Hunter 
(1972:182) notes, "The connnitIee's terms of reference were wide and in particular they were 
requested to examine and report on whether all or part of the cargoes could be handled more 
economically or efficiently by: Containers, pallets, standard loads or packs, and any other new or 
improved manner such as mechanical loading." 
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(6) The Waterfront Conference 
New Zealand's Waterfront Conference was modelled on an Australian precedent. 
In 1965 a National Stevedoring Industry Conference was created by the 
Government in Australia (see Deery 1978). This Conference, which continued 
until 1967, was established in order to facilitate the modification of the industrial 
relations framework at a time of "exceptionally high industrial unrest", but its 
brief expanded to incorporate "wide ranging discussions aimed at planning and 
reorganizing an industry which was in the process of being transformed by 
imminent and rapid technological change" (ibid:207). As a result of these 
negotiations, a system of 'permanent employment' was established whereby 
Australian waterside workers at the major ports were directly employed by 
stevedoring companies, or by 'Holding Companies' established by these latter, in 
return for a guaranteed weekly wage (see Deery 1978:210). As Turnbull et al. 
(1992:44) note, this was part of a change that occurred around the world in 
response to containerization: "The basic formula everywhere was the same - the 
'buy-out' of casual employment and all the associated casual work practices in 
exchange for employment/income security". 
New Zealand's Waterfront Conference was initiated by the Minister of Labour 
(Tom Shand) in 1967, the year that the Australian Conference was brought to a 
conclusion.44 Formally, the purpose ofthe Conference was: 
to initiate an exchange of views and so far as possible reach 
agreement as to new terms of employment for waterside workers, 
having regard to the urgent need of increasing the efficiency of 
cargo-handling and expediting the tum-round of shipping .... The 
Conference shall have regard not only to conventional procedures 
but to the changes in cargo-handling procedures which may result 
44 The fIrst meeting of the Conference was held in February 1968. 
from the adoption of unit-handling techniques, or the introduction 
of container ships or other vessels designed for new methods of 
cargo-handling.45 
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The Conference was supported both by the Port Employers Association and the 
Waterside Workers Federation, although the support of the Federation could at 
most be described as 'qualified'. The Conference comprised representatives of 
these organizations, as well as the Federation of Labour, the Harbour Workers 
Union, the Harbours' Association, the Waterfront Industry Commission, and the 
Department of Labour.46 The Chairman of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, 
Judge Archer, doubled as the Conference Chairman. 
Despite the array of organizations represented, there is no doubt that the main 
participants were the Port Employers Association and the Waterside Workers 
Federation. The Harbour Boards and Harbour Workers' Union were only 
represented in order to get their view concerning the integration of hours and 
conditions of work between watersiders and harbour workers. The Conference 
had a conciliation function only, and thus only had the authority to recommend 
changes rather than the authority to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, it was 
agreed when the Conference began that, like the GPOs, no agreement would be 
binding on any watersideI' until it was confirmed by a national ballot of the 
members of each port union. The Conference proceeded on the understanding that 
the Waterfront Industry Commission and Waterfront Industry Tribunal would 
remain intact, but the parties could jointly recommend changes to the Waterfront 
45 Document entitled "Purpose and Functions of the New Zealand Waterfront Conference". New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 35/11 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
46 The Conference comprised the following participants: the Chairman; 2 representatives of the 
Overseas Shipowners Committee; 2 representatives of the New Zealand Shipowners' Federation; 2 
representatives of the Overseas Shipping Lines; 1 representative of the Port Employers 
Association; 4 representatives of the Waterside Workers Federation, 1 representative of the 
Harbours Association; 1 representative of the Harbour Workers Union; 2 representatives of the 
Federation of Labour; 1 representative of the Waterfront Industry Commission; 1 representative of 
the Department of Labour. 
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Industry Act 1953 (which, at least in theory, could involve changes to these latter 
institutions which were established by the Act). 
The degree to which the Conference was modelled on the Australian one (and the 
extent to which developments in other countries were taken into consideration) is 
indicated by Judge Archer's comments at one of the first meetings of the 
Conference: 
The need for major changes on the waterfront has been recognized, 
and a measure of success achieved, in many other countries, and we 
should be encouraged by what has been done in North America, in 
Britain, and more particularly in Australia. I make no apology for 
suggesting that we should take considerable notice of what has 
been done in Australia.47 
At the first meeting all members had copies of the agreement which resulted from 
the Australian National Stevedoring Industry Conference. But ifthe intent was the 
same, the outcome (as we shall see) was very different. 
As is apparent in the formal aims of the Conference, there was a consensus 
regarding an attempt to negotiate new conditions of employment. Inevitably this 
involved negotiating a quid pro quo of the type referred to earlier, wherein 
'modernization' was traded off against more secure income and employment (see 
Turnbull et al. 1992:44). Ted Thompson, the Assistant General Secretary of the 
Waterside Workers Federation (who attended meetings of the Conference) wrote: 
With the approval of the Employers and Workers' Organizations 
the Government set up a Waterfront Industry Conference 
comprised of Employer [and] Worker representation .... There was 
a lengthy agenda but the objective was to endeavour to develop 
changes in the industrial scene and working conditions without 
stand-off disputes which were becoming apparent at this time with 
47 Minutes ofWaterfi'ont Conference Meeting Number 2,5/2/68. New Zealand Waterfront Workers 
Union Records, 92-305, Box 36/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
changes in cargo presentation requiring altered methods of 
handling. It was hoped to rationalize some aspects of work and to 
change conditions for both employer and worker and to do this by 
'agreement' .48 
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While the Modernization Fund effected some trade-offs regarding the introduction 
of new technology, it did not fundamentally alter the terms of employment. 
Indeed, this latter was done via the Waterfront Conference, although largely in the 
absence of an explicit agreement surrounding the terms on which container work 
would be performed. While there was a general sense in which the trade-offs 
achieved at the Conference compensated for the potential effects of 
containerization on employment and income security, as we shall see, the actual 
details of the quid pro quo that was subsequently brokered applied mostly to the 
terms and conditions for conventional work. 
The Conference Agenda was apparently drawn up by the employers.49 It listed a 
number of items: terms of employment (including permanent employment and 
permanent gangs), hours of work, incentive schemes and training schemes, 
discipline, the Modernization Fund (including mechanization and redundancy), 
wet weather work, and 'matters affecting the turnaround of shipping' (including 
delays, demarcation disputes and restrictive practices). However, after discussions 
over a few months the agenda was distilled down to just a few key items that the 
parties focused on in depth. These items (which I will discuss below) were central 
to the agreement that was finally reached. 
In Britain and Australia, as Turnbull et al. (1992:44-5) point out, "the dominant 
cause of the industrial umest and the 'restrictive practices' that dogged the 
48 E.G. Thompson, 'History of Container Introduction and Development on New Zealand 
Waterfronts' (Waterside Workers Federation Circular), 1980. 
49 This comment was made by a delegate at the Waterside Workers Federation's conference in 
1968. Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation First Biennial Conference, 18/11168. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 13/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
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industry was deemed to have been the casual nature of waterfront employment". 
Similarly in New Zealand it was the indirect employment relationship, resulting 
from the existence of the Waterfront Industry Commission, which was regarded by 
the Port Employers Association as the 'source of all evil' in waterfront industrial 
relations. 50 Thus the employers entered the Conference, and like their Australian 
counterparts had achieved, immediately sought a version of direct permanent 
employment via a 'Holding Company.' Consequently the first item on their 
agenda was an attempt to abolish the Waterfront Industry Commission. General 
Secretary Napier commented at the national Waterside Workers Federation's first 
conference in 1968 that: "One of the first employer demands at the [Waterfront] 
Conference was to abolish the W.I.C."Sl 
The following excerpt from a PEA Management Committee meeting, which 
provides the rationale for this gambit, is worth quoting at length: 
The proposal which was basic to all else was that the waterside 
workers should be engaged under permanent conditions, the aim 
being to gain major improvements in working facilities and 
industrial relations. It was recognized, because of the seasonal 
nature of New Zealand's trade and the widely differing fluctuations 
in labour requirements, that only a limited number of companies 
could employ a permanent staff of waterside workers, so that the 
balance of the labour force would be engaged on a permanent basis 
as a pool of labour to be made available to individual companies as 
required. This pool of labour would be controlled by the direct 
employers at each port. It was anticipated that a national 
organization, either the Port Employers Association or a subsidiary 
closely allied thereto, as a holding company with branches at the 
ports, would finance the scheme by way of a national levy. The 
administration must be such that the employers at a port 
collectively dealt directly with their own labour and had the 
opportunity of building a better relationship with the men. 52 
50 1n this context, 'casual employment' and 'indirect employment' refer to the same type of 
arrangement. 
5! Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation First Biennial Conference, 18/11/68. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 13/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
52 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 429, 21/2/68. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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An important part of this proposal was that the PEA estimated that employers 
would not have to pay any more to finance this scheme than they did already 
through the levies which funded the Commission. In effect, the proposed 
arrangement was identical to the one which had been adopted in Australia where 
some water siders were employed directly by stevedoring companies (who were 
referred to as 'operational' employers), and others were employed by a holding 
company funded by a group of stevedoring companies (see Deery 1978:2lO). And 
at various points Viv Blakeley, the Chairman of the PEA, actually cited the case of 
Australia in support of the employers' proposals. 
The Conference minutes show that a number of discussions on this matter were 
held at meetings during the first sixth months of the Conference. Throughout 
these discussions the Federation's representatives strongly resisted any attempt to 
abolish the Commission, and in this they were supported by the Commissioner 
himself. Typical comments on this matter from each side are as follows. At the 
fifth meeting of the Conference the matter was fully aired. The position of the 
Federation is indicated by General Secretary Napier's comment, that to abolish the 
Commission: 
would be in our view a retrograde step. We have had difficulties 
with the Waterfront Industry Commission but on balances they 
have been a steadying influence and probably good for the 
. d 53 III ustry. 
President Eddie Isbey put it in stronger terms (harking back to the days of the 
'auction block' system): "The waterside worker of New Zealand does not want 
53 Minutes of Waterfront Conference Meeting 5, 1116/68. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 36/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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permanency no matter what the set-up is .... We have had bad experience of 
employment directly by employers."s4 
By the sixth meeting of the Conference direct employment was abandoned by the 
PEA as unobtainable, given the vehement resistance by the Federation's 
representatives. In the words of Judge Archer, after another lengthy discussion of 
the matter, "I think: we have covered this [issue] fairly fully. It does appear that 
the workers do not favour elimination of the Commission. It is set up by statute 
and could only be removed [the] same. This may [only] be done if complete 
agreement was reached in this."s5 This impasse effectively put an end to the 
discussions on this topic. The PEA did suggest, however, that the Commission be 
reconstituted to "a representative Commission so that it became part of the 
industty rather than an independent third party.,,56 Although this suggestion 
received support from the Federation, this suggestion was left to 'float' until near 
the end of the Conference, as the discussions then moved on to other areas. 57 
In short, the employers wanted permanent employment but could not get it. The 
two conditions that the PEA then focused on were the introduction of shiftwork 
and wet weather work. The divisions within the PEA (between the Overseas 
Shipowners and the New Zealand Shipowners Federation) which previously had 
been apparent over the issue of shiftwork had been resolved, and it was sought in 
order to extend the hours of work. Similarly, wet weather work was sought in 
order to minimize (the not insignificant) delays to work which occurred in 
inclement weather. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 440, 19/5/68. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 203 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
57 Minutes of Waterfront Conference Meeting 8, 12/8/68. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 36/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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The attitude of the Federation to the proposal for shiftwork is summed up in the 
following statement from the Conference minutes: "The feeling of the Port Unions 
was that in contrast to other industries, shift work was to be an innovation on the 
waterfront and that waterside workers would expect to receive adequate 
recompense for agreeing to it."s8 Consequently the Federation's representatives 
sought substantial penal rates for a second (night) shift. In response, the PEA 
even tried giving shiftwork another name. At a PEA Management Committee 
meeting a representative of the Overseas Lines stated that "It was desirable to 
avoid the use of the term 'shift work' in respect of the night hours proposed", and 
the Committee decided that "the employers' representatives on the Waterfront 
Commission be authorized to negotiate for the introduction of shift work but 
under another name."S9 This was really 'a rose by any other name' and did not 
resolve the issue. By this time the sticking point was not merely that the 
Federation sought a penal rate for the 'supplementary hours'. 
It became apparent the Federation would only agree to these changes to the 
conditions of work if a permanent 40 hour week was introduced, in order to 
provide a greater measure of income security than the existing system of 
guaranteed wages. As the PEA Management Committee minutes state: 
At the last sitting of the Waterfront Conference the union 
representatives had made it quite clear that if the employers wanted 
improvement in working conditions in the way of shift work and 
wet weather work, then the unions would require a system of 
permanent employment on the basis of 40 hours at ordinary time 
per week, with overtime being paid for work outside the 40 hours. 
If permanent employment, which would compensate the men for 
the removal of much of the unproductive paid time, was not agreed, 
58 Minutes of Waterfront Conference Meeting 9,9/9/68. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 36/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
59 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 448, 6/11/68. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 204 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
then the unions would not be prepared to proceed with shift work 
and wet weather work.6o 
295 
Thus the form of 'permanent employment' that the Federation sought to introduce 
was not direct employment by stevedoring companies as such, but rather the 
payment to watersiders of a standard 40 hour weekly wage irrespective of whether 
work was available for them to perform (to replace the system of guaranteed 
wages). The PEA immediately balked at the suggestion, as it stood. The 
Conference minutes record that: 
Mr Blakeley stated that when the employers had put forward their 
original proposals, those relating to permanent employment 
represented a package deal which was designed to maintain costS.61 
The PEA regarded the suggested form of 'permanent employment' as being too 
expensive. However, over a period of time, the PEA's representatives decided 
that in order to secure the introduction of supplementary hours and wet weather 
working, they were prepared to concede a permanent 40 hour week (at the major 
ports) - based on a series of other trade-offs. 
From this point onwards, the Conference essentially became a forum for 
negotiations between the PEA and the Federation in order to settle a new General 
Principal Order. The Federation secured the consent of the port unions to hold 
over the claims for an order to replace GPO 279 (which expired in February 1969) 
until the Conference had finished. Between May 1969 and March 1970 the 
Conference did not meet as these negotiations proceeded. Indeed Ted Thompson 
recalls how at this time the Chairman of the Conference, Judge Archer, became 
disgruntled at how the Conference was being conducted, particularly with work 
6°Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 449, 20/11/68. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 204 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
61 Minutes of Waterfront Conference Meeting 11, 6/11/68. New Zealand Waterfront Workers 
Union Records, 92-305, Box 36/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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being done In a committee, the recommendations of which he only rubber-
stamped. 62 
By March 1970 agreement had been reached on a number of issues, with each side 
making concessions. The PEA had agreed to the Federation's version of 
'permanent employment' at the 12 major ports, together with increases in the 
hourly rate and other rates, and increased retirement benefits. In return the 
Federation had agreed to supplementary hours of 7 hours per day at the 
'permanent ports' (although at the same rate as normal hours), wet weather work, 
and a revised incentive bonus scheme based on tonnage handled. Another 
concession made by the employers was in allowing the restriction of casual labour 
(see Chapter 10). The terms of redundancies were also discussed, and it was 
agreed that no redundancies would occur during the course of the new GPO, but 
that in the interim representatives of the PEA and the Federation would discuss the 
issue further in order to arrive at a redundancy agreement (see Chapter 10). 
However the document which resulted from these negotiations (GPO 305) was 
subsequently rejected by the Auckland Union and the Wellington Union. In 
Chapter 5, I provided a detailed discussion of the process by which this occurred, 
and how it was resolved. As I noted in that chapter, the rejection of the new order 
by these unions was foreshadowed by a demarcation dispute over containers in 
1969. In a sense, these disputes were intertwined. 
Despite the brief of the Conference (which included consideration of containers), 
from the Conference minutes it appears that very little discussion of 
containerization actually occulTed. Undoubtedly this was, in part, because a 
decision to introduce cellular container vessels on New Zealand's export trade was 
62 Personal Communication, 1/8/94. 
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not finally made until March 1969. Consequently, the implications of 
containerization could not be fully anticipated. Given that the problems associated 
with containerization were somewhat vague, the Conference participants engaged 
in detailed bargaining over conventional work, and the quid pro quo that was 
subsequently brokered applied mostly to the terms and conditions for this type of 
work. Meanwhile, the port unions were left to deal with the piecemeal 
containerization that was occurring at the local port level. Indeed, a demarcation 
dispute erupted in 1969, which involved the Federation not acting as the larger 
port unions desired, by failing to deal with the issues surrounding containerization. 
(7) Containerization and the Off-Wharf Depots 
The first senous disputes over containers, which occurred in the late 1960s, 
involved containers transported by ro-ro vessels, primarily those engaged in the 
Union Shipping Company's trans-Tasman operation (see Chapter 8). This is 
because cellular vessels were not introduced into New Zealand until 1971 (see 
below). The ports affected were Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton because 
these were the ports of call for the Company's ro-ro service in its early years, and 
thus were the ports where containers first entered and exited New Zealand. 
Although this service had been introduced on a negotiated basis, through a special 
principal order agreed to by the Federation and the Union Shipping Company 
which regulated the operation of the Seacargo Terminals at these ports, this 
agreement by no means covered all of the contingencies regarding the containers 
that were shipped through these terminals. 
As I noted above, while the Waterside Workers Federation was negotiating at the 
Conference, largely over the terms and conditions of conventional work, the 
watersiders unions at these latter ports were dealing with containerization at the 
local level. This eventually led to 'renegade' action by the Wellington Union. In 
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this sense, there were a number of continuities with pre-container technological 
change: containers were first introduced on a piecemeal basis, disputes arose at the 
local port level, and then were picked up and dealt with by the Waterside Workers 
Federation. Essentially the Federation was in a reactive position, as a second-
order player. 
Although one of the reasons that the Federation of Labour had attended the 
Waterfront Conference was to iron out inter-union disputes, as I noted above, the 
Conference did not meet for a long period, and had become transformed merely 
into a bargaining forum for a new GPO. While these latter negotiations were 
proceeding an inter-union dispute erupted over work coverage with respect to the 
packing and unpacking containers. The issue in dispute was that of which union's 
members should perform the work of packing and unpacking containers both on 
and off the wharf, but particularly at the off-wharf depots. Why was this issue 
raised? 
Containerization is a sophisticated form of unitization, a process which 
standardizes cargo into 'unit loads' (see Hoyle and Hilling 1984). This process, in 
tum, facilitates intermodalism, "the [direct] transfer of goods from one transport 
mode to another" (ibid: 1 0). And intermodalism has the potential to allow for the 
labour process to be 'segmented', and for work traditionally performed by 
waterfront workers in ports to be carried out at sites other than the fixed spatial 
locale of a port.63 As Mills notes: "The container has had a revolutionary impact 
on the entire transport industry because it can be stuffed and unstuffed at any 
location serviced by the ... equipment that can move it when loaded" (1979:143). 
This, in tum, raises issues of work coverage. As Finlay succinctly puts it: "The 
problem is that the container is an entity that does not fit the jurisdictional barriers 
63 Branch (1986:81-2) writes of the "simplification of inter modal transfer, in which the large size of 
the unit helps to reduce the costs of inland distribution." 
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established during the break-bulk era" (1988: 175). Waterfront workers faced with 
this situation typically sought to exert closure over the categories of work they 
deemed to be traditionally 'theirs'. As Hoyle and Hilling note, "dockers in a 
number of countries have tried to redefine dock work to include cargo-handling 
wherever it takes place - British dockers tried for a five-mile zone adjacent to 
ports and American longshoremen press for fifty miles" (1984:10). New Zealand 
was no exception. 
This issue appears to have first been raised at Auckland where disputes had 
occuned in 1969 over coverage of the work of packing and unpacking of 
containers on the wharf, after the Union had insisted on this work being performed 
by watersiders (see Roth 1993: 172). Furthermore, the issue of work coverage at 
off-wharf depots was raised. As Roth (ibid:173) writes: "The Union was able to 
police container filling and unfilling on the waterfront but freight forwarding firms 
were already setting up intermediate or consolidators' depots away from the 
wharves where the work was done by other workers." The workers who did this 
work were usually members of the Storemen and Packers Federation, a union not 
previously associated with waterfront work. In 1969 storemen claimed this work 
at Auckland. Roth notes that the Auckland Union immediately contacted the 
General Secretary of the Waterside Workers Federation, and sought that "the 
filling and emptying of all containers at the depots off the wharf be claimed as 
being waterside workers' work", and that if coverage of this work could not be 
secured that black bans be placed on containers filled at these depots (1993: 173). 
The Federation responded by handing the matter over to the FOL to resolve. 
Thus the depots issue, which involved a umon not traditionally linked to 
waterfront work, was dealt with through a set of negotiations separate from, and 
parallel to, the Waterfront Conference. Given the novelty of the new situation, it 
was to be caught between national and local negotiations. Although the Waterside 
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Workers Federation had handed the matter to the FOL, the local watersiders' 
unions were having to deal with the threat that container technology posed to work 
coverage on a day-to-day basis at the port level. Indeed, the Wellington Union felt 
that the officials of their Federation were not being proactive enough. 
The dispute at Wellington (like the one at Auckland) centered on the packing and 
unpacking of containers at off-wharf depots, and involved the Wellington 
Watersiders' Union disputing coverage of this work with members of the local 
Storemen and Packers Union. Prior to this time, negotiations initiated by the FOL 
with the Storemen and Packers had occurred, but the issue had not been resolved. 
The Wellington Union's officials attempted to clarify the situation regarding these 
negotiations. Upon learning that the issue was far from resolved the rank and file 
at Wellington voted to apply a 'Black Ban' on handling containers to or from off-
wharf depots. Representatives of the Wellington Union flew to Auckland and 
received support for their actions from watersiders there, and the Lyttelton Union 
also lent its support. 
A resolution was then adopted by the Wellington Union's executive to demand a 
meeting of the Waterside Workers Federation's national executive with the 
Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton Unions (those most affected by 
containerization). The Federation complied, but also attempted to get the black 
ban lifted. Interestingly, Federation General Secretary Napier was also the Vice-
President of the FOL at the time and he tried in earnest to have the black ban 
lifted, which the Wellington Union refused to do. As I noted in Chapter 5, the 
Union flatly refused to hand over the dispute to its Federation. Further moves by 
the Storemen and Packers to secure this work resulted in water siders stopping 
work in protest for two days at Auckland and Wellington on two separate 
occasions, in October and December 1969. 
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The meeting of the three watersiders' UnIons and the Waterside Workers 
Federation executive was held in December 1969. The minutes indicate 
considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the Wellington Union with the way that 
its Federation was dealing with the matter, particularly in handing it to the FOL. 
Other watersiders' unions represented at the meeting supported the representatives 
of the Wellington Union. For example, B. Gamer of the Napier Union stated: 
We should have adopted a firmer policy in recent years regarding 
fringe work areas, complacency has been too rampant. The 
practice of filching watersiders' work has been going on for years. 
The Wellington Union are to be admired for the stand they have 
taken. 64 
Again the Federation executive attempted to get the Wellington Union to 
discontinue the ban, on the grounds that it was not in line with Federation policy 
(which was to have the matter resolved by the FOL). Federation Vice-President 
Quinlan commented: 
The Black Ban has cause quite a lot of discussion. . . . When this 
puts the Federation into a situation that policy is not being adhered 
to it is a weakening of our position.65 
The Wellington Union tabled a list of demands, the crux of which was that 
water siders should do the work of packing and unpacking containers off the wharf, 
and moreover that the "Waterside Workers Federation determine firm policy 
around containerization and circulate ports with firm policy instructions to have 
work coverage protected.,,66 General Secretary Napier responded by stating that: 
there was little possibility of the Executive of the [Waterside 
Workers] Federation settling this whole question to the satisfaction 
64 Minutes ofWWF Special Executive Meeting, 8/12/69. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
of watersiders .... If we could obtain what the Wellington Union 
want we need not bother about the Federation of Labour.67 
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Nonetheless, Ray Fergus of the Lyttelton Union tabled a resolution supp0l1ing the 
Wellington Union. He stated: 
Most of the speakers ... agreed that the dispute was necessary .... 
As a Federation we should show a united front to the Federation of 
Labour and the resolution is intended to endorse and show 
confidence in the Wellington Union.68 
That his resolution was passed indicates the support of the other port union 
delegates for the Wellington Union's position. 
The issue of work coverage in the off-wharf depots, in its entirety, exhibits both 
similarities to and differences from how pre-container technological change was 
dealt with. The similarities center on the watersiders' unions dealing with the 
effects of new technology at the local level, and the Waterside Workers Federation 
picking up on the issue after disputes had occurred, as well as attempts by the port 
unions to force their Federation to formulate a policy. It evidences essentially a 
proactive approach by the port unions, which had to deal with the effects of 
containers on a day-to-day basis at the port level, and a reactive approach by their 
Federation. In this particular dispute the unions were not assisted by the fact that 
the Federation was busy at this time negotiating a new GPO which dealt primarily 
with terms and conditions for break-bulk work. 
The differences were a result of the fact that containerization had the potential to 
allow for the displacement of work beyond the port. Prior to containerization, 
jurisdictional disputes had invariably involved unions that had their basis within 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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the ports (primarily the Harbour Workers Union). However, in the context of a 
legally constituted union coverage system, the displacement of 'segments' of the 
labour process to sites outside of ports provided the basis for jurisdictional 
conflicts that drew into the fray unions not previously associated with waterfront 
work. The FOL then became actively involved in an attempt to resolve these 
inter-union disputes. 
In the end, a compromise was reached: the matter was handed over to the FOL on 
the understanding that the Storemen and Packers would be drawn back into 
discussions which were intended to produce a binding decision. A special 
subcommittee of the unions affected was constituted, and in January 1970 
guidelines were agreed to by the subcommittee and National Executive of the 
FOL. Under these guidelines, full container loads (i.e. those containing only one 
shipper's cargo) could be loaded or unloaded at the shipper's own premises using 
their own workers. However the work of (un)loading all containers packed 
outside the shipper's premises, at an off-wharf consolidating depot, was deemed to 
be that of watersiders.69 (Although the guidelines made no mention of LCL 
containers, it was a common practice for these to be packed and unpacked on the 
wharf by watersiders.) 
This decision was much to the chagrin of the Storemen and Packers Federation, 
which claimed that their signatory had exceeded his authority in being party to this 
agreement. Roth (1993: 174) notes that the Storemen and Packers subsequently 
voted to leave the FOL. Buoyed by this decision, the Auckland, Wellington and 
Lyttelton Unions pushed for, and won, extension of their membership rule to 
include workers in off-wharf depots. Thus these (otherwise exclusive) unions 
69 Minutes and Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Conference of the Federation 
of Labour (1970:32). 
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were prepared to widen their membership in order to capture work coverage. 70 
Changing the jurisdictional boundaries of unions in this manner required the 
consent of the Minister of Labour. Roth notes that the "Minister of Labour Jack 
Marshall accepted the FOL's decision and approved rule changes of waterside 
unions ... to allow them to work in any off-wharf depots he might designate" 
(1993:174). 
The three local unions then pushed for actual coverage at off-wharf depots. The 
Auckland Union secured this at three depots by agreement with the local Storemen 
and Packers Union (see Roth 1993:174), but elsewhere it was rejected by depot 
operators and storemen alike. The operators particularly did not want watersiders 
to get work coverage because their wages and conditions were superior to those of 
storemen. The problem was that the agreement brokered by the FOL did not bind 
employers, nor the Storemen and Packers (after their exit from the FOL). 
Furthermore, the Government refused to designate off-wharf depots (Roth 
1993: 176). Once again, a black ban was placed on containers from certain depots 
for several weeks in 1971, this time by the Wellington, Lyttelton and Auckland 
Unions in concert. As before, it appears that the Waterside Workers Federation 
was not entirely supportive of these unions, seeking a negotiated solution instead 
of direct action. The ban was only lifted when the Government agreed to establish 
a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Containers that inter alia would deal with the 
issue (WIC Report 1972:19). 
The Commission of Inquiry, which began in June 1971 made recommendations on 
the issue that were acted upon by the Government. Essentially it established a 
trade-off: it took off-wharf depots off the watersiders, but restricted the containers 
that could be worked in the depots to full container load (FCL) containers. The 
70 This development was similarities to the situation in Australia where, in response to 
containerization, the Australian Waterside Workers Federation attempted to incorporate other 
occupational groups into their membership (see Deery 1983). 
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Commission issued an interim report in November 1971 which recommended that 
the Minister of Labour not exercise his discretion in allowing an extension of the 
membership of waterside workers unions, and the previously granted extensions 
were subsequently rescinded. But the Commission of Inquiry also recommended 
that LCL containers (those containing cargo belonging to more than one shipper) 
had to be (un)packed within wharflimits by watersiders. 
However, in 1973, following the election of a sympathetic Labour Government, 
the Wellington Union secured two designated off-wharf depots (Roth 1993: 177). 
The WIC's annual report notes: 
Towards the end of November 1973 the Minister of Labour 
designated two off-wharf container depots as being subject to 
coverage by the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union. Such 
coverage does not mean that waterside workers on the 
commission's bureau registers will be employed at these depots, 
but only that the depot employees become members of a section of 
the Waterside Workers' Union and have their wages and conditions 
negotiated with their employers by that union (WIC Report 
1973:21). 
Thus it was somewhat of a 'limited settlement', and the port umons were 
unsuccessful in getting any more terminals so designated. As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter 11, the position of successive governments became increasingly one of 
'containment', by attempting to prevent the wages and conditions of watersiders 
from moving beyond the wharves. Later, in 1975, a Supreme Court ruling 
established that the Minister of Labour's decision to designate the two depots at 
Wellington "had been invalid" (Roth 1993: 1 78). 
The tension between the Waterside Workers Federation and its member unions 
undoubtedly played a part in the loss of coverage of the off-wharf depots. 
Whereas the three largest port unions opted for direct action, the Federation sought 
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a negotiated settlement (which was in part a result of the links between the 
Federation's executive and the FOL). As we have seen, this settlement did not, in 
the end, work to the advantage of watersiders. But while they may have lost 
coverage of the off-wharf container depots, they did secure LCL work and, as we 
shall see in the next section, they had considerably more success on the wharf. 
(8) The Container Terminals Agreement 
To recap, one of the reasons why the Waterfront Conference did not deal with 
containerization was that a decision to containerize New Zealand's export trade 
using cellular vessels (as opposed to the already existing limited use of 1'0-1'0 
vessels on the trans-Tasman and coastal trade) was not taken until late in the 
piece. Instead a series of discussions and decisions surrounding containerization 
(such as the issue of work coverage at the off-wharf depots) occurred parallel to 
the Waterfront Conference. 
As I noted above, the report of the Molyneaux Committee (which was published 
in 1967) had recommended inter alia the introduction of "a four ship container 
service on the New Zealand I Britain trade" (Hunter 1972:182). However the four 
British Conference Lines did not make a decision to introduce such a service until 
early in 1969. The facilities that were required for cellular (as opposed to ro-ro) 
vessels were costly, including significant capital outlays for quayside container 
cranes. Realistically, given the level of trade, only harbour boards were in a 
position to finance these facilities (see Chapter 8). Thus a decision was made to 
establish common user 'container terminals' within already existing ports. But the 
issue was where these terminals should be established.71 The Molyneaux Report 
71 I will provide only a schematic overview of the developments surrounding the establishment of 
container terminals. For a detailed outline of the sequence of events the reader is directed to Craw 
(1982), who provides an excellent account of the political dimensions to the development of the 
terminals. 
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had recommended Auckland and Wellington, as had a report by an independent 
consulting group (see Craw 1982). However a number of other harbour boards, 
such as Lyttelton and Northland, vied for their ports to be considered as sites for 
container terminals. 
The designation of container terminals was essentially a political decision. 
Government intervention in this area was not unusual for, as Bush points out, 
Transport planning and management had long been political 
footballs and subject to experimental rearrangements. They 
uneasily straddled central and local government. Legislation in 
1968 set up a national Ports Authority to devise an overall 
integrated plan for port development and regulate major projects as 
a counter to unchecked provincialism (1980:52). 
The designation of container terminals was taken by the Ports Authority in concert 
with the Transport Commission, which had been set up in 1965. Craw writes: 
The Transport Commission, in May 1969, advised the Government 
that it accepted in principle the shipping lines' proposal that a 
container service should be provided using terminals at Auckland 
and Wellington. This view was supported by the Ports Authority, 
and in October 1969 the Government confirmed the establishment 
of those ports as New Zealand's initial container terminals 
(1982:98). 
A further terminal was subsequently approved for construction at Port Chalmers, 
in the South Island.72 Construction ofthe terminals began in 1970, and they were 
intended to begin operation in 1971. However an issue that was almost of equal 
importance to the shipping lines' decision to introduce containers, and the 
Government's decision on the site of the terminals, was the terms on which work 
would be conducted within the tetminals. 
72 A fourth container tenninal was established, at the Port ofLyttelton, in 1976. 
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As Finlay (1988:69) observes, in the waterfront industry generally there are no 
'greenfield sites' because of the 'spatial fix' that ports are subject to. However, 
containerization has the potential to alter this fixity, by allowing for the 
'segmentation' of the labour process, and its displacement outside of ports (i.e. the 
issue of off-wharf depots which I dealt with above). But it also raises the 
possibility of new sites using container technology. For instance, in Britain 
containerization resulted in the flourishing of container ports, such as Felixstowe, 
which operated outside of the National Dock Labour Scheme (see Turnbull et al. 
1992:67-71). However this did not occur in New Zealand. Because of the legally 
underpinned institutional arrangements, and the fact that container terminals were 
being established within already existing ports, new sites could not be established 
outside of the bureau system and I or coverage of the watersiders' unions. Thus 
container technology was deployed across an already existing system of labour 
administration, one in which the port unions and their Federation had considerable 
industrial strength. What did happen however was that, for industrial purposes, 
container terminals were regarded as 'ports within ports'. In effect, they were 
'legal fictions' which were subject to a national agreement separate from the 
General Principal Order. Under this agreement the nature of the workforce and 
the terms and conditions of work differed substantially from those on the 
conventional wharves. 
The negotiations which secured this agreement were entirely separate from, and 
later than, those at the Waterfront Conference for GPO 305. Also, they did not 
involve the Port Employers Association. The operators of the new terminals were 
Harbour Boards, with the exception of Wellington where a consortium of shipping 
companies operated the terminal on lease from the Wellington Harbour Board. 
The terminal operators formed the Container Terminal Operators Association and 
in industrial negotiations were represented by this organization, rather than the 
Port Employers Association (see Chapter 9). 
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The negotiations began in late 1970 regarding the terms for working cellular 
container ships at the new terminals, which were due to commence operation in 
1971. But prior to these negotiations there had been a series of discussions which 
involved the Federation of Labour in order to deal with the issue of demarcation. 
Because harbour boards were the employers in the container terminals, harbour 
workers had a legitimate claim at least to some of the work within the terminals. 
In order to achieve an agreement between the Harbour Workers Union and the 
Waterside Workers Federation, the Government, shipowners and the terminal 
operators sought the involvement of the FOL. This approach was accepted by the 
two unions, and the FOL decided that the terminals should be manned by a 
'composite workforce' of waterside workers and harbour workers. This decision 
was accepted as a principle by the two unions, but the issue in dispute was the 
precise ratio of water siders to harbour workers. Ted Thompson, who had been the 
Assistant General Secretary of the Waterside Workers Federation at the time, 
commented that: 
My demand to the FOL executive was one in ten. And Skinner and 
I, at that time I'd been a member of the FOL for a number of years, 
and on waterfront matters of course I'd be Tom's advisor. But at 
the same time, as Knox and Skinner said, there's got to be a bit of 
equilibrium here. And they would go along with the principle but 
they brought down to the executive a recommendation that in fact it 
should be ... six wharfies, one harbour board employee. And that 
was accepted, passed on to the employers, who accepted it too. 
(Interview) 
There were, however, a number of other issues in dispute. Significantly, the 
container terminal operators wanted a permanently employed workforce, whereas 
the Waterside Workers Federation insisted upon the principle of worker rotation. 
Similarly manning scales, wage rates, hours of work, along with other terms and 
conditions, were also in dispute. 
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These disputes could not be settled before the terminals actually began operation, 
and when the first cellular container ship (the 'Columbus New Zealand') arrived 
in New Zealand in June 1971 there was no agreement for it to be worked under. 
At each of the three container terminals it was "worked on an interim basis under 
the provisions of General Principal Order 305" while negotiations proceeded 
(WIC Report 1971: 19). However, as a Commission Report noted, when 
the second such ship, Act III, arrived on 19 August a final 
settlement had not been reached. The employers' and unions' 
representatives had met to negotiate an agreement on the day prior 
to the vessel's arrival, but they did not reach an agreement then; nor 
later when the negotiations continued over the weekend. Work was 
only finally begun on 24 August after the Minister of Labour had 
told officials of the waterside workers' union and of the harbour 
board employees' union that special legislation would be 
introduced if the ship was not worked. The ship was then worked 
under the provisions of General Principal Order 305. Subsequent 
ships have also worked under this order, on an interim basis, while 
negotiations continued until, having reached a stalemate, the matter 
was referred to arbitration (WIC Report 1971:19). 
It was under the threat of decisive Government intervention that the unions were 
forced into arbitration over the matter. However this could not be done through 
the usual channels. The issues in dispute could not be settled by the Waterfront 
Industry Tribunal because they involved harbour workers (who were outside of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction). Equally, the Arbitration Court (the body that the harbour 
workers were subject to) could not decide on the matter because it involved 
watersiders. Furthermore, as Ted Thompson (the former Assistant General 
Secretary of the Waterside Workers Federation) commented in an interview I 
conducted with him, neither the Federation's officials or the employers wanted the 
matter to be decided by the Tribunal because they considered that Judge Archer 
was "too traditional" - particularly in dealing with the unprecedented issues 
surrounding the operation of the container terminals. 
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The solution adopted, which was initiated by the Government, was to appoint an 
independent arbitrator to give a firm decision on the issues in dispute. In 
appointing the arbitrator the then Minister of Labour, Jack Marshall, gave Ted 
Thompson (who was to represent the Federation at the arbitration hearings) a list 
of arbitrators, any of whom the employers would accept. Ted told me that one of 
the names caught his eye immediately, that of Ronald Davison, an Auckland 
Queen's Counsel, who he knew of through a prior dispute involving the Seaman's 
Union (Ted was an ex-seaman). Ted regarded Davison as being not 
unsympathetic to trade unions, and selected him. 
Extensive submissions were heard by Davison from each of the two unions and 
the Container Terminal Operators before he gave his decision, which was issued 
on 16 December 1971. It set out in detail the terms and conditions of work and 
became the agreement that the terminals were worked under. The most important 
features of the decision were as follows. First and foremost, it established the 
composite workforce at a ratio of six watersiders to one harbour worker (as 
previously decided by the FOL and agreed upon between the unions and the 
container terminal operators). Work coverage was such that the composite 
workforce would be integrated and do all work, except the driving of portainer 
cranes (which was to be performed by harbour workers) and ship's gantry cranes 
(which was to be performed by waterside workers). Significantly, it also 
established the principle of worker rotation, rather than a permanent workforce 
(which the employers had wanted), albeit for a six month term of engagement 
(which was slightly longer than the unions had sought). The decision also 
established a system of shift work, with two shifts and an optional third extra shift. 
The main issues in dispute regarding hours of work were work on weekends and 
public holidays, and the working of a third shift - neither of which the unions 
wanted to be compulsory. While Davison granted "employers the right to require 
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work after 12 midday Saturday, Sunday and Holidays", the third shift was to be 
worked only with agreement of the unions.73 The decision also specified all rates 
of pay, which in most cases were set at an intermediate figure approximately 
halfway between the claims of the employers and those of the unions. And it 
established an 'equity payment' of $0.20 per full container load, which the unions 
had wanted (albeit at only 20% of the rate they sought) to compensate for loss of 
work in packing and unpacking these containers, which was performed at off-
wharf sites. 
The attitude of the Waterside Workers Federation's officials to the decision was 
mixed. President Ray Fergus commented at the Federation's conference in 1972 
that: 
Although the final document handed down by Mr Davison gave us 
little in regard to the very important claims we had made, most 
importantly it did not surrender any of our basic conditions which 
the Employers sought to wrest from US. 74 
Indeed it appears that the Federation's officials were satisfied with all but the 
decisions on manning scales, hours of work and some aspects of pay rates. 
However, if the watersiders' representatives were dissatisfied with some aspects of 
the decision, the employers were even more so with the decision as a whole. 
According to Ted Thompson the Container Terminal Operators were aghast at the 
decision, and asked if he would keep it quiet so that they could further consider it. 
Ted said that his response was a short and simple "get stuffed" (interview). As we 
shall see in later chapters, the terms of the agreement provided a platform for 
subsequent claims by the Federation which resulted in substantially improved 
terms and conditions of work in the terminals. 
73 Decision and Award of Arbitrator, 16/12171, Clause 4. 
74Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 16/10/72. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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In summary, I noted above the potential of container technology to erode the 
control that unions exert over the labour market, occupational boundaries and 
work coverage, through the establishment of new (possibly 'greenfield') sites of 
work. However this did not occur in New Zealand. New sites were established in 
the form of container terminals, 'legal fictions' that were designated as separate 
areas of work. However, they were established as much on the unions' terms as 
the employers. In many respects, the container terminals agreement, which 
established a composite workforce, was as much of a watershed as the (much 
disputed) GPO 305, the main outcome of the Waterfront Conference, which 
introduced 'permanent employment' on the conventional wharves. 
With respect to the approach of the Waterside Workers Federation to containers, 
there were considerable similarities to how technological change had been dealt 
with previously. The similarities centered on the preparedness of individual port 
unions to dispute the terms on which new technology was introduced, and then the 
Federation submitting to the decision of an arbitrator, albeit under strong pressure 
from the Government (including a threat to change the law). Although this 
approach was in large part responsible for watersiders losing coverage of off-
wharf container depots, the Federation had more success on the wharf via the 
container terminals agreement - although partly through a quirk of circumstance 
surrounding the appointment of the arbitrator. Similarly, while the Federation was 
unable to establish container-handling rights outside the wharves, through the 
container terminals agreement it was able to secure an 'equity payment' to 
watersiders for all FCLs handled at container terminals to compensate for work 
lost. 
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(9) Conclusion 
In this chapter I have dealt with the process of technological change on the 
waterfront. There were elements both of continuity and discontinuity throughout 
this process, from when self-propelled mechanical equipment was introduced in 
the 1950s through until containerization in the early 1970s. The continuities 
centered primarily on the decentralized approach of the watersiders' national 
organization to defending occupational boundaries and gang manning levels. Like 
pre-container technological change, containerization was initially introduced in a 
piecemeal way by the employers, and dealt with in a similar way by watersiders' 
local unions. 
The discontinuities centered on the fact that, unlike the earlier round of 
technological change, containerization radically disrupted jurisdictional 
boundaries by shifting work beyond the port. The unitization of cargo facilitated 
the segmentation of the labour process and its spatial displacement. Combined 
with a union coverage system that provided the basis for claims to jurisdiction for 
Storemen and Packers, containerization opened up a new era in which on and off 
port issues had to be resolved. Nonetheless, as before, the disputes that resulted 
were resolved through arbitration. Ultimately, this produced the watershed 
container terminal agreement which was settled in 1971. 
In many respects, this latter industrial agreement was of equal significance to the 
GPO. In the post-container period, therefore, there was not one but rather two key 
national agreements. However, the organization on the employers' side that was 
involved in negotiating the container terminal agreement was the Container 
Terminal Operators Association, and not the Port Employers Association. This 
emergence of this new employers' organization, in tum, was a result of the 
differentiation of corporate actors which accompanied the process of 
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containerization. This development will be addressed in the following chapter, 
which examines the effects of the bureau system of labour administration upon 
firms. 
CHAPTER 8 : FIRMS AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
The extent of vertical integration and the reasons for the 
persistence of small firms operating through the market are not 
only narrow concerns of industrial organization; they are of 
interest to all students of the institutions of advanced capitalism. 
Mark Granovetter (1992:76). 
(1) Introduction 
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In this chapter I will address the issue of why, in an industry where internationally 
vertical integration has been a key development (particularly after 
containerization), in New Zealand small independent stevedoring companies 
persisted alongside large vertically integrated companies. The argument that I 
develop will initially be framed as a critique of sociological models of the 
relationship between labour markets and firms. In particular, I will reject the 
assumption implicit within this literature that firm size is an independent variable 
in relation to labour market type. 
After demonstrating that firm size was as much a dependent variable during the 
break-bulk era insofar as the bureau system supported small firms by providing 
'labour flexibility', I will then proceed to examine the conditions surrounding the 
emergence of a new type of 'hybrid' small firm in the 1970s. In previous chapters 
I demonstrated how the bureau system of labour administration empowered 
unions, and in this chapter I will argue that the other significant unintended 
consequence of this system was that it secured the existence of small firms. These 
effects of the bureau system intersected in the post-container era when a number 
of the port unions became involved in establishing small new entrant stevedoring 
compames. 
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As well as examining the effect of the labour market upon firm size, in this 
chapter I will trace out changing patterns of ownership and control within 
stevedoring generally. Despite the considerable amount of historical research on 
the shipping companies that operated in New Zealand, there has been almost 
nothing written on the corporate actors that were involved in stevedoring. This is 
unusual given that stevedoring is the crucial link between sea and land 
transportation, and this chapter goes some way towards filling this gap in the 
literature. Given the time period covered, like the preceding chapter, it also serves 
as an 'inter-chapter' which links my discussion of the pre- and post-container 
periods. 
(2) The Relationship Between Firm Size and the Labour Market 
Within industrial sociology the relationship between firm size and labour markets 
has typically been understood as being unilinear. As Granovetter (1984:323) 
insightfully observes, within the literature in this field "Workplace size . . . has 
appeared mainly as an independent variable." Granovetter's point also obtains 
with respect to firm size. A good example, which he cites, is the dual labour 
market literature (for reviews, see Hodson and Kaufman 1982; Kalleberg and 
Sorensen 1979). According to studies within this field, large firms in the 
industrial 'core' create internal labour markets characterized by job security and 
high wages, whereas workers in peripheral small firms occupy a secondary labour 
market which is characterized by insecure and unstable forms of employment and 
lower wages (Edwards 1975; Piore 1971; Wilkinson 1981). 
This approach is also present within the sociology of organizations, with respect to 
organizational size. In an exhaustive review of the literature, Kimberly 
(1976:579) found that: "Among those studies that have examined the causal status 
of [organizational] size, the largest number see size as exogenous, that is, as 
318 
causing other variables to assume particular values". The dual labour market 
literature can be read as one particular case of regarding organizational "size as an 
exogenous variable" (ibid), with respect to the effects of one type of organization 
(firms) upon one set of variables (labour market structure). 
Another good example of the implicit assumptions about firm size which 
characterize the sociological literature generally is Fligstein and Fernandez's 
model of labour markets, which I critically utilized in the analysis of employment 
relations in Chapter 4. For Fligstein and Fernandez (1988), firm size is an 
independent variable in relation to the organization of the labour market. Large 
firms are assumed to exert greater control over the demand for labour than small 
firms, which translates into greater control over bargaining processes and 
outcomes. Depending on the strength of worker organization, the existence of 
"large [firms] with high degrees of market power" results, in tum, either in 
'contested' labour markets (in the context of a strong unions) or firm-internal 
labour markets (in the context of weak unions) (ibid: 16). Small firms, on the 
other hand, yield 'worker-controlled' or 'competitive' labour markets respectively. 
In this chapter I will argue that these assumptions about firm size do not hold with 
respect to the relationship between firms and labour markets on the waterfront in 
New Zealand. In the discussion of employment relations (in Chapter 4) I pointed 
to some of the ways in which the bureau system eliminated firm size as an 
independent variable. For example, in negotiations over register strengths which 
regulated the size of the labour supply large and small firms alike (despite their 
different labour requirements) had to cooperate in, and externalize decision-
making to, the Port Employers Association. In this chapter I will extend this 
argument by demonstrating that, far from being an independent variable, there is a 
strong sense in which firm size was actually a dependent variable in relation to the 
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labour market - dependent on the occupational registration system that the labour 
market was organized around. 
In the third and fourth sections of the chapter I show that, historically, small 
stevedoring firms co-existed alongside large vertically-integrated companies. I 
will argue that the bureau system provided space for small firms by abrogating the 
economies of scale associated with employing labour in an otherwise labour 
intensive industry. The system of labour administration, by guaranteeing a supply 
of labour, relieved firms of the need to permanently employ watersiders. This 
system, in tum, provided space for small firms operating on insecure or short-term 
contracts in markets where labour costs would otherwise have been prohibitive. In 
the case studies in the last section of the chapter, I will show that not having to 
employ an operational workforce meant that small companies could be set up 
relatively cheaply. But before engaging in these tasks, it is necessary to identifY 
the role of the private firms that engaged in stevedoring, relative to New Zealand's 
port authorities, in providing the services at the heart of the industry. 
(3) Harbour Boards and the Corporate 'Division of Labour' 
The waterfront can be regarded as a 'distributive' service industry (Gershuny and 
Miles 1983:13). The services that form the core ofthe industry involve the spatial 
displacement, arrangement and storage of cargo carried aboard ships. The two 
main types of services are wharfingering which comprises the receival and 
delivery, marshalling, and storage of cargo within ports, and stevedoring which is 
the transfer of cargo from the ship to the wharf and vice-versa.) These services, in 
I Both types of work are also embedded within a broader network of activities which mayor may 
not be located within the spatial confines of a port. These activities include: freight forwarding (the 
consolidation of small and diverse cargoes from a number of shippers); customs broking; shipping 
agency; hire and maintenance of cargo-handling equipment and vehicles; and container hire, 
cleaning and repair. They also include the services associated with the vessels that carry the cargo; 
for instance, guiding ships into port and out to sea, and maintaining and servicing them while in 
port. 
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turn, are based on the provision and maintenance of what Turnbull and Wass 
(1994:7) respectively term port superstructure (cargo-handling equipment, such as 
shore-based winches, and storage facilities) and port infrastructure in the form of 
wharves, docking facilities and so forth. 
These general observations, however, provide no indication of the types of 
organizations that provide these core services. Different types of agencies, 
whether publicly or privately owned, may be involved in the provision of port 
infrastructure, superstructure and the core services of wharfingering and 
stevedoring. Although they are usually provided either by port authorities, 
shipping companies and stevedoring companies, or some combination of these 
organizations, the 'institutional mix' differs both within and between port systems. 
Turnbull and Wass (1994) have provided a useful framework for categorizing the 
involvement of port authorities in these areas: 
PORT AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES 
PORT TYPE Infrastructure Superstructure Stevedoring 
Landlord + 
Tool + + 
Service + + + 
Source: Turnbull and Wass (1994:9) 
In New Zealand the functional equivalent of port authorities were (until they were 
'corporatized' in 1989) the harbour boards. As Bush (1980:103) points out, "The 
actual management of ports is one of the oldest local authority functions in New 
Zealand." Harbour boards were special purpose (or ad hoc) "elected local 
authorities" (MOT 1984:152).2 The majority of harbour boards were created in 
2 Bush notes that harbour boards had an "unusual and vaJying hybrid system of representation" 
which included ratepayers, local councils, shipowners, and even union representatives (1980:26-7). 
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the 1870s by a series of Acts of Parliament to administer and maintain ports 
throughout the country. Bush writes that: 
Harbour Boards may construct and maintain port works and 
provide machines and cranes for loading and discharging goods. 
They may also provide ancillary services such as tugs, dredges and 
pilots (1980:22). 
Prior to containerization, the majority of harbour boards did not provide 
wharfingering and stevedoring services. 
Most of New Zealand's ports, as in Britain (see Turnbull and Wass 1994:9), were 
'tool ports' insofar as harbour boards provided and maintained both the 
infrastructure of ports and cargo-handling equipment. Harbour boards owned and 
operated fixed items such as wharf-based cranes and shed-cranes which were hired 
to companies, and in the majority of ports, the mobile equipment used on the 
wharf (such as forklifts, tractors and, in some ports, even handbarrows) was itself 
provided by or hired from the local harbour board. There were also some ports 
(Tauranga, Wanganui and Whangarei, for instance) where the harbour board 
provided cranes and only some of the mobile cargo handling equipment used on 
the wharf. At others, as in the case of the Port of Otago, most of the mobile 
equipment used both on the ship and the shore was supplied by private companies 
rather than the harbour board. In general, however, the equipment provided within 
ports by the shipping companies and stevedoring companies was limited to mobile 
equipment (such as forklifts, conveyors and so forth) used aboard ships.3 
However this system was rationalized in 1950 by the Harbours Act which "abolished all sectional 
representation" (ibid:27). 
3 The material in this paragraph is derived from the Ministry of Transport's Onshore Costs Study 
(1984: 161-4) and a New Zealand Transport Commission report published in 1967 which is entitled 
New Zealand Ports: A Statistical and General Description. Hereafter this latter report will be 
referred to as 'NZTC'. 
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Some harbour boards did carry out wharfingering. A notable example is the Port 
of Nelson where, since 1921, the harbour board provided a full wharfingering 
service. William Parr, a former General Manager and the author of a history of the 
Nelson Harbour Board, explains why this service was provided: 
the Harbour Board felt that wharfingering was an essential work 
best handled by an independent body whose sole concern was the 
giving of efficient service to the public at the lowest possible cost. 
Any other system would have led to confusion by reason of the fact 
that ships of different companies discharged their cargoes into the 
same wharf shed and from which deliveries often took some days 
to complete. Under such circumstances the Board felt that it was 
undesirable for anyone company to have control of the wharf shed 
or, indeed, to have the cargo handled in publicly owned sheds by 
any private organization (Parr 1979:56). 
But only a handful of other harbour boards provided such a service. The main 
ones were the boards which administered the ports of Wellington, Napier and 
Bluff (NZTC 1967). However, the service at Napier was for discharged cargo 
only, and the Wellington Harbour Board ceased all wharfingering operations early 
in 1966 (Parr 1979:63). Similarly, the situation at the Port of Bluff was somewhat 
exceptional because of the nature of harbour board which administered it: 
In some ways the Southland Board is not typical because its 1958 
Empowering Act specifically designates it as a wharfingering and 
stevedoring board. The Board exercises its powers under this Act 
by formally licensing stevedoring companies in the port for two-
year periods at a nominal fee (MOT 1984:162). 
Where a wharfingering service was provided by a harbour board, stevedoring 
firms usually took control of cargo at 'the hook'. Harbour boards usually only 
retained watersiders from the labour bureaux in such cases, all other work being 
performed by their own employees, the harbour workers. For example, the Nelson 
Harbour Board retained nine-man gangs of watersiders from the local bureau to 
perfOlID the work on the wharf (i.e. loading and unloading slings, and moving 
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cargo to and from sheds) (Parr 1979:58). Conversely, where stevedoring firms 
performed wharfingering, they were responsible from the receival and delivery 
phase (although the harbour boards often provided sheds and other storage 
facilities ).4 
In the context of New Zealand's occupationally-based union and award system, 
the existence of harbour boards gave rise to a bifurcated workforce and union 
structure on the waterfront. When harbour boards provided - either by hiring or 
leasing - cargo-handling equipment (such as forklifts), they also usually supplied 
harbour workers as drivers. Conversely, when companies provided this equipment 
it was usually driven by watersiders. There was, however, at least one exception 
to this practice in that the Marlborough Harbour Board hired forklifts to 
stevedoring companies at the Port of Picton but these were operated by watersiders 
(NZTC 1967:306). Variations in these practices were the source of numerous 
'demarcation' disputes in the 1960s (see Chapter 7). 
While harbour boards provided a wharfingering service at a few ports, they did not 
really approximate the 'service port' model because (with a few minor exceptions) 
harbour boards were generally not involved in stevedoring, prior to 
containerization. The issue of why harbour boards were not involved III 
stevedoring is a complex one. In part, it was the result of a traditional 'division of 
labour' between harbour boards and firms which evolved over time in the context 
of particular constituencies of port users, and differences in the commercial 
outlook of the harbour boards themselves. 
41t should also be noted that at 'railway ports' the Railways Department operated the marshalling 
service; in these cases they retained labour from the bureau for the 'rail side' (and at some ports, 
such as Lyttelton, there were separate registers for the rail side men). However this arrangement 
ended with the abolition of the railway ports in 1955. 
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The harbour boards' principal source of income was from port charges such as 
pilotage, towage and wharfage, and most harbour boards were content to allow 
privately owned shipping companies and stevedoring companies to provide 
stevedoring services. Nonetheless, the boards did have an interest in the efficiency 
of the wharfingering and stevedoring service offered by firms within their 
jurisdiction. The Ministry of Transport, which solicited the opinions of harbour 
board executive members for its 1984 Onshore Costs Study, reported that they 
expressed concern over the efficiency of firms within their respective ports insofar 
as it affected the viability of the port as a whole: 
The boards take the view that service to ship operators and shippers 
is paramount, and many would be willing to undertake stevedoring 
themselves if the private companies did not provide a particular 
necessary service, or did not provide it at a reasonable price. They 
are somewhat suspicious of stevedoring companies in many 
instances, and . . . [claim] that a number of stevedoring companies 
have little capital invested and therefore little incentive to take a 
long-term responsible approach to the industry (MOT 1984:162). 
Although this study was conducted after containerization, undoubtedly this view 
also characterized harbour boards in the break-bulk period. Indeed, as I noted 
above, it was efficiency considerations that were largely responsible for the 
decision of the Nelson Harbour Board to provide a wharfingering service. 
However the non-involvement of harbour boards in stevedoring was not merely a 
result of the perceived efficiency of the companies that provided this service, but 
also of resistance by shipping and stevedoring companies to the entry of the boards 
into this field. The Port Employers Association's annual report for 1959 indicates 
that harbour boards met strong opposition from the PEA regarding their attempts 
to enter stevedoring. Although there was nothing in the Harbours Act to prevent 
harbour boards acting as stevedores, a number of them sought to be legislatively 
granted the specific right to do so. By 1959 the Lyttelton, Taranaki, Timaru and 
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Tauranga harbour boards had been granted this right, but none had used it. 
Although the PEA sought to keep harbour boards out of stevedoring, it did not 
object to them licensing stevedoring companies. Some harbour boards 
subsequently obtained the right to license stevedoring companies that operated 
within their ports, but only one or two ports actually used this power: the 
Southland Harbour Board (which was referred to above) and the Bay of Plenty 
Harbour Board (MOT 1984:33). 
Thus, in the break-bulk era, the involvement of harbour boards in stevedoring was 
negligible. The situation at the Port of Nelson, where the harbour board was the 
"largest single employer of watersiders" (Parr 1979:59), was the exception. In an 
interview with a former manager of a harbour board at one of the main ports I was 
told that, before the container terminals were established, a typical response from 
watersiders to an inquiry as to the identity of the Harbour Board Manager would 
have been "who's he?". In this period, there was a stable blend of public and 
private provision of infrastructure, superstructure, and services which conformed 
to the 'tool port' model. Even after containerization the only harbour boards that 
engaged in stevedoring were those at three of the four ports where container 
terminals were established (see below). 
With harbour boards removed from the field of stevedoring, three other corporate 
actors were left: shipping companies, specialist stevedores that were subsidiaries 
of shipping companies, and 'independent' stevedoring companies which 
contracted for work from shipping companies. In the following section I will trace 
out the main companies within each of these categories. I will demonstrate that 
small firms had always coexisted alongside large ones and, moreover, that even 
with the (albeit uneven) trend towards vertical integration following 
containerization, small firms persisted and even increased in number. But before 
doing so, a brief comment on the sources I have used is in order. 
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Unlike the meat industry, for instance, where all companies had to be licensed (see 
Curtis 1996), companies that sought to requisition gangs of watersiders from the 
bureaux did not have to be registered with the Waterfront Industry Commission 
until the Waterfront Industry Act was amended in 1976.5 Nonetheless, some 
indication of the companies that engaged in stevedoring can be gained from the 
Commission's annual reports which list the companies that paid wages through 
the Commission at each port during the period from 1952 until 1969. The 
proportion of wages paid also provides some indication of the size of each 
company in terms oftheir market share.6 Additionally, I have used the following 
sources: interviews with key informants who worked for shipping companies or 
stevedoring companies, ownership searches conducted at the regional offices of 
the Registrar of Companies, published sources (such the 1967 Transport 
Commission report), the New Zealand Shipping Directory (an advertising 
publication), company annual reports, as well as published histories of shipping 
companies. 
I must stress, however, that the analysis which follows is based on incomplete 
information and thus I do not claim to have achieved total accuracy. Rather it is 
the best approximation that can be made given limited and fragmentary source 
material. Nonetheless, it represents the first systematic attempt to trace out 
patterns of ownership and control within New Zealand's waterfront industry. 
These patterns are presented schematically in Appendix 1. 
5 Until 1976 any company could requisition labour from the bureau. However the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1976 made it mandatory for companies to be registered with the Commission. In 
practice, the criterion for registration that the companies in question employed foremen-stevedores 
and thus had the ability to exercise supervision over gangs of water siders (see Chapter 10). 
6 Turkington (1976:224-5) makes the same point, but engages only in a very brief comparison of 
wages paid by some companies. 
(4) The Evolution of Stevedoring Companies 1950-65 
Anything to do with loading ships is a very, very labour intensive 
job. It involves a lot of people in an endless chain starting right 
out at the farmer's gate all the way down the line until the stuff is 
finally aboard the ship and the ship has sailed Now its been long 
recognized . . . that a tremendous amount of power lies in the 
hands of those who can control that chain at any given point . ... 
As a result of that, a large number of people in the chain have 
always wanted to be involved in stevedoring because they see 
stevedoring as a direct link in that power game. It has long been 
recognized by anyone who knows anything about it at all that there 
is no money in stevedoring. No matter how you go about it you're 
unlikely to make much money. You're very likely to lose a lot, but 
you're very unlikely to make a lot. So that begs the question, 
doesn't it, why do all the big people want to get into stevedoring? 
And the reason, of course, is simple: he who controls stevedoring is 
in the most powerful position in the chain. 
Interview. 
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The preceding quotation, which I have extracted from an interview with the 
former manager of a stevedoring company, illustrates the centrality of stevedoring 
within the field of maritime transportation. As I mentioned in the previous 
section, in New Zealand three main types of companies engaged in stevedoring: 
shipping companies with their own stevedoring department; stevedoring 
companies which were subsidiaries of shipping companies; and 'independent' 
stevedoring companies. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, a reasonably stable 
split in the provision of stevedoring existed between these types of companies. 
The shipping companies that carried out their own stevedoring can be grouped 
into large overseas companies which operated at most ports throughout New 
Zealand, and small coastal companies which operated at just a few ports. Overall, 
the largest 'employers' of water siders were the large, vertically integrated shipping 
companies which had their own stevedoring departments.7 Of these, the New 
7 I am using the term 'vertically integrated' here to refer to the fact that these companies had their 
own stevedoring department or division. In so doing, I am following other writers who also use the 
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Zealand-based Union Stearn Ship Company paid the greatest proportion of wages 
(consistently more than 20% from 1953 to 1963). This company was well-
established in New Zealand, having originally been formed in Dunedin in 1875, 
although in 1917 it had been taken over by the Peninsular and Oriental Stearn 
Navigation Company of Britain (McLaughlin 1987). During the 1950s and 1960s 
the company's main primary operations were the Australasian coastal and trans-
Tasman trades (Trace 1992:92).8 Shaw Savill and Albion and the New Zealand 
Shipping Company, two of the British Conference Lines, also did their own 
stevedoring at the majority of ports. These three companies were represented at 
most ports and were consistently the largest 'employers' of waterfront labour. 
During the years from 1953 until 1965, they collectively accounted for not less 
than 45% of the total wages paid through the Waterfront Industry Commission 
(see Graph 8.1). 
However, New Zealand has always had a considerable 'coastal trade' (see Ville 
1993). Indeed, as I noted in Chapter 3, the PEA was fundamentally split between 
the overseas shipowners and the coastal shipping companies (whose interests often 
did not coincide). Many of the coastal shipping companies, which were generally 
much smaller than their overseas counterparts, also did their own stevedoring at 
their few ports of call. These companies included Richardson and Company, 
Anchor Shipping and Foundry, the Holm Shipping Cbmpany, Geo. H. Scales and 
the Canterbury Steam Ship Company.9 To be sure, some of these companies did 
do 'outside' stevedoring work. For instance, in the mid-1960s, Richardson's 
stevedored Anchor Company vessels and two Japanese lines at the Port of Napier, 
term in this restricted fashion (see Finlay 1988; Trace 1992). Strictly speaking, vertical integration 
can extend much further along the chain of transportation (see Casson 1986). 
8 While he Union Steam Ship Company did do stevedoring for other companies at a handful of 
ports (e.g. Timaru) in the mid-1960s, its stevedoring department catered primarily for the 
Company's own vessels. A former senior manager with the Company, David Graham, (who is 
quoted later in the chapter) described it as an 'in-house' stevedoring operation. 
9 There are business histories of the following coastal shipping companies: Geo. H. Scales Ltd 
(Coveney 1972); Anchor Shipping and Foundry Company (Kirk 1967); Holm Shipping Company 
(Kirk 1975); Northern Steam Ship Company (Furniss 1977). 
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the Canterbury Steam Ship Company did all of the stevedoring at the small port of 
Wanganui, and Holm Shipping worked Danish vessels at Lyttelton (NZTC 
1967:382). However these companies, like their overseas counterparts, generally 
did not contract for outside stevedoring work. At some ports (such as Timaru) 
they contracted out their own stevedoring. 
A number of the larger shipping companies also had substantial shareholdings in, 
or completely owned, stevedoring companies. These subsidiary firms typically did 
the work of their parent shipping companies and often contracted for outside work 
as well. Kinsey and Company at the Port of Lyttelton is a good example. 
Although it had originally been formed as an independent stevedoring company 
(see below), in 1955 it was taken over by Port Line (one ofthe British Conference 
Lines). A significant development amongst the subsidiary firms occurred in 1964 
when the four Conference Lines formed a national stevedoring firm. 1 0 It was 
called the New Zealand Stevedoring and Wharfingering Company and was jointly 
owned by Shaw Savill and Albion, Blue Star Line, Port Line, and the New 
Zealand Shipping Company. This marked the formation of the first national 
specialist stevedoring company. Although it primarily did work for the 
Conference Lines, it also contracted for some stevedoring work outside the Lines. 
The independent stevedoring companies were generally smaller firms which were 
based at only one or two ports. As Chen and Hambrick (1995:454) point out, "A 
firm can be considered small in two different but related ways - in terms of sheer 
organizational size or in terms of its industry market share." The stevedoring 
companies in question were, in general, small in terms of organizational size and 
most definitely in terms of their market share. Using the proportion of wages paid 
as an index of market share, they included companies such as Despatch 
IO The company was fonned in response to a recommendation of the 1964 'Streamlining Report', 
that the Conference Lines amalgamate their stevedoring operations. 
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Stevedoring and Agency Company which operated in the mid-1950s and 
accounted for only 0.3% and 0.1% of total wages paid through the Commission in 
1955 and 1956 respectively. Others included Leonard and Dingley, an Auckland-
based firm which also did work at Whangarei, Mount Maunganui and Tauranga 
Stevedores (at the Port of Tauranga) , Pufiett and Smith at the Port of Napier, D.C. 
Turnbull and Co. and H.J.R. Somerville at Timaru, and Keith Ramsay Limited at 
Dunedin. In each of the years from 1953 to 1963, these latter four companies 
together accounted for not more than 1.5% of total wages paid through the 
Commission. 
Most ports had at least one small independent company. Until the late 1960s, the 
typical pattern at each ofthe larger ports was for there to be branches of the Union 
Steam Ship Company, the Conference Lines or subsidiaries of these lines, the 
coastal companies, and a smaller independent stevedoring company which 
survived on the 'leftovers' of stevedoring work. These latter companies were 
owned by interests with no particular links or ties to shipping companies, but 
rather were established as independent stevedoring contractors. For instance, 
Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores was established by Robert Owens 
(the founder of the Owens Group of companies) in the late 1950s to capitalize on 
the lucrative export log trade through this port (see below). 
A number of these companies were established early this century by individuals 
who had interests in allied fields (as merchants or shipping agents, for instance). 
Kinsey and Company, for example, was originally founded at the Port of Lyttelton 
in 1913 by Sir Joseph James Kinsey, who was a shipping agent, and was owned by 
Kinsey along with three other businessmen (one of whom was a merchant).ll 
Additionally, some of the independent companies were not exclusively involved in 
11 This company was subsequently taken over by Port Line in 1955. 
331 
stevedoring. A good example is D.C. Turnbull and Company, a firm that was 
formed at Timaru in 1942 by David Clarkson Turnbull, which also acted as a grain 
and produce merchant, a shipping agent and a stock and station agent. Similarly, 
H.J.R. Somerville and Sons, which was formed at Timaru in 1948 by Henry 
Somerville, was also a merchant and a shipping agent. The latter two companies 
were family businesses, and to this day the majority of shares in each are owned 
by members of the original families. 12 
The independent companies worked in the interstices between the large and the 
small shipping companies which did the majority of their own stevedoring, and the 
stevedoring companies which were subsidiaries of shipping companies (such as 
Kinsey's and New Zealand Stevedoring and Wharfingering) that also contracted 
for outside work. As the examples in the following paragraph demonstrate, the 
independent firms generally survived on the work outside both the Conference 
Lines (which either had their own stevedoring department or used subsidiaries) 
and the Union Steam Ship Company. Instead, they did the work of companies that 
only irregularly visited the ports where they were based, or had one or two major 
contracts with other overseas lines (outside of the British Conference) or the small 
coastal companies. 
At the Port of Whangarei in the mid-1960s Leonard and Dingley (one of the 
independent companies) worked vessels other than those of the Union Steam Ship 
Company (which carried out its own stevedoring), bulk fertilizer vessels (which 
were discharged by the British Phosphate Commission) and the four British 
Conference Lines. Of these latter, Port Line and Blue Star vessels were worked by 
the Auckland Stevedoring Company and Shaw Savill and Albion, and the New 
Zealand Shipping Company's vessels were worked by Waitemata Stevedoring 
12 This information was gleaned from the annual returns filed by these companies with the Registrar 
of Companies. 
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(NZTC 1967:28). At the Port of Napier at this time, the British Conference Lines 
were handled by the Napier Stevedoring Company which also worked some 
Dutch, French and German vessels (ibid: 186). The Union Company stevedored its 
own vessels, as did the British Phosphate Commission. Richardson and Company 
also worked its own ships as well as those of the Anchor Shipping and Foundry 
Company and two Japanese Lines (ibid: 186). All other stevedoring, however, was 
performed by Puflett and Smith (an independent company). Similarly, the 
independent companies at the Port of Timaru did the work outside of the main 
lines (the Conference Lines and the Union Company, that is). D.C. Turnbull 
worked the vessels of the Canterbury Steam Ship Company and the Northern 
Steam Ship Company, as well as those of the Japan Line. H.J.R. Somerville and 
Sons worked Nedlloyd Lines, Chandris Line, Columbus Line and Holm Shipping 
Company vessels. And Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedoring, which also 
operated at this port, did the stevedoring for two Japanese lines (ibid:412). 
Thus, throughout this period (1950-65), small independent companies persisted 
alongside the large companies which were involved in stevedoring. The small 
companies often operated on insecure contracts, and there were considerable year-
to-year fluctuations in the amount of work they carried out. Graph 8.2, which 
plots the percentage change in the wages paid each year by three small firms, gives 
some indication of the fluctuations which were characteristic of working 'on the 
margins'. Although the availability of stevedoring work outside the main players 
at most ports was crucial to the success of the small companies, they were only 
able to capitalize upon this 'niche' because of the way that the labour market was 
organized. The fluctuations in business these firms experienced, and the attendant 
fluctuations in their daily labour requirements, were compensated for by the 
'labour flexibility' afforded by the bureau system. 
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Similarly, the involvement in stevedoring of small companies that were not 
specialist stevedoring firms (those that also acted as shipping agents, for instance), 
was supported by these same arrangements. It should also be noted, however, that 
the conditions that allowed small stevedoring companies to flourish also allowed 
the small coastal shipping companies to do their own stevedoring (and thus 
reduced their dependence on independent contractors). At Lyttelton, for instance, 
the Canterbury Steamship Company simply employed one person in the dual role 
of foreman-stevedore and supervisor and requisitioned gangs from the local labour 
bureau when its vessels were in port. 13 
It should be noted that a number of the small independent firms that I mentioned 
above had been established prior to decasualization (e.g. Kinsey and Co., D.C. 
Turnbull and Co., H.J.R. Somerville and Sons and Leonard and Dingley). This is 
because the casual labour market functioned to support small firms in a similar 
way to the bureau system. However the bureau system perpetuated and extended 
the labour market conditions which supported small firms. In some ways the 
bureau system was even more conducive to small firms because a ready supply of 
experienced and skilled labour was always on hand (which could be supplemented 
with casuals in times of labour shortages). Indeed it was easier to procure skilled 
deckmen (winchmen and hatchmen), for instance, through a rule-governed 
requisition system which all companies had to abide by, than through spot-
contracts where large companies would have been able to exercise their market 
power in hiring workers at the 'auction block'. 
Small firms, then, were able to co-exist alongside large vertically integrated firms, 
primarily because they were supported by favourable conditions provided by the 
system of labour administration. The bureau system provided space for small 
13 This detail was revealed in an interview with a foreman, now retired, who used to work for this 
company. 
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firms by abrogating the economies of scale associated with employing labour in an 
otherwise labour intensive industry. The bureau system, in guaranteeing a supply 
of labour for the duration of a job, relieved firms of the need to permanently 
employ watersiders. 14 This system, in turn, provided space for small firms 
operating on short-teilli or insecure contracts in competitive and fluctuating 
(service) product markets where the cost of permanently employing labour would 
otherwise have been prohibitive. In this sense, firm size was a dependent variable 
in relation to the state-regulated labour market. 
Although small firms, like the large ones, were required to pay the National 
Administration Fund levy, this paled in comparison to the cost of permanently 
employing labour. Also, the funding of the bureau system through a national levy 
resulted in the cost of maintaining a ready supply of labour being cross-subsidized 
by the larger firms and busier ports. IS 
As I will demonstrate III the case studies below, not having to employ an 
operational workforce meant that a small stevedoring company could be 
established relatively easily and inexpensively. Until 1976 companies that 
'employed' watersiders did not have to be registered, and could simply hire or 
even borrow gear, while retaining labour from their local labour bureau only when 
they had arranged a job. Not only did companies not require their own mobile 
cargo-handling equipment (which in any case constituted a small proportion of the 
total costs of a break-bulk stevedoring operation), at many ports it could not even 
14 To be sure, there were times of labour shortage when a supply of labour could not be guaranteed. 
But, even then, labour was allocated by the bureaux according to the priorities detennined by the 
local branches of the PEA, which represented both large fInns and small fInns. 
15 Interestingly enough, Turnbull et al. note a similar effect of the system of labour administration 
in Britain: "the NDLS proved to be extremely cost effective for the stevedoring companies. In 
particular, they were able to hire labour for just 4 hours from the NDLB before returning dockers 
to the pool; labour costs, in other words, were almost perfectly variable. Although employers were 
required to fInance the NDLS via a percentage levy on their total wage bill, this did more to cross-
subsidize employment in the industly than it did to provide adequate employment or income 
protection to the dockers. As a result, the NDLS facilitated the survival of a large number of small 
employers who might only un/load a handful of ships every year" (1994:6-7). 
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be used on the wharves because the harbour boards exercised a monopoly on the 
provision of this equipment. 
The bureau system also allowed firms to retain only a nominal presence in ports 
and to bid for contracts alongside the firms which were permanently based there. 
Appendix 1 provides some indication of the prevalence of this practice. The 
Onshore Costs Study states that "it is . . . reasonably common for stevedores to 
handle individual shipments in ports other than those at which they are 
permanently based" (MOT 1984:32). When a contract was secured, a stevedoring 
company would simply send foremen-stevedores to the port, hire equipment, and 
requisition gangs from the local bureau. Companies that engaged in this practice 
were referred to by members of some harbour boards as 'carpet-baggers' 
(ibid: 162). 
Some of the independent stevedoring compames did actually grow in 
organizational size. For example, Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores 
subsequently developed into one of the larger stevedoring companies in the North 
Island; Pufiett and Smith (at the Port of Napier) was also a reasonably large 
operation. However, the majority of independent stevedores continued to operate 
at just one or two ports, and hence in terms of overall market share they were still 
relatively' small' . l6 The first independent stevedoring company that operated on a 
national scale, and captured a significant market share, did not emerge until 
Seaport Operations developed in the mid-1970s. Moreover, throughout the period 
under consideration - even after containerization - there was still space for smaller 
independent firms of the type that will be examined in the case studies below. 
16 For example, in 1966 the proportion of total wages paid through the Waterfront Industry 
Commission by Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores, and Puflett and Smith, was 1.8% and 
0.6% respectively. This is relatively small when compared Union Shipping (the largest company 
involved in stevedoring), which paid 20% of total wages, and the New Zealand Shipping Company 
(the next largest) which paid 11.9% that year. 
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(5) Containerization and the Limits to Vertical Integration 
Changes in patterns of ownership and control from the mid-1960s onwards were 
inextricably intertwined with containerization. In the pre-container era, the large 
shipping companies (such as Union Shipping and the British Conference Lines) 
that carried out their own stevedoring were vertically integrated in this manner for 
reasons other than anything to do with securing a supply of labour (see 
Williamson 1975; Chandler 1977). They had to requisition gangs from the labour 
bureaux just as the small independent stevedores did. As the quotation from a 
manager at the beginning of the preceding section indicates, there always have 
been pressures for shipping companies to control stevedoring. These pressures 
center on the cost of time in port. As Kimeldorfwrites of the break-bulk period in 
America: 
Given the industry's proportionately high level of capital 
investment and fairly uniform labour costs, profit margins were 
largely determined by efficiency in stevedoring operations. The 
length of time a ship was in port, earning no revenues while costly 
dock charges piled up, had to be minimized. A fast 'turnaround' in 
discharging and loading cargo was therefore essential to economic 
survival (1988 :28). 
However these costs, and thus the pressures for vertical integration, were vastly 
increased by containerization. 
Although it was not the first, containerization was the most sophisticated and 
successful of the attempts to standardize cargoes through unitization. This process 
involved: 
the replacement of man-loads by unit-loads of standardized 
dimensions, neutralized characteristics, and weights appropriate for 
the maximum use of mechanical equipment in which units the 
freight could, wherever possible, move from origin to destination 
without the breaking of bulk (Hoyle and Hilling 1984:9).17 
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Containerization had its origins in attempts to reduce the costs of stevedoring, in 
the United States in the 1950s (see Gilman 1986; Bird 1971:107). It was given a 
further impetus in 1965 when the ISO established international standards for 
containers, marking the advent of the 'standardized ISO container' (Bird 
1971: 1 05; Hoyle and Hilling 1984: 10). 
The advantages of containerization inhere in the efficiencies and economies of a 
standardized unit-load. Cellular container ships can carry approximately five 
times more cargo than conventional ships of similar dimensions. Furthermore, 
container vessels are capable of considerably faster transit times than conventional 
cargo vessels. Container technology also significantly increases the amount of 
cargo able to be discharged across the wharf. As Branch (1986:81) notes, it 
affords the "capability of achieving very fast rates of handling associated with a 
high rate of throughput per man, which gives large savings in stevedoring costs." 
Because vessels are faster and achieve higher discharge rates, turnaround times 
(the time needed to load and/or unload the cargo) are significantly reduced. 
However, the pressures for control over stevedoring are heightened by 
containerization. Willman observes that: 
Containerization applies mass-production techniques to goods 
distribution which requires standardization and rapid throughput: 
capacity utilization thus becomes important (1986: 112-3). 
17 Branch (1986:83) states that "The success of the freight container stems from standardization: 
knowledge of the maximum gross weight, the plan dimensions and the disposition of lifting points 
enables handling equipment to be designed largely without reference to the type of cargo and to be 
marketed throughout the world." 
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Not only does containerization make decreases in ship turnaround times possible, 
the capital intensive nature of container shipping necessitates that such decreases 
be made. As Hayut points out: 
Extensive capital investments in ship construction and ... [h]igh 
operational costs of container ships dictate more efficient 
utilization of the vessels than in the past. The emphasis in vessel 
operation is to improve the turnaround time of ships in ports and to 
cut total voyage time by reducing the number of port calls 
(1981:164). 
These features of container operations increase the pressure for vertical 
integration. As Turnbull et al. (1992:61) note, "Vertical integration is claimed to 
be the most important characteristic of containerized traffic". Because of the 
tremendous costs of establishing container operations, and the premium placed on 
ship turnaround time by shipping companies which operate a container service, the 
logical step for shipping companies is to vertically integrate with stevedoring 
companies (i.e. to absorb the latter in the interests of efficiency). Vertical 
integration then proceeds 'backwards' along the transport chain: 
vertical integration . . . takes place as consortia, and indeed 
individual shipping lines, take control of cargo handling operations, 
inland transport forwarding, distribution, and inland container 
depots. It is essential that shipping companies control the port 
interface, especially on deep-sea trade where freight is the most 
significant component of the total transport system (ibid:61). 
And, indeed, vertical integration of this type did in fact occur in Britain and 
America following containerization. In Britain, horizontal and vertical integration 
in the wake of containerization ultimately "led to the emergence of a smaller 
number of very large employers in the 1980s" (ibid:61). Finlay noted a similar 
pattern of vertical integration on the West Coast of the United States. He writes: 
Before the container era, most cargoes were hand-handled as break 
bulk and relations between the steamship lines and the stevedore 
companies were exclusively those of the open market: the 
steamship operator would contract the discharging andlor loading 
of his ship to an independent stevedore, which would then hire the 
necessary longshore labour (Finlay 1987:56). 
Containerization resulted in these relationships being changed considerably: 
After containerization, a number of steamship lines established 
their own stevedore subsidiaries to handle their ships exclusively .. 
. . The steamship lines have decided to reduce delays and mistakes 
by the doing the job themselves instead of contracting to 
independent stevedores (Finlay 1988:71,73).18 
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The impact of containerization on the waterfront industry in New Zealand, 
however, was somewhat different in that vertical integration occurred only 
unevenly. 
In New Zealand, although the rationalization of the industry proceeded, with the 
concentration of capital in larger enterprises, it did so unevenly. In ShOl1, a three-
fold movement occurred: a process of 'vertical disintegration' whereby some of 
the large shipping companies divested themselves of their stevedoring departments 
and subsidiaries (a development that was linked to the establishment of container 
terminals); the continued existence of independent stevedoring companies, 
together with the emergence of two large players within stevedoring (Union 
Shipping and the Owens Group); and instead of small firms disappearing, a new 
type of 'hybrid' small firm emerged, which was based on the labour market 
arrangements generated by the bureau system. I will now sketch in the main 
features of each of these (not unrelated) developments. 
18 However, a principal difference between the two settings following containerization was that in 
Britain capital (and hence employment) was concentrated in port authorities (see Turnbull et al. 
1992:61-2), whereas in America it was concentrated in shipping companies. 
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The process of 'veltical disintegration' occurred as some shipping companies 
divested themselves of their stevedoring departments and subsidiaries. 18 This 
development was linked to the way that container technology was introduced in 
New Zealand, which resulted in the establishment of 'common use' container 
terminals. This, in turn, can be explained in terms of the dynamics of introducing 
a new type of technology within a small (state-regulated) society. In the larger 
ports throughout the world it is not uncommon for shipping companies to own and 
operate, not only container cranes, but entire container terminals (see Branch 
1986: 115). However in New Zealand the level of trade was such that, in general, 
it was not economical for shipping companies to have their own dedicated 
container cranes and facilities. 
Regulation by the New Zealand Transport Commission and the Ports Authority 
meant that the establishment of container terminals was the result of a planned, 
centralized decision-making process (see Craw 1982). To be sure, once the sites 
of the four container terminals were confirmed, shipping companies were given 
the opportunity to establish and operate the terminals. 19 For instance, the 
Lyttelton Harbour Board invited shipping companies to set up the container 
terminal at Lyttelton, but they declined. The only port where shipping companies 
(through a consortium) were prepared to meet the cost of operating a terminal was 
Wellington. There the terminal was leased from the Wellington Harbour Board by 
Container Terminals Limited, whose majority shareholder was the Shipping 
Corporation of New Zealand "with the balance of shares held by the principal 
shipping line users" (New Zealand Ports Authority 1981 :54). At the other three 
ports (Auckland, Lyttelton and Port Chalmers), however, the harbour boards 
established the terminals. This was facilitated by the ability of the harbour boards 
18 POI' an indication of the extent of this process, see Appendix 1. 
19 The decision to establish a container terminal at each of the four ports in question was made in 
the following years: Auckland and Wellington (1969), Port Chalmers (1970), Lyttelton (1975). The 
terminals at the fonner three ports began operation in 1971, and the tenninal at Lyttelton began 
operation in 1976. 
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to finance container facilities through having access to special local government 
loans (see Bush 1980). 
The establishment of container terminals marked the partial shift of three of the 
main ports, where harbour boards owned and operated container terminals, from 
'tool ports' to 'service ports'. As the Onshore Costs Study (MOT 1984:38) noted, 
"Each separate container terminal operator provides all of the cargo-handling 
equipment (although at Wellington the harbour board hires the cranes to the ship 
operator or his agent), and no private stevedore works in the terminals." Although 
the three harbour boards in question both provided the equipment and carried out 
the stevedoring within the container terminals, private stevedores continued to 
perform the stevedoring on the conventional wharves at these ports. In this 
respect, they continued to be 'tool ports'. 
Each of the container terminals were operated as facilities that could be used by 
the various shipping companies which visited the ports. This 'common-use' 
philosophy was particularly strong. For example, the Auckland terminal, like the 
Wellington terminal, was originally managed by a group of shipping companies 
(Associated Container Transportation, Columbus Line, and Farrell Lines) through 
Maritime Services Ltd (Transportant 1972:175). However this arrangement "led 
to difficulties for other shipping companies and the harbour board re-took control 
[in 1972] in order to re-assert the common user approach" (MOT 1984:157). At 
the POli of Wellington this problem did not occur "as all users of the terminal are 
shareholders in the terminal operating company" (ibid: 157). 
Because of the public provision of container facilities and servIces, shipping 
companies did not require the capacity to stevedore their containerized vessels 
(which in any case would have been too expensive for them to supply, given the 
volume of trade in New Zealand). As Trace writes: 
The major sunk cost in liner shipping lies in the investment 
committed in container terminals. However the existence of 
common-user terminals means that potential entrants do not need to 
build their own facilities (1992:95). 
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The establishment of common-user terminals in New Zealand meant that the 
shipping lines that switched to containers did not need to build their own 
terminals. Furthermore, a process of 'vertical disintegration' occurred as some 
shipping companies divested themselves of their conventional stevedoring 
departments and subsidiaries, following the shift to containers, opting instead to 
use the publicly provided container terminals. The exit of the Conference Lines 
from stevedoring supplies a good example of the process of 'vertical 
disintegration' which accompanied the development of the container terminals. 
Their exit coincided with the rise of the Owens Group, which was instrumental in 
the emergence of one of the two large, national 'contracting' stevedores that 
developed in the 1970s. 
The Owens Group Ltd originated on the waterfront. In 1953 Robert Owens, a 
postwar British immigrant, founded at the Port of Mount Maunganui a small 
company that made canvas covers (the Tauranga Canvas Company). Owens 
moved into stevedoring in the late 1950s and established Mount Maunganui and 
Tauranga Stevedores, which was built up on the basis of the lucrative log export 
trade from the port?O This company also carried out some stevedoring work at 
Timaru, Nelson and Picton. The wages paid by this company through the 
Waterfront Industry Commission increased from £53,749 in 1959 to £506,680 in 
1969. In the intervening period, Robert Owens extended his operation further 
along the transportation chain. Indeed, Owens was a pioneer of 'integrated 
transport' in this country, with business interests ranging from logging operations 
20 This infOlmation was, in part, gleaned from the brief company history contained in the Owens 
Group Annual Report for 1985. 
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to road transportation to the (un)loading of ships. These enterprises formed the 
basis of the Owens Group of companies and partly owned subsidiaries. 
Owens' stevedoring operation went national in the early 1970s. As I noted above, 
this coincided with the exit of the British Conference Lines from stevedoring. The 
Owens Group took over New Zealand Stevedoring and Wharfingering, as well the 
stevedoring companies (such as Kinsey and Co. at Lyttelton) that were operated by 
individual members of the British Conference Lines. After taking over these 
companies, the Owens Group emerged as the owner of one of the two large 
national contracting stevedores. This also marked the development of the first 
independent contracting stevedore that operated on a national scale, and the return 
to New Zealand control of a significant portion of stevedoring. 
In the mid-1970s the compames that Owens had taken over (Seatrans 
Consolidated, Kinsey and Co. Ltd, and Gannaway and Co. Ltd), along with Mount 
Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores, were formed into a new national 
stevedoring company, United Stevedores, which operated in most ports throughout 
the country alongside the Owens-owned New Zealand Stevedoring and 
Wharfingering. However, in 1976 this latter company ceased to operate as a 
distinct entity and was incorporated along with United Stevedores into the Owens' 
new national stevedoring company, Seaport Operations Limited. 
Seaport Operations was an 'independent' stevedoring company in the sense that it 
was not owned or controlled by a shipping company. However, the Owens 
Group's entry into stevedoring on a national scale was accompanied by its entry 
into the shipping industry. The Owens Group did subsequently attempt to 
vertically integrate forwards into the shipping industry, in a much publicized 
takeover bid for the Union Steam Ship Company (which was owned by P & 0) in 
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1970. This led to a 'takeover battle' with Thomas Nationwide Transport (TNT) of 
Australia.21 
In the five years prior to 1970 the Union Company had returned only a small 
profit, and was in the costly process of converting to a roll-on roll-off operation 
(McLaughlin 1987: 117). Consequently, P & 0 was seeking to sell the company: 
P & 0 appreciated that the Union Company had developed an 
obligation to continue to provide services to New Zealand and TNT 
was the only company ... which had shown an interest in buying it 
as a going concern to develop it commercially (ibid: 117). 
However, Robert Owens made a late bid for the company.22 Although financially 
weaker than TNT's offer, Owens' bid was strengthened both by P & 0 seeking the 
New Zealand Government's approval for the sale of the company, and by the 
climate of public support for the company to return to New Zealand ownership 
(ibid: 118-9). 
Although Owens' bid to take over the Union Company subsequently failed, he 
was able to purchase a significant shareholding in it. Trace writes: 
In 1971 P & 0 sold Union Shipping to Tasman Union, a holding 
company owned on a 50:50 basis by Australian and New Zealand 
interests. The Australian interest was held by TNT Shipping and 
Development, a subsidiary of TNT, while the New Zealand interest 
was jointly owned by Brierley Investments and Owens Investments 
(1992:92). 
21 An excellent, detailed account of this takeover bid is provided by McLaughlin (1987: 117-123). 
22 According to McLaughlin, despite contact the previous year with P & 0, Owens "knew nothing 
about the possible sale of the Union Company until it was mentioned in the newspapers. He was 
then forced to make a hurried, rapidly-prepared approach to P & 0, who showed a willingness to 
listen but not to commit. He had no time to properly prepare the kind of takeover he wanted" 
(1987:117). 
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By purchasing a substantial shareholding in the Union Company, Owens did 
acquire an interest in shipping. But, once again, this reverses the usual sequence 
of events whereby shipping companies seek control of stevedoring following 
containerization. Furthermore, the opportunity for Owens to enter stevedoring on 
a national scale was provided by the Conference Lines selling their own 
stevedoring companies, which, when compared to international developments, 
was itself unusual. Further, the Owens Group buying into Union Shipping meant 
that it owned a portion of its main stevedoring competitor. 
", 
By the early the 1970s, the Union Company had horizontally integrated by buying 
up a good many of the small coastal shipping companies. It owned Richardson 
and Company, the Holm Shipping Company, the Canterbury Steam Shipping 
Company, and Anchor Shipping and Foundry Company. As I noted above, 
vertical integration occurred unevenly following containerization. As well as 
horizontally integrating, the Union Company was the main case where vertical 
integration did in fact occur. However, the Company tried a different option to a 
costly lift-onllift-off container operation, which would have required substantial 
investment in quayside container cranes, straddle carriers and so forth. 
Since the mid-1960s, the Union Company had been converting to unitized roll-on 
vessels. At that time, ro-ro operations were typically carried out by loading 
containers onto truck trailers which were then towed aboard ship. The Union 
Company, however, instead opted to "introduce an entirely new concept in roll-on 
shipping services by pioneering the use of heavy duty fork lift machines and 
loading and discharging cargo unitized on large steel pallets or packed in 
containers" (McLaughlin 1987:164). To complement this operation the company 
developed a series of dedicated, special purpose roll-onlroll-off terminals, 
exclusively for its own use, which allowed it to operate outside of the container 
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telminals and thus to have complete control of container-handling. The author of 
the Company's history notes that: 
The provIsIOn of special terminals at the ports of call was 
fundamental to the success of the roll-on services. In New Zealand 
the harbour authorities were at first overawed by the extent of the 
company's planning but they became most enthusiastic and were 
helpful in providing facilities for the exclusive use of the Union 
Company on long leases that guaranteed the revenue required to 
cover the outlay (McLaughlin 1987:168). 
By the early 1970s, as well as a trans-Tasman servIce, the Union Company 
"provided unitized roll-on services on the New Zealand coast between Auckland, 
Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin" (ibid:lll). The 'Seacargo Terminals', as they 
were known, were located at each of these ports. In 1975 another terminal was 
established at the Port of Tauranga. 
But by developing and operating its own cargo terminals, where it performed its 
own stevedoring, the company's stevedoring departments (which catered for 
conventional stevedoring) were almost rendered redundant. David Graham, a 
former senior manager with the Union Company, writes of this period: 
The Union Steam Ship Company which operated its own 'in house' 
stevedoring was . . . gearing up for containerization and the 
establishment of specialized services for their roll-on roll-off 
vessels. With gear stores, stevedoring equipment and ... loyal and 
long service staff at all ports, the Union Company was faced with 
major reorganization and redundancy costs in the early 1970s. It 
was about this time that I took over the management of company 
branches, including the stevedoring operation. With fewer and 
fewer conventional company ships and the loss of agency vessels 
such as British India Steam, the only way to survive, was to 
aggressively enter into contract stevedoring (1994:10). 
This move into contract stevedoring was part of an overall realignment of the 
company's operations. As McLaughlin notes: 
The company actively expanded in areas where there was a degree 
of expertise already existing. These activities included tendering to 
outside companies for stevedoring work at all New Zealand and 
Pacific Islands ports, undertaking agency representations for 
foreign vessels calling in the New Zealand area, and also an 
expanded workshop organization to cater for outside vessels and 
shore contract work (1987:116). 
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To carry out these activities, Union Shipping formed a separate stevedoring, 
freight and agency division. As its 1977 Annual Report pointed out, "the 
Company is now one of only two which have national coverage of all New 
Zealand ports with resident staff and gear stores" (1977:15). Its principal 
competitor was Seaport Operations. 
Despite increasing pressures for vertical integration following containerization, the 
paradoxical growth of a large independent contractor like Seaport Operations, and 
also the expansion of Union Shipping into competitive stevedoring, at least in 
part, can be explained by the fact that these companies largely did conventional 
stevedoring (and that container vessels were worked in the container terminals). 
During the mid-1970s there was still a considerable (although rapidly diminishing) 
amount of conventional stevedoring work at ports throughout New Zealand. The 
Union Company's 1976 Annual Report states that: 
Although containerization and roll on/roll off operations continue 
to expand, there is still a demand for conventional services to many 
overseas ports and it is anticipated this pattern will continue for a 
number of years (1976:18). 
Union Shipping entered this field with some success, its 1975 Annual Report 
noting that the company's stevedoring and ship agency division "traded profitably 
with nearly half the total revenue coming from other than Union Company 
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vessels" (1975:21). The cargoes it worked included bulk grain, soda ash, meat, 
dolomite and bentonite, cars, bananas, and citrus fruits. 
The competitive nature of the remaining conventional stevedoring work IS 
indicated by the tactics employed by Union Shipping. David Graham writes: 
A long time stevedore with the British lines, Captain Jim Douglas 
joined me and with the support of our port supervisors and foremen 
we offered fixed price contracts to cargo owners - an almost 
unheard of practice at New Zealand ports at that time. We soon 
received the support of companies such as Amalgamated Marketing 
who were then shipping large quantities of mutton and butter to the 
U.S.S.R. and there were many other companies who welcomed this 
competitive approach (1994: 10). 
Competition in this field further intensified in the late 1970s, and the number of 
firms that engaged in the practice of 'carpet-bagging' increased significantly (see 
Appendix 1). As Union Shipping's 1979 Annual Report stated, "with a decreasing 
volume of conventional stevedoring in New Zealand, competition is keen" 
(1975:5). In 1980, Union Shipping was restructured and a subsidiary company, 
Union Maritime Services (UMS), was created that incorporated both the 
stevedoring and ship agency division of the parent company. The new company 
also was responsible for the operation of the Seacargo Terminals. 
While they mostly performed conventional work, UMS and Seaport Operations 
also began to stevedore 'self-sustaining' container vessels (i.e. those with their 
own gear) which could be worked outside of the container terminals, on 
conventional wharves. In 1979 UMS won a tender to operate a container complex 
at New Plymouth which serviced "self-sustaining vessels operating to the Middle 
East and The West Indies Gulf' (Annual Report 1979:5). And, in its Seacargo 
terminals, UMS began to stevedore roll on/roll off vessels belonging to other 
companies. 
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Competition within stevedoring continued to intensify throughout the 1980s. As 
David Graham recalls, "the competition between stevedores was keen and it was 
not long before Seaport was complaining to their parent company - Owens Group 
and who at that time also had a shareholding in the Union Company" (1994:11). 
At the same time the Union Company's Seacargo Terminals were not fairing well. 
In 1984 and 1985 the terminals suffered a considerable financial loss. The 
Company's 1984 Annual Report states: 
With the advent of further competition in the Tasman, cargo was 
diverted from ... [the] Seacargo terminals to the container 
terminals. The introduction of Pacifica Shipping Company's roll-
on roll-off vessel between Wellington and Lyttelton saw cargoes 
lost ... [by] Union Maritime Services' terminals at these ports 
(1984:8). 
The upshot of these developments was a process of rationalization. This process 
resulted in Union Maritime Services taking over Seaport Operations in November 
1986 to form a single national stevedoring company, called New Zealand 
Stevedoring, and the abolition of the Seacargo terminals at all ports except Mount 
Maunganui in 1987. Following the transfer of Seaport Operations, Owens 
Investments Limited abandoned its involvement in shipping and returned to its 
more traditional spheres of operation.23 In 1989 it sold its 25% share in Union 
Shipping to Brierley Investments Limited (the New Zealand based multinational 
company which already owned 25% of the latter). 
In summmy, during the 1970s and 1980s, the main players within stevedoring 
were the harbour boards (which operated the container terminals at the ports of 
Auckland, Lyttelton and Port Chalmers), the consortium of shipping lines which 
23 In 1985 the Owens Group Limited was transformed into a public company called Owens 
Investments Limited. 
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operated the container terminal at Wellington, and (until they merged in 1986) the 
two national stevedoring contractors. Following the ascendancy of Seaport 
Operations and Union Maritime Services, some of the smaller stevedoring 
companies disappeared from the scene. F or example, HJR Somerville and Sons 
ceased to operate as stevedores at the Port of Timaru, and returned to shipping 
agency work. 
However, in the mid-1970s, when containerization was occurring apace, another 
parallel development was taking place. This consisted of a series of small 
independent stevedoring firms emerging at ports throughout the country. Each of 
these was a joint venture in which one of the coalition partners was a local 
watersiders' union. Because of the involvement of the port unions, I have termed 
these 'hybrid' firms. What must be explained is the emergence of a new 'type' of 
small firm (as opposed to the already existing and well-established locally based 
firms) at a time when one would otherwise expect small firms to disappear. This 
is particularly so, given that these firms were (with one exception) the only new 
entrants into stevedoring from 1975 until the industry was deregulated in 1989 
(see Appendix 1)?4 
The persistence of small hybrid companies even after containerization, like the 
growth of large independent stevedoring contractors (such as Seaport Operations), 
can partly be explained by the fact that the hybrid firms mostly did conventional 
stevedoring. But the task is to explain why these small hybrid firms emerged at 
precisely the time when containerization was occurring apace, when conventional 
stevedoring was rapidly diminishing and was intensively sought after on a national 
basis by Seaport Operations and Union Maritime Services. How did the hybrid 
firms manage to survive in this extremely competitive environment? The case 
24 The only other new entrant was Associated Stevedores, an independent company that was 
established by Les Dickson at the Port of Tauranga in the early 1980s. 
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studies below both provide an answer to this question and cast further light on the 
labour market conditions resulting from the bureau system that supported small 
firms generally. 
(6) The 'Hybrid' Firms 
To account for the development of the 'hybrid' firms requires an understanding 
both of the 'space' that the bureau system allowed for small firms, and also the 
political environment in the 1970s which was conducive to their development. 
The hybrid firms developed at a time when successive governments were 
advocating various forms of 'worker participation' (see Smith 1979). Indeed, 
these firms were frequently paraded under the banner of 'worker participation' (for 
example, see Wood 1979). Although there was undoubtedly an element of 
'worker paliicipation' in the unions' rationale for entering into these ventures, 
there also was a profit-making side. The historian of the Auckland Union argues 
that as well as having "ideological concerns with 'industrial democracy"', they 
"looked for a share in profits, of course" (Roth 1993: 182). In any case, my 
intention is not to assess the extent to which these joint ventures did facilitate 
industrial democracy, nor to precisely ascertain the motives for the unions' 
involvement in these enterprises. Rather, I will identify aspects of the political 
environment which elicited the small hybrid firms and the labour market 
conditions which sustained them. 
Despite the rhetoric of worker participation surrounding their formation, the 
hybrid firms were not 'worker cooperatives' of the type that emerged on Britain's 
waterfront after the NDLS was abolished (see Turnbull and Weston 1993). 
Rather, they were incorporated private companies in which local port unions 
owned shares. The first of these companies, New Zealand Marshalling Limited, 
was formed at the Port of Mount Maunganui in 1975 as a joint venture between 
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the Mount Maunganui Waterside Workers' Union and the New Zealand Lumber 
Company. The following year, as Wood (1979:21) notes, the Lyttelton Union 
"formed its own wholly owned stevedoring company" - Express Stevedoring 
Limited - "which successfully contracted for some bulk cargoes." However in 
1977, the Lyttelton Union entered into a joint venture, the Lyttelton Stevedoring 
Company (see below). Several other hybrid firms were also formed in 1977. The 
Auckland Stevedoring Company was established when "one of the biggest 
stevedores of conventional vessels at the port was re-formed . . . with equal 
shareholding by the Auckland Waterside Workers' Union, the Auckland 
Stevedoring Co. Ltd. and McKay Shipping Ltd" (Wood 1979:21). The Onehunga 
Union established its own stevedoring company (Manukau Stevedoring Services 
Limited), and New Zealand Marshalling established a subsidiary at Whangarei in 
partnership with the local union. In 1978 the Nelson Union established Nelson 
Stevedores Limited. New Zealand Marshalling established a small company in 
partnership with the Gisborne Union in 1980, and also that year South Stevedores 
Limited was formed at the Port of Bluff by the Bluff Waterside Workers Union, 
J.E. Watson and Company, and Bay of Plenty Stevedoring. 
With the exception of Auckland Stevedoring, which was established by taking 
over an already existing company, all of the hybrid firms (at least initially) were 
very small (both organizationally and in terms of market share), and all were 
engaged in conventional stevedoring?5 In 1979, Wood noted that these 
companies "have mostly been formed with a minimum of capital" and "have not 
been established for cargo handling at the highly capital intensive container and 
roll-onlroll-off terminals so that to some extent the[ir] future ... may depend on 
the viability of cargo handling on conventional [wharves] and bulk shipping not 
using terminals" (1979:23-4). As I noted above, conventional stevedoring was an 
25 The proportion of wages paid through the Waterfront Industry Commission in 1977 by 
stevedoring companies that were either partly or wholly owned by watersiders' unions was "5.4 
percent of the wages paid for all waterside work" Wood 1979:23). 
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extremely competitive (and also rapidly diminishing) service product market to 
enter. 
In the case studies below, I will provide a brief discussion of the conditions 
surrounding the formation and development of two of the hybrid firms: New 
Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring Ltd and the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company. 
Formerly confidential files of the Waterfront Industry Commission (which are 
now held in the National Archives) allowed me to reconstruct the events 
surrounding the formation of New Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring, the first 
hybrid firm to be established, and to get some insight into the way that state actors 
were involved in its formation. In the case of the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company 
I will provide a detailed case study based on company minutes and records, 
together with interviews I conducted with former key personne1. Each case study 
highlights different aspects of the conditions which sustained the small hybrid 
firms. In the former case, a strong element of political sponsorship is apparent, 
whereas the latter case highlights the supporting role of the bureau system of 
labour administration. 
(6.1) New Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring 
New Zealand Marshalling was established in 1975. This firm was based on 
conditions which were state-supported in a double-sense. Firstly, as I noted 
above, the company was formed against the backdrop of the third Labour 
Govemment's initiative to encourage 'worker participation' (see Smith 1979:42). 
Secondly, the bureau system of labour administration provided the 'labour 
flexibility' to support small firms of this type. 
Because of its proximity to the Kaingaroa forest, the Port of Mount Maunganui 
handled a large volume of wood product exports. At this pOli the local harbour 
board was not involved in wharfingering or cargo marshalling. Indeed, there were 
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six companies which engaged in wharfingering and stevedoring, more than at 
most other ports throughout the country. New Zealand Marshalling arose out of 
discussions between the Mount Maunganui Waterside Workers Union and the 
Tasman Pulp and Paper Company over a possible cargo marshalling contract. As 
Brian Wood (who was then the Assistant General Manager of the Waterfront 
Industry Commission) noted, "The formation of the company arose out of a desire 
by the Union to tender for an important contract for the assembly of pulp and 
paper cargoes on the wharf." (1979:19). 
In July 1974 Union officials had written to Tasman Pulp and Paper to express their 
interest in tendering for conventional cargo marshalling work, and the 
aforementioned contract in particular. The Union received a favourable response 
from the company.26 The Union officials then entered into talks with the 
Waterfront Commissioner, the Minister of Labour, along with other Ministers in 
the Labour Government, about the possibility of tendering for this contract. The 
Waterfront Commissioner was a crucial actor in the decision to establish a joint 
venture company. In a letter to the Minister of Labour, Commissioner Bockett 
indicated that he supported the initiative but pointed out the Union's difficulty in 
obtaining mechanical equipment to carry out the job, and also the Union officials' 
lack of managerial experience. He suggested that the Union attempt to enter into a 
joint venture with the New Zealand Lumber Company, which already undertook 
stevedoring for Tasman Pulp and Paper. 
The Union agreed to these proposals, as did the New Zealand Lumber Company. 
Tasman Pulp and Paper had intended to place the contract up for tender, but after 
the joint venture was proposed it asked for a meeting with the Government. A 
meeting between the Ministers of Labour, Finance and Transport, the Waterfront 
26 Written notes by the Waterfront Commissioner of a meeting with the Mount Maunganui 
Waterside Workers Union on 3117174. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 53, 
5/608 (National Archives). 
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Commissioner and representatives of Tasman Pulp and Paper occurred in 
November 1974. At this meeting the Ministers expressed the Government's 
support for the joint venture, as did the representatives of Tasman Pulp and Paper. 
Indeed, W. Olsen "said that his company considered that there were advantages in 
entering into this form of contracting with the Union as it was a sharing of 
management and would, he felt, create good industrial relations.,,27 
New Zealand Marshalling was formed in April 1975 with a nominal capital of just 
$1000, of which each partner provided half. The Board of Directors comprised 
the President and Secretary of the Mount Maunganui Waterside Workers Union, 
along with two representatives of the New Zealand Lumber Company. Not 
surprisingly, New Zealand Marshalling won the contract to marshall Tasman Pulp 
and Paper's export cargoes. The contract involved using forklifts (which New 
Zealand Lumber supplied) to unload trucks carrying newsprint and pulp, to 
stockpile this material until a vessel was available, and then to place it on the 
wharf ready for loading (by New Zealand Lumber). 
The new company was seen in some quarters as being of national significance, and 
it received extensive media coverage. The Union President stated that: 
To our knowledge this is a breakthrough in this type of business. If 
we are successful the union could be a leader to other unions and 
encourage them to start joint ventures. This could tend to diminish 
disputes and the board of directors would be able to discuss any 
problems and look at them from a member's point of view as well 
as the Company' S?8 
27Notes of meeting between Cabinet Ministers, the Waterfront Commissioner and Tasman Pulp 
and Paper on 19111174. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 53, 5/608 
(National Archives). 
28 Bay a/Plenty Times, lO/4175. 
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The General Secretary of the Waterside Workers Federation also lent his SUppOlt 
to the initiative: "It has the full support of the Federation.,,29 However Mount 
Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores, the contractor that usually handled pulp and 
paper cargo at the port, vigorously opposed the new company and its contract. 
As I noted above, one of the factors that assisted in the formation of the company 
was political sponsorship by the Labour Government. An important part of this 
sponsorship was an agreement between the Union and Waterfront Industry 
Commission which meant that the company could retain waterside workers from 
the local labour bureau on a semi-permanent basis.3D As well as one foreman, the 
company 'employed' one leading hand and six forklift drivers. However, one of 
the seven watersiders was replaced every six months. This arrangement preserved 
at least an element of the principle of worker rotation which was central to labour 
allocation practices under the bureau system. The company could requisition as 
many additional watersiders from the bureau as it required. In light of this 
arrangement, the Commissioner granted a reduction in the NAF levy (because 
guaranteed wages did not have to be paid). This possibility had been discussed 
prior to the formation of New Zealand Marshalling. G. Symon of the New 
Zealand Lumber Company had written to the Commissioner in 1974 to ask if the 
proposed company could make a reduced contribution to the NAF levy, which the 
Commissioner had agreed to as long as the company provided "long-term 
continuous employment".3] This assurance enabled New Zealand Marshalling to 
include in its tender for the contract the provision that any savings which resulted 
from a reduction in the levy would be passed on to Tasman Pulp and Paper. 
29 Ibid. 
30 By 1975 there was a precedent for semi-permanent employment, insofar as this type of 
anangement operated in the four container terminals, and also in the Union Shipping Company's 
Seacargo Terminals. 
31 Letter from G. Symon to Commissioner Bockett, 10/12174; letter from Commissioner Bockett to 
G. Symon, 17/12174. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3864, Box 53,5/608 (National 
Archives). 
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Although it employed watersiders on a semi-permanent basis, the company still 
benefitted from the labour flexibility which resulted from being able to draw 
additional watersiders from the bureau when work requirements exceeded the 
capacity of its regular workforce. Indeed, at two crucial points the existence of the 
bureau system was decisive to the company's survival. When Tasman Pulp and 
Paper Workers struck work in 1983, New Zealand Marshalling arranged with the 
Waterfront Industry Commission (with the Mount Maunganui Waterside Workers 
Union's consent) simply to return its watersiders to the bureau until the strike 
ended. A similar arrangement was agreed to during the course of an industrial 
dispute at the Kawerau Pulp and Paper Mill in 1986. These incidents further 
illustrate the way that special arrangements, which nonetheless were based on the 
labour flexibility afforded by the bureau system, allowed this small hybrid firm to 
operate. 
In 1977 New Zealand Marshalling gained a contract to load two Tasman Pulp and 
Paper vessels using forklifts and ship's elevators, which marked its entry into 
contract stevedoring. To reflect this shift in its sphere of operation, the name of 
the company was changed in 1980 to New Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring 
Limited. By 1981, it had secured contracts to stevedore all of the New Zealand 
Shipping Corporation's vessels which entered the port, and also had stevedoring 
contracts with the New Zealand Farmers' Fertilizer Importing Company and 
Armada Lines. It had also increased its workforce to 25, and by this time had 
assets totalling more than $500,000.32 In 1977 the company established a 
subsidiary company at Whangarei (New Zealand Marshalling (Whangarei) 
Limited) which it owned jointly with the Whangarei Waterside Workers' Union. 
A similar company was established in partnership with the local union at Gisborne 
in 1980. 
32 New Zealand Herald, 6/7/81. 
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In summary, New Zealand Marshalling was formed through series of agreements 
between private actors and state actors, as a vehicle for the Mount Maunganui 
Waterside Workers Union to enter cargo marshalling. As such, the company 
originally was based on a prior agreement that it should gain a marshalling 
contract. Because it was a long term contract, and because the company semi-
permanently employed watersiders, the labour flexibility afforded by the bureau 
system was not as important as it might otherwise have been to the continuing 
existence of this particular hybrid small firm. Nonetheless, at two decisive 
moments, when industrial action outside the port disrupted the company's 
business, this system was crucial to its survival. The discussion of Lyttelton 
Stevedoring, in the next section, will demonstrate that the flexibility provided by 
the bureau system was even more important in the case of small firms that were 
not able to secure long-term contracts. 
(6.2) The Lyttelton Stevedoring Company 
The Lyttelton Stevedoring Company was formed at the Port of Lyttelton in 1977. 
The circumstances surrounding its formation were somewhat more conventional 
than those of New Zealand Marshalling, in that it was largely established in order 
to break a 'stranglehold' by the larger players over stevedoring at this port. 
Lyttelton was one of the ports where, outside the container terminal, the only 
contracting stevedores were Seaport Operations and Union Shipping. One 
shipping company in particular, Geo. H. Scales, was the 'first mover' in the 
formation of the company. In an interview, the former Manager of the Lyttelton 
Stevedoring Company, Captain Anderson, recalled that: 
Lyttelton Stevedoring . . . came into existence because of 
frustration. . . because there was no competition in the area, so 
shipping companies felt they were totally at the mercy of the 
particular stevedoring companies there. They had to take what they 
offered. They could see perhaps where there was sloppiness and 
the rest of it in management ... and they couldn't do anything 
about it. So Ross Fast, who was then manager of George H. Scales 
in Christchurch, at that stage he approached various people and 
said 'well why don't we set up our own stevedoring company'. 
(Interview) 
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Geo. H. Scales was a shipping company with a longstanding history of operating 
outside the main players, having originally been formed by farmers to break the 
monopoly of the Conference Lines (see Coveney 1972). Its ships were primarily 
conventional vessels, and carried wool, meat and fruit. In the 1970s Scales had 
used Seaport Operations to stevedore its vessels, but there was little incentive to 
tum them around quickly because of the 'cost-plus nature of the contracts used 
(see below). According to the former Company Secretary of Lyttelton 
Stevedoring (who subsequently worked for Scales), Scales was involved in the 
Lyttelton Stevedoring Company to provide a service to its own ships, and to the 
vessels of the companies it acted as the agent for, and also to introduce more 
competition into stevedoring at the Port of Lyttelton. 
The other partners in the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company were McKay Shipping 
(another of the smaller shipping companies involved in conventional shipping), 
Bay of Plenty Stevedores Limited (and independent stevedoring company based at 
the Port of Tauranga), and the Lyttelton Waterside Workers Union (through its 
own company Express Stevedoring). Along with Scales, McKay Shipping owned 
a sixth of the shares, and the latter two partners owned a third each. The 
Company's directors were drawn from each of the partners, and the two who 
represented the Union were respectively the Union Secretary and Vice-President. 
Lyttelton Stevedoring was not truly 'independent' because two (and latterly three) 
of its shareholders were shipping companies. Nonetheless, Lyttelton Stevedoring 
was established not just to provide a service to these companies, but as a 
contracting stevedore that was expected to return a profit to its owners. The 
360 
minutes of the first Board of Directors' meeting record a comment by one of the 
directors which makes this clear: "L. Batchelor . . . made the point that the 
operation must be looked on as a commercial enterprise and that to survive the 
Company would need to make a profit.,,33 The company minutes demonstrate that 
profitability was a primary concern particularly to the Union (which is 
understandable given the investment of Union funds in the venture). 
The fact that stevedoring compames did not have to employ an operational 
workforce, because of the bureau system of labour administration, meant that a 
small stevedoring company like Lyttelton Stevedoring could be established 
relatively inexpensively. The contrast with the first years of the post-reform 
period (where labour is directly employed) was highlighted by Captain Anderson: 
We at Lyttelton Stevedoring were set up with sixty thousand 
dollars. And we could do that because our basic requirements were 
enough foremen to be able to run the job labour-wise, and a 
manager and a girl, and that was it. But nowadays if you wanted to 
set up a stevedoring company you've got a manager, you've got 
your foremen, and then you've got your actual labour itself which 
you've got to pay the whole year round. So ... you wouldn't set up 
a stevedoring company these days under half a million. (Interview) 
This led to a 'streamlined' type of company structure. When it was first formed, 
Lyttelton Stevedoring employed just six full-time staff: the Manager (who doubled 
as a supervisor), four foremen-stevedores, and an office clerk. Gangs of 
watersiders were requisitioned from the bureau only when the Company had 
arranged a job. Because labour was not permanently hired, Lyttelton 
Stevedoring'S management structure was very similar to that of the large 
companies like Seaport Operations.34 Any differences were largely in numbers 
33 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 24/1/77. 
34 Of course, the large vertically integrated companies which carried out stevedoring (such as Union 
Shipping) had a more complex managerial hierarchy insofar as they employed ship's crews and 
other workers in their operations. 
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(of foremen-stevedores, supervisors and so forth). Management, as such, (in the 
sense of 'man-management') had no place on the waterfront because there was no 
labour to manage except when carrying out a job, which in any case was primarily 
the responsibility of the foreman-stevedores. 
Similarly the need for equipment was minimal. The Lyttelton Harbour Board 
supplied all mobile cargo-handling equipment on the wharf (or 'the hard', as it 
was colloquially termed). The company purchased a small amount of equipment 
owned by Express Stevedoring, as well as having some gear made, and further 
equipment was hired from the Harbour Board and other hire agencies. Space was 
rented in a nearby building for use as a gear store and an office. Registration of 
the company as an employer with the Waterfront Industry Commission under the 
1976 Waterfront Industry Act was a mere formality, the primary criterion being 
that of employing foremen-stevedores and thus being able to exercise supervision 
over gangs of water siders (see Chapter 10). 
Thus the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company began its operations with a relatively 
small capital outlay and minimal overheads. Initially, it secured two contracts: to 
load frozen meat bound for Japan, and bales of wool destined for the Soviet 
Union. Indications are that the Company, at least initially, operated largely on 
short-term contracts and one-off contracts. It was able to survive on insecure 
contracts of this nature largely because it did not have to permanently employ 
watersiders. Fluctuations in labour requirements (which was a function of 
irregular work) were accommodated by the bureau system: the company could 
requisition several gangs from the bureau one week, and then none the next. Thus 
this system provided space for the Company to operate in a highly competitive and 
fluctuating (service) product market where the overhead cost of permanently 
employing labour would otherwise have been prohibitive. The main fixed labour 
cost, the wages of foremen-stevedores, was partially defrayed by the Company 
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hiring out its foremen to its competitors in slack periods. The Company also 
secured a reciprocal arrangement to hire in foreman-stevedores during busy 
periods. 
Lyttelton Stevedoring tendered for work in a competitive environment alongside 
Seaport Operations and Union Maritime Services. After beginning with just two 
contracts, the Company gained contracts for a number of different cargoes. By 
1980, it had secured contracts inter alia for conventional meat loading, fruit, bulk 
tallow and gypsum. Also, that year it bought a container spreader which enabled it 
to work the occasional 'self-sustaining' containerized vessel (which had ship-
board cranes). 
Lyttelton Stevedoring was awarded a number of contracts in preference to Union 
Maritime Services and Seaport Operations.35 But, despite securing a number of 
contracts, the Company's two competitors had the advantage of being able to offer 
a service on a national basis. This is reflected in a statement by J. Burch, recorded 
in minutes of a Lyttelton Stevedoring Company directors meeting in 1980, that 
they "were at a decided disadvantage being independent operators at ports whereas 
Seaport . . . could carry losses by incorporating pOliS overall. ,,36 F or instance, the 
national stevedoring companies could quote across ports in order to secure a 
contract with a shipping company for a number of ports. Companies like Seaport 
Operations also could make up losses incurred at Lyttelton through its branches at 
ports elsewhere. Indeed, comments in the company minutes of Lyttelton 
Stevedoring indicated that Union Maritime Services and Seaport Operations 
sometimes tendered almost at cost price. For example, Lyttelton Stevedoring lost 
a Polish Ocean Lines contract in 1980 because it was unable to reduce its rates to 
35 Union Shipping's 1978 Annual Report noted that it had lost some stevedoring contracts to 
Lyttelton Stevedoring. 
36 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 2112/80. 
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match those offered by Union Maritime Services.37 Union Shipping's 1983 
Annual Report states that "with a decline in cargo volumes there has been 
evidence of low margin quoting as stevedores strive after all available business" 
(1983:8). Nonetheless, despite the large companies' advantages, one of Lyttelton 
Stevedoring's directors commented in 1982 that "most new operators into the port 
over the last five years have come to Lyttelton Stevedoring.,,38 
Correctly costing jobs, although a complicated matter that involved "sheets of 
calculations" (to quote the former general manager), was absolutely crucial to 
Lyttelton Stevedoring's continued existence. The company secretary recalled that 
the Company almost collapsed when two contracts were incorrectly costed. The 
type of contract also was critical. The former general manager, Captain Anderson, 
stated that the narrow margins which the Company operated on were the reason 
that it rarely offered fixed rate contracts to shipping companies, preferring instead 
to work on cost-plus or other types of contracts: 
You can quote on a fixed rate, which is so much per ton, and that 
includes everything. That includes the cost of the labour, the cost 
of everything else ... You can have a fixed rate with most sections. 
That's a pure gamble because ... if it rained for three days and 
you're actually picking up all the costs and you've got a hundred 
men standing by for three days doing nothing, and they've all got to 
be paid, you're looking at hundreds of thousands of dollars. You're 
down the drain, gone. (Interview) 
Cost-plus contracts could actually be cheaper because, despite the fact that they 
were cost-plus to the shipping company, they were less expensive than fixed rate 
contracts where, because of the risk to the stevedoring company, the fixed rate 
would have to be high. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyrteiton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 18/11/82. 
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Small stevedoring companies could potentially be disadvantaged by limitations in 
the types of contracts that they were able to offer. A large company like Union 
Maritime Services could afford to offer fixed-rate contracts (as is indicated by 
David Graham's comments in the previous section), because any losses could be 
absorbed by the company's branches elsewhere. However it appears there was 
one type of contract that was in demand, which Lyttelton Stevedoring not only was 
able to offer, but also enabled it to skim a percentage off the top. This was the 
'sliding-scale' contract. Thomas (1978:123-4) argues that sliding scale contracts 
have distinct advantages over cost plus contracts, in that the sliding scale "is 
linked to output and productivity and takes into account the behavior of costs with 
improving performance", whereas a cost-plus arrangement "discourages action 
intended to improve productivity", since "the gross revenue received by the 
stevedore or terminal operator falls with increased productivity." Despite the 
advantages to shippers of sliding scales, the complexity of this type of contract 
made it possible for Lyttelton Stevedoring to 'hide' charges. As Captain 
Anderson stated: 
The sliding scale is a very complicated business because its based 
on you charging so much a ton per hour. So if you're doing twenty 
tons per hour then the cost is a lot lower than if you're doing only 
ten tons an hour .... Theoretically, its worked on the principle that 
as your rate increases your profit margin increases. That's the way 
it should be built in. As the number of tons per hour you do 
increases, your actual profit margin should increase too, so that 
both the charterer and you gain. So you pick up about half the 
additional costs through lowering the rate and he picks up about 
half of it. That's theoretically. In practice, of course, very few 
people understand [it] and you can fiddle with it quite a bit. For 
some reason or other people loved the sliding scale. I don't know 
whether they actually liked being duped. They must, I think, 
because it's one that was in very common demand. . . . 
Theoretically at the bottom of the scale your profit margin should 
be a lot less, so there's a built-in incentive. But as I said there was 
very few people who understand how the hell it's worked out in the 
first place. (Interview) 
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It appears from company records that Lyttelton Stevedoring's limited ability to 
offer fixed rate contracts did not greatly disadvantage this company, relative to its 
two competitors, because fixed rate contracts were not in high demand. The most 
common contracts were of the cost plus and sliding scale types. 
Issues of contractual form aside, the Company survived in a competitive 
environment also by actively exploiting the personal connections of its directors. 
The directors who represented the two shipping companies (Geo. H. Scales and 
McKay Shipping) both had an extensive and long-term involvement in the 
industry, and they used .their extensive contacts within and 'inside knowledge' of 
the industry to secure contracts. This knowledge included which shipping 
companies were likely to route vessels through the port, which stevedoring 
contracts were coming up for review, and the likelihood of Lyttelton Stevedoring 
gaining a particular contract. 
The directors also channelled work from their own compames to Lyttelton 
Stevedoring. Indeed, all of Scales' own vessels were worked by the Company. 
Also, Scales acted as a shipping agent and used to arrange for their principals' 
stevedoring to be done by Lyttelton Stevedoring. An interview with the former 
company secretary revealed that Geo. H. Scales "would have to get a couple of 
quotes" in order to get the best deal for their shipping company principals. As 
only one of the four shareholders in Lyttelton Stevedoring, Scales had to negotiate 
a contract rate with it, in the same manner as other shipping companies. But, in 
practice, what usually happened was that the manager at Scales would first obtain 
a quote from Seaport Operations, and then arrange to receive a marginally lower 
one from Lyttelton Stevedoring, which he would accept. 
Lyttelton Stevedoring was also linked to some ofthe other small hybrid companies 
through Independent Stevedores Limited. Although it was a registered company, 
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this latter organization appears to have been somewhat of a 'quasifirm' (Eccles 
1981) in that it mostly acted as a vehicle of cooperation for the loosely connected 
hybrid firms. It was initially set up to enable some of these companies to compete 
with national stevedoring companies in quoting for meat shipments and Dairy 
Board charter ships on a national basis.39 Although it is unclear whether this was 
ever carried out, this organization did result in the hybrid firms cooperating by 
passing on information and work to each other. For example, when Lyttelton 
Stevedoring was first set up, Auckland Stevedoring readily furnished this 
company's directors with a copy of its schedule of rates for them to use as a 
guide.4o 
As in the preceding case, the involvement of the local union in the Company was 
significant. The Union representatives' detailed knowledge of the prevailing 
industrial agreements, of how particular types of cargoes were worked, and of any 
difficulties that were likely to be encountered on the job, assisted in lubricating the 
Company's operations and its relations with clients. In Captain Anderson's view, 
the Union did not want, however, to be seen as 'going easy' on the Company. He 
maintained that the Union's shareholding in Lyttelton Stevedoring: 
didn't really have any effect at all on the ... day-by-day dealings 
with the Union. In fact, rather the reverse. I think it probably made 
the executive members, particularly the walking delegate, more 
determined to appear not to be influenced. It didn't make matters 
easier in that respect. They had to be 'squeaky clean' or appear to 
be 'squeaky clean', you see. (Interview) 
He recalled an amusing incident when the Union's involvement in the Company 
caused a problem for him personally: 
39 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 22/11/79. 
40 It should be noted, however, that in this particular case the link between the companies was also 
a result of the fact that one of the partners in Lyttelton Stevedoring, McKay Shipping, also owned 
shares in Auckland Stevedoring. 
I had a company car, naturally enough, as a manager. And down at 
Lyttelton one of the problems we had was getting gear down to the 
ship from the gear store .... You can be sure as hell you just get the 
job going and ... [a] gang can't get down below because the access 
way is blocked and you need a ladder, and the ship hasn't got one. 
So somebody has to get a ladder and if you haven't got a gear man 
somebody's got to get in a truck and go out. . . . And in the 
meantime you've got a gang which is costing maybe something like 
a hundred dollars an hour or more standing by, doing nothing. So 
the pressure's really on. And to get round that I had a couple of 
ski-bars in the garage, and I thought to myself one day 'I'll put 
those bars on the car' ... then I can whip a ladder on top and run it 
straight down to the ship. Immediately the word went right round 
Lyttelton, 'Anderson's using our car to go skiing'. 'Our' because 
they [the Union] were shareholders. Simple as that. So I took the 
ski bars off. (Interview) 
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Nonetheless, the Company Chairman stated at a meeting that, in relation to 
bidding for contracts loading meat for shipment to the USSR and Iran, "possibly 
our connection and relationship with the waterside union could be to our 
advantage.,,41 Undoubtedly, the involvement of the Union played a part in 
establishing trust with potential clients. The company secretary spoke of "deals 
being done" and, apart from a few minor incidents which were taken to the Port 
Conciliation Committee, he could not recall Lyttelton Stevedoring having any 
serious labour relations problems at all. 
Nonetheless, Lyttelton Stevedoring was poised on a knife-edge for much of the 12 
years that it was in business. Despite its reasonable success in securing contracts, 
the Company returned a loss in the first three years that it operated. Indeed, at a 
directors meeting in 1981, a contingency plan was established regarding 
redundancy payments to salaried staff in the event that the Company folded. At a 
meeting of directors that year the Union representative commented that "this year 
would be the telling one", and another director commented that the Company was 
41 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lytteiton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 21/8/80. 
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in need of new business.42 Lyttelton Stevedoring's situation indicates just how 
precariously balanced some of the small stevedoring companies actually were, 
despite the labour conditions associated with the bureau system which were 
conducive to their existence. 
Although the Company broke even in 1982, a director (who represented the 
Union) commented at a meeting that: "the prospects for the future [are] not too 
good".43 But despite the bleak prediction, and the fact that the Company lost its 
meat loading contracts, the following year was something of a turning point 
insofar as a small profit was made. In 1984, however, the Company incurred a 
$16,204 loss. Fixed labour costs in the form of foremen-stevedores' wages were 
significant during this period. The Company lost the reciprocal agreement with its 
competitors regarding the cross-hiring of foremen. The directors were extremely 
wary of employing extra foreman-stevedores, because in the event that it lost a 
contract, the cost of just one extra foreman's wages could break the Company. 
Lyttelton Stevedoring was given a boost in 1986 when Bay of Plenty Stevedores 
sold its shares to Pacifica Shipping, a Lyttelton-based coastal shipping company. 
At the same time, each of the four partners adjusted their shareholding to 25%, 
and the Company's issued share capital was increased to $80,000. After Pacifica 
came on board, the Company was able to establish a branch at Wellington where it 
carried out Pacifica's inter-island roll on / roll off work. After establishing the 
branch at Wellington, Lyttelton Stevedoring's business increased considerably. At 
Lyttelton it secured contracts for livestock shipments, frozen orange juice, P.V.C., 
fishing vessels, and paper. It was given a further boost by a contract to work the 
trans-Tasman container ships vessels of the Tasman Express Line, in which 
McKay Shipping and Scales were partners. 
42 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 27/3/81. 
43 Minutes of Directors Meeting, Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Minutes, 18/2/82. 
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However, the Company's profitability continued to fluctuate. It made a 
considerable loss in 1987, and then a substantial profit in 1988. As I argued 
above, the Company was only able to remain in this precarious situation because 
of the supporting labour market conditions provided by the bureau system. Just 
how important the bureau system of labour administration was in supporting small 
stevedoring companies like Lyttelton Stevedoring, is evidenced by the rapidity 
with which this company folded when faced with the prospect of permanently 
employing watersiders. 
On September 30 1989 the Waterfront Industry Commission was abolished (see 
Chapter 13). After that date, waterside workers were directly employed by 
stevedoring companies and the newly formed Port Companies. Although there 
was a considerable lead-up to port reform, the earliest mention of this process in 
the company minutes was in March 1989. To be sure, there had been discussions 
between the directors the year before about the role of the Port Companies, which 
were formed in October 1988.44 These discussions were centered on the possible 
entry of the newly formed Port Companies into stevedoring outside the container 
terminals. At a meeting of directors in December 1988: 
[The] Chairman advised that he had spoken to both the Lyttelton 
Port Company Limited and Wellington Port Company regarding a 
shareholding in Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Limited. Both 
Port Companies had been receptive to the approach. They also 
expressed the view that they would be reluctant to commence 
stevedoring 'in their own right' .45 
44 Port Companies were formed through the 'corporatization' of harbour boards (see Ward 1990). 
This development, along with the process of waterfront reform generally, will be dealt with in 
Chapters 13, 14 and 15. 
45 Minutes of Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 14/12/88. 
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Although they were initially receptive after being approached on an informal 
basis, each of the Port Companies subsequently declined to become involved in 
Lyttelton Stevedoring. 
However, further port reform was not made until a Board of Directors meeting in 
March 1989. At this meeting a letter from the Secretary of the Lyttelton Union 
was tabled which "expressed concern for the future of the Company in light of the 
major changes taking place on the Waterfront.,,46 There was a discussion of the 
Company's labour requirements in light of proposal by the Government to abolish 
the Waterfront Industry Commission (through the Waterfront Industry Reform 
Bill). But even then, it appears that it was very much 'business as usual' right up 
until deregulation actually occurred. At the same meeting the Manager spoke 
about new contracts for cars, squash and wheat, and the possibility of buying a 
heavy forklift. 
Nonetheless, the pressure on the Company was mounting. At a meeting in July 
1989, one of the directors (who was also the local Union Secretary) questioned 
"whether the Company had the resources to compete with other Stevedoring 
Companies especially in regard to employing permanent labour.,,47 But in the 
General Manager's report at the next meeting the following comment was made: 
With the current thinking in some quarters that many stevedoring 
companies will no longer be in business post 30 September 1989 it 
suggested that the Chairman write to all major lines and customers. 
It was felt that Mr Grout should reiterate the view that Lyttelton 
Stevedoring Company Limited would continue to trade and by 
doing so, preclude the possibility of anyone company having a 
monopoly in stevedoring at the port of Lyttelton.48 
46 Minutes of Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 23/3/89. 
47 Minutes ofLyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 14/7/89. 
48 Minutes of Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 26/7/89. 
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This statement notwithstanding, at the next Board of Directors meeting a 
discussion was held about the future of the Company, where the General Manager 
informed the Board of Directors that "25 watersiders would be required if [the] 
Lyttelton Stevedoring Company was to consider 'direct employment",.49 It was 
subsequently decided that the company could not afford to permanently hire 
waterside workers. The minutes record that: 
Directors discussed at length matters relating to the future of 
Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Limited. It was considered that 
the Company did not have the resources or the capital to employ in 
Lyttelton the number of personnel which would be required [on] 01 
October 1989.50 
A last ditch effort was then made to was to see if the Lyttelton Port Company 
would buy the entire company, which it declined to do. The same offer was made 
to New Zealand Stevedoring, which also was declined. 
Ultimately it was the need to employ permanent labour which caused the company 
to fold. Because LytteIton Stevedoring operated on short-term contracts, and was 
thus subject to considerable fluctuations in business, it simply could not afford to 
directly employ watersiders. Without the labour flexibility afforded by the bureau 
system, the Company could not continue to operate. One of the directors stated 
that: "the Company could not survive in its present state as the Company was too 
small to compete with other larger stevedoring companies.,,51 With respect to 
permanently hiring watersiders, the Company's then General Manager, John Cave, 
commented to the media that: "We decided that it was too big a gamble to take 
without guaranteed contracts."S2 
49 Minutes ofLyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 30/8/89. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Minutes of Lyttelton Stevedoring Company Board of Directors Meeting, 6/9/89. 
52 Christchurch Press, 22/9/89. 
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Lyttelton Stevedoring ceased trading at the end of September 1989. It was not 
alone. Within a few months of the abolition of the Waterfront IndustlY 
Commission, almost all of the small hybrid firms folded. Only firms like New 
Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring, which had secured long-term contracts, 
were able to survive. However, even that company was forced to rationalize its 
operation, by closing all of its subsidiaries. 
(7) Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the relationship between the labour market and 
firm size. Contra the orthodox view in the sociological literature, which 
conceptualizes firm size as an independent variable in this relationship, in the case 
of small firms on the waterfront firm size was a variable that was dependent on the 
occupational registration system that the labour market was organized around. 
This case demonstrates that the causal relationship between labour markets and 
firms is, therefore, not unilinear. Firm size was as much a function ofthe 'type' of 
labour market, as the type of labour market was a function of firm size. 
Additionally, I have identified a novel interplay between firms and labour markets. 
In previous chapters I demonstrated that the bureau system of labour 
administration empowered unions, and in this chapter that it secured small firms. 
These, the most significant, unintended consequences of this system overlapped in 
the 1970s when several of the watersiders' local unions became involved in 
establishing small new entrant stevedoring companies. 
The other significant fmding which has resulted from the analysis of company 
types in this chapter is that containerization did not give rise to widespread vertical 
integration. Rather, this process occurred unevenly, and it was accompanied by a 
process of veliical disintegration. As a result, instead of large vertically integrated 
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shipping companies becoming the major players within stevedoring, a number of 
new types of organizations and firms and entered the field. 
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CHAPTER 9 : INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS RECONSTITUTED 
(1) Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the organizational capacities, and organizational form, of 
the key corporate actors on the side of watersiders and of waterfront employers in 
the period after containerization occurred. In the first section I outline changes to 
the legislative framework wrought by the Waterfront Industry Act 1976. The Act 
both reconfigured aspects of the regulatory environment within which the key 
actors interrelated, and led to a new actor, the reconstituted Waterfront Industry 
Commission, entering the scene. Then I deal with the organizational capacities of 
the key actors, as a prelude to examining how the relationships between these 
actors were played out within the spheres of employment relations, industrial 
relations and work relations during the 1970s and 1980s. 
(2) The Waterfront Industry Act 1976 
In this section I will briefly overview the changes to the institutional framework 
that were wrought by the new Act. Although a full account of the origins of the 
Act is beyond the scope of this chapter, it can briefly be noted that pressure had 
been mounting for some time, on both the side of the unions and that of the 
employers to make changes to the Waterfront Industry Act 1953. For example, 
despite the port unions having achieved a considerable measure of informal 
control over recruitment at the port level, the Waterside Workers Federation 
sought formal joint control over this aspect of the labour supply. Also, since the 
mid-1960s, successive governments had regarded it as being desirable to establish 
'one judicial authority' to cover the main occupational groupings on the 
waterfront, in order to resolve demarcation disputes promptly. Perhaps the most 
significant development, however, was that agreement had been reached between 
375 
the WWF and the PEA during the term of the Waterfront Conference to push for 
the transformation of the Commission into a representative organization. 
The third Labour Government registered its intentions to alter the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1953 by inviting submissions from the WWF and the PEA in March 
1973. After a lengthy series of submissions a Waterfront Industry Bill was drafted 
in 1975. Before it could be passed a new National Government was elected in 
November of that year. However the incumbent Government simply passed the 
Bill into law in December 1976 without altering it, and the new Act took effect on 
1 April 1977. 
While the Act left the bureau system of labour administration fundamentally 
intact, it altered aspects of the regulatory framework that underpinned it. For 
example, port unions were granted formal joint control of recruitment, and. the 
responsibility for selecting new entrants to bureau registers was transferred from 
the local branches of the PEA to the port conciliation committees. The Act also 
legally codified a practice that had been established in the early 1970s whereby the 
packing and unpacking of LCL containers had to be performed within wharf limits 
by watersiders (see Chapter 7). It also contained provisions for the Government to 
formally designate portside container terminals and inland container terminals. 
The Act also removed the other main occupational groups on the waterfront 
(foremen stevedores, tally clerks, and harbour workers who were involved in 
cargo-handling) from the mainstream arbitration system, and placed them under 
the jurisdiction of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. These groups were given 
access to the local port conciliation committees to resolve disputes with their 
employers, and the industrial agreements that they were party to were transformed 
into principal orders issued by the Tribunal. But, significantly, they remained 
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outside the broader system of labour administration, and as such continued to be 
'directly employed' by their respective employers. 
However the more fundamental change wrought by the Act was to the role and 
composition of the Waterfront Industry Commission. Significantly, the 
Commission was reconstituted from a non-representative institution (overseen by 
a Government appointed sole Commissioner) to an institution that represented the 
port unions and the waterfront employers. Under the Act the Commissioner was 
replaced by a five-member panel that was made up of an independent chairman, 
who was appointed by the Government, two representatives nominated by the 
employers (one drawn from each of the Port Employers Association and the 
Harbour Board Employers Union, and two representatives nominated by the 
Waterside Workers Federation. 
Not only was the composition of the Commission changed, its role was 
substantially altered. Whereas previously the role of the Commission and the 
Commissioner had been purely administrative, in relation to the functions of the 
labour bureaux, the Act confelTed upon the new representative Commission a 
decision-making role in two key areas. Firstly, the Commission was given 
responsibility for the setting of bureau register strengths and the formulation of 
bureau rules at the port level (which previously had been the responsibility of the 
local port conciliation committees). Secondly, the Act required employers that 
retained watersiders from the labour bureaux to be registered by the Commission 
as 'employers of waterfront labour'. The Commission had the task of deciding 
who was eligible to register, and only registered employers could 'employ' 
watersiders and enter into industrial agreements (via principal orders) with the 
local pOli unions andlor the WWF. The registration of employers thus became 
central to their constitution as actors within the spheres both of employment 
relations and of industrial relations. 
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The Commission was also responsible for appointing 'port inspectors' whose role, 
under s 9a of the Act, was to "ensure the full and proper utilization of waterside 
workers and to ensure that employers carry out adequate and continuing 
supervision to promote the efficiency of waterside work." Thus part of the new 
representative Commission's role was to exercise surveillance over employers. 
The port inspectors were to report back to the Commission, which had the power 
to suspend or cancel the registration of an employer who did not comply with their 
responsibilities under the Act. 
By altering the composition of the Commission the Act had, in effect, created a 
new corporate actor out of the worker and employer organizations previously 
constituted and recognized by the Waterfront Industry Act 1953, which in tum had 
institutionally mediated the 'basic' interests of capital and labour. Under the Act, 
the Commission itself became a 'corporate actor' alongside the already existing 
key actors, with the responsibility and authority to make decisions within the 
sphere of employment relations that were binding upon these actors. Furthermore, 
the Commission as an organization had its own particular set of interests, which 
were not merely reducible to those of the worker and employer organizations that 
it 'represented' (see Chapter 10). The Commission's interests centered on 
fulfilling its statutory obligations, legitimating its authority relative to that of the 
key actors, and establishing its own public 'credibility' as an organization. 
The Commission's role, relative to the key actors, led to the emergence of an 
additional set of tensions (within the sphere of employment relations) between 
centralized and decentralized decision-making, alongside the tensions between the 
national and the local which had always existed within and between the summit 
organizations of the unions and of the employers. In Chapter 10, I will 
demonstrate that these tensions were particularly evident in the Commission's 
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attempts to determine register limitations at the port level. They were also evident 
in the Commission's decision not to appoint port inspectors (see Chapter 11). 
The hiatus between the provisions of the new Act and how it was implemented in 
practice demonstrates that it was not possible to simply legislate into existence a 
new corporate actor without generating resistance (which was path-dependent) 
from the existing corporate actors originally constituted and recognized by the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1953. This was so, despite the fact that these latter actors 
had agreed that the Commission should be transformed into a representative body. 
Insofar as the tensions that emerged were only resolved in actual administrative 
practice, the Act did not function as a rigid 'blueprint' for reconfiguring the 
already existing institutional and organizational framework. 
(3) The Port Unions 
During the 1970s and the early 1980s the 'organizational capacity' of the port 
unions and their summit organization, the Waterside Workers Federation, steadily 
increased. This was so, despite the internal divisions that wracked the Federation 
in 1970. To recap, a national federation had been formed in 1967 that 
consolidated the 'internal strength' of the port unions' representative organization 
(which until that time had taken the form of two regionally-based federations 
linked via a 'joint council'). However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 5, a 
fundamental source of instability within the Federation emerged in 1970 when the 
Auckland and Wellington port unions refused to ratifY GPO 305. While the 
Wellington Union capitulated within a matter of weeks, the Auckland Union held 
out for a full seven months before agreeing to become party to the new national 
agreement in March 1971. 
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This development, which pitted the two largest (and arguably the strongest) port 
unions against their national organization, had the potential to erode the fragile 
unity of Federation. In particular, it seriously questioned the ability of the 
Federation to secure an 'externalized' form of organization, wherein the port 
unions delegated to it their relations with employers in order to bargain at the 
national level. However, unity began to be gradually restored within the 
Federation after the Auckland Union was brought back into the fold. 
Late in 1971 the Auckland Union sought to become active again within the 
Federation. As I noted in Chapter 5, undoubtedly part of the reason for the 
Union's reconciliation with the Federation was that it was facing an unsettled 
period in which containerization was occurring apace, with the threat of 
redundancies looming large. However the Federation also accommodated the 
wishes of the larger unions, like Auckland and Wellington, which it could not 
afford to have secede from it because of their sheer numerical strength. For 
example, it was resolved at a meeting of the WWF Executive in 1975 to allow 
Supplementary Principal Orders at some of the larger ports (notably Auckland) to 
be renegotiated prior to the national agreement. However this latter move was 
coupled with a change to the Federation's rules which required the port unions to 
submit all local agreements made with employers to the Federation for approval 
(see Chapter 11). This was done, at least in part, in order to forestall a union from 
breaking ranks during national bargaining and negotiating its own agreement at 
the port level with the employers. 
Throughout this period the local autonomy of the port unions did not reassert itself 
in a manner which posed a threat to the Federation's unity. Indeed rather than port 
unions breaking with the Federation, other unions joined the Federation. At a 
number of ports the tally clerks (who had their own union) joined the local 
watersiders' union. At these ports amalgamation was effected by creating a tally 
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clerks 'section' within the pOli union.' By this time most of the port unions 
possessed a stable and experienced membership (see Chapter 10). 
This did not mean that internal divisions within the Federation, particularly 
between the large unions and small unions, were removed or lessened. This 
tension is evident in a debate that occurred at the Federation's national conference 
in 1974 over the representation of larger unions on the national executive. Under 
the representative structure that existed, each port union could elect only one 
executive member, which meant that the larger unions like Auckland, Wellington, 
and Lyttelton (which comprised the bulk of the rarlk and file) had the same 
representation as smaller unions like Picton. Ron Wasley of the Lyttelton Union 
commented that: 
it is the big ports that provide the economic punch [through strike 
action] when it is needed. The large ports are really only asking for 
representation relative to the size of their membership? 
However these tensions only manifested themselves internally, and did not intrude 
upon the Federation's dealings with the employers as they did in 1970. 
The main effect of these divisions was to preclude the transformation of the 
Federation into a national union. This latter move was suggested by the members 
of the executive at the Federation's biennial conference in 1976 and was supported 
by representatives of the Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton Unions. (The fact 
that the Auckland Union's delegates supported the formation of a national union 
demonstrates the degree to which that union had been incorporated back into the 
Federation.) In his report to the conference the General Secretary of the 
I By 1974, the tally clerks had amalgamated with the local watersiders' union at the ports of 
Wellington, Lyttelton, Mount Maunganui, and New Plymouth. 
2 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 2111 0174. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Federation, Ted Thompson, advocated the formation of a national umon, but 
conceded that the majority of port unions were opposed to this move. Once again, 
it was the small unions that demurred. A comment by a representative of the 
Westport Union (B. Andrews) summed up their position: "It is the protection and 
autonomy of the small ports we are concerned about.,,3 The persistence of this 
opposition is reflected in the results of a national ballot that was held in 1980 
which opposed the formation of a national union.4 
However the fact that there was considerable opposition amongst the port unions 
to forming a national union did not adversely affect the Federation in its dealings 
with the employers. Although it was a division between the large unions and the 
small unions that prevented the formation of a national union, in their dealings 
with the employers the unions were united within the Federation. In this sense, 
these 'internal' divisions did not manifest themselves 'externally'. 
Throughout this period an 'externalized' form of organization was maintained 
whereby the port unions delegated to the Federation their dealings with the 
employers, in relation to negotiating the national agreement (the GPO) and the 
port level agreements (the SPOs). Also, it appears that the unions generally 
abided by the rule that all other local agreements (such as those negotiated with 
individual employers) had to be vetted by the Federation executive. Significantly, 
there was no further instance of a union 'breaking ranks' in the manner that the 
Auckland Union had in 1970. 
If anything, the Federation was increasingly cohesive in its dealings with 
employers during this period. In the following section I will show that the 
3 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10/76. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
4 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/10/80. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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employers, on the other hand, experienced increasing disunity following the shift 
to containerization. Consequently the port unions, acting in concert with their 
Federation, were able to 'pick ofr individual employers through decentralized 
bargaining, but the employers were unable to split off any of the port unions from 
the Federation. 
Divisions only began to reassert themselves within the Federation in the mid-
1980s. Once again the Auckland Union was involved, but this time the conflict 
was not over an industrial agreement. In 1975 a comprehensive Waterfront 
Superannuation Fund had been established to replace the previous schemes. And 
in 1982 a change in tax rates that applied to schemes of this type prompted the 
Fund's trustees, who were drawn from the Federation's national officials, to seek 
to legally reclassify it as a pension scheme. The trustees, along with the General 
Secretary of the Federation, visited every port in order to explain the proposed 
change. Ballots were taken and at all ports, except Auckland, the vote was 
returned in favour of reclassifying the Fund. 
The Auckland Union objected to this change to the Fund on the grounds that it had 
the potential to disadvantage water siders who wanted to take their entitlement in 
the form of a 'lump sum,.5 The opposition amongst the rank and file of this union 
to the proposed change was considerable, with 1000 of its 1200 members voting 
against changing the Fund. 6 Nonetheless the change was made, and in December 
1983 the Auckland Union served an injunction on the Fund's trustees in an 
attempt to return the Fund to its original form. The Union then took a case to the 
High Court in March 1984, which found in favour of the trustees. This decision 
5 Under the new tax regime all superannuation funds had to be classified into one of four 
categories, which attracted different tax rates. The dispute in question centered on the fact that 
members of the Auckland Union believed that the trustees of the fund had classified it in a manner 
which would penalize those who sought to take their entitlement from the fund as a 'lump sum' 
rather than in the form of regular pension payments. 
6 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 15110/84. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/8 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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was eventually appealed by the Union to the Court of Appeal in 1986, agam 
unsuccessfully, and the Union then threatened to take the case to the Privy 
Council. 
In Chapter 11, I will demonstrate that it was at the very time when the Federation 
was attempting to reorganize in response to the prospect of the industry being 
deregulated, when the formation of a national union was most vital, that it was 
faced with persistent legal action by the largest of its member unions. Debates 
occurred at the Federation's biennial conferences in 1984 and 1986 regarding the 
merits of forming a national union. The difficulties that the actions of the 
Auckland Union posed to unification were expressed by General Secretary 
Jennings at the 1984 Conference: "the debacle brought about by the change ... to 
the Superannuation Act has brought to the fore, with a vengeance, the question of 
big port domination.,,7 A remit put to the conference, that the national executive 
investigate the possibility of forming a national union, was defeated. This matter 
was raised again at the Federation's conference in 1986, but once again agreement 
could not be reached. Even the representatives of the larger unions, which had 
previously supported forming a national union, expressed doubts in light of the 
actions of the Auckland Union. In the words of a Wellington Union representative 
(T. Cutter): 
We have got a section of our own organization who are prepared to 
take us to the Privy Council. . . . We talk about democracy, well 
what then is it? ... What kind of national union is it going to be?8 
As a result of these organizational difficulties a national union was formed only 
after the introduction of the Labour Relations Act 1987 which required all 
registered unions to have at least 1000 members (see Chapter 13). A national 
7 Ibid. 
8 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 22110/86. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/9 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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union was therefore legislated into existence. Even then, the Auckland Union 
briefly considered forming a separate union, insofar as it had more than the 1000 
member minimum stipulated by the Act. 
It must be reiterated, however, that divisions within the Federation only posed a 
threat to its organizational capacities when they (re )emerged in the mid-1980s. 
During the bulk of the period under consideration, divisions within the Federation 
were dealt with in a manner which did not sap its 'external strength'. Despite the 
fact that the watersiders' summit organization was a federation comprised of port 
unions, which continued to have a considerable degree of local autonomy, 
throughout the 1970s and up to the mid-1980s they were more successful than the 
employers in maintaining an 'externalized' form of organization. 
(4) Employer Organizations 
In this section I will deal with the 'organizational capacities' of the employers in 
the period after the shift to containerization. Overall, the capacity of the 
employers to organize collectively diminished as a fragmentation of actors and 
interests led to internal divisions on their side. This employer disunity stemmed 
from changes in the types of organizations that were involved in stevedoring after 
containerization occurred. I dealt with these changes in company type and form in 
depth in Chapter 8. To recap, the most fundamental development was that 
containerization did not give rise to pervasive vertical integration. Instead of 
vertically integrated shipping companies dominating the market, a number of new 
types of firms and organizations emerged as a process of 'vertical disintegration' 
occurred. 
Overall, four mam groups of corporate actors emerged. Overseas shipping 
companies and coastal shipping companies continued to be 'interested' actors with 
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regard to how stevedoring was carried out, although many of these companies 
were themselves no longer directly involved in stevedoring. But alongside these 
shipping companies there emerged a number of new entrant firms and 
organizations that became involved in stevedoring. There were container terminal 
operators who carried out the stevedoring within the container terminals which 
were established in the early 1970s. With the exception of the terminal at the Port 
of Wellington, the terminals were operated by harbour boards. In this sense, 
harbour boards entered the institutional field as significant actors. Additionally, 
large stevedoring companies that were 'independent' of shipping companies 
developed, along with a minor new entrant firm in the form of the small 'hybrid' 
stevedoring companies that some of the port unions were involved in. And, to a 
lesser degree, even the harbour boards that did not operate container terminals 
emerged as actors within this field, insofar as some (such as the Southland 
Harbour Board) sought to enter stevedoring. 
The diversification and fragmentation of employer interests which stemmed from 
containerization resulted in the Port Employers Association, as an organization 
that traditionally had been led by shipping companies, no longer being 
representative of the main sets of actors on the employers' side. Insofar as the 
interests of these corporate actors were not congruent, they formed separate 
representative organizations. This reorganization of the employers led to the 
emergence of four different bodies. 
The Port Employers Association, which previously had been the sole employer 
organization, became relegated to status of just one amongst a number of such 
organizations in the post-containerization period. The Association continued to 
represent shipping companies (both conventional and container), and it also 
represented stevedoring companies. The fact that stevedoring companies belonged 
to the PEA was a legacy of the fact that this organization had previously 
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represented both sets of interests, in the days when stevedoring companies were 
smaller and less significant as actors, but had been dominated by the shipping 
companIes. 
In terms of shipping companies, the mainstays of the PEA continued to be the 
Union Steam Ship Company, and the British Conference Lines (some of which 
had formed new subsidiaries to enter into container shipping through companies 
such as Overseas Containers Ltd. and Associated Container Transportation Ltd.). 
To some extent the coastal shipping companies declined in significance after 
containerization (see Broeze 1992). However a fundamental split emerged within 
this organization between the shipping companies and the stevedoring companies. 
In the 1950s independent stevedoring companies were generally small companies 
that were based at a single port (or a handful of ports), and the larger stevedoring 
companies were owned and controlled by shipping companies (see Chapter 8). 
The split that developed reflected the exit of a number of shipping companies 
(primarily the Conference Lines) from stevedoring in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and the rise of the large and commercially aggressive, independent 
'contracting' stevedores like Seaport Operations and Union Maritime Services. 
The interests of these latter companies were not necessarily congruent with those 
of shipping companies.9 This is exemplified by the fact that Seaport Operations, 
one of the two largest specialist stevedoring companies, was one of the leaders in 
establishing the Stevedoring Employers Association. 
The Stevedoring Employers Association (SEA) was formed in November 1978 to 
represent stevedoring companies. Its founding members were the main 
9 Although Union Maritime Services was in fact a subsidiary of the Union Steam Ship Company, it 
contracted for stevedoring work outside of its parent company. As the only other national 
stevedoring company it was Seaport's main competitor (see Chapter 8). 
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independent stevedoring companies that operated on the waterfront. lo Robert 
Owens of Seaport Operations was the main protagonist in forming this 
organization. I I The SEA was formed to represent the interests of the stevedoring 
companies in spheres such as lobbying to keep harbour boards out of stevedoring, 
to attempt to achieve greater unity amongst these companies in bargaining with the 
unions, and to differentiate the interests of stevedoring companies from those of 
the shipping companies that did not act as stevedores (which were represented by 
the PEA). It should be noted, however, that many of the stevedoring companies 
that belonged to this organization also belonged to the PEA. 12 
The third employers' organization, the Container Terminal Operators Association 
(CTOA), was formed in the early 1970s by the organizations that operated the 
country's four container terminals. As such, it comprised three harbour boards 
(Auckland, Lyttelton and Otago), as well as the consortium of shipping companies 
(Container Terminals Ltd.) which operated the container terminal at the Port of 
Wellington. The CTOA was formed primarily to represent these organizations in 
bargaining with the unions whose members made up the 'composite workforce' 
(of watersiders and harbour workers) that worked within the terminals. 
The fourth (albeit peripheral) organization was the Harbour Board Employers 
Union (HBEU). This organization had existed for a number of years and 
represented the harbour boards in negotiating with their principal group of 
employees, the harbour workers. Outside of the container terminals harbour 
boards generally did not 'employ' waterside workers, the exception largely being 
ports where the harbour board was involved in cargo receival and delivery. But 
10 The founding members were as follows: Anchor Dorman, Bay of Plenty Stevedoring, Leonard 
and Dingley, Marine Services and Stevedores, Pufiett and Smith, Seaport Operations, Tapley Swift 
Shipping, D.C. Turnbull and Co., and Union Shipping. 
11 Owens had threatened to break with the PEA as far back as 1965, when he was the managing 
director of Mount Maunganui and Tauranga Stevedores at the Port of Tauranga. 
12 The companies that held dual membership included Pufiett and Smith, Seaport Operations, 
Union Maritime Services, and Bay of Plenty Stevedoring. 
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owing to developments such as demarcation disputes this organization was drawn 
into the field of play that the preceding groups of employers operated within. This 
was also the case insofar as negotiations between waterfront employers and 
watersiders set a benchmark for the negotiations between harbour boards and their 
own employees in the cargo-handling area. The HBEU overlapped with the 
Container Terminal Operators Association insofar as the three harbour boards that 
operated container terminals belonged to both organizations. There were, 
however, considerable differences of interest between the two organizations. 13 
This fragmentation of actors and interests on the employers' side in the wake of 
containerization undermined their organizational capacity with respect to the 
practice of industrial relations. The divisions between the different groups of 
employers rendered it increasingly difficult for them to organize collectively in 
their dealings with the Waterside Workers Federation. In Chapter 11, I will 
demonstrate that the Federation and the port unions exploited this disunity to good 
effect by means of decentralized bargaining. They capitalized upon this increasing 
employer disunity by negotiating special agreements with individual companies 
which divided the employers even further. 
These developments in the 1970s prompted the employers to attempt to form a 
unified and overarching employers' organization that would handle all 
negotiations with the port unions and the Waterside Workers Federation. The 
possibility of forming a new employers' organization was first suggested in 1976. 
A conference was held that year at which the main groups of employers agreed in 
principle to form an overarching organization to represent their interests (see 
13 For example, the regional harbour boards opposed allowing non-cellular and partly cellular 
vessels to be (un)loaded within the container terminals. Because of a restriction imposed by the 
WWF in 1982, these vessels had to be worked outside of the terminals. Consequently, many 
regional ports received a number of these vessels which might otherwise have been worked at the 
container terminal ports. The Container Terminal Operators Association, on the other hand, 
persistently sought to eliminate this restriction (see Chapter 11). 
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Chapter 11). A 'steering committee', compnsmg representatives of the four 
separate employers' organizations, was subsequently established to facilitate the 
formation of a new organization. However the committee faced a number of 
problems in reconciling the different positions of the main employer groupings 
with respect to the nature and role of a new and inclusive employers' organization. 
Significantly, the matters in dispute centered on the composition and 
representative structure of the proposed organization. The tensions amongst the 
different groups of employers on this issue are clearly evident in records of 
discussions which were held at various PEA Management Committee meetings 
during 1976. For example, the minutes of one of the meetings record that: "A 
difference of opinion was . . . apparent as to how far operational employers would 
accept formulation of policy in regard to conditions of employment . . . by the 
proposed Federation.,,14 This tension was indicative of a split between the 
specialist stevedores (such as the container terminal operators and large 
independent stevedoring companies like Seaport Operations) who were 
'operational employers' in the sense of retaining gangs of watersiders from the 
Commission, on the one hand, and the shipping companies - only some of which 
were involved in stevedoring. The issue was the degree of representation that the 
so-called 'non-operational' employers (the shipping companies that were not 
involved in stevedoring) were to have within the new organization. ls 
This internal tension was particularly evident between the container terminal 
operators and the shipping companies. The minutes of a General Meeting of the 
PEA in 1976 contain the following record of a comment by a representative of the 
container terminal operators who was present: 
14 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 638, 19/5/76. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
15 To recap, prior to containerization this type of division did not emerge because the main shipping 
companies (both overseas and coastal) were actively involved in stevedoring either through their 
own stevedoring departments or subsidiary stevedoring companies. 
Many of the shipping lines trading to New Zealand had gone over 
to containers and operated through container terminals where the 
shipowner had no say whatsoever in industrial matters. He felt that 
the time had come for shipowners to have no influence or control 
over negotiations and employment of labour on the waterfront. 16 
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The container terminal operators attempted, in effect, to marginalize the role of the 
shipping companies within the proposed employers' organization. Indeed the 
Chairman of the Port Employers Association, Viv Blakeley, had commented 
earlier at a PEA Management Committee meeting that: 
The attitude of the container terminal operators was dictated by the 
feeling that in a couple of years they would be the major employers 
of waterfront labour and did not want their policy dictated by the 
present set-up on the waterfront.17 
The 'present set-up' was one in which shipping companies, through the PEA,did 
have considerable involvement in industrial matters (although the container 
terminal operators refused to allow the PEA to control the negotiations for the 
composite workforce agreement which regulated the container terminals). 
The Union Steam Ship Company, because its subsidiary Union Maritime Services 
was a major contracting stevedore, spanned the interests both of the shipping 
companies and those of the stevedoring companies. It vehemently opposed the 
attempts by the container terminal operators to marginalize the shipping 
companies. A representative of the company stated at the same meeting that: "it 
was not in the interests of the Union Steam Ship Company to accept second class 
status in comparison with the Container Terminal Operators.,,18 Instead the 
16 General Meeting of the PEA, 19/10176. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 205 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
17 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 646, 18/9176. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
18 Ibid. 
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shipping companies sought equal representation within the new organization 
alongside organizations involved in stevedoring, a proposal that was opposed by 
the container terminal operators. 
These internal divisions were also evident in relation to the nature of the new 
organization regarding whether it should be centralized, with the authority to 
control the actions of its members, or a loose-knit grouping of the already existing 
separate organizations. The container terminal operators wanted an overarching 
organization which allowed its member organizations considerable autonomy. 
The Stevedoring Employers Association, on the other hand, sought to form a 
single unified and centralized organization to which its member organizations 
would delegate all of their dealings with the port unions and the Waterside 
Workers Federation. 
In an attempt to resolve these divisions a 'Council of Waterfront Employers' was 
established in 1978. It was agreed that its members (the PEA, the Container 
Terminal Operators Association, the Stevedoring Employers Association, and the 
Harbour Boards Employers Union) would remain in existence but an overarching 
organization that represented these employer groupings would be created. This 
organization would be given responsibility for dealing with matters of industrial 
relations. 19 
That it took a further three years, until 1981, to form such an organization 
indicates the problems that the divisions between the main interests posed to 
achieving some measure of unity within the employers' camp. The new 
organization was called the New Zealand Association of Waterfront Employers 
(NZA WE). The organization was guided by a council that comprised two 
19 Minutes of PEA/WEU Meeting 705, l3/12/78. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, 
Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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representatives drawn from each of the POli Employers Association (which had 
since been renamed the Waterfront Employers Union), the Container Terminal 
Operators Association, the Stevedoring Employers Association, and the Harbour 
Board Employers Union. At the port level, Port Industrial Committees were 
formed which comprised representatives of each of these groups?O 
NZA WE dealt with the industrial affairs of the Port Employers Association, the 
Stevedoring Employers Association and the Container Terminal Operators 
Association. In negotiations for General Principal Orders the NZA WE negotiating 
team comprised representatives of each of these organizations. Similarly members 
of NZA WE conducted the negotiations for the container terminal composite 
workforce agreement on behalf of the Container Terminal Operators 
Association.21 However the Harbour Board Employers Union occupied an uneasy 
position within this organization from the beginning. While it supported the 
formation of the new organization, the HBEU continued to handle its own 
industrial affairs "pending resolution of its relationship with the Association.,,22 
Tensions emerged between some of the harbour boards at the smaller ports and the 
NZA WE' s Council. For example, when NZA WE sought a drastic reduction in 
bureau register strength numbers at the Port of Bluff in 1986, it was opposed not 
only by the WWF but also the Southland Harbour Board (because of potential of 
this move to reduce the port's trade). This harbour board's 1986 Annual Report 
made reference to: 
the cavalier and high-handed approach adopted by the NZA WE 
Head Office in respect of register strengths during the year. 
20 The actual composition of the committees varied between ports. For example, the Container 
Terminal Operators Association was represented only at ports where container terminals were 
located. 
21 In April 1983 the structure ofNZA WE was altered to allow the Bulk and Homogeneous Shippers 
Association, the main organization representing shippers, to have two representatives on the 
NZA WE Council. 
22 NZAWE Annual Report (1983:4). Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 62 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
[T]his type of attitude is symptomatic of their insensitivity to 
regional ports and their aspirations .... We continue to question the 
present structure of NZA WE and believe that representation on a 
local port basis rather than a national basis would best serve the 
. fh·d 23 Illterests 0 t e III ustry. 
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As a result of such tensions, the relationship between the harbour boards and 
NZA WE was never satisfactorily resolved and the HBEU withdrew from NZA WE 
in June 1987. 
From the point of view ofNZA WE's dealings with the port unions and the WWF 
its strained relationship with the HBEU was relatively insignificant. This is 
because the harbour boards 'employed' only a very small number of watersiders 
alongside harbour workers, who comprised their main group of employees. What 
was significant, however, was the continuing fragmentation in bargaining which 
stemmed from the fact that NZA WE could not force individual firms to delegate 
to it their 'bargaining authority'. The Waterfront Industry Act 1976 had 
established a registration system for companies and stipulated that only registered 
companies could negotiate agreements with the port unions. However the Act did 
not make membership of a legally recognized employers' organization a 
prerequisite to becoming registered. In Chapter 11, I will demonstrate that 
NZA WE experienced difficulty in controlling the actions not only of companies 
that were not members of the organization, but even of some companies that were 
members, insofar as they continued to negotiate special agreements directly with 
the port unions and the WWF. These agreements had a 'rachet effect' of bidding 
up wages and conditions. The port unions and the Federation continued to exploit 
the divisions within the employers camp, as they had done before the formation of 
NZA WE, by using decentralized bargaining to 'split off' individual firms from the 
Association. 
23 Southland Harbour Board Annual Report (1986:14). 
394 
Despite the fOlmation of NZA WE, fragmentation in bargaining continued to be a 
'thorn in the side' of the employers insofar as it undermined their capacity to act 
collectively within the realm of industrial relations. Unity amongst the employers 
was not achieved until the reform of the industry was mooted in the mid-1980s, 
which provided a 'rallying point' for the majority of employers. 
(5) Conclusion 
The period after containerization was characterized by increasing unity on the part 
of the unions, and increasing employer disunity. As I will show in the following 
chapters, under the legislative framework established by the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976 these differing organizational capacities were reflected in the outcomes 
in each of the spheres of employment relations, industrial relations and work 
relations. The dynamic of union strength and employer weakness that these 
outcomes reflected persisted until the mid-1980s, when the legislative and 
institutional supports of the unions began to be challenged by state reformers. 
SECTION FOUR 
WORK, EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
1972-1986 
CHAPTER 10: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 1972-1986 
labour markets are organized systems of conflict among the buyers 
and sellers of labour .... [I]t is important to study historical changes 
in the form of labour market conflict and the processes that have 
operated to undermine and/Dr transform these negotiations. This 
leads to a consideration of which strategies of labour market control 
are most effective over time .... An especially fruitful area would 
be to study changes in strategies of labour [market] control in light 
of changes in ... technologies in concrete historical situations. 
(Fligstein and Fernandez 1988:22-3, emphasis added) 
(1) Introduction 
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This chapter will examine the effects of the major forces for change outlined in the 
previous chapters, principally containerization but also the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976, upon employment relations. In Chapter 4, I employed a model which 
suggests that how labour markets are organized "is a manifestation of power 
relations among the ... [key] actors in labour markets" (Fligstein et. al. 1988:22). 
Container technology had the potential to disrupt the (more or less) stable set of 
power relations which gelled in the break-bulk era; it posed a threat particularly to 
the port unions, which had steadily accumulated control within the labour market 
since 1953. 
However, the effects of containerization on power relations within the labour 
market are not automatically predetermined by any technological 'logic'. Contrary 
to the claims of the Braverman-inspired labour process theorists (see Edwards 
1979), unions and workers are not necessarily disempowered and managerial 
control does not automatically and unambiguously (re )asselt itself following this 
process of technological change. Rather the outcomes of this process are 
dependent on the strategies of the collective actors within the labour market, the 
institutional framework they operate within, the resources they have at their 
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disposal, and the way that these can be mobilized to deal with the challenges 
posed by containerization. 
That the effects of containerization upon power relations between the key actors 
within labour markets are contingent, both in terms of actors' strategies as well as 
outcomes, is amply demonstrated by cases from other countries. The diversity of 
strategies and outcomes is nicely illustrated by differences between ports on the 
West Coast of the United States, which were subject to a 'Mechanization and 
Modernization' agreement settled in 1961 (see Finlay 1988:50-66), and ports on 
the East Coast where a 'guaranteed annual income' was secured in 1966 (see 
DiFazio 1985). As Turnbull et al. (1992:44-5) note, these strategies and outcomes 
were different again in Britain and Australia, where a form of 'permanent 
employment' was established. 
In this chapter I will demonstrate how the strategies of labour market control 
adopted by the key actors on the side of watersiders and of employers in New 
Zealand changed over time III response to the pressures exerted by 
containerization. Similarly, I will examine the changes to the institutional 
arrangements that were made when the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 was passed. 
I will document the effects of each of these forces for change upon power relations 
within, and hence upon the nature of, the labour market. In so doing, I will focus 
on the aspects of the labour market (or, as I have termed it, the sphere of 
employment relations) where the greatest changes occurred. Thus I will 
concentrate mostly on the setting of register limitations and will write less about 
recruitment and the negotiation of bureau rules. 
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(2) Recruitment 
In this section I will examine how the changes in the industry outlined in the 
previous chapters - principally the new Act - affected recruitment practices. I will 
also identify changes both to the degree of 'openness' of the labour market and to 
the 'profile' of the registered workforce. But before engaging in these tasks I will 
briefly revisit the argument which I developed previously. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the state-regulated occupational registration system, 
which was secured in the wake of the 1951 dispute, disrupted the union controlled 
method of recruitment which had previously existed on the waterfront. Following 
the passage of the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 the local branches of Port 
Employers Association formally gained control over access to the register at each 
port. This legislative intervention had significant consequences for the pattern of 
recruitment which developed, when compared to patterns in other countries. 
Whereas studies of ports in Britain and America identify (at least in the break-bulk 
era) 'traditional' patterns of recruitment, that were based on ties of kinship within 
insular occupational communities, in New Zealand the informal ties associated 
with occupational (sub)culture and tradition at the points of entry to the labour 
market were dismantled and replaced by a system which gave employers the sole 
legal right and responsibility of controlling recruitment. The port unions exercised 
no formal influence over access to the register and ipso facto over membership of 
their own organization. 1 
But despite the fact that the Port Employers' Association was given complete 
control over who was to be registered, I demonstrated that the unions at many 
ports were gradually able to regain an element of informal joint control over 
1 To recap, registration automatically conferred the right to union membership (see Chapter 5). 
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registration during the 1950s. This increased as the port unions were rebuilt and 
gained in strength throughout the 1960s. Particular ties (often based on kinship) at 
the local level reasserted themselves as the layer of social relations, which had 
been disrupted by the deregistration of the unions (and watersiders) in the 
aftelmath of the 1951 dispute, was gradually re-established within the formal 
procedures established by the new Act. 
It will be recalled that the port union Federations fought for joint control of 
recruitment right from 1953. One of the primary reasons for this was because 
those who were registered automatically became union members. The importance 
attached by the Federations to gaining formal 'joint control' is indicated by the 
fact that they had pushed for such control (albeit unsuccessfully) when the 
Waterfront Industry Act was amended in 1964. As I noted in the previous chapter, 
the port unions only achieved formal joint control over recruitment when the new 
Waterfront Industry Act was passed in 1976. Under the new Act the responsibility 
for deciding who should be registered at each port was vested in the local Port 
Conciliation Committee. 
Because of the informal arrangements concerning preferential hiring that had been 
secured between the port unions and Port Employers' Association, this legislative 
change merely gave formal assent to an already existing set of practices. 
Furthermore, it applied only to newly recruited men and thus did not affect the 
bureau registers. The unions achieved joint control of recruitment precisely at the 
time, however, when (as I will demonstrate in the next section) recruitment slowed 
almost to a standstill at some ports because of the downward pressures exerted 
upon register strengths by containerization. Lengthy waiting lists existed at some 
ports even in the 1950s and 1960s, but these lists increased markedly following 
containerization, and recruitment practically ceased at many ports in the late 
1970s. 
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It was in the context of static register strengths and joint control of recruitment 
that a furore erupted at the Port of Auckland in the mid-1980s over the use of 
kinship as a basis for recruitment. At this port new workers had not been recruited 
for almost 10 years, vacancies on the register owing to natural attrition having 
been largely filled by permanent transfers from other ports. However, an 
unusually high number of workers who retired in 1985 provided one of the few 
occasions in the post-container period when new recruits were sought (Roth 
1993: 190). A local newspaper published an editorial which was critical of a claim 
by the Auckland Union that, despite public advertising, an anticipated 60 new jobs 
on the waterfront would go to sons of registered watersiders.2 The local Union 
Secretary, Dai Martin, claimed that the port employers had agreed to this figure, 
but the employers denied that any such agreement had been made. In any case, the 
Union's 1986 annual report stated that: "the union was able to have 55 members' 
sons included in the 63 new members even after a news media attack on this 
policy" (quoted in Roth 1993:191). 
Despite the fact that the local unions had achieved a considerable degree of 
informal control of recruitment, some issues were still contested by the employers. 
For example, although some unions had achieved informal agreements over 
preference being granted to watersiders' sons prior to 1976, it is apparent that 
kinship-ties reasserted themselves in earnest after the unions achieved formal joint 
control of recruitment. Undoubtedly, there was at least a grain of truth to the 
popular belief in the 1970s and 1980s that one had to be the 'son of a watersider' 
in order to get ajob on the wharves. 
2 New Zealand Herald, 14/8/85. Roth refers to the same newspaper article in his history of the 
Auckland Union (1993:190). 
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Containerization did not directly affect recruitment because, as I will explain in 
the third section of this chapter, watersiders were selected from bureau registers 
(from the 'internal market', that is) to work in container facilities. However, the 
decline in recruitment in the 1970s, at the time of containerization, was 
accompanied by a series of changes both to the labour market and to the registered 
workforce. Graph 10.1 reveals that rates of labour turnover decreased 
substantially in the early 1970s. This resulted in the labour market becoming more 
'closed' and insular as the vacancies on the registers diminished, and those that 
did occur were filled by permanent transfers from other ports. In tum this marked 
a shift from a series of relatively open localized labour markets, to a closed 
national labour market within which vacancies were filled by transferring men 
from other ports. The greater geographical mobility of the workforce that resulted 
was, paradoxically, a result of decreasing employment opportunities. 
The demographic profile of the workforce also changed considerably during the 
years under consideration. The Waterfront Industry Commission published 
statistics in two periods on the ages of watersiders. The contrast in the age-profile 
of water siders between the two periods is stark. Graphs 10.2 and 10.3, which plot 
these statistics, reveal an aging workforce. There was a steady decline in the '29 
and Under' and '30 to 39' age groups, and considerable growth in the '50 to 59' 
age group. These shifts were reflected in the average age of watersiders, which 
increased from 41.6 years in 1959 to 47.4 years in 1988. Indeed the Waterfront 
Industry Commission was prompted to remark that: "Concern has been expressed 
by both sides of the industry at the relatively high average age of workers at some 
ports" (WIC Report 1984: 17). 
Coupled with decreasing labour turnover rates, these demographic changes 
resulted in an aging, stable workforce. The insularity of the labour market 
increased throughout this period as less workers exited, and those who were 
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registered stayed longer in the industry. This development is undoubtedly linked 
to the economic climate generally, particularly increasing unemployment as the 
postwar 'long boom' ran out of steam in the early 1970s, which discouraged 
workers from leaving the industry. Together with changes to the terms of 
employment, these conditions made work on the waterfront an even more 
attractive proposition than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s (because of high 
wages relative to other blue collar occupations, and flexible work patterns). As 
the furore at Auckland in 1985 illustrates, jobs on the waterfront were vigorously 
sought after, to the point where the issue of recruitment was forced onto the public 
agenda. 
The increased insularity of the labour market contradicts the purported effects of 
containerization which commentators in the labour process tradition identify. 
Mills (1979), for instance, argues that containerization saps occupational 
communities and disrupts the integrity and insularity of labour markets. In pOliS 
in New Zealand, however, the labour market became increasingly insular during 
this period both as downward pressures on register strengths mounted and the 
W aterside Workers Federation achieved greater control of the (albeit diminishing) 
labour supply. While the increasing 'insularity' of the labour market does not 
suggest anything about the degree of 'communality' amongst water siders within 
the labour market, the record of port unions throughout this period, in terms of 
collective action, tends to indicate a considerable degree of social solidarity. In 
any case, the more general point, and one which I will subsequently pursue at 
greater length, is that the effects of containerization are mediated by the way that 
unions effect strategies of labour market closure, rather than being automatically 
prefigured in a mechanical or deterministic fashion by a technological 'logic' at 
the level of the labour process. 
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To recap, because the port unions regained a considerable degree of informal 
control over recruitment prior to the Waterfront Industry Act 1976, there was a 
certain degree of continuity with the preceding period in recruitment practices. 
The most dramatic change in recruitment practices, in the period that this thesis 
examines, occurred with the shift to direct employment in 1989. As in the 
aftermath of the 1951 dispute, employers used their newly acquired control of 
recruitment - this time at the company level - to exclude watersiders who were 
active unionists. The emergence in the post-reform period of this type of 
discriminatory preferential hiring practice will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 13. 
(3) Register Strengths 
(3.1) Shifts in Union and Employer Strategies 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the occupational registration system took the 
labour supply out of competition, and that this had the effect of decentering firms, 
which had to 'externalize' their decisions over the supply of labour to the Port 
Employers' Association. Prior to 1976 register strengths were jointly negotiated 
by the local unions and branches of the Port Employers' Association through the 
medium of the Port Conciliation Committees. Decisions over the labour supply 
were therefore made in a joint manner, at the level of the port, rather than the firm. 
The actual size of the bureau register at each port was a product of the respective 
interests of, and pressures on, the unions and the PEA. In Chapter 4, I identified 
the prosperous economic and replete labour market conditions that formed the 
backdrop to the negotiations between unions and employers over register 
limitations. The proximate conditions, on the other hand, were the immediate 
pressures upon the collective actors. These latter conditions entailed a series of 
trade-offs. Because watersiders received only guaranteed wages if no work was 
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available, the port unions had to attempt to equilibrate the size of the register with 
the amount of 'work opportunity'. In short, this involved trading off numbers of 
registered watersiders (and thus union members) against wage levels. The 
employers, on the other hand, sought to balance labour requirements at ports -
allowing for seasonal fluctuations - against the cost of guaranteed wages paid to 
water siders when no work was available. In short, they attempted to balance 
labour shortages against guaranteed wage payments. 
As a supplement to the registered workforce, casual labour was a decisive variable 
during this period. In effect, casual workers provided a buffer which meant that a 
vast permanent oversupply of labour did not have to be on hand at each port. This 
was in the interests both of the unions and the employers. Casual labour provided 
flexibility both for employers (in covering labour shortages) and for watersiders 
(by allowing them to take days off as desired, and because the registers did not 
have to be 'padded' by employers to the same extent in order to cover seasonal 
fluctuations - which would have decreased watersiders' average earnings). But 
despite the use of 'seagulls' (as the casual workers were known), absolute labour 
shortages still occurred at some ports during this period. 
However, from the late 1960s onwards, considerable changes OCCUlTed in both the 
mediate and proximate conditions which circumscribed the broad limits that 
bureau register limitations were set within. Changes in these influences, in tum, 
resulted in shifts in the strategies of unions and employers in relation to the setting 
of bureau register limitations. As we shall subsequently see, these new strategic 
considerations impacted decisively upon the level of bureau registers in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
The most impOliant change in the proximate conditions was that in the early 1970s 
New Zealand's postwar 'long boom' ended (see Roper 1993:4-5). Levels of trade 
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declined which was reflected in declining levels of shipping activity at most ports. 
Similarly, the absolute labour shortages which previously occurred, not only on 
the waterfront but in industries generally, ceased as structural unemployment 
emerged once again (see Gould 1985; Rosenberg 1986). 
Most importantly, however, for the shifts in the strategies of unions and employers 
regarding the setting of register limitations were a series of changes to proximate 
conditions. Coupled with the decreases in manpower requirements which resulted 
from declining levels of trade, containerization led to considerable downward 
pressures on register strengths. The effect of containerization was felt both 
directly, at the ports where containers were used, and indirectly in leading to the 
decline in levels of shipping to smaller ports, some of which were forced to close 
(see Bush 1980:103-4).3 Because of what Rubery (1994:14), writing in another 
context, refers to as "the influence of the external labour market on the internal 
[labour market]", employers had access to a ready supply of casual labour as 
absolute labour shortages ceased. 
In the context of these conditions, the Port Employers' Association sought to 
reduce the number of registered watersiders at almost all ports. But they could not 
do so unilaterally because of the unions having joint control of register strengths. 
Indeed the situation was very similar to the one in Britain, which Turnbull and 
Wass (1994:5) succinctly summarize, where dockers': 
employment was protected both by the terms of the NDLS, which 
gave the unions joint control (and therefore an effective veto) over 
any decision to reduce the size of the dockers' register, and by an 
agreement dating from 1972 which eschewed the use of 
compulsory redundancies, even in the event of company closures 
(this was the source of the dockers' infamous 'job-for-life'). 
3 As Bush notes, "By the end of 1978 all trade with North America and 80% of general and 
refrigerated cargo to the United Kingdom and Western Europe was containerized" (1980:103). 
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Because New Zealand's port unions, like their British counterparts, had 'joint 
control' over bureau register limitations, any reduction in the numbers of 
registered watersiders had to be negotiated and agreed to. Short of abolishing the 
occupational registration system (which was suggested by employers during the 
Waterfront Conference but was not acted upon by the Government), the Port 
Employers Association had to arrive at a negotiated settlement. As in Britain, an 
agreement was subsequently reached in 1973 that redundancies were to be 
voluntary. 4 
In this context there was a decisive shift in union strategy. Aware of the declining 
levels of work opportunity, and the possibility of redundancies, decisions were 
made by union officials at both the national level and the port level to keep 
register strengths up. Whereas there were numerous instances in the preceding 
period when unions actually sought to keep register strengths down (in order to 
keep the earnings of the rank and file up), and allowing casuals, from the late 
1960s onwards there was a shift in strategy (and policy) towards inflating the 
registers. This resulted in a strategy that could be termed 'labour hoarding', which 
in turn was linked to an attempt to restrict the use of casual labour. 
This shift appears to have occurred in the late 1960s. The earliest evidence I can 
find of it are comments made at the North Island Federation's Conference in 1966. 
The issue of redundancy as a result of technological change was broached at this 
conference, which led to a discussion of register strengths. Ron Wasley, a 
Lyttelton Union committee member, stated that: 
4 Although New Zealand did not ratify ILO Convention 137 regarding containerization, because of 
these institutional arrangements effectively it was observed by default. 
Our register is now higher than before. Our aim should ... be to 
keep registers up and so help to keep non-registered watersiders 
out. 5 
Federation General Secretary Napier replied: 
Some port registers will stand an increase but we don't suggest that 
we should increase the numbers to the embarrassment of those 
already on the register. 6 
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The comment about 'embarrassment' undoubtedly reflects the tension between 
squeezing out casuals by increasing numbers of registered watersiders, and 
maintaining the wage levels of the latter. This tension was eased somewhat in 
1970 when 'permanency' (a forty hour paid week, that is) was achieved. 
A WWF Executive meeting resolved in 1969 to make a further approach to the 
employers, through the medium of the Waterfront Conference, on a number of 
issues including the "elimination of non-unionists" (casual workers, that is). 7 The 
latter was one of the several conditions that a WWF Special Council wanted 
accepted by the employers. However, this move was not without some opposition 
from within the port unions. As I have argued, casual labour was used on the 
waterfront not just because of 'employer preference' because it also had 
advantages for registered watersiders. Watersiders tolerated casual labour because 
it enabled them to keep register numbers down and wage levels up, to the point 
where at some ports they were at odds with their union officials, who opposed 
large numbers of casual workers (see Chapter 4). But it was not just a matter of 
wage levels. Casual workers also provided flexibility for watersiders in relation to 
5 Minutes of North Island Waterfront Workers Industrial Association Conference, 14111166. New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, 
NLNZ). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Executive Meeting, 29/9/69. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 12/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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when they worked, enabling them to take days off (as was allowed for under 
bureau rules) and holidays during busy periods. 
Once again, I must emphasize that casual labour provided flexibility for labour, 
but only because the occupational registration system gave watersiders job 
security. The nature of this flexibility was clearly evident in comments made by a 
delegate at a WWF Conference specially convened in April 1970 to discuss the 
proposals for a new GPO which had emerged from the Waterfront Conference. 
As I noted above, one of the conditions that the WWF sought was the abolition of 
casual labour. On this matter, one of the representatives of the Auckland Union, J. 
O'Brian, expressed his dissatisfaction with the total elimination of casual labour 
precisely because of the 'flexibility' it allowed in the busy season: 
At Christmas time over 700 men were on holiday, 160 on leave and 
compo. I want to take holidays when I want them. 8 
Nonetheless, the emerging consensus on the part of the Federation's officials and 
within the port unions was that casual labour should be abolished. That there was 
a definite swing on the part of watersiders in their attitude towards casual workers 
is indicated by increasing numbers of disputes at the port level over the use of 
, seagulls' .9 
(3.2) Restricting Casual Labour 
An important part of the unions' strategy of abolishing casual labour was the 
seeking of increases in register strengths in order to 'squeeze out' casuals. At the 
8 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Special Conference, 2114170. Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 13/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
9 For example, in October 1971 members of the Napier Union refused to work supplementary hours 
if casuals were employed for day-work. An employers' representative commented that: "the local 
union have been adamant that they do not wish to have any non-union labour employed." Minutes 
of PEA Management Committee Meeting 527, 20/1 0171. Port Employers Association Records, 89-
395, Box 205 (Alexander Twnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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special WWF conference in 1970 Chairman Wasley stated that "it is not intended 
that register strengths be over inflated. The eventual elimination of outside labour 
is a prime objective."IO And at the second biennial conference of the WWF in 
1970, General Secretary Napier expressed in precise terms this view, which was to 
become the policy of the Federation: 
With the changing methods of work generally and the introduction 
of cellular containerization in the not too distant future . . . steps 
have been taken to protect our position .... Limitation of the use of 
non-registered labour with the objective of total elimination and 
voluntary employer financed transfer between ports requiring 
. . b . 11 mcreases m ureau regIsters. 
The first major step in the elimination of casual labour, which Napier alluded to in 
the comment above, occurred as a result of negotiations through the Waterfront 
Conference. As I noted in Chapter 7, the agreement which was encoded in GPO 
305 involved a series of trade-offs by employers against the introduction of 
supplementary hours (a modified form of second shift). The employers 
(particularly the Overseas Shipowners) had been wanting shiftwork to be 
introduced for a number of years in order to extend the hours of work to facilitate 
improved ship turnaround times. A former Port Employers' Association Branch 
Secretary commented: 
10 Ibid. 
the permanent forty hour week . . . [was] one of the things we gave 
away so we could work supplementary hours. The union wouldn't 
call it 'shift work', that was a dirty word. So we called it 
supplementmy hours of work. And we had to give an awful lot 
away to get them. . .. Mind you, it was worth it. . . . We used to 
work to 9 o'clock at night or even 10 o'clock to finish a ship. 
(Interview) 
11 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 23111170. Zealand Waterfront Workers 
Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Ted Thompson, who was then a WWF executive member, described 
supplementary hours as "a major employer gain.,,12 
One of the reasons why the Federation agreed to the provision m GPO 305 
regarding the working of supplementary hours, even though it was opposed at the 
local level and was central to the considerable opposition sparked by the 
Wellington and Auckland unions to the new Order, was that it provided a way of 
maintaining register strengths. At the WWF conference in 1972 General Secretary 
Napier, in what was to be his last report, defended the introduction of 
supplementary hours in the following terms: 
Shortening the hours of work for the individual and the use of the 
maximum number of men, either by supplementary hours or 
negotiated shift work, is one way in which retention of men on the 
Bureau Registers of Port Unions can be materially assisted. While 
not a complete answer to the introduction of modernization with 
possible redundancy problems, it undoubtedly provides for the 
retention of a far greater number of men, working under better 
conditions of employment, than using less men for longer hours. 13 
But register strengths could be sustained in this manner only if the unions could 
restrict the employers' ability to utilize casual labour as a supplement to the 
registered workforce. As well as 40 hours per week pay to all registered 
watersiders irrespective of whether work was available (so-called 'permanent 
conditions of employment'), part of the quid pro quo for the introduction of 
supplementary hours was an agreement to restrict the use of casual labour. With 
respect to the comment by the employers' representative, cited above, this was one 
of the things that was' given away' . 
12 Personal communication, 1/8/94. 
13 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 16/10/72. Zealand Waterfront Workers 
Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/2 (Alexander Turnbull Librmy, NLNZ). 
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The restriction on the use of casual labour was included in the proposals that 
emerged from the Waterfront Conference, and it subsequently became a part of 
GPO 305. As in all Orders since GPO 24 was settled in 1953, GPO 305 contained 
a clause which granted registered waterside workers preference at each port and 
allowed for non-registered workers to be used when registered workers were not 
available. However the clause had had appended to it a note which further 
restricted the extent to which casual labour could be used. The note stated that: 
It is the objective of the parties to work together at each port to 
reduce to the fullest extent possible and to eventually eliminate as 
far as is practicable, the need to go outside the registered labour 
force to meet the requirements for waterside work. 14 
In order to achieve this reduction, it was further stipulated that registered workers 
had to accommodate these changes during the busy season (which was the source 
of criticism from the watersider quoted above, regarding holidays): 
To lessen the impact of seasonal peak requirements in the industry, 
registered waterside workers will be expected to make themselves 
available for work to the fullest extent required in accordance with 
the terms of the Order and to accept reasonable staggering of their 
annual holidays to avoid large numbers of men being absent from 
work during peak and seasonal demands for labour. 15 
However, the crux of the agreement was a stipulation relating to the establishment 
of subsidiary registers. On the one hand, it was stated that "the industry would 
suffer by the total elimination of the employment of other than full-time members 
of the Bureau Registers", as situations would arise when there were insufficient 
registered watersiders available, but to deal with these situations "in a manner 
more acceptable to the regular waterside workers", it was agreed that subsidiary 
registers could be established by the local Port Conciliation Committee at ports 
14 GPO 305, Clause 39, Note 1. 
15 GPO 305, Clause 39, Note 3. 
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where they were required. 16 The subsidiary registers were to be comprised of 
registered watersiders who had retired and "other approved workers". This 
agreement supplemented the 1953 (and later the 1976) Waterfront Industry Act 
which had created a bureau register at each port. 
Changes at this time in the labour market strategies of the key actors were 
registered in some of the interviews that I conducted. A former Waterfront 
Industry Commission Branch Manager, who had over 35 years experience at three 
different ports, recalled a definite change in the early 1970s in the unions' attitudes 
towards register strengths: 
When I first started they wanted to keep it [ the register] down. But 
once they had permanency this changed .... You'd get the wharfies 
wanting to increase the register. . . . When they brought in 
permanency it got rid of casuals. That put the upsurge on the 
strengths. We used to take up that flow by using casuals .... That 
put pressure on, including shipowners wanting more men at times 
too, because their ships are lying idle and its costing them a 
fortune. Particularly when its the height of the export season when 
all the ports are busy. (Interview) 
Similarly, the former Secretary of the PEA at Lyttelton recalled how, in the early 
1970s, the employers at this port were increasingly subject to pressure from the 
local union to increase register strengths: 
It was worth the world to keep it right up, you see, because then 
when men left they were paid redundancy money .... After that it 
was their principle to keep the register way up. Because we would 
normally have natural attrition, men leave, and it would fall down. 
And then the Union would say 'oh no, we'll put it back up to where 
it was', and we'd say 'there's no reason to do it'. And that's when 
the argument came because the only reason they wanted it to go 
back up was because every time a man left he got redundancy. 
(Interview) 
16 GPO 305, Clause 39, Note 4. 
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The two quotations capture different elements in the equation: although casuals 
were not (as the former quotation implies) eliminated altogether when 'permanent 
employment' was first introduced in 1970, this latter did somewhat ease the 
pressure that the size of the register exerted upon watersiders' wage levels, which 
meant that unions could work to build register strengths up, while at the same time 
working to 'squeeze out' the remaining casuals. Redundancy agreements were 
then negotiated on the basis of replete registers. 
Once again, I must stress that achieving 'permanent conditions of employment' at 
12 of the country's ports eased the pressure on the unions, regarding balancing 
numbers of workers against the amount of 'work opportunity' that was available at 
each port, and thus against wage levels. To recap, 'permanent employment' did 
not mean that watersiders were directly employed by stevedoring companies, nor 
even that they were allocated on a long-term basis to these companies, but rather 
that they were paid the equivalent of 40 hours per week irrespective of whether 
work was available. To be sure, this did not mean that watersiders qua individuals 
had a complete disincentive to be allocated to work, for basic wages were not the 
only component in wages; also included were bonus payments (which were pooled 
and shared out on the basis of time worked), rates negotiated on the job, and so 
forth. However, the 40 hour week payment comprised a greater proportion of total 
wages paid than guaranteed wages did in the previous period. 17 This meant that 
the unions did not, to the same extent, have to balance the size of bureau registers 
against the amount of 'work opportunity' that was available at each port. In tum, 
this provided the port unions with the opportunity to seek substantial increases in 
register strengths. 
17 Because no statistics on wage levels were published by the Waterfront Industry Commission 
during the 1970s, in making this claim I am relying on information obtained from interviews I 
conducted with watersiders. The following comment by a watersider is typical: "When we changed 
to Order 305 the wages jumped up, because the hours changed. And it was part of the scheme that 
they'd built in evelything." 
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Bureau registers were systematically renegotiated in 1971. Graph 10.4 
demonstrates that a disparity between bureau register limitations and the actual 
register strengths had developed in the few years prior to this time. As one of the 
Commission's reports notes, "The large differences between the agreed limitation 
and the actual strength of the bureau register has developed since 1966. This is 
because of an agreement not to revise bureau limitations during the Waterfront 
Conference" (WIC Report 1969:12). In 1971, after the Conference was brought to 
a conclusion, register limitations were decreased by 566 positions but the actual 
register strengths were increased considerably - more men were taken on to offset 
the working of supplementary hours, coupled with the restriction on casual labour. 
At the 1970 WWF Conference, General Secretary Napier announced that: 
"agreements have been reached in several ports to further increase their 
membership substantially to replace the previous use of non-registered labour.,,18 
The 1971 WIC Report stated: "To compensate in some measure for the limited use 
of non-registered labour, the bureau strength was increased by 756 men from 5965 
at 30 September 1970 to 6721 at 30 September 1971" (WIC Report 1971:4)19 As 
Graph 10.4 shows, this increase brought the register strengths back into line with 
register limitations (given the 5% tolerance which existed). 
In line with the agreement embodied in GPO 305, subsidiary registers were 
created in late 1970 and 1971 at a number of ports which had "permanent 
conditions of employment" (WIC Report 1971:12). This agreement was 
implemented at the port level by negotiations between unions and the local 
branches of the PEA through the medium of the Port Conciliation Committees. 
For instance, the bureau rules at the Port of Taranaki in 1971 contained a clause 
18 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 23111170. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1411 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
19 In 1980, while reflecting back on the outcomes of the Waterfront Conference, WWF General 
Secretary Ted Thompson commented that: "In 1969 our strength was 5900 and in 1971 it was 
6800. We rode a winner and secured jobs." Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 
20/10/80. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/6 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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specifically relating to the use of non-registered labour which stated that the 
proportion of such labour drawn at anyone time from the subsidiary register was 
limited to 10% of the bureau register strength,z° A similar agreement was 
incorporated within bureau rules which were ratified at a Port Conciliation 
Committee meeting at the Port of Timaru in November 1970,z1 While the 
subsidiary register at the Port of Auckland had a total of 245 workers on it, outside 
of holiday periods, the number of workers from the register who were allowed to 
work each day was limited to those required to fill vacancies caused by registered 
men being off work. Similarly, at Lyttelton there was a subsidiary register of 50, 
of which 35 could work on a daily basis.22 
These examples appear to be typical and it seems that, in practice, finite 
restrictions on the use of casual labour from subsidiary registers was common. 
Furthermore, at some ports the subsidiary register was prioritized: the former 
Secretary of the Port Employers' Association branch at Lyttelton recalled that "we 
had a limited number of 35. Well my son was number one and the President of 
the Waterfront Workers Union's son was number two on this list" (interview). 
Thus the port unions (by agreement with the employers) established their own 
registers, to complement the registers established by the Waterfront Industry Act 
1953. Consequently, at most ports during the 1970s there was not one register, but 
two: a bureau register and a (union-sponsored) subsidiary register. The unions 
used the subsidiary registers as a 'tool' to control the labour supply. This type of 
register provided the unions with a way of 'sealing' the labour market, which was 
cross-cut by seasonal work, on a national basis. 
20 Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 49,5/473 (National Archives). 
21 Ibid. 
22 PEA Annual Report, 31/3/74. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 130 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Although actual estimates of numbers of casual workers were not published by the 
Waterfront Industry Commission after 1959, the percentage of wages and 
allowances paid to non-registered (i.e. casual) workers can be used as an index of 
the actual number of casual workers on the waterfront. From Graph 10.5, which 
plots these figures, it can be seen that the numbers of casual workers declined 
sharply in 1971-72. 
Although initially there was some resistance from watersiders at the local level 
towards moves to restrict casual labour (recall the statement, cited earlier, by the 
water sider who wanted his holidays during the busy period), pressure began to 
increase from the rank and file to limit the use of casual labour. In 1972 a dispute 
occurred over the use of non-registered workers at Bluff, which was caused by 
watersiders not accepting that casual workers could work on days when 
watersiders were off work after having worked protracted supplementary hours?3 
And at a WWF executive meeting in 1972 one of the executive members argued 
that the Federation should attempt to "drop all non-unionists.,,24 Union delegates 
at the WWF conference in 1976 expressed the same sentiment. P. Belton of the 
Nelson Union remarked that "Nelson had tried to do away with non-union labour 
years ago", while P. Leneghan of the Auckland Union maintained that "there 
should not be any non-unionists.,,25 
As Graph 10.5 demonstrates, casual labour was gradually 'squeezed out' by the 
unions during the 1970s. How, then, did the employers deal with their fluctuating 
labour requirements? Principally in two ways: To some extent they were forced to 
incorporate provision for seasonal fluctuations into register numbers. For 
23 Minutes ofWWF Executive Meeting, 5/7/72. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 
92-305, Box 12/7 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
24 Ibid. 
25Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10/76. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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example, in a letter sent to the PEA General Secretary in 1974, the Timaru PEA 
Branch Secretary wrote: 
As there seems little likelihood of ever returning to the previous 
situation where we had available and were able to employ a large 
number of non-Unionists we have no alternative but to maintain the 
Register at a strength sufficient to cope with the seasonal 
. 26 reqmrements. 
However, this was extremely costly under 'permanent conditions of employment' 
because the numbers of watersiders could not then be reduced after the busy 
period had ended, and their wages had to be funded out of the National 
Administration Fund levy. This caused particular problems at the major fruit 
exporting ports of Nelson and Napier. It was at these ports that the system of 
temporary interport labour transfers was first introduced. This system was 
actually suggested by the Waterside Workers' Federation General Secretary, Ted 
Thompson. He vividly recalls how temporary interport transfers came about: 
there arose a situation in the 1970s where surpluses of labour 
existed at Port Chalmers and acute shortages were occurring at fruit 
loading ports. . . . During an interport first aid competition being 
held at Wellington the then Secretary of the Port Chalmers 
Watersiders Union raised the matter with myself and Mr Arthur 
Bockett, the Chairman and General Manager of the Waterfront 
Industry Commission, in an informal way. I developed this more 
fully shortly thereafter and the Commission did a quick assessment 
of projected costs and anticipated savings and we quickly got the 
matter under way?? 
There had been a similar arrangement during World War Two which served as a 
precedent, and interport transfer clauses remained in the Supplementmy Principal 
Orders at some ports after the war ended. But, as Ted pointed out, these clauses 
were "really a carry over from earlier days, used during the war years, and separate 
26 Letter from S. Thomas to V. Blakeley, 4/1/73. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 
130 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
27 Personal Communication, 4/9/94. 
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and distinct from the large scale arrangements made for the busy periods at export 
ports in the 1970s,,?8 
The Port Employers Association agreed to this arrangement because, given the 
restriction on casual labour, it was cheaper than seeking new additions to the 
register. And, insofar as it was funded collectively, it cost individual employers 
considerably less than labour shortages would have. This system was gradually 
extended to other ports during the 1970s. The former Commission Branch 
Manager at Lyttelton, where men were frequently transferred to from Timaru and 
Port Chalmers, stated in an interview that: 
It wasn't as expensive as you'd think. The shipowners didn't make 
the agreement for nothing. The men down there were getting paid to 
do nothing. And they've got a ship laying idle which is costing them 
thousands a day and not a bloody ton of cargo going on or off. But 
we'd fly those guys up and put them up in a good hotel, and then they 
got so much a day out of living expenses, and then we picked up the 
tab for their board. (Interview) 
Ted recalls that there was "a degree of resentment from shipowners who did not 
directly benefit but who were obliged to contribute to the levy charges.,,29 
However, as one the Commission's annual reports noted: 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
While interport transfers do involve payments through the 
commission's National Administration Fund by way of travelling 
and accommodation expenses they are of some value to all sections 
of the waterfront industry in cushioning the effects of reduced 
availability of work at the workers' home port and reducing the 
effects of short-term seasonal peaks which would be prohibitively 
expensive to meet by permanent additions to the register (WIC 
Report 1974:13). 
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Under this aITangement watersiders volunteered for transfer and were selected by 
the local bureau. Transfers were usually for one week, travelling and 
accommodation expenses were paid for by the Commission, and the watersiders in 
question also received a transfer allowance. As far as I am aware, this system of 
shuttling workers between ports was unique to New Zealand, and testified to the 
success of the Waterside Workers Federation in restricting casual labour. This 
system increased in importance at ports throughout the country as the port unions 
gradually squeezed casual labour out of the industry.3o In 1980, WWF President 
Ray Fergus commented that: "The improvement and vastly expanded use of ... 
[temporary] transfers has of course gone hand in hand with the abolition of non-
union [labour].,,31 
(3.3) Redundancy Agreements 
At the same time as casuals were initially restricted, pressure was mounting for 
some form of redundancy agreement. The Commission stated in its annual report 
for 1972 that: 
The increasing tonnages of cargo handled by the Government 
Railways inter-island feITies, the Union Steam Ship Co. coastal and 
trans-Tasman roll-on / roll-off ships, and the introduction of 
cellular container ships in the overseas trade has caused a 
redundancy problem at a number of New Zealand ports. (WIC 
Report 1972:3) 
When a new GPO 347 was negotiated in April 1973, "it was agreed that 
negotiations on redundancy would commence as soon as practicable" (ibid:4).32 
30 By 1981, "each of the country's 18 ports transferred men to other ports, while 16 of the ports 
required assistance and 16 ports were at times both a donor and recipient port" (WIC Report 
1981:14). 
31 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/10/80. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
32 Appendix 4, clause 1, of GPO 347 states: "That to avoid delaying the implementation of the 
other provisions of this General Principal Order negotiations will be commenced as soon as 
practicable with a view to establishing a formula as to terms and conditions under which men will 
leave the industly where at any port the number of men on the Bureau Register is surplus to 
continuing requirements." 
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A redundancy agreement was reached between the Port Employers' Association 
and Waterside Workers' Federation in June 1973. This agreement was 
subsequently confirmed by the Waterfront Industry Tribunal.33 Except at some of 
the smaller ports, where it was agreed between the PEA and the WWF that the 
register be discontinued, under this agreement all redundancies were to be 
voluntary. Indeed, General Secretary Ted Thompson remarked to a WWF 
conference that: 
this organization has one of the best redundancy provisions in a 
national agreement in this country, when we wish to utilize it. And 
we are the only industrial organization that has been able, at least to 
date, to determine when such should apply.34 
Redundancies were negotiated on a port-by-port basis (although, as we shall see, 
the employers subsequently attempted to have the related issue of register 
strengths considered on a national basis). Typically, representatives of the WWF 
and the PEA, with involvement of their local branches at the port in question, 
would negotiate over the numbers by which the local bureau register was to be 
reduced, together with the "maximum number of waterside workers in each 
classification and/or age group that should be permitted to cancel their 
registration.,,35 Also there was a provision that watersiders at ports where the 
register was discontinued could, by agreement, permanently transfer to other ports. 
The parties then applied to the Waterfront Industry Tribunal for a 'Declaration of 
Redundancy'. As GPO 357 stated: 
Immediately after the making of a declaration of redundancy, the 
New Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation will invite and 
encourage its members within the agreed classification and / or age 
33 This agreement was incorporated retrospectively into GPO 347. 
34 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/10/80. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/6 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
35 GPO 357, Appendix 4, Clause 2(c). 
groups at the port to indicate their willingness to leave the industry 
with redundancy benefits or to transfer to an agreed port.36 
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The GPO also stated that: "the parties will jointly examine the question of Bureau 
Register strengths at all ports".3? 
Although register strengths were influenced by industrial agreements (the GPO 
and local Orders), particularly the clauses which set out gang sizes, until this time 
register strengths were set through a series of negotiations at the local level which 
were separate from negotiations over these agreements. However, the registers 
could now be reduced by means of jointly agreed redundancy orders negotiated, 
not through the provisions of the Waterfront Industry Act, but rather under the 
terms of the agreement contained in the General Principal Order. As we shall see, 
after the Waterfront InduStlY Act was revamped in 1976, this became a source of 
tension as conflicts developed between the agreements and sets of rules 
established in each of the spheres which I have termed 'employment relations' and 
'industrial relations'. 
The first port where redundancies occurred was the small port of Raglan where, in 
September 1973, the register was closed which resulted in 36 redundancies. Early 
in 1974 further redundancy orders were applied for, and under the terms of the 
orders "81 men at Wellington, 53 at Lyttelton, and 20 at Taranaki elected to 
terminate their employment" (WIC Report 1974:5). The following year there 
were redundancies at the Port of Tauranga/Mount Maunganui, as well as at the 
minor ports of Wanganui and Oamaru where the registers were closed (WIC 
Report 1975:20). 
36 GPO 357, Appendix 4, Clause 5. 
37 GPO 357, Appendix 4, Clause 15. 
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However, some of the port unions refused to negotiate redundancy agreements. At 
the port level - from the unions' point of view - building up register strengths, and 
eliminating casual labour, was a necessary prerequisite to establishing any sort of 
effective redundancy agreement. Because casuals supplied a 'buffer', which 
allowed the registers to be set at levels below the amount of labour required at the 
busiest times, the unions took the view that this buffer had to be eliminated and 
registers built up before they could then be reduced through voluntary 
redundancies. The situation at the Port of Auckland at this time was slightly 
different to most other ports insofar as the employers sought in 1973 to increase 
register strengths by 30 men. However, the Auckland Union sought a much larger 
increase as a prelude to addressing the issue of redundancy for older men. Ted 
Thompson, then the Assistant General Secretary of the WWF, remarked at the 
time that: "it would be difficult to get a redundancy payment while the register is 
below strength.,,38 
The Port Employers Association began to apply increasing pressure to the 
Federation to reduce the size of bureau registers through redundancies. The 
effects of containerization impacted strongly in the mid-1970s and were 
compounded by the deteriorating economic situation: the 1973/4 oil shocks struck 
hard in New Zealand and led to declining levels of trade (see Roper 1993; Gould 
1985). As the 1975 WIC Report incisively observed: 
The high level of demand created by the substantial increase of 
imports in 1973-74 had offset much of the diminished requirements 
for waterside labour which were developing as a result of the 
introduction of container services and extended use of roll-on 1 roll-
off services. With the sudden cessation of this excess demand the 
waterfront industry has been confronted once again with serious 
problems of financing very large payments of guaranteed wages 
from a falling income (WIC Report 1975:3). 
38Minutes of WWF Executive Meeting, 13/12/73. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 12/7 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Graph 10.6 demonstrates the significant increase in labour surpluses that occurred 
at this time. It was at this point that the employers applied pressure to drop older 
watersiders on the register (particularly those over 60). 
Even after the 'adjustments' made in the wake of the Waterfront Conference, and 
the redundancy orders at some ports, a number of port unions continued to seek 
increases in the bureau register. However the Port Employers Association 
responded by seeking to defer negotiations over registers at the port level to a 
discussion of register strengths at a national level. A comment by one of the 
representatives of the Lyttelton Union at a WWF executive meeting in 1974 
clearly indicate this shift in approach on the part of the employers: 
Mr Wasley stated that the Union was constantly endeavouring to 
force the employers to build up the bureau register but the employers 
have referred the question to the general situation of bureau registers 
at all portS.39 
In November 1974 representatives of the WWF met with PEA officials. At this 
meeting the employers proposed register limitations for all ports (i.e. that the issue 
be considered on a national basis). Discussions of these limitations were linked to 
the negotiation of redundancy agreements at each individual port. These 
discussions, however, led only to small reductions in register limitations at the 
ports of Auckland and Mount Maunganui. Nonetheless, the employers got their 
wish for register strengths to be considered nationally when the Waterfront 
Industry Act 1976 was passed. But because of the institutional arrangements that 
it created, this was by no means a straightforward matter. 
39 Minutes of WWF Executive Meeting, 26/11174. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 1217 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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(3.4) The Reconstituted Waterfront Industry Commission 
To recap, the new Act attempted to rework the institutional anangements 'from 
the center'. The Act marked a shift from a non-representative Commission under 
the direction of a sole Commissioner, which was coupled to decentralized 
authority in the setting of register strengths and in the negotiation of bureau rules, 
to a representative Commission which at a national level exercised centralized 
authority over these things. Under the Act responsibility for setting bureau 
register limitations (and establishing bureau rules) shifted from the local Port 
Conciliation Committees to the reconstituted Waterfront Industry Commission. 40 
Consequently, the setting of bureau register strengths was switched from the port 
level to the national level. 
This legislative intervention created a new corporate actor, the reconstituted 
Commission, with its own set of interests. As I demonstrate below,. the 
Commission's interests centered particularly on fulfilling its legislative functions 
(which in some areas were unclear), legitimating its authority to act decisively 
relative to the key private actors, and not acting in a manner which caused it to be 
publicly embarrassed. In a number of cases the members of the Commission 
simply did not know how to go about fulfilling their statutory obligations. The 
way in which this role was negotiated hinged on the manner in which members of 
the Commission positioned it relative to the already well-established (and 
powerful) national organizations of employers and watersiders, and also to the 
local branches of these organizations and the Port Conciliation Committees. 
The new role of the Commission exacerbated the tensions between the national 
and the local, between centralized and decentralized decision making, which 
40 Under the Act the Commission was reconstituted as a representative body, comprising two 
members representing the employers, two members representing the port unions, and an 
independent chairman. Note that the representatives were not the leaders of the national PEA or 
WWF but rather individuals with considerable experience within the industry, who were drawn 
from the local branches of these organizations. 
424 
existed previously. Under the Waterfront Industry Act 1953 decisions over 
register strengths and bureau rules were made locally. However the reconstituted 
Commission was charged with the responsibility for making decisions at the 
national level on these local matters. The difficulties that arose when the 
Commission attempted to determine register limitations are indicative of the 
problems inherent in superimposing a national administrative framework onto a 
locally-based set of arrangements, which to a certain extent would always have to 
be based on local differences. 
In setting register strengths, the Commission needed the involvement of the local 
actors on each side because, although these actors might disagree, only they could 
know the broad labour requirements at the port level. Indeed the Act states that 
"investigation and consideration of the opinions of the unions of employers and 
workers at the port" was required, prior to the Commission setting register 
strengths at the port level.41 But the problem was that the Commission's 
members did not know what the role of negotiations between the local actors, 
typically via the Port Conciliation Committees, should be in the decision-making 
process. 
At the Commission' s inaugural meeting in April 1977 it was agreed that letters 
should be written to the WWF and the PEA to get their views regarding register 
strengths. 42 Although these letters were subsequently sent, the replies received 
were in a number of cases less than satisfactory. For instance, the minutes of a 
meeting of the Commission in August 1977 recorded that correspondence had 
been received from Lyttelton which indicated that, at least at this port, there was a 
degree of uncertainty as to the Commission's powers in the setting of bureau 
41 Waterfront Industry Act 1976, s 9(l)c. 
42 Minutes of the Waterfi'ont Industry Commission, Meeting 1, 13/4177. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
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register strengths.43 Interestingly enough, this was mirrored in similar uncertainty 
on the part of the Commission's members. The point at issue was the 'tolerance', 
incorporated in the GPO, which allowed register strengths (the actual number of 
workers on the register, that is) to vary by 5% above or below the agreed register 
limitation at each port. 
At the next meeting (in September 1977) the Chairman of the Commission, Mr T. 
Small, commented that the Port of Onehunga would be worthwhile using as a 
"guinea pig" for the setting of register strengths.44 The use of this phrase 
illustrates the uncertainty on the part of the Commission's members in relation to 
this issue. The employers and the union at Onehunga, through the medium of the 
local Port Conciliation Committee - Chairman Small explained - had both 
submitted a figure with a 5% tolerance. The problem was that the Act stated that 
the Commission was required to set the number of workers on registers - which 
implies a fixed number - and made no distinction between limitations and 
strengths, such as the 5% tolerance allowed. The tolerance was provided for in a 
clause contained in the GPO, whereas the Commission's powers were defined 
under the Act, which resulted in an area of ambiguity. Indeed, the Commission 
was somewhat divided on this matter. The union representative, Mel Foster, 
argued that the Act superseded the GPO. However the Chairman disagreed, 
stating that they were: 
all working on the assumption that the tolerance did apply. Neither 
the 1953 Act nor the 1976 Act specifically mentioned 'tolerance'. 
It was covered in the GPO and it appeared it was a method used to 
cover the highs and lows.45 
43 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 8, 23/8/77. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
44 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 9, 13/9/77. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
45 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 9, 13/9/77. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
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This confusion exemplifies tensions inherent in the labour market being regulated 
in such a manner that it was systematically separated from the way that the formal 
rules governing work were negotiated, with different sites of regulation, separate 
bargaining procedures, and separate sets of rules regulating each of these spheres. 
(As I argued in a previous chapter, the distinction I have drawn between 
employment and industrial relations corresponded to a real set of arrangements on 
the waterfront.) 
The Commission subsequently set the size of the register at Onehunga with a 
tolerance. It did stipulate, however, that applications needed to be made directly 
to the Commission rather than through the Port Conciliation Committee. This 
latter ruling foreshadowed subsequent ambivalence on the part of the Commission 
over the extent to which the actors at the local level could bargain over strengths 
through the PCCs (as opposed to each party submitting a figure to . the 
Commission and it making the final decision). Indeed the confusion raised by the 
5% tolerance clause in the GPO was repeated in relation the sections of the GPO 
which stipulated that the key actors had an obligation (but also a right) to negotiate 
over register strengths and redundancies. This centered on the potential conflict 
between the Commission setting register limitations as required under the Act, and 
the unions and employers negotiating register limitations, as part and parcel of 
declarations of redundancy as set out in the GPO. 
At some ports, particularly those where the parties agreed (such as Port Chalmers), 
register strengths were set without much difficulty during 1978. In effect, all the 
Commission did was to rubber stamp an agreement which had been reached at the 
local level. However, at ports where agreement could not be reached at the local 
level, and where it seemed that the Commission would have to make a decision, 
considerable difficulties arose. The Port of Auckland is a case in point. It appears 
that the Commission was reluctant to intervene, with one of the union 
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representatives on the Commission stating that: "while there is a possibility of 
agreement being reached between the principal parties the Commission should not 
attempt to interfere.,,46 Undoubtedly part of this unwillingness was that members 
of the Commission (both the employer and the union representatives) did not 
know what to do - in the sense of what their powers were relative to the key actors 
at the local level - and were concerned about overstepping the mark. One of the 
employers' representatives suggested that perhaps they should: 
confirm the present undertakings that it was a decision of the 
Commission to determine register strengths and the prerogative of 
the Port Conciliation Chairman to ensure that these decisions were 
abided by.47 
The other employers' representative went as far as to comment that, in relation to 
setting register strengths, he felt "confused" as to what the responsibilities of the 
Commission were under the Act relative to the provisions in the GPO which 
permitted negotiations at the port level. One of the union representatives replied 
that: 
If it had been meant that the Commission was to be the sole arbitrator 
then all the clauses in the GPO should have been deleted. If the 
Commission was going to be set up and used to interfere with the 
rights of parties to negotiate then there would be all kinds of 
trouble.48 
It appears that the Commission's members were wary of overstepping the limits of 
their authority and getting embroiled in, or even causing, a dispute. One of the 
employers' representatives (D. Binnie), in an attempt to seek legitimation for their 
authority to act, said that he felt they "had to obtain a legal opinion as to what was 
46 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 19, 26/7/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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really important, the Act or the General Principal Order.,,49 The other employers' 
representative (R. Dawson) opined that if the Commission "did not take steps to 
adjust the level [of bureau registers] ... then it was not carrying out its primary 
function to ensure the efficiency of the industry."so A resolution was passed at 
this meeting which stated that negotiations over register strengths should be 
decided by the employers and unions themselves, but if such an agreement could 
not be reached then the Commission should determine the matter. 
Despite this resolution, at the next meeting of the Commission the issue was 
raised once again. Once again, the bone of contention was the extent of 
involvement of the unions and employers, and the importance of negotiations 
between them in the setting of register strengths relative to the Commission's role. 
Mr Ritchie (one of the Commission's union representatives) remarked that the 
Waterside Workers Federation "would not try to tell the Commission that it had 
no rights at all but there was provision under the [General] Principal Order for the 
parties to negotiate on this matter."SI Mr Binnie, on the other hand, argued that 
the Commission did have the authority under the Act to set bureau register 
limitations. Chairman Small summed up the situation by stating that: 
to be effective and correct in what a bureau limitation might be, he 
felt it was the desire of members that there should be agreement 
between the parties .... The first principle would be if the parties 
agree, then the Commission would consider if [it was] right and 
proper.S2 
The legal opinion which had been obtained on the potential conflict between the 
Act and the General Principal Order was that the Commission was empowered to 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
5! Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 20, 29/8/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
52 Ibid. 
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vary register strengths both up and down. 53 But, despite this opinion, the 
members of the Commission still sought in earnest to have the WWF and PEA 
reach agreement on the size of bureau registers at the port level. 
Part of the Commission's brief was to determine register strengths for all ports. 
The frustration of the Commission in attempting to facilitate negotiations between 
the PEA and WWF over register strengths (which were intertwined with 
negotiations over redundancies) is apparent its 1978 Annual Report: 
Towards the end of 1977 the commission arranged to hold ... [a] 
meeting with the main parties in the waterfront industry .... It was 
expected that bureau registers could be discussed at this meeting. 
By February 1978 when the meeting was held the Waterside 
Workers' Federation had already had some discussions on 
redundancy with the Waterside Employers' Union. As the year 
proceeded and the drastically reduced level of employment became 
more and more apparent, . . . so the discussions on redundancy 
continued .... In June 1978 the commission requested the parties 
to inform it on the state of negotiations as it was very concerned at 
having to defer the fixing of bureau registers .... On 2 November 
1978 the commission again wrote to the parties expressing concern 
at the apparent lack of progress and advising them of its intention 
to hold meetings for the purpose of obtaining the opinions of the 
parties at each port which are needed before a new bureau register 
can be determined. . . . The time taken before it became possible to 
proceed with meetings which will lead to the determination of new 
register strengths has been prolonged. The commission would wish 
that it had been shorter (WIC Report 1978:5-6). 
The minutes of the meeting of the Commission in November 1978, where it was 
resolved to write to the unions and the employers, are particularly instructive 
regarding its members' unwillingness to act without the cooperation of, and input 
from the private actors. The minutes also indicate the pressure that members of 
the Commission felt, particularly insofar as it was a new organization, given 
certain statutory responsibilities under the Act. It seems that the main thing the 
53 Minutes of the Water1i-ont Industry Commission, Meeting 21, 28/9/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
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members of the Commission were worried about was preserving its public 'face'. 
The following statement is the record of a comment made by one of the union 
representatives (S. Ritchie) regarding the lack of agreement between the PEA and 
the WWF over revising register strengths: 
if the matter took much longer to reach agreement neither the 
Employers' Union or the Federation would be the villains, it would 
be the Commission. The Commission was in a very vulnerable 
position because of the Act. They had already received letters from 
the Auckland Port Employers Union and some Harbour Boards and if 
they all ganged up the Commission would be held responsible and 
the parties let off the hook. 54 
To some degree, it appears that the private actors exploited the area of uncertainty 
between the Act and the GPO. F or instance, the WWF refused to bargain with 
employers over register limitations until the issue of redundancies for men aged 
60-65 was resolved, yet at the same time they insisted that they had the right to 
have an input into the setting of these limitations (which the Commission was 
under pressure to finalize). 
It should be reiterated that the Commission actually wanted the parties to negotiate 
over this issue. As well as sending letters to the PEA and WWF which once again 
pointed out the Commission's obligations under the Act and expressed concern at 
the lack of progress, the members of the Commission also instructed its Branch 
Managers to convene meetings of employers and the unions at the local level to 
get opinions about labour requirements "preparatory to the WIC setting the 
required bureau strengths at all portS.,,55 The minutes record the following 
comment by R. Dawson (an employers' representative): 
54 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 22, 1111/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
55 Ibid. 
while register limitations would be decided on a national basis there 
must be some sort of negotiations on a local basis for the 
Commission to make responsible decisions on what would be 
needed.56 
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This expresses the difficulties associated with a national administrative body being 
given responsibility for matters which always would have to be influenced by 
interests at the local level (as only the local actors could know the manpower 
requirements of each port). It is apparent from the minutes of the Commission's 
meetings that, despite the resolutions it had previously passed, its members had 
not at this point decided how far to intervene if agreement at the local level could 
not be reached. 
The procedure that was finally adopted is as follows. Following the meetings with 
representatives of the employers and unions, which were convened at the port 
level by the Commission's Branch Managers, the parties made submissions on 
register strengths to the Commission. These submissions were then passed on to 
the head offices of the PEA and WWF, and the Commission met with their 
national representatives in Apri11979 (WIC Report 1979:5). It appears from the 
Commission's minutes that at a number of ports agreements were reached by the 
parties themselves, including the Port of Auckland (where agreement had 
previously been difficult to obtain). In cases where agreement could not be 
reached, however, the Commission did set registers limitations which the 
employers and unions agreed to abide by. Doing so did not provoke a crisis. 
Overall, as the relevant Commission annual report noted: 
56 Ibid. 
The commission endeavoured to set levels which would balance the 
demands made at peak periods with the need to minimize guaranteed 
wage payments in the slack periods. In attempting this reconciliation 
considerable thought was given to the way in which temporary 
transfers of men between ports could smooth out the peaks and 
troughs of employment. . . . The overall effect of the commission's 
determination is that the new bureau registers are generally lower 
than the levels previously fixed (WIC Report 1979:5-6). 
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The sharp decrease in register limitations which resulted is apparent in Graph 
10.4. But is should also be noted that the actual register strengths decreased only 
slightly. 
When the Commission set register limitations in 1979 it did so with the provision 
for the 5% tolerance included in the GPO. This was taken as a given, and was 
subsequently confirmed by a decision of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal in an 
appeal by the Port Employers' Association regarding the extent to which the 
tolerance applied. The Tribunal found that at no time could the actual bureau 
register strength fall below or rise above the limitation imposed by the Waterfront 
Industry Commission by more than 5%.57 Under this arrangement, the Port 
Conciliation Committees could vary the actual strength of the register but only 
within this margin. When either the employers or union at a port sought to exceed 
this tolerance, they were required to apply to the Commission for a 'review' of the 
limitation. As a subsequent Tribunal decision put it, "Although the Commission 
has not been (and could not be) a party to any of the General Principal Orders, it 
accepts from a practical viewpoint that the provision is an appropriate one. ,,58 
This latter comment exemplifies the tensions between the Act and the GPO, 
between state actors and private actors, and ultimately between employment 
relations and industrial relations as separately constituted 'realms' within a legally 
regulated system. A somewhat paradoxical result of the different rights and 
responsibilities enshrined in the Act and the GPO was that the Commission could 
57 WIT Decision 750, 4/2/80. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 57, (National 
Archives). 
58 WIT Decision 864, 17/5/85. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 58, 
(National Archives). 
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not reduce the actual number of watersiders on the register. As the Commission 
report for 1978 noted: 
there appear to be serious misunderstandings as to the limits of the 
commission's powers under the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 to 
determine bureau register strengths at all New Zealand ports. The 
commission therefore considers it necessary to draw particular 
attention to the fact that while it has responsibility for fixing bureau 
register strengths it cannot take any action of its volition to remove 
a single waterside worker from a port bureau register. The 
employers . . . have an agreement with the waterside workers' 
unions which means that redundancy will only be carried out by 
voluntary means (WIC Report 1978:6). 
What this meant was that the Commission set register limits but it could not 
enforce these if they were less than the number actually on the register. 
Reductions in register strengths could only be effected through watersiders taking 
voluntary redundancies, and by natural attrition. 
As the aggregate figures presented in Graph 10.4 indicate, after the Commission 
set register limitations in 1979 there were some ports where the register strength 
exceeded the limitation. 59 Thus the Commission had to allow "employee levels to 
run down to an economic level" (WIC Report 1978:6). It appears, however, that 
this process was materially assisted by the prevailing redundancy agreements. 
Further redundancy agreements had been negotiated late in 1978 which provided 
for voluntary retirement for men 60 and over, and compulsory retirement for men 
65 and over.60 As Roth (1993:183) notes, "The employers ... failed in their 
59 In 1979 the ports where the register strengths exceeded the register limitation, and the numbers 
involved, are as follows: Auckland (33), Wellington (57), Dunedin (4), Napier (90), Taranaki (25), 
Timaru (13) and Gisborne (9). 
60 The agreement which resulted in compulsory retirement was actually negotiated two years 
previously. In 1976 the PEA, Harbours Association and WWF had made an application by consent 
to the Waterfront Industry Tribunal for a Principal Order fixing a date for the removal from bureau 
registers of all watersiders 65 and over. The date set by the Tribunal was 2 October 1978 WIT 
Decision 686, 10/8/76. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 57, (National 
Archives). 
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efforts to make redundancy at age 60 compulsory and the redundancy payments 
agreed on were among the best in the country." 
(3.5) The Consolidation of a National Labour Market 
At this time, the Waterside Workers' Federation sought to exert even greater 
control over the (albeit diminishing) supply of labour. The Federation established 
a policy whereby the port unions attempted to 'reserve' any vacancies on bureau 
registers for those already in the industry. In general, the Federation sought to 
exclude outsiders from entry to bureau registers while members at other ports were 
available for permanent transfers. Federation President Ray Fergus stated at an 
executive meeting that: 
The Federation policy is to circularize all ports for permanent 
transfers in preference to putting outsiders on the registers whether 
or not these people have been employed as non-union labour.61 
This policy depended on the local unions adhering to it (and also the employers at 
the ports in question agreeing to accept the watersiders who were to be 
transferred). It was not always successful. For although the Federation assumed 
greater control over the labour supply in an attempt to establish a closed national 
labour market, the port unions still exerted control within the labour market at the 
local level. For example, the Nelson Union incurred the wrath of Federation 
executive members for allowing outside labour onto the bureau register instead of 
arranging a permanent transfer. One executive member even commented that "we 
should do something positive to bring the Nelson Union into line.,,62 
Nonetheless, the increase in the numbers of permanent transfers (which Graph 
10.7 demonstrates) shows that the strategy was reasonably successful. This 
61 Minutes of WWF Executive Meeting, 24/2/78. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 13/\ (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
62 Minutes of WWF Executive Meeting, 24/3/8\. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union 
Records, 92-305, Box 1312 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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resulted in a change from a senes of local labour markets which recruited 
watersiders from a local 'catchment' to more of a nationally organized market 
where watersiders were shuttled between ports (both through permanent and 
temporary transfers) to fill vacancies. 
This Federation strategy of filling vacancies 'internally' was complemented by a 
decision to push for the complete elimination of casual labour. At a WWF 
executive meeting in 1978 it had been resolved not to allow the use of casual 
labour while register strengths were being negotiated. Although casual labour was 
still being used at some ports (such as Picton and Timaru) at this time, at others 
(such as Auckland, Mount Maunganui, Gisborne, Nelson and New Plymouth) 
casuals had been squeezed out of the labour market.63 This was a result both of 
the port unions' success in building up register strengths, and their opposition (and 
that of the rank and file) to its continued use. For example, in January 1989 the 
Nelson Union abolished the subsidiary register at that port and stopped the use of 
casuals. 64 
As Graph 10.5 demonstrates, casual labour was all but eliminated by 1979, and the 
subsidiary register clause was subsequently excluded from the GPO that was 
negotiated in 1980.65 As Ted Thompson commented, "When it was accepted that 
it was a case of redundancy to lower-age group workers this position was only 
agreed in conjunction with the phase out of ... casual labour.,,66 The PEA's 
annual report for 1980 stated that: 
in light of the situation which has been prevalent over recent years, 
with the absolute refusal by port Unions to work with non-Union 
63 Minutes ofWWF Executive Meeting, 30/3/79. Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-
305, Box 13/1 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
64 PEA/WEU Annual Report, 1/3/79. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 130 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
65 Consequently the Commission ceased collecting statistics on wages paid to casual workers. 
66 Personal Communication, 6/10/94. 
labour and [ships'] crew, the preference clause was therefore 
amended precluding the use of non-Union labour.67 
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Undoubtedly some employers wanted to use casual labour, particularly at the fruit 
exporting ports which experienced considerable variations in the demand for 
labour (see MOT 1984:211), but temporary interport labour transfers had to 
suffice. WWF President Ray Fergus noted in 1982 that: 
in at least one ... [port] our employers are still doing all they can to 
remove or substantially remove ... [temporary] transfers and to 
bring about non-registered and/or crew employment once again. In 
fact in that port the local employes and harbour board in particular, 
have never ceased to demand a return to that type of . . . 
employment. 68 
The point is that the unions had enough industrial strength to be able to eliminate 
casual labour. The more general point is that the position of casual workers within 
the labour market is as much a product of the capacity of unions to implement 
strategies of labour market closure as that of' employer preference', or any general 
trend towards or against (de )casualization. 
Following the Commission setting the register limitations for the first time in 
1979, it continued to review the situation each year. Once again, it sought to 
ensure agreement was reached between the employers and the Federation before 
making a decision. In 1980, the Commission held meetings at the port level 
regarding register limitations. As the Commission's annual report (1980:4) noted, 
"A number of ports reached unanimous agreement on numbers considered 
appropriate and in all cases the commission was in agreement with the numbers 
recommended." However there were a number of cases where the Commission 
67 PEA/WEU Annual Report, 1/3/79. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 130 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
68 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10/82. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/7 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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made decisions on register strengths at ports where agreement between the union 
and the employers could not be reached. Once again, the Commission was limited 
by the fact that it had no power to actually reduce register strengths at ports where 
they were in excess of the limitations which it had set. For instance, the 
Commission retained the register strength of 400 which it had set at the Port of 
Napier in 1979, despite submissions to alter it. But the actual register strength 
remained at 475. The most that the Commission could do was to request that "the 
parties concerned ... make more strenuous efforts to reduce the bureau strength to 
the number determined" (WIC Report 1981 :5). Paradoxically, at the same time as 
a national labour market was being consolidated (through the actions of the 
Federation), the reconstituted Commission was unable to centrally regulate this 
market. 
In the mid-1980s pressure was applied by the employers to decrease the size of 
port registers even further. As the Ministry of Transport's Onshore Costs Study 
noted in 1984, "Given the current employer's [sic] view that manpower levels 
have not fallen sufficiently quickly to meet the requirements of the waterfront 
industry, the question of increased redundancies may soon surface" (MOT 
1984: 178). Although the question subsequently did surface, reductions in 
'manpower levels' were achieved by agreements for further voluntary retirements 
(at some ports down to age 55) and negotiated redundancy orders. Graph 10.4 
demonstrates the steady decline in register numbers during the 1980s. 
A further development occurred in the late 1980s when it became apparent that the 
industry was to be deregulated, and after changes to the legal framework which 
regulated industrial relations. The unions engaged in a form of concession 
bargaining which linked changes in work practices to reductions in register 
strengths. Before briefly outlining this strategic shift (which will be elaborated in 
greater depth in Chapter 13), I will examine the impact of containerization upon 
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the other mam set of 'power resources' regarding the labour supply: the 
procedures through which watersiders were allocated to work. 
(4) Allocation to Work 
In Chapter 4, I examined the manner in which bureau rules were negotiated and 
what they regulated. I demonstrated that bureau rules were negotiated at the local 
port level through the Port Conciliation Committees, and that by the mid-1950s 
broadly similar sets of bureau rules had been adopted at most ports. To recap, 
bureau rules provided for the classification and engagement of registered 
watersiders, the order of their allocation to work in accordance with the principle 
of equalization of work opportunity for the registered workforce at each port, and 
the system of penalties which formed the basis of the formal system of industrial 
discipline on the waterfront. 
As in the setting of register strengths, under the 1976 Waterfront Industry Act the 
responsibility for establishing and amending bureau rules was transferred from the 
local Port Conciliation Committees to the reconstituted Commission. It appears, 
however, that this shift in responsibilities was by no means as contentious or 
troublesome as the issue of register strengths. At a Commission meeting in 1977, 
one of the members stated that "when the Commission did get around to revising 
bureau rules they would consult with the parties.,,69 It appears that the 
Commission took some time before it did 'get around' to making these revisions, 
and when it did so it was very much influenced by the opinions of the key actors at 
the port level. Indeed in 1984 the Assistant General Manager of the Commission, 
P. Ryan, sent a memorandum to all Branch Managers reminding them of the 
Commission's responsibility in establishing bureau rules. It stated: 
69 Minutes of the Waterfront Industry Commission, Meeting 10, 11110177. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
The Commission however, as with local amenities matters, would to 
a very large extent be guided by local interests and, therefore, any 
proposals relating to changes to bureau rules are to be advised to this 
office, together with a report by the Branch Manager on the effect 
any such proposals may have on the conduct of bureau operations, 
for the Commission's consideration. 70 
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Unlike bureau register strengths, substantial changes to bureau rules did not occur 
and thus, in this area, there were greater continuities with the previous period. 
Indeed, one of the most contentious issues, the allocation of watersiders to work in 
the four designated container terminals and the Union Shipping Company's roll-
on I roll off (Seacargo) terminals, was no longer regulated by bureau rules and thus 
had already been placed outside the purview of the reconstituted Commission. 
Because the discussion (in Chapter 4) of employment relations in the break-bulk 
period dealt with work allocation practices, it is appropriate at this point to deal 
with the tensions which containerization gave rise to in this latter area, and the 
manner in which they were resolved. 
The issue is the challenge that work in the new container facilities posed to the 
manner in which the distribution of "collective job opportunity" (Perlman 1928:9) 
was regulated. In Chapter 4, I explained how the unions had been successful in 
establishing a system of enforced equalization of the distribution of work, which 
was vital to achieving harmony amongst union members. Although a tension 
developed between this system of work allocation and the wage form, which 
centered on work that paid different rates of bonus, the unions subsequently were 
able to overcome this problem by securing agreement amongst the rank and file at 
each port to pool bonus payments. 
70 Memorandum, 12/11/84. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 44, 5/473 
(National Archives). 
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Work in container facilities had a similar potential to be a source of division 
amongst watersiders because generally it was better paid, some watersiders 
regarded it as more desirable, and it was more regular than work outside these 
facilities. As one executive member of the Lyttelton Union put it, "a man who 
was in the container terminal knew he would have a certain foreman, a certain job 
with certain days off but when he went back to the comer he did not know what 
his next job would be.',7l Although undoubtedly many watersiders liked the 
variation in cargoes and jobs which break-bulk work provided, the greater 
regularity of container work appealed to others. 
Certainly, such a problem arose within the Foreman-Stevedores Union, in that 
some of its members regarded the foremen who worked at the Lyttelton container 
terminal as having formed a 'clique'. Despite cross-hiring arrangements between 
companies these individuals had accepted double-shifts and so forth, which 
angered the foremen who worked on the conventional wharves.72 Part of the 
reason this problem occurred was that, unlike watersiders, foremen-stevedores 
were permanently employed by companies. But it nonetheless demonstrates the 
potential difficulties the waterside workers' unions faced in relation to their 
members working within these facilities. 
The Port Employers Association argued, in its submission to the 1971 Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into container handling, that work in the container 
terminals should be carried out by a separate section of the watersiders' union at 
the ports in question. The employers also maintained that watersiders should be 
allocated to the terminals on a long term basis, justifying this with an argument 
that related to the 'firm-specific' skills which watersiders would acquire and be 
71 Minutes of Special Meeting of the Waterfront Industry Commission, 14/2/78. Waterfront 
Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
72 This point was commented on by members of the Board of Directors of the Lyttelton Stevedoring 
Company at its Annual General Meeting on 27/3/81. 
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required to use. In short, the employers sought to create a 'segmented' labour 
market and workforce. However, well aware of the potential of such an 
arrangement to divide union members, the Federation strongly resisted this move. 
Ted Thompson, who was then the General Secretary, commented in an interview: 
They didn't get off the ground with that. We did give them regular 
workers but we had a change over date .... We wouldn't agree that 
they have them there [in the container terminals] for ever and a day 
and create a labour aristocracy. (Interview) 
Ultimately, the manner in which watersiders were allocated to the composite 
workforce (of watersiders and harbour workers) in container terminals was 
decided in the arbitrated agreement that formed the basis of the Principal Order 
which regulated work in these facilities (see Chapter 7). 
To be sure, the Federation lost some things relating to the terms of employment 
under this agreement. For instance, the agreement stipulated that members of the 
composite workforce had to "report for duty" each day and could only take a day 
off with the permission of the Terminal Manager (for a good reason), as opposed 
to the arrangement under bureau rules where watersiders could take days off as 
long as they notified the bureau the day before. The arbitrator, R. Davison, wrote 
in support of this decision: 
I do not think it appropriate that in container work of this type the 
ordinary rules as to time off applicable to Union members on other 
work should apply. The essence of container work is that it shall 
be done by a small, highly trained gang of workers who shall be 
available during agreed working hours to carry out container 
operations. In these circumstances I think it essential that an 
employer should have more control over the attendance of workers 
in the composite work force. 73 
73 Arbitration Between Operators of Marine Container Terminals and the New Zealand Waterside 
Workers' Federation and The New Zealand Habour Boards Employees' Industrial Union of 
Workers, (R. Davison, Arbitrator), 16110171. 
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The Federation was therefore unsuccessful in its attempt to retain the same 
employment procedures as applied on conventional wharves. 
Significantly, however, the Federation did secure a form of job rotation on a 
relatively short term basis. Arbitrator Davison wrote in his decision: 
The difference between the parties . . . arises from the employers 
wishing to have a long term engagement of the work force so as to 
enable workers to acquire maximum skills and efficiency. On the 
other hand, the Unions want as many of their members as possible 
to have the opportunity of taking part in container operations. 74 
The employers had wanted workers in the composite workforce to remain with an 
employer for twelve months at a time, whereas the Federation had wanted the 
period of engagement to be eighteen weeks. The arbitrator ruled, however, that 
the period of engagement was to be six months with one third of the workforce 
being replaced every two months. Although this decision was subsequently 
amended by negotiations between the employers and the unions, it formed the 
basis of the terms of employment under the container terminals agreement until 
the Waterfront Industry Commission was abolished in 1989. By the time Principal 
Order 432 was negotiated in 1979, the terms of employment had been altered such 
that the period of engagement differed slightly between the four container 
terminals, but the same principle of worker rotation applied in each case.75 Under 
the Principal Order covering the Union Shipping Company's 'Seacargo 
Terminals', a similar arrangement existed whereby one third of the watersiders at 
these facilities were rotated every six weeks. 
74 Ibid. 
75 At Auckland the composite workforce remained in employment for 24 weeks, one quarter being 
replaced at six weekly intervals; at Wellington and Port Chalmers the period of engagement was 18 
weeks with one third being replaced at six weekly intervals; and at Lyttelton the period of 
engagement was 12 weeks with one third being replaced every four weeks. 
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As in the case of bureau registers generally, the unions had 'joint control' of the 
size of the composite workforce. The agreement which governed the composite 
workforce in container terminals contained a clause which stipulated that the 
minimum number of workers in the composite workforce was to be negotiated 
between the employer and the local union, in conjunction with the national 
officers ofthe Federation. It also stipulated that, when an employer was recruiting 
workers for the composite workforce, they had to apply to the local watersiders' 
union and the Harbour Workers Union for volunteers, from whom the required 
workers were selected. Workers in the composite workforce who volunteered, and 
were selected by each port's selection committee, were then sent to the Waterfront 
Training Organization (the number being based on the port's allocation of workers 
to be trained). 
As Graph 10.8 demonstrates, a reasonably significant number of watersiders 
worked in container terminals and the Union Shipping Company's Seacargo 
Terminals. Undoubtedly there was resentment in some quarters towards 
watersiders who were selected to work in these facilities. But the form of worker 
rotation that was adopted did forestall the development of a 'labour aristocracy'. 
Any problems that were caused for the unions by resentment on the part of 
watersiders regarding the allocation of workers to container work, was slight in 
comparison to the problems regarding differing levels of bonus payments which 
developed in the break-bulk period prior to bonuses being pooled. 
(5) Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that containerization, coupled with decreasing levels 
of trade, had the potential to disrupt the stable set of power relations between the 
key actors in the labour market which had gelled in the break-bulk era. It posed a 
particular threat to the unions. However, because they had joint control of register 
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limitations, which was a decisive 'power resource', the unions were able to 
effectively manage the downward pressures on the register. This institutional 
arrangement allowed the unions to build up register strengths while 
simultaneously squeezing out casual labour. Furthermore, the impact on 
bargaining of the industrial strength which the Federation had built up during the 
1960s was reflected in an agreement that redundancies were to be voluntary. In 
the context of joint control of register strengths, the Port Employers' Association 
had to accept a series of trade-offs in order to get register numbers down. 
Despite these controls, the overall effect of voluntary redundancies on 
employment levels was drastic, with the number of registered water siders 
declining by almost half, from 6832 in 1970 to 3697 in 1987. However through 
the Federation eventually forcing the complete elimination of casual labour (as 
one of the 'trade-offs mentioned above) in 1980, and by insisting that vacancies be 
filled from within the industry, a 'sealed' national labour market was developed in 
which watersiders were shuttled between ports (both through permanent and 
temporary transfers). The overriding feature of this period is that the Federation 
and the port unions exerted increasingly tighter control over an ever-diminishing 
supply of labour. 
These strategies were deployed within a set of institutional arrangements that were 
modified by the Waterfront Industry Act 1976. This legislative intervention 
resulted in a shift from a non-representative Commission, which was coupled to 
decentralized authority in the setting of register strengths and the establishment of 
bureau rules, to a representative Commission which exercised centralized 
authority at the national level. However, achieving 'joint control' at this level in 
1977 did not substantially alter power relations between employers and unions 
because both had been excluded from representation on the Commission prior to 
this time. Furthermore, the Commission initially was unwilling to act decisively 
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in the setting of register limitations. Instead it defelTed to the private actors and to 
negotiations conducted at the local level. And when the Commission did act to set 
limitations, where these were below the actual numbers of registered watersiders, 
the Commission could not enforce them because it had no authority to effect 
redundancies. Because of these tensions, and despite the effective coordination of 
a national labour market by the Federation, in this case a completely national form 
of governance could not be achieved. 
The problems the Commission faced in setting register limitations not only 
highlight, once again, the tensions involved in superimposing a national system 
onto a locally based one. These problems also exemplifY the tensions between the 
Act and the GPO, between the Commission and 'the parties', between state actors 
and private actors, and ultimately between employment relations and industrial 
relations as separately constituted 'realms' within a legally regulated system. 
These tensions, in particular the blurring of the boundaries between employment 
relations and industrial relations, foreshadowed developments in the late 1980s. 
However, unlike the late 1970s when, if anything, the Waterside Workers' 
Federation actually exploited (or at least were not disadvantaged by) the tension 
between the Act and the GPO, ten years later the erosion of these boundaries 
signalled a weakening ofthe Federation's position. 
Throughout the period that this thesis examines (from 1953 onwards) register 
strengths at each port were negotiated separately from the size of gangs and work 
practices (although the former were built upon the latter). This arrangement was 
reinforced by the fact that there were two sites of bargaining and a separate set of 
rules and procedures governing each of the spheres that I have termed 
'employment relations' and 'industrial relations' respectively. In negotiating 
register strengths gang strengths and work practices (which were set out in the 
General Principal Orders and Principal Orders) were simply taken for granted. 
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Agreed upon register limitations at each port reflected the prevailing gang 
strengths and work practices. Obviously there were flow-on effects to register 
strengths of any reductions in gang sizes (of which there were few, even after 
containerization), but the two sets of negotiations were not explicitly linked. 
Rather, work practices were considered separately from the labour supply. 
This arrangement changed in the late 1980s when the Federation faced the 
prospect of the industry being deregulated, an onslaught from the employers, and 
also a change in the legislative regulation of industrial relations (which I will deal 
with in Chapter 13). It was in this context that, in 1987, the Auckland Union 
opened up a fmm of concession bargaining which explicitly linked changes in 
work practices and reductions in register strengths. The Auckland port employers' 
industrial officer wrote in a letter to the Branch Manager of the Commission that: 
The parties have by agreement departed from the traditional method 
of detelmining such [bureau register] limitations which has included 
allowances for current practices.76 
The employers and the Auckland Union had agreed to a new bureau register 
limitation of 780 - a reduction of some 170 workers. This reduction was linked to 
adherence to the manning scales set out in the GPO and flexibility in the 
utilization of workers engaged for work other than loading and unloading cargo, 
both of which were expected to save employers 30 workers per day. Also, 
watersiders who were rostered to have a rest day were to be made available for 
work, which was expected to make an additional 40 men available for use in times 
of high demand for labour. Never before had modifications in work practices and 
register strengths been explicitly linked in this manner. The port industrial officer 
presented the employers' side of the story: 
76 Letter from G. Ward to P. Ryan, 10/12/87. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, 
Box 49, (National Archives). 
the parties to the agreement are confident that an improvement in 
industrial relations in the port manifested in this agreement will 
result in a much faster turnaround of vessels in the port which will 
result in much greater efficiency of labour utilization.77 
Significantly, however, employers were still not able to use casual labour. 
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In the face of containerization, the unions had been able to manage downward 
pressures on register strengths and (as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters) 
had largely retained control of work practices. However, these concessions by the 
Auckland Union foreshadowed the port unions, in the post-deregulation period, 
losing control of certain aspects of the labour supply (with the reintroduction of 
casual labour), and even greater control of work practices. These issues will be 
addressed in the last three chapters of the thesis. In the next chapter, however, I 
will examine industrial relations in the container era, prior to deregulation. 
77 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 11: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1972-1986 
(1) Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine industrial relations on the waterfront from 1972 until 
1986. Like Chapter 5, which dealt with industrial relations in the preceding 
period, this chapter performs two tasks: it outlines bargaining processes and 
outcomes in terms of wages and conditions, and also identifies the shifting 
relationships between the key actors which were manifested in industrial relations 
practices. The first (essentially descriptive) task will form the basis of the 
chapter's structure as an historical narrative, arranged chronologically. The 
second task constitutes the analytical component of the chapter. The argument I 
make is that it was the tension and shifting balance between those actors pursuing 
centralization and those pursuing decentralization which shaped the pattern of 
industrial relations in this period. 
(2) Union Strategies and Employer Strategies 
The period which I will examine in this chapter was characterized by increasing 
union strength, and increasing employer disunity. Although the main employers' 
organization was a centralized association, and the watersiders' national 
organization was only a loosely-knit federation, paradoxically the port unions had 
more success at acting in concert than the employers. The Federation and port 
unions exploited the divisions between employers (which, as I noted in Chapter 9, 
were largely a product of technological change) to good effect, by splitting off 
individual employers in securing special agreements, and then using these as the 
basis for improvements in the national agreement. 
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(2.1) The Waterside Workers Federation 
In Chapter 9, I argued that both the 'external strength' and 'internal strength' (Fox 
and Flanders 1969:155) of the Federation and the port unions steadily increased 
throughout this period. The divisions within the Federation which had erupted in 
1970 (when the Auckland and Wellington Unions refused to ratify GPO 305) had 
been resolved to the point that they did not reappear in bargaining. To be sure, 
there continued to be divisions within the Federation but these tended only to 
manifest themselves internally, such as in precluding the formation of a national 
umon. And, as we shall see, any internal divisions of this type within the 
Federation did not impinge on "the external sanctions it ... [brought] to bear on 
employers in negotiations" (Fox and Flanders 1969: 155). In general, the local 
autonomy of the individual port unions did not manifest itself in a way that sapped 
the Federation's 'external strength', and the threat of one of the port unions 
'breaking away' was greatly diminished. 
This external strength of the Federation was reflected in the perpetuation of 
negative attitudes towards compulsory arbitration (until it ended in 1984) and the 
Tribunal (until it was abolished in 1986). Throughout this period, the Federation 
opted for direct action in preference to arbitration. The wielding of a strike threat 
at the national level continued to form the background to negotiations for General 
Principal Orders. The Federation drew on a stable, experienced membership to 
make judicious use of industrial action which resulted in significant gains in 
wages and conditions being achieved. As we shall see, the Federation was at the 
forefront of the attempts by unions to challenge the wage controls imposed by 
successive Governments during the 1970s. 
The other crucial facet of the Federation's strategy during this period was to 
attempt to capitalize upon, and accentuate, the divisions within the employers' 
camp. Following containerization, it became increasingly difficult for the 
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employers to organize and get agreement regarding the manner in and level at 
which bargaining should take place. In this context, the port unions and the 
Federation 'picked off' individual employers through Principal Orders negotiated 
at the level of the firm which bid wages and conditions well above the minimums 
enshrined in the GPO. In effect, this allowed the Federation to playoff the Port 
Employers Association, which attempted to hold the line, against individual 
employers who were willing to enter into special agreements and to make 
concessions in order to achieve some desired outcome (typically improved vessel 
turnaround times). 
The Federation's judicious use of industrial action (which was built upon 
reasonable unity among the port unions), coupled with employer disunity which 
allowed the unions to 'pick off' individual employers, was central to the 
Federation's success in terms of wages and conditions. It was this dynamic of 
union strength and employer weakness which characterized industrial relations on 
the waterfront during the 1970s and for much ofthe 1980s. 
(2.2) The Employers 
The main problem that the employers, collectively, were faced with in this period 
was increasing employer disunity. Much of the strategy of the main employers' 
organization was focused on attempting to overcome the problems that this 
disunity posed with respect to bargaining. As we shall see, this hinged on seeking 
to legally restrict the right of individual employers to strike agreements with port 
unions and the Federation, and on the formation of a new and more unified 
employers' organization. 
In Chapter 9, I provided a discussion of the sources of the disunity amongst 
employers, which in this section I will only briefly revisit. One of the possible 
outcomes of technological change within an industry is that the workforce 
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becomes 'segmented'. This employer strategy hinges upon 'investing' in workers 
with firm-specific skills and fragmenting labour (as a control strategy). But rather 
than the waterfront employers segmenting the workforce after containerization, the 
employers' organization itself became fragmented. 
The key point is that the developments in ownership and control, which I outlined 
in Chapter 8, impeded the ability of the employers to organize. To recap, 
containerization led to a fragmentation of interests (and actors) at the economic 
level. Rather than resulting in widespread vertical integration (wherein one type 
of large hierarchically organized firm dominated the market), technological 
change in the form of containerization also gave rise to a parallel process of 
'vertical disintegration'. This process resulted in a proliferation of different types 
of organizations: as well as large and small shipping companies (which had always 
operated on New Zealand's waterfront), there emerged container terminals owned 
by harbour boards, large independent stevedoring companies, and small 'hybrid' 
stevedoring companies - all of which had distinct sets of interests. 
The employers found it increasingly difficult to organize for the purposes of 
collective bargaining, given the new types of employers, firms, and organizations 
which emerged in the wake of containerization. By the early to mid-1970s, as new 
corporate actors entered the field, the Port Employers' Association was becoming 
increasingly unrepresentative of the employers within the industry. The 
previously existing principal split between the overseas and coastal shipowners, 
although it still existed within the PEA, was giving way to a more complex and 
fragmented set of divisions. These divisions were located both within the PEA, 
and also existed between this organization and the other actors and organizations 
which were involved in negotiating with watersiders. Within the PEA, a division 
emerged between the shipping companies and the stevedoring companies. 
External to the PEA, and reflecting this latter division, the New Zealand 
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Stevedoring Employers Association (which represented stevedoring compames 
that operated outside container terminals) was set up in 1978. Similarly, the 
Container Terminal Operators Association had been formed in the early 1970s and 
conducted its own negotiations for the container terminals agreement. 
In total, there were four main sets of corporate actors and interests, and while they 
overlapped they were distinct in the sense of having their own organizations: 
shipping companies (conventional and container, coastal and overseas), which 
were represented through the Port Employers Association; stevedoring companies 
that carried out conventional and container work outside of container terminals, 
which were represented by the New Zealand Stevedoring Employers Association; 
container terminal operators that performed the stevedoring in container terminals, 
which were represented through the Container Terminal Operators Association; 
and harbour boards which were represented through the Harbour Board Employers 
Union. 
The principal lines of division mirrored the different types of companies. Because 
stand-alone container terminals developed, there emerged a distinct set of interests 
along these lines (which would not have occurred if vertical integration had taken 
place). This produced a division between the container terminal operators and the 
shipping companies (to the point where the former attempted to marginalize the 
latter within the realm of bargaining). Similarly the emergence of large 
independent stevedores (as a result of vertical disintegration) led to another 
distinct set of interests emerging, which were not entirely consonant with those of 
the shipping companies. Also, there was a split between harbour boards and 
container terminal operators (even though three of these latter were themselves 
harbour boards), and between the conventional stevedores and the container 
terminal operators. 
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This fragmentation of economic interests, in turn, made it difficult for the 
employers to unite at an organizational level for the purposes of industrial 
relations. This difficulty was exacerbated by the fact that these actors had access 
to the same legal machinery as the Port Employers Association in making 
agreements with port unions and the Federation. In effect, this was a problem in 
securing 'externalization', whereby authority in industrial relations is delegated by 
firms to an external organization. Externalization presupposes, to use the words 
of Fox and Flanders, "industry-wide organizations powerful enough to impose 
their decisions on their members" (1969:151). During the 1970s, the waterfront 
employers simply did not have an industry-wide organization which incorporated 
all employers. Moreover, the PEA could not force 'externalization' in industrial 
matters upon individual employers (and indeed could not even force firms to join 
it). Individual companies were free to make agreements with port unions and the 
Federation. The fragmentation in bargaining that this resulted in was a continual 
source of frustration to the PEA throughout the 1970s. 
As I indicated in the section on umon strategy above, the fragmentation of 
bargaining which resulted served to strength the Federation's hand. Particularly 
during the 1970s, the Federation used special agreements negotiated with 
individual employers to good effect, both to play employers off against each other 
and then to undermine the PEA in negotiations at the national level for General 
Principal Orders. The employers' strategy in response to the upsurge in special 
agreements was twofold. First, the PEA sought legislative change in order to 
restrict the right to make industrial agreements to a registered employers' 
organization. But when this effort was unsuccessful, the PEA attempted to 
construct a new united employers' organization to bridge the diverse sets of 
corporate actors. As a result of this effort, the New Zealand Association of 
Waterfront Employers (NZAWE) was formed in 1982. Although this new 
organization was more militant than the Port Employers Association, NZA WE 
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had to attempt to reconcile the different (and often competing) interests within the 
organization. As we shall see, it had only limited success in unifying bargaining 
and fostering 'externalization' within the employers' camp. 
(3) Bargaining Processes and Outcomes 1972-1986 
This period was characterized by increasing union cohesiveness and strength, and 
increasing employer disunity. These differing organizational capacities, in tum, 
were reflected in bargaining processes and outcomes. In this section I will first 
deal with these processes and outcomes at the national level (which centered on 
negotiations for General Principal Orders), and then I will discuss the very 
important practice of local bargaining which co-existed alongside collective 
bargaining at the national leveL 
(3.1) National Bargaining 1972-1980 
Although the waterfront operated within its own specialized industrial relations 
legal framework, I noted in Chapter 5 that the pattern of wage-bargaining was 
nonetheless influenced by the centralized wage-setting arrangements, and 
occupational wage relativities, within the Arbitration system generally. The 
breakdown of this system was brought to a head when the 1968 nil General Wage 
Order issued by the Arbitration Court undermined its role in setting wages (see 
Boston 1984:89-94; Walsh 1994). As Walsh notes: 
By the late 1960s it was clear that the traditional system of wage-
fixing through the conciliation and arbitration system was no longer 
working. This had resulted from the proliferation of regional 
ruling-rates agreements and enterprise-based house agreements 
which had made basic award rates virtually meaningless in most 
key occupations. A complicated situation was made more difficult 
by the seven week Auckland electricians' strike of 1969. The 
settlement of this strike set off a rash of relativity disputes and 
triggered 18 months of occupational leapfrogging as different 
trades groups sought to restore relativity with each other. In order 
to control the unprecedented wage escalation associated with this, 
the Government imposed wage controls in 1971. Apart from a 
brief period of free bargaining in 1973, these statutory wage 
controls remained in effect, in one form or another, until August 
1977 (1983:43). 
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The wage controls that the National Government established in 1971 formed a 
crucial part of the broader industrial relations 'climate' within which negotiations 
between waterfront employers and unions over wage increases took place. I Prior 
to this, the body which exercised overall control over the setting of wages, through 
the GWO system was the Arbitration Court. It will be recalled that the Waterfront 
Industry Tribunal, as a matter of course, passed on these increases to watersiders 
(often during the course ofa General Principal Order). However, after the passing 
of the first round of wage control legislation in 1971 the Arbitration Court was 
displaced as the body which controlled wages, and this role was taken over by the 
Remuneration Authority. 
In 1972 GPO 305 was renegotiated through the National Conciliation 
Committee? Although these negotiations began at a time of incomes control, 
they were eventually settled in a 'window' period of unrestricted wage bargaining 
in 1973.3 The outstanding issue in this bargaining round, from the Federation's 
standpoint, was an increase in the basic hourly rate of pay. It will be recalled from 
Chapter 5 that a two day national stoppage, and numerous local stoppages and go 
slows at the port level had occurred in 1971 to try to force a wage adjustment from 
1 Boston (1984:8-9) states that "significant inflationary pressures in the labour market", coupled 
with the "Arbitration Court's loss of status in 1984", led to the imposition of wage controls. He 
continues: "The then National Government of Sir Keith Holyoake sought to reach agreement with 
the union movement on a programme of wage restraint, but these efforts were not successful. 
Unwilling to adopt deflationary monetary and fiscal policies, the Government chose instead in 
March 1971 to impose statutory wage and price controls. These measures, which were introduced 
by means of the Stabilization of Remuneration Act (1971), limited wage increases to a maximum of 
7 percent and prevented wage rates from being re-negotiatated within 12 months of the previous 
settlement (the so-called 12 month rule),' (Boston 1984:9). 
2 GPO 305 expired on 31 March 1972. 
3 Norman Kirk's Labour Government, which assumed office in November 1972, eliminated wage 
controls from December 1972 until August 1973, wherein a period of unrestricted wage bargaining 
existed (see Boston 1984: 19). 
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the employers. Then, in February 1972, just prior to the renegotiation of GPO 
305, the Federation directed all of the port unions to refuse to work on Waitangi 
Day, which resulted in the loss of 53,148 man-hours (WIC Report 1972:95).4 
Graph 11.1 registers the increase in the level of stoppages. 
Despite this industrial action, the Federation met only limited success. One 
executive member recommended accepting an interim agreement, stating that: 
"Neither of the alternatives - confrontation or arbitration at this particular stage -
appear attractive.,,5 As the Waterfront Industry Commission's 1972 annual report 
noted: "after lengthy negotiations it was agreed that existing provisions should be 
extended to 31 December 1972 as an interim agreement" (WIC Report 1972: 19). 
Under this agreement watersiders received an increase in meal money only. 
However, when GPO 347 was finally agreed to in April 1973, after the lifting of 
the wage controls, the Federation inter alia secured an increase of slightly more 
than 7% in the basic hourly rate.6 
Also in 1972 the agreement that applied to the container terminals at the ports of 
Auckland, Wellington, and Port Chalmers was renegotiated. It should be noted 
that the Port Employers' Association was not involved in these negotiations. 
Rather they were conducted by the Container Terminal Operators Association 
(CTOA), although the PEA Management Committee did attempt to liaise with the 
operators. Although the terms of this agreement provoked a one day stoppage at 
the Auckland terminal late in 1972, the agreement was relatively favourable. To 
be sure, the container terminal employers received concessions including greater 
ability to work in wet weather, an increase in the period that watersiders could be 
4 Waitangi Day celebrates the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. The 
port unions observed this as an unauthorized holiday. 
5 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Executive Meeting, 30/8/72. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1217 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
6 This agreement also had incorporated into it retrospectively the voluntary redundancy agreement 
which was settled in June 1973 (see Chapter 9). 
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rostered to terminals, as well as extended shift work provisions which made it 
"possible to work a container ship for 21 hours continuously throughout the day" 
(WIC Report 1973:20). But these concessions were purchased inter alia at the 
cost of increased special rates and shift allowances, along with increased 
efficiency payments and equity payments (ibid:20). The Container Terminal 
agreement which was settled in 1972, because of the wage increases it contained, 
had to be agreed to by the Remuneration Authority (which gave its consent). 
Although GPO 347 was settled during a period of unrestricted wage bargaining, 
this latter ended in August 1973 when the third Labour Government reintroduced 
wage controls. 7 Boston (1984: 136) writes that: "The Economic Stabilization 
Regulations (1973) marked the beginning of four years of continuous statutory 
control of wages and prices in New Zealand." The economic situation was 
exacerbated by spiralling inflation, and the impact of the Oil Shocks, and in July 
1974 these regulations were "replaced with the Wage Adjustment Regulations. 
These provided for free wage bargaining up to a maximum of 2.25 percent, with 
provision for extra amounts to be awarded on productivity grounds" as well as six 
monthly cost-of-living orders (Boston 1984:9). 
The watersiders were at the forefront of the union movement's challenge to the 
1974 wage controls. An article in the National Business Review at the time 
announced that "New Zealand's 8000 waterfront workers will provide the first real 
test to the government's wage controls when they start new wage negotiations this 
week."s The approach that they took was to become characteristic of the 
challenges to the wage controls over the next several years. As Walsh (1993:183) 
7Boston (1984:9) writes of this period: "By August 1973 wage rates were escalating rapidly in 
various sectors of the economy, spurred on by unstable wage relativities and by tight labour market 
conditions. Against a background of 1eap-frogging wage claims, the Labour Government felt 
obliged to intervene and restore stability." 
8 'Watersiders' Wage Package Unwraps Birthday Pay Claim', National Business Review, 22/5/74. 
It should be noted that there were in fact just over 6300 registered watersiders, not 8000 as the 
article states. 
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notes, "The various tribunals continually faced claims by various groups, often 
union-employer alliances, asserting their urgent need to restore a long-held, often 
mist-shrouded, but always sacred relativity with another group". In the 
watersiders' case it was parity with building tradesmen that was sought. 
With respect to the system of occupational wage relativities, Boston (1984:61) 
notes that "one of the main trend-setter awards in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
the Building Trades Award (carpenters)." It will be recalled that, since a ruling of 
the Tribunal in 1962, watersiders' basic hourly rates had kept in step with those of 
building tradesmen, and the Port Employers' Association accepted this 
arrangement as part of the system of occupational wage relativities which 
prevailed generally. However GPO 305, which was settled in 1970, departed from 
this principle as part of the trade-off against the introduction of the 'permanent' 40 
hour paid week. In 1974 the watersiders sought in earnest to re-establish their 
wage relativity with this occupational group. 
Under the wage control regulations a General Wage Order of9 percent was issued 
by the Government in July 1974, with unions being permitted to agree to a 
maximum of 2.25 percent wage increases above this (Boston 1984:147). Any 
increases above this amount had to be agreed to by the Industrial Commission.9 
However, just as waterfront unions and employers were not previously within the 
immediate jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court, because of the existence of the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal they were not governed by the Industrial 
Commission. 1O The National Business Review at the time stated that: 
9 The Industrial Commission, which had the task of ruling on disputes of interest, was one of two 
bodies established under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 (the other being the Industrial Court, 
which dealt with disputes of rights). 
10 This is because the previous wage regulating authority, the Wages Tribunal, was a specifically 
constituted body which regulated wage claims (and had authority over all industries). However, in 
1974 when this institution was abolished, the various industries returned to being subject to their 
own industrial courts, which in the case of the waterfront was the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. 
(The waterfront was subject neither to the Industrial Court or the Industrial Commission.) 
the watersiders, unlike most of the country's unions, will not have 
to take any pay settlement before the Industrial Commission for its 
ratification if the settlement exceeds 11.25 per cent. . . . The 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal ... will now have to interpret the new 
pay control regulations for itself while the Industrial Commission 
does it for most of the rest of the country's unions. II 
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In the 1974 GPO negotiations the WWF sought, as well as a substantial wage 
increase, a decrease in the length of the working day.12 The PEA initially tried to 
keep the unions to the 11.25% limit, but in protest the port unions participated in a 
national stoppage for one day. 13 Under the pressure of industrial action, in August 
1974 the Federation and the PEA agreed to a 16.63% increase in the basic hourly 
rate and, via the National Conciliation Committee, applied 'by consent' to the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal to have a new GPO registered which would contain 
this provision. However in a bold move the Tribunal, citing the Government's 
wage regulations, subsequently decreased the wage claim to 11.25%. As a result 
of the Tribunal's decision, General Secretary Ted Thompson was prompted to 
comment at the Federation's conference in 1974 that: 
the Tribunal has, in our view, in an autocratic manner 
misinterpreted the meaning and intention of the Wage Adjustment 
Regulations 1974 .. " The Tribunal in its Memorandum again as it 
has often done in the past makes gratuitous insults to the 
Federation. This is a pattern to which successive advocates have 
been SUbjected to [sic] previously and in the absence of any 
tangible reason we attribute this latest outburst to senility.14 
II National Business Review, 19/6174. 
12 This accords with the approach of unions generally at this time. Boston (1984:151) notes that 
"the controls on wage rates led union negotiators to give more emphasis to improving non-wage 
benefits and supplementary payments of one kind or another". 
13 This was a significant stoppage which resulted in the loss of some 66,236 man-hours. It occurred 
at all pOliS where permanent conditions of employment existed (WIC Report 1974:92). 
14 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 21110174. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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In its newly assumed (non-arbitral) wage-fixing role, the Tribunal undoubtedly 
faced the same problems as the Industrial Commission, particularly when it sought 
to overrule an agreement which had been reached between the Federation and the 
waterfront employers. 15 This pressure was evident when the Federation and the 
PEA, through the National Conciliation Committee, lodged the claim for the wage 
increase again - this time with more success. 16 Undoubtedly due to such 
pressures, the Tribunal relented and granted an increase that was approximately 2 
percent higher than the maximum allowed for in the regulations (WIC Report 
1974:20). The document containing this wage increase was subsequently 
registered as GPO 357 by the Tribunal in October 1974.17 
The Federation, in securing the cooperation of the PEA, overcame some of the 
problems associated with the wage regulations and forced the Tribunal to back 
down from the stand it had taken. But because of the wage controls, watersiders 
did not regain full wage parity with building tradesmen. 18 This marked a low 
point in the Federation's attitude towards the Tribunal. President Ray Fergus 
commented that: "This body continues to be seen by our members as one which 
cannot be relied upon to give any real degree of equity and justice to our 
members." 19 The continuing antipathy of the port unions to the Tribunal, and 
15 As Boston notes, "In September 1974 the FOL President [Tom Skinner] claimed that the 
Commission was applying the Regulations too rigidly . . . . He also contended that if the 
Commission continued to decline wage agreements reached between unions and employers it 
would quickly lose the confidence of the labour movement and suffer a similar fate to the 
Remuneration Authority" (1984:150). More generally, Boston insightfully observes that "It was 
unfortunate that the Industrial Commission, which was supposed to be an arbitral body, was given 
the additional task of enforcing the Government's pay policy. For one thing, the functions of 
arbitration and stabilization are analytically distinct and are difficult to combine in one 
organization. For another, an arbitral body will quickly lose the confidence of the union movement 
if it acquires the image of a pay-control agency" (1984: 151). 
16 Regulation 7 of the Wage Adjustment Regulations allowed for a wage increase above 11.25% to 
be granted in cases where 'serious anomalies' existed (Boston 1984: 150). 
17 Through an agreement previously reached between the Federation and the PEA in the National 
Conciliation Committee, GPO 357 also provided for inter alia annual holidays to be increased by 
three days, for increased meal allowances, and for alterations to the incentive bonus scheme which 
were beneficial to registered watersiders (WIC RepOlt 1974:20). 
18 Full wage parity was not regained until 1979 (see below). 
19 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 21/10174. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/3 (Alexander Turnbull Librmy, NLNZ). 
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their preference for direct negotiation and strike action over compulsory 
arbitration, was expressed by a representative of the Auckland Union (P. 
Leneghan) in the following manner: "we should withdraw from the Tribunal and 
do direct negotiations with the Port Employers on wages and conditions.,,2o 
As I noted above, as well as the GPO, there was another major agreement which 
was renegotiated - the container terminals agreement. Although this latter 
agreement had been established separately by the 'Davison Award', and was 
renegotiated separately by the Federation with the container terminal operators, 
and not the PEA, the two agreements were linked. There was a 'trigger 
mechanism' contained in the container terminals agreement which automatically 
passed on wage increases incorporated in the GPO to container terminals. There 
was also the potential for features of the container terminals agreement (such as 
those relating to shift work) to be passed on to watersiders who worked on the 
conventional wharves. Thus there was good reason for the two groups of 
employers to cooperate in negotiations. The CTOA was represented at GPO 
negotiations. The CTOA, however, would not allow the PEA to control their 
negotiations, but accepted that this latter organization could be represented at the 
container terminal negotiations. 
The container terminal agreement contained provisIOns which were very 
advantageous to watersiders. The container terminals proved to be very lucrative 
to the harbour boards in particular, and they were prepared to pay for the 
'flexibility' to operate them? 1 Indeed the Auckland Union's President, Jack 
Clare, was prompted in 1974 to claim that: "We have the highest manning in the 
20 Ibid. 
21 By 1983, at the three ports where harbour boards operated container terminals (Auckland, 
Lyttelton and Otago), container terminal operations represented the greatest individual source of 
income to the harbour boards in question (see MOT 1984:254). 
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world for our container complex.,,22 Whether Clare's claim was correct is 
uncertain, but it definitely was the case that the terminals had high levels of 
manning and very good wages and conditions. Ted Thompson, who was the 
Federation's General Secretary at this time, made the following comment in an 
interview: 
We negotiated very, very good conditions for them. Not 
immediately, but not too long after they ... had a thirty hour week. 
And actually [they] had even less hours than that, a four day week, 
four days on and two off.23 
The different conditions of work undoubtedly provoked some resentment amongst 
watersiders at the pOliS where the container terminals were located. Ron Wasley, 
the President of the Lyttelton Union, commented at the Federation conference in 
1974 that: "in container ports there are two classes of workers. The specialists at 
the complex are working shorter hours than the conventional ship workers.,,24 
But, as I argued in the previous chapter, the unions had largely forestalled the 
emergence of a segmented workforce by securing the rotation of workers through 
the terminals. Furthermore, any divisions within the rank and file that the unions 
22 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 21110174. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
23 The Container Terminals agreement contained provisions for two 7.5 hour shifts, together with a 
third shift of 6 hours if required. Watersiders rostered to the terminals worked four days on and 
two days off. The four days worked were from Monday to Saturday (although if one of the days 
worked was Saturday the shift length was reduced to 7 hours). Provision was also made for work 
on Sundays on a voluntary basis (again with two 7 hour shifts). The pay rates were time and a half 
for shifts on week days, double time for Saturday shifts, and 2.5 times the base hourly rate for 
Sunday shifts. A circular produced in 1980 by the Federation for its members explained the shift 
system thus: "There are in fact 3 groups of workers - one group works the fIrst shift for 4 days. 
One group works the second shift for 4 days and the third group is having 2 days off. This means 
that for the 6 day working week at the Terminals each individual worker will normally work 4 days 
of 7.5 hours - [a] thirty hour week. If his week includes a Saturday, and this will happen 4 times 
out of 6, the Saturday Shift of 7 hours reduces his week to 29.5 hours. If a Sunday is worked ... 
the payment is very high .... [Sunday work] is generally accepted by all the workers even though 
it is voluntary for the individual, it is done by the workers who worked on the Saturday (the day 
before) and does not fIgure in the normal working week .... [I]t is optional, extra, over and above 
the normal routine. The inclusion of a Sunday makes the greatest total of hours any Terminal 
worker could work 36.5 but increase his wages by about 40%." 
24Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 21110174. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/3 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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experienced after containerization were slight in comparison to the problems that 
the employers faced in getting unity within their ranks. As we shall see, the 
employers became increasingly fragmented. 
In 1975, just ten months after GPO 357 had been settled, a new GPO (Number 
365) was negotiated. These negotiations, as in the preceding round, were 
constrained by the Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974. Under these regulations 
wage increases were restricted to 2.25%, and the Industrial Commission awarded 
two cost-of-living orders during 1975 (Boston 1984:147)?5 The Federation 
achieved this 2.25% increase in the basic hourly rate, as well as in special rates 
and incentive contract rates. Although in this round of bargaining the Federation 
appears to have held in abeyance its attempts to regain parity with building 
industry tradesmen, it did achieve some improved conditions of employment, 
including an increase in annual holidays.26 
The following year, in 1976, the General Principal Order was renegotiated. Once 
again, the Federation confronted the wage controls. But this time there was a 
concerted campaign led by the Federation of Labour to defeat these controls. As 
Boston (1984:164) points out, "By the end of 1975 a statutory incomes policy had 
been in force for much of the previous five years with only a short reprieve during 
the initial stages of the third Labour Government." Understandably, the unions 
were "becoming increasingly restive under the shackles of enforced restraint and 
there were growing pressures within the union movement for a return to free 
collective bargaining" (ibid:164). However the incumbent National Government 
continued the wage controls regime, albeit in amended form, of the previous 
25 The first of these cost-of-living orders, which provided for a 4% increase, was granted during the 
currency of GPO 357. The second of these orders, which provided for an 11 cent per hour increase 
in the hourly rate, was incorporated into GPO 365 (WIC Report 1975:19). 
26 See WIC Report (1975: 19). 
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Labour Government (ibid:165).27 The most significant amendment was that the 
Government imposed a twelve month wage freeze in May 1976. As Boston 
(1984: 170) notes, "the union movement responded bitterly to the wage freeze", 
and it set off a flurry of industrial action coordinated by the Federation of 
Labour.28 The port unions participated in these stoppages, which on the 
waterfront took the form of a series of unauthorized stopwork meetings. 
Although the Government made a concession and revised its regulations to allow 
wage increases in 'exceptional circumstances', this process was impeded by the 
fact that "in order to make an application to the Industrial Commission for a wage 
increase, a union had to secure the support of the relevant employer(s)" (Boston 
1984:173). The employers refused to make joint applications for wage increases 
until an 'exceptional circumstance' was defined by the Industrial Commission 
(ibid: 173). "The union movement, angered by the apparent attempt of employers 
to engage in delaying tactics, responded by mounting a vigorous campaign of 
industrial action. Indeed the winter months of 1976 witnessed a large number of 
strikes in many sectors" (ibid: 173). The watersiders were actively involved in this 
campaign which resulted in 24 hour strikes at a number of ports in July of that 
year. The watersiders also engaged in industrial action in relation to their own 
negotiations for a new GPO which were proceeding at the same time, most notably 
in the form of a one day national strike which occurred in August and then another 
in September. Graph 11.2 registers this increase in the level of strike activity. 
27 Boston argues that "the incomes policy pursued by the National Government during its fIrst 20 
months in offIce had much in common with that of the Rowling [Labour] Administration. The 
Wage Adjustment Regulations (1974) were retained, though heavily amended. There were GWOs 
[General Wage Orders] at roughly six-monthly intervals. There was provision for exceptions for 
most of the period . . . . The Industrial Commission continued to administer the Regulations" 
(1984:165). 
28 Boston writes: "Stop-work meetings were held up and down the country and a special conference 
of the FOL, the fIrst such emergency conference for fIve years, was held in Wellington .... At this 
conference, delegates passed resolutions calling for an immediate end to the wage freeze, a return 
to free wage bargaining, three-monthly GWOs, an increase in the forthcoming 7 percent ($7) wage 
order, and immediate adjustments in all pension payments. Moreover, the conference 
recommended that affIliated unions organize one-day stoppages in the main centres, and authorized 
Trades Councils to mount campaigns of direct action" (1984:170-1). 
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In the face of concerted industrial pressure from the union movement, the 
Employers Federation gave in. The Federation of Labour used the Drivers' 
Federation Award as a test case, and "After much argument, the FOL and the 
Employers' Federation reached agreement on a 3 percent pay rise" (ibid:173). The 
Industrial Commission agreed to this increase, and "soon afterwards similar 
increases were awarded to electricians and dairy workers. Once these groups had 
demonstrated the validity of their claims the flood gates were opened for others to 
follow" (ibid: 173). At the WWF conference later that year, General Secretary Ted 
Thompson spoke of the: 
sordid attempt by the New Zealand Employers' Federation to deny 
workers the right to negotiate adjustments in wages with individual 
employers, an action overcome by working class support and 
solidarity with Federation of Labour policy .... The artificial 
instructions from Government to employers not to negotiate wages 
and very little else either, has taken several months of pressure by 
many unions and in our own case several weeks of go-slows and 
short 24 hour stoppages and sometimes longer ones at several ports 
to convince the employers that to continue to act as a handrag for 
the Tory Government has not been conducive to the production of 
profit. 29 
The new GPO (number 399), which was settled in October 1976, increased the 
basic hourly rate from $2.18 to $2.27, and also increased special rates and 
allowances. In agreeing to these increases the Waterfront Industry Tribunal took 
its lead from the Industrial Commission. But more than resulting in a wage 
increase, the negotiations in 1976 were significant in marking a new level of 
militancy on the waterfront, and the increased (and very effective) use of strike 
action on a national basis. 
29 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10176. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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As well as an upsurge in strike activity on the waterfront in 1976, the new 
Waterfront Industry Act (which took effect in April 1977) was passed that year. 
This legislative change was of far greater importance to industrial relations on the 
waterfront than the Industrial Relations Act which had been introduced by the 
Labour Government in 1973. As I noted in Chapter 5, this latter piece of 
legislation was largely intended to regulate informal second tier bargaining. 
Brosnan et al. write that: 
this Act attempted to accommodate and regulate the growth of free 
bargaining by incorporating it within the formal system. It retained 
conciliation, arbitration, the national award system and compulsory 
unionism at the hub of the system but it provided for the 
registration with the Court of collective agreements reached outside 
the conciliation process .... It was designed to return the focus of 
industrial relations to the centre and to reverse the decentralizing 
trends which had upset the relative order and stability of earlier 
years (1990:34,193).30 
But because the Waterfront Industry Act had its own provisions for regulating 
'second-tier' bargaining (which it expressly permitted), and because in everything 
apart from the general principles of the arbitration system (associated with union 
and employer registration) the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act did not apply, the effect of this new piece of legislation on the 
waterfront was negligible. Rather it was the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 which 
modified the industrial relations framework on the waterfront. 
The Waterfront Industry Act 1976 was discussed in Chapter 9, and I will only 
briefly mention its main features here insofar as they apply to sphere of industrial 
relations. Under the new Act, the other main occupational groups on the 
waterfront (foremen-stevedores, tally clerks, and harbour workers involved in 
30 The institutional framework was also modified by the Act: "Structurally the main change was the 
replacement of the Arbitration Court with two new bodies, an Industrial Court (to arbitrate on 
disputes of rights) and an Industrial Commission (to arbitrate on disputes of interest)" (Boston 
1984:129). 
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cargo-handling operations) were removed from the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Court (formerly the Arbitration Court) and placed within the ambit of the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal. The National Conciliation Committees which were 
constituted for the purposes of negotiating GPOs were replaced by a Conciliation 
Council, and the brief of Port Conciliation Committees was increased to include 
the other groups of workers who were brought under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. 
As I noted in Chapter 9, the Act also transformed the Waterfront Industry 
Commission from a non-representative body under the direction of a sole 
Commissioner to a representative body jointly controlled by representatives of the 
employers and the Federation. In order to be allocated gangs of watersiders from 
the labour bureaux, individual employers were required to be registered with the 
reconstituted Commission, and only registered employers could make industrial 
agreements with port unions and the Waterside Workers' Federation. 
Significantly, however, (and much to the Port Employers' Association's chagrin) 
the new Act left intact the provisions for any individual employer, as long as they 
were so registered, to make an agreement with a port union or the Federation. 
Moreover, the new Act attempted to regulate industrial relations by providing for 
the appointment by the Commission of 'port inspectors' who would 'police' the 
waterfront to ensure that the provisions of the Act were being adhered to by the 
employers. The Commission's 1977 annual report conveniently summarizes their 
role: 
The duties of port inspectors are to investigate and report to the 
commission the extent to which registered employers of waterside 
workers are fulfilling their obligations under the Act, to report 
where the efficiency of waterside work is being impeded by the 
manner in which other work within the waterfront industry is being 
performed, and to suggest to employers and waterside workers 
means by which waterside work could be performed with greater 
expedition and efficiency (WIC Report 1977:8). 
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Port inspectors were given the power to "Enter any wharf or ship" and to "Inspect 
any waterside work and other work within the waterfront industry.,,31 In 
exercising this surveillance function, primarily over the employers, undoubtedly 
this system was intended to eliminate practices such as spelling which (as I argued 
in Chapter 6) were central to the way that work was performed. Under the Section 
36 of the Act, which set out the "employers' obligations", employers were 
expected to exercise effective supervision and to ensure that work was performed 
efficiently, and the Act provided for the imposition by the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal of a fine of up to $1500 if employers contravened this requirement. 
However the interesting point about this attempt to establish a 'surveillance 
model' is not what port inspectors were intended to do, but rather the fact that it 
did not succeed (see below), which demonstrates the ambiguity of the law as form 
of industrial regulation. Also, the fact that the Commission was to appoint the 
'port inspectors', who would then report back to the Commission (which took the 
Commission out of the realm of pure administration and into that of monitoring 
industrial relations), foreshadowed the informal role in industrial relations as a 
'talking shop' that the Commission subsequently assumed. These differences 
between the provisions of the Act and how they were applied in practice 
demonstrate, and indeed the discussion of the setting of register strengths in 
Chapter 10 further illustrates, that the new Act functioned not as an unambiguous 
'blueprint' for reworking the institutional and regulatory framework, but rather 
was subject to interpretation and modification in the process of its 
implementation. 
31 Waterfront Industry Act 1976, Section 48(2). 
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The transition to the new Act was not entirely smooth, as the subsumption of the 
foremen-stevedores into the ambit of the Tribunal demonstrates.32 Under the 
provisions of the Act foremen-stevedores (like the tally clerks, and also the 
harbour workers who were part of the container terminals composite workforce) 
were granted access to the Port Conciliation Committees and to the Waterfront 
Industry Tribunal to resolve disputes (of interest and of right), and the industrial 
agreements they were party to became Principal Orders.33 Foremen-stevedores 
had previously been employed under collective agreements registered in the 
Industrial Commission under the Industrial Relations Act 1973. When the 
Waterfront Industry Act 1976 was passed, which removed them from the 
jurisdiction of the Commission and placed them under the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal, the transposition was effected simply by taking the previous collective 
agreement, replacing all references to the Industrial Commission with the 
'Waterfront Industry Tribunal' and then registering the agreement as a Principal 
Order with the Tribunal. By doing this, the personal grievance provisions in the 
agreement were transposed into the Principal Order. But the problem with this 
was that the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 did not provide for 'personal 
grievances,.34 Although a 'personal grievance' was defined under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973, these provisions of the Act (along with most others) did not 
apply to the waterfront. Thus, when foremen-stevedores began to file for personal 
grievances, the Tribunal was forced to rule that it had no legal jurisdiction to 
decide on these cases (nor for that matter did any other court in the country). This 
case illustrates just how different the waterfront arrangements were relative to the 
'conventional' arbitration system, and also the problems associated with 
implementing the Act. 
32 The details of the following example have been extracted from WIT Decision, FS.29, 2217/85. 
Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 59, (National Archives). 
33 It should be noted that the Foremen-Stevedores Union included permanent hands and 
timekeepers, who were also brought under the Tribunal. 
34 The GPO did not have provisions for personal grievances either. But the Act, like the one it 
replaced, did allow watersiders to appeal deregistration. 
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The new Act resulted in a number of other unanticipated changes, not least in the 
employers' organization. A problem arose because, unlike the 1953 Act which it 
replaced, the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 made no reference the New Zealand 
Port Employers' Association. Instead, for reasons which are unclear, it referred to 
the New Zealand Waterside Employers' Association which had been registered 50 
years previously under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1925.35 To 
deal with this situation, the Management Committee of the PEA cancelled it as a 
registered employers' organization and in 1977 registered the New Zealand 
Waterside Employers' Industrial Union of Employers under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973.36 But for all intents and purposes this was the same 
organization as the PEA. The PEA continued to exist and dealt with financial and 
non-industrial matters, while the WEU dealt with industrial matters. The 
Management Committee of each organization was one and the same, the meetings 
of the Branch Committees were held concurrently, and they published a single 
annual report.37 Hence this was a change in name, rather than in composition or 
function. 
Just as unanticipated developments, such as those outlined above, occurred when 
the new Act was implemented, a number of anticipated ones did not occur - which 
further demonstrates the ambiguity of the law as a source of industrial regulation. 
As I noted above, the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 marked an attempt to monitor 
and regulate industrial relations by means of a system of inspection. In effect, port 
35 Section 63(3) of the Act, which deals with 'Transitional Provisions', states that "All references 
to the New Zealand Port Employers' Association ... in any principal order in force at the 
commencement of this Act or in any order amending any such principal order and so in force shall, 
unless inconsistent with the context be read as references to the New Zealand Waterside 
Employers' Association Industrial Association of Employers". It will be recalled from the 
discussion in Chapter 2 that the Port Employers' Association, which was registered in 1949, took 
over the functions of the Waterside Employers' Association. It appears, however, that the 
registration of this latter organization was never cancelled and that when the 1976 Act was drafted 
reference was made to it instead of the Port Employers' Association. 
36 Henceforth I will refer to this organization by the abbreviation 'WEU'. 
37 Details of this reorganization have been gleaned from the PEA/WEU Annual Report for 1978. 
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inspectors were to exerCIse a surveillance function primarily in relation to the 
practices of employers. But it was the unions, not the employers, that vehemently 
opposed this inspection system and ultimately prevented port inspectors from 
being appointed. Although the Commission was legally empowered to appoint 
port inspectors, it did not do so because the Government directed it not to. The 
Minister of Labour attended the inaugural of the Commission in 1977 and 
informed the Commission that the Government did not want to appoint port 
inspectors. 38 The reason for this was that the Federation, and port unions, did not 
want them to be appointed.39 Although it is unclear how this message was 
conveyed to the Government, the union representatives who were members of the 
Commission made the Federation's opposition to the appointment of port 
inspectors very clear. At one meeting, Mel Foster commented that there was no 
need for port inspectors to oversee industrial matters: 
If there had to be a policeman to supervise two parties who should be 
together there would be no show of having harmony, it would just 
create havoc. The only way was to bring the two parties together to 
at least get common ground.40 
Rather than agreeing to appoint port inspectors, the union representatives sought 
to meet the employers through the Commission. At the next meeting, Mel Foster 
commented further: "If you had bad industrial relations on the waterfront you 
could forget what port inspectors could or could not do.,,41 And at this meeting 
the members of the Commission passed a resolution for a consultative seminar 
38 Although this was not recorded in the minutes of the first meeting of the Commission, because 
the Minister of Labour directed that minutes not be kept of his discussion with its members, 
reference was made to this by the Chairman at a subsequent meeting. Minutes of Waterfront 
Industry Commission Meeting 7, 21/7/77. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 
48 (National Archives). 
39 As well as the comments of the Chairman in the meeting referred to in the preceding note, this 
reason for port inspectors not being appointed was also given in the Waterfront Employers' Union 
Annual Report 1978. 
40 Minutes of Waterfront Industry Commission Meeting 9, 13/9/77. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
41 Minutes of Waterfront Industry Commission Meeting 10, 11110/77. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
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between unions and employers to be held by the Commission to discuss aspects of 
industrial relations on the waterfront (including port inspectors). Thus the 
Commission, which even though it was to appoint port inspectors was not 
supposed to be involved in 'industrial matters', took on something of an informal 
role in this sphere as an industrial relations 'talking shop' for employers and the 
Federation.42 This was not a legislatively prescribed function, rather it emerged 
informally. Indeed, the Commission's Chairman described the first of these 
meetings "as a forum being all embracing rather than within the confines of the 
Act.,,43 
That the National Government (which was not noted for its sympathy to trade 
unions) heeded the wishes of the Federation by directing the Commission not to 
appoint port inspectors speaks to the degree of power that the Waterside Workers' 
Federation exerted in industrial matters. This is particularly the case insofar as 
this decision impeded the Commission's functioning, and actually cut across the 
purported intention of the Act (i.e. to better monitor and control the waterfront). 
This decision made it difficult for the Commission to find out what was going on 
at the port level because, in a sense, the inspectors (along with the local bureau 
managers) were to have acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the newly centralized 
Commission at the local port level. The Commission's minutes record a comment 
by one of its members, who represented the employers, that: 
He did not see how, as a Commission, they could be expected to see 
all that was going on around the country and ensure that all who had 
been granted registration as employers were carrying out their 
functions correctly.44 
42 It is interesting to note that this development occurred at the same time as the Commission was 
attempting to 'cajole' these actors into setting register strengths (see Chapter Eight). 
43 Minutes of Waterfront Industry Commission Special Meeting, 14/2/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
44 Minutes of Waterfront Industly Commission Meeting 7, 21/7/77. Waterfront Industly 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
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The same member commented at another meeting that: "At the moment the 
Commission found it difficult to get a clear picture of what was happening from 
one end of New Zealand to another.,,45 
From my reading of the Commission's minutes it appears that the informal 
meetings it held between employer and union representatives achieved very little. 
What is important, however, is that these meetings were supposed to substitute for 
port inspectors, and that these inspectors were not appointed because port unions 
did not want them, and possessed the strength to enforce this view (which 
undoubtedly rested on a strike threat). This case also speaks to union strength in 
another sense (which will be taken up in the next chapter): the industrial strength 
of the port unions was mirrored in watersiders' control of work which manifested 
itself in the form of employer-tolerated practices such as 'spelling'. Undoubtedly 
one of the reasons that the unions vehemently opposed the introduction of this 
system of inspection was its potential to disrupt the workplace 'indulgency 
pattern' (Gouldner 1954). In sum, this aspect of the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 
represented a failed attempt to use the law to eliminate practices which were 
tacitly condoned (as part of the wage-effort bargain) by individual employers. 
The industrial strength of the port unions, which forestalled the appointment of 
port inspectors, was further demonstrated in 1977 over the case of LCL 
containers.46 It will be recalled that, after a number of demarcation disputes 
between the port unions and the Storeman and Packers Federation at the time 
when containers were first introduced over who had coverage of the work of 
packing and unpacking containers, an agreement had been brokered by the 
Federation of Labour. Under this agreement, which was subsequently supported 
45 Minutes of Waterfront Industry Commission Special Meeting, 14/2/78. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 48 (National Archives). 
46 LCL is an abbreviation for 'less than full container load' and such containers carry cargo 
belonging to more than one consignee. FCL, on the other hand, represents 'full container load' and 
such containers carry cargo belonging to a single consignee (see Branch 1986:156-7). 
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by a Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1972, LCL containers had to be packed and 
unpacked on the wharf by waterside workers. Although FCL containers could be 
packed and unpacked off the wharf, this could only be carried out at the shipper's 
own premises using their own labour (rather than at an agent's premises). The 
agreement which had previously been reached over coverage of LCL containers 
was subsequently encoded in the Waterfront Industry Act 1976. After the Act was 
passed, a number of manufacturing importers and transport operators wrote to' the 
Minister of Labour seeking clarification of the legislation, in order both to achieve 
greater 'flexibility' in the unpacking of LCLs and to have FCLs devanned at an 
agents' premises.47 In April 1978 the Minister of Labour wrote the following 
reply to a letter by the Secretary of the Transport Advisory Council: 
In the short term we are bound by the practice of devanning LCL 
containers on the wharf as has become customary and followed on 
from the recommendations of the Royal Commission into 
containers. There are only two ways in which this situation could 
be changed rapidly, either (1) By the initiation of a full-scale 
confrontation with the waterfront unions and conceivably the 
greater part of the trade union movement, or (2) By allowing the 
waterfront unions to extend their coverage and take their conditions 
offwharf.48 
However, in soliciting suggestions from vanous groups as to how greater 
flexibility in the packing and unpacking of containers could be achieved, the 
Minister of Labour made very clear that neither of the preceding alternatives were 
considered viable by the Government. 
In 1974 a journalist wrote in the National Business Review that the Government 
was trying to "keep the worker aristocrats within the wharf gates.,,49 Although it 
47 Copies of these letters are contained in a file of Waterfront Industry Commission records. 
Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 53,5/605 (National Archives). 
48 Letter from J. Gordon to E. Williams, 1114/78. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, 
W3472, Box 53, 5/605 (National Archives). 
49 National Business Review, 19/6/74. 
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refers to watersiders pejoratively, there is more than a grain of truth to this claim. 
The Government's approach during the 1970s increasingly became one of 
containment - attempting to prevent watersiders' wages and conditions from 
moving beyond the wharves. Indeed, as the Waterfront Industry Commission 
itself noted, the definitions of waterside work contained in the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976 were "designed to ensure that waterside conditions do not flow on to 
other workers outside the wharf limits" (WIC 1977:6). Moreover, in the context 
ofthe militancy and strength of the port unions, the Government sought at all costs 
to avoid provoking a major confrontation with the Waterside Workers Federation. 
As these examples demonstrate, the Government clearly recognised the industrial 
strength of the watersiders. Other examples abound at the port level, where 
employers tolerated informal practices, as part of the 'indulgency pattern', in the 
interests of industrial harmony. A good example is that of pillaging. In 1974 the 
Managing Director of a company that manufactured leather goods wrote to the 
Minister of Labour complaining that boxes of tools had been stolen from its 
containers on numerous occasions. In the letter, it was claimed that the company 
had complained to the stevedoring company in question (the New Zealand Express 
Company) and threatened to make a formal complaint to the police. Apparently a 
representative of the stevedoring company replied: "For goodness sake, don't do 
that. There is harmony on the waterfront now, don't upset it."sO Other such 
examples abound in the records of the Waterfront Industry Commission. What 
they demonstrate is the degree of control that the port unions exerted over the 
waterfront both at a national level, and at the local port level. 
The Federation continued to make considerable gains in wages and conditions 
throughout the latter half of the 1970s. This was particularly the case when the 
50 Letter from the Managing Director of C.B. McCrean Leather Merchants to Minister of Labour, 
26111174. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 53,5/608 (National Archives). 
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wage controls were finally lifted in August 1977. The General Principal Order 
was renegotiated in 1977 (GPO 407), in 1979 (GPO 428) and in 1980 (GPO 444). 
Each of these rounds of negotiations involved strike action by the port unions, 
most significantly in 1980 when two 48 hour national strikes occurred. And each 
of the resulting agreements contained a substantial wage Increase. Most 
significantly, the abolition of the wage controls led to the reinforcement of 
occupational wage relativities (see Walsh 1993: 184), and in the 1979 GPO 
negotiations watersiders regained wage parity with building tradesmen. Because 
of the 'trigger mechanism' which linked the GPO and the container terminal 
agreement, the wage increases secured in each of these bargaining rounds were 
automatically passed on to watersiders in the container terminals. Furthermore, in 
GPO 444 the Federation secured the abolition of casual labour which had 
previously been used to supplement the registered workforce (see Chapter 10). 
However the considerable gains in wages and conditions that the Federation made 
throughout the 1970s were a product not only of its industrial strength and 
bargaining power, but also of employer disunity which the Federation and the port 
unions exploited. Part of the Federation's success in bargaining in this period was 
a result of the way in which it effectively used decentralized bargaining, 
particularly Principal Orders negotiated with individual employers, to fragment the 
employers collectively. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, the latter 
part of the 1970s was characterized by the unions playing off employers against 
each other by means of special agreements, in order to achieve significant gains at 
both the local and national levels. 
(3.2) Local Bargaining 1972-1980 
During this period there was are-emergence of the 'stable balance' with respect to 
bargaining at the national and port levels which, until the difficulties of securing 
consent from the larger unions to introduce GPO 305 in 1970, had existed in the 
477 
1950s and 1960s. The records of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal indicate that 
the negotiation of the General Principal Order and Supplementmy Principal Orders 
were largely re-synchronized. As in the previous period, there appears to have 
been considerable cooperation between the Federation and the PEA over the order 
and manner in which negotiations at the port level (for SPOs) took place. 
Typically, after a new GPO had been settled negotiations for SPOs and the 
container terminals agreement would be commenced. In the Federation's camp 
there were no instances of unions breaking ranks, via local bargaining, as the 
Auckland Union had done in 1970. However, the Federation accommodated some 
of the larger unions - like Auckland - by allowing negotiations over local 
conditions to precede national negotiations. 
If the Federation managed to reunite and to present a united front to employers, at 
least in the realm of bargaining, the employers were increasingly wracked by 
internal divisions which manifested themselves in bargaining practices. Although 
this disunity did not manifest itself in bargaining at the port level (for SPOs), it 
was apparent in bargaining at the level of the company and the site. In the 
discussion which follows I will demonstrate how, throughout the 1970s, the polt 
unions 'picked off individual employers by securing special (second-tier) 
agreements which the Federation then used as a precedent for seeking similar 
conditions to be incorporated in the GPO. While the GPO still formed the 
foundation of the Federation's bargaining position (by taking wages out of 
competition downwards), these 'satellite' agreements were 'levered off the GPO 
for better wages and conditions, which then formed the basis for claims made in 
subsequent negotiations at the national level. These special agreements helped 
strengthen the Federation's bargaining position, but the employers who entered 
into them made concessions which the Port Employers Association regarded as 
undermining the employers' collective interests. 
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To recap, technological change in the late 1960s led to the diversification (and 
fragmentation) of employer interests. The key point is that vertical disintegration 
(and the other developments in ownership and control which I outlined in Chapter 
8) impeded the ability of the employers to organize. This problem was 
compounded by the fact that these diverse actors had access to the same legal 
machinery as the national organization in order to negotiate agreements with the 
port unions and their Federation. Significantly, individual firms had the right to 
make such agreements. 
The problem that the Port Employers Association faced was that, although it was a 
centralized association, it could not force employers to join nor could it even veto 
special agreements made between its own members and port unions. The 
Federation on the other hand, although it was not a centralized national union as 
such, managed via an amendment to its rules to limit the freedom of port unions to 
make local agreements.51 In the main, it appears that the port unions abided by 
these rules. Despite being a loose national organization comprised of independent 
port unions, each with a considerable degree of local autonomy, the Federation 
was therefore more successful than the PEA at achieving an 'externalized' mode 
of action. 
In 1973, when the revision of the Waterfront Industry Act was being considered, 
the PEA made submissions that all 'employers' of waterfront labour should be 
registered and, moreover, that only registered employers who belonged to the PEA 
should be allowed to negotiate agreements with port unions. 52 But this attempt by 
the employers' organization to influence the amendments to the Act was 
51 In 1976, Clause 27 of the Federation's rules was amended to read that each affiliated "Union 
shall conduct its own local business" but "Agreements covering conditions of employment shall be 
referred to the Federation for consideration and approval prior to adoption by the particular 
affiliated Union." 
52 PEA Annual Report 1973. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 130 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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unsuccessful. Although the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 required that employers 
be registered by the Waterfront Industry Commission before they could be 
allocated labour from the local labour bureaux, it did not (as the PEA had wanted) 
restrict the right of individual employers to strike agreements with port unions, 
which could then be registered with the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. Under the 
1976 Act, like its precursor, any association and any registered employer could 
enter into an agreement with a POit union. 53 An examination of the Commission's 
minutes shows that any direct employer, defined by employment of foremen-
stevedores and thus having the ability to exercise supervision over watersiders, 
was automatically granted registration. F or companies that employed foremen-
stevedores registration was therefore simply a formality, and was extended to 
many companies that did not belong to the PEA. Furthermore, as one of the cases 
below shows, registered employers became increasingly subject to pressure from 
shippers to secure special agreements. Thus non-direct employers could. get 
special agreements to work cargo via their chosen (registered) stevedoring 
company. 
As I.demonstrated in Chapter 5, local agreements in the form of Principal Orders 
negotiated between port unions and individual firms, at the level of the company 
or site, had always existed during the 1950s and 1960s. But these flourished in the 
mid-to-Iate 1970s primarily in response to different companies seeking a 
competitive edge using new technology. This often took the form of introducing a 
new type of vessel that combined the already existing container technology in a 
new way (the 'Strider Class' vessels mentioned below are a good example). The 
cost of time in port for these (very expensive) vessels was usually considerably 
53 Section 18( I) of the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 states that "Any union or association or 
employer may at any time apply to the Tribunal on a form provided by the Tribunal for a principal 
order or other order." This is further elaborated to include only registered employers by s 34(3) 
which states: "No person (other than a registered employer of waterside workers) shall be entitled 
to enter into an agreement with any waterside workers or with any union or association of waterside 
workers on conditions for employing waterside workers." 
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greater than for other types of vessels. In the satellite agreements individual 
companies typically made significant concessions on wages and conditions to the 
port unions involved in order to get their agreement to operate the new vessels 
under conditions which promoted faster turnaround times. 
I will deal in detail with three satellite agreements negotiated in the late 1970s, not 
only because they illustrate very well the processes at work (particularly the 
divisions, cross-cutting pressures, and sectional interests within the employers' 
organization), but also because they were in themselves landmark agreements. 
The following account of these agreements has been constructed from Waterfront 
Employers Union (WEU) records.54 
The first agreement I will deal with was negotiated in 1978 between Scancarriers 
Ltd (a shipping company) and the Waterside Workers Federation. This company 
operated roll-on / roll-off container vessels over conventional wharves. It did not 
belong to the Waterfront Employers' Union and was not registered as an employer 
with the Waterfront Industry Commission, instead contracting specialist 
stevedoring companies at the ports where it operated (Auckland, Napier and 
Timaru) to load and unload and unload its vessels.55 Although 1'0 / ro vessels 
were by no means new to New Zealand, the agreement which the company 
reached with the WWF contained a number of provisions which the WEU strongly 
objected to. As the minutes of one of the WEU Management Committee meetings 
state: 
It was . . . pointed out that there were several points in the 
Agreement which it was feared would set dangerous precedents and 
54 It will be recalled that in 1977 the name of the Port Employers Association was changed to the 
'Waterfront Employers Union'. 
55 A different stevedoring company was contracted at each port: Leonard and Dingley (Auckland), 
Putlett and Smith (Napier), and D.C. Turnbull (Timam). 
it was felt that it was unfortunate that the Agreement had been 
finalized without consultation with the Management Committee. 56 
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For instance, the agreement provided for two drivers for each loading and 
unloading operation. A watersider used a tractor to tow trailers to and from the 
stacking point, and then a harbour worker used a forklift to lift containers on and 
off the trailers. 57 Also, a very favourable bonus rate was agreed to. But of greater 
concern was the shift arrangement. The agreement provided for a seven day week 
based on a shift work system akin to the one that operated in the container 
terminals. The Waterfront Employers Union did not oppose shiftwork as such, but 
rather the fact that shift payments were based on the ordinary time rate of pay 
contained in the GPO. It regarded this agreement as having undermined 
the intense effort which had been made last year in re-negotiating 
the GPO to establish two rates of pay for watersiders, the lower rate 
to be used for shift operations. 58 
The GPO was to be renegotiated later that year, and "concern was felt that the 
wording of the Scancarrier Agreement would tie shift rates to the Carpenters' 
rate.,,59 Thus the employers organization felt that the agreement undermined the 
GPO, and that the Federation was gaining concessions from a single employer 
which would then be sought on a national basis in subsequent GPO negotiations. 
However, despite their opposition to the agreement, the WEU formally could do 
nothing to prevent it. When the WEU refused to sign the agreement, the three 
stevedoring firms involved (all of whom were members of the WEU) signed it 
instead, and it was subsequently registered as Principal Order 412 by the 
56 Minutes of PEA/WEU Management Committee Meeting 28, 17/5/78. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
57 In effect, this provided employment for one more watersider than might otherwise have been the 
case if harbour workers alone had performed this work. 
58 Minutes of PEA/WEU Management Committee Meeting 28, 17/5/78. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
59 Ibid. 
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Waterfront Industry Tribunal. 60 Once again, this demonstrates the difficulties that 
the employers' organization faced, given that registered stevedoring companies 
themselves had access to the same legal machinery as the WEU in making 
agreements. Furthermore, a shipping company that was not registered as an 
employer (and thus could not make agreements with the port unions or the 
Federation) could simply contract a registered stevedoring company and then 
apply pressure for it to make such an agreement. And the WEU could not 
formally prevent its member companies from doing so. 
The second agreement, which was negotiated in 1978 in the wake of the 
Scancarriers agreement, concerned 'Strider Class' vessels. These vessels, new to 
New Zealand in the late 1970s, were a combination of a roll-on / roll-off vessel 
and a cellular container ship.61 The vessels were owned by the Austiran Shipping 
Company and were to operate at the ports of Tauranga, Napier and Timaru. This 
company did not belong to the WEU but its agent, Seatrans Consolidated, did 
belong to the WEU.62 Unlike the case above, Seatrans asked the WEU to 
negotiate an agreement for these vessels. But the WWF actually questioned the 
right of the WEU to negotiate on behalf of Seatrans. As the WEU Management 
Committee minutes state, "It was quite clear that the Federation preferred to 
negotiate direct with the stevedores.,,63 Indeed, the extent of this preference is 
indicated by the fact that the WEU had to produce documentary evidence to prove 
that Austiran had appointed Seatrans as its agent, and that Seatrans had authorized 
the WEU to negotiate an agreement, before the Federation would enter into any 
negotiations. 
60 WIT Decision 712, 26/5/78. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 57 
(National Archives). 
61 Strider Class vessels used a tractor-trailer arrangement for loading and unloading containers, like 
a normal ro / ro operation, but each vessel had its own gantry crane which lifted containers from 
the trailers and put them into the cell guides aboard ship, and vice versa. 
62 In this case, Seatrans Consolidated acted as the shipping agent, and another (unnamed) company 
was appointed as the stevedore. 
63 Minutes ofPEAlWEU Management Committee Meeting 33, 7/8/78. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Librmy, NLNZ). 
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Similarly, once negotiations did begin, the WEU had considerable difficulty in 
securing an agreement because the Federation sought, using the Scancarriers 
agreement as a precedent, that two drivers be provided per tractor unit and the 
same bonus rate as applied on Scancarriers vessels. The WEU Management 
Committee felt that conceding these conditions "would confirm the very 
undesirable precedents which had already been set.,,64 However they were forced 
to agree to these conditions because Seatrans, under pressure from their clients 
(Austiran), were going to authorize their stevedores to negotiate an agreement 
directly with the Federation if the WEU could not secure an agreement. If this had 
occurred, these concessions most likely would have been made anyway. Within 
the WEU Management Committee: 
The opinion was expressed that in view of the precedent which had 
already been established, coupled with the suggestion that the 
Agents would have to give consideration to instructing their 
stevedores to make an agreement, the Employers' Union had to be 
realistic and face the fact that the precedent had already been set 
and there was little likelihood of breaking the situation down.65 
As the preceding case demonstrates, the WWF successfully adopted the tactic of 
seeking to negotiate agreements directly with stevedoring companies, without the 
involvement of the employers' organization. 
The third example relates to an agreement, made at the Port of Auckland in 1979, 
between the well-established stevedoring company of Leonard and Dingley (a 
long-time member of the PEA and the WEU) , and the Auckland Waterside 
Workers Union.66 In this case, New Zealand Steel, an exporter of steel, pressured 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The details of this agreement have been drawn from the Minutes of PEA/WEU Management 
Committee Meeting 54, 517179. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Leonard and Dingley into an agreement with the Auckland Union to work a 
conventional operation under a shift arrangement at container rates of pay. This 
was done in order to 'buy' a quicker turnaround time from the Union. The 
Auckland Union then put a similar proposal to another employer, and other 
companies began to consider negotiating shiftwork for work on conventional 
wharves. In effect, the Union played one company off against another. Once 
again, the WEU saw this as "an undesirable precedent", particularly insofar as it 
had the potential to erode the differences between the rates of pay in the container 
terminals and on the conventional wharves. At a WEU Management Committee 
meeting: 
Concern was expressed that there appeared to be no way in which 
individual employers can be stopped from entering into such 
agreements, as the Waterfront Industry Act enables any registered 
employer to make an agreement. 67 
This is a clear example of a port user circumventing the centralized bargaining 
institutions, and bringing pressure to bear on a stevedoring company. Individual 
stevedores were, understandably, quick to heed the wishes of their clients 
(particularly when the former were prepared to pay the price of special 
agreements). 68 Les Dickson, the Chairman of the Stevedoring Employers 
Association, later commented that in this period there was a "proliferation of 
principal orders negotiated by stevedoring companies on behalf of shipping 
principals who were looking for a competitive edge.,,69 The effects of these 
agreements were twofold. First, there was an upward spiral in terms of companies 
seeking a competitive edge being forced to offer similar conditions to those 
67 Ibid. 
68 The shipping companies could, however, pass this cost on to the shippers. In submission's to the 
Ministry of Transport's Onshore Costs Study, it was noted that "Many [shippers] considered that 
costs to shippers had risen due to the influence that ship operators have over their client stevedores, 
and the ease with which they concede expensive and unnecessary terms and conditions." (MOT 
1985:15). 
69 Comment in a speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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contained in already existing satellite agreements. Second, although shipping 
companies often were willing to pay for special conditions, the satellite 
agreements in question undermined the attempts ofWEU to 'hold the line' both in 
special agreements generally and in national negotiations. 
The Federation and the port unions effectively exploited this situation. The case 
of shiftwork is instructive in this regard. A two-shift system for all ports had been 
proposed by the Federation in 1976, in part, as a means of combatting 
d d . 70 re un ancles. Subsequently, this was sought in GPO negotiations in 1976. 
Although an agreement had been reached with the WEU to trial shiftwork, 
because of a breakdown over actual terms and conditions (and partly because 
some port unions were not entirely enthusiastic about it) by 1982 this still had not 
occurred. 71 However, by means of satellite agreements, the Federation effectively 
got shiftwork introduced on conventional wharves, albeit on a limited scale,'by 
the back door' and on very favourable terms. 
Within the industrial relations literature of the 1990s, decentralized bargaining is 
often assumed to be an employer strategy associated with attempts to extend or to 
consolidate employer power. Katz notes that some theorists regard: 
70 At the WWF conference in 1976 a resolution was passed that "instead of the present system of 
two minimum periods per day plus supplementary hours a proposal be drafted for the next General 
Principal Order setting out the basis of a regular two shift system with a minimum payment for the 
shift." This move represented something of a volte-face for the Federation in that at the time of the 
Waterfront Conference it had resisted the move towards shiftwork, and had only agreed to 
'supplementary hours' on the basis of achieving permanent conditions of employment. In the 
meantime, the PEA, which had always been split on the issue of shiftwork, no longer sought its 
comprehensive introduction. Minutes of Waterside Workers Conference, 20/10176. New Zealand 
Waterfront Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/4 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
71 During the renegotiation of GPO 428 in 1980, the NZA WE representatives made clear that, 
despite the agreement in principle reached in 1976 to trial shiftwork, they did not want to pursue 
this any further. A comment by the General Secretary of NZA WE, R. Benham, is recorded in the 
minutes thus: "From the Employers' point of view the question of shifts would mean additional 
supervisory staff, mechanical equipment, more workers and problems with regard to ancillary 
services. To date it was not known with any surety that all Employers would favour the 
introduction of shift work. What the Employers did not want were the same hassles experienced 
when supplementary hours were first introduced." Minutes of National Conciliation Committee 
Meeting, 4/3/80. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 26 (Alexander Turnbull 
Library, NLNZ). 
decentralization as a useful tool through which employers have 
gained bargaining power advantage .... Employers seem to benefit 
most from the ability to play plants (and local unions) off against 
one another - that is, to whipsaw local unions (1993: 13). 
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But on the waterfront, where centralized and decentralized bargaining co-existed, 
it was the unions that used decentralization to achieve a bargaining advantage. 72 
Indeed in another comment by Katz, we can substitute 'union' for 'employers' and 
vice versa. Thus: unions use "decentralized bargaining to gain the concessions 
they desire because central . . . [employers' associations] are unwilling to grant 
them, whereas local ... [employers] are more willing to do so" (ibid:13). This 
encapsulates the strategy of the port unions, and what they achieved. They played 
off of one employer against another to gain better wages and conditions, and also 
played off individual employers against the national employers' organization. It is 
legitimate to alter Katz's statement in this manner because here he is writing about 
decentralized bargaining as a 'temporary' strategy wherein, after gaining benefits 
from decentralization, "employers may . . . prefer to return to centralized 
bargaining because of the advantages it provides (stability, predictability, and 
economies of scale)" (ibid:13). This temporary strategy is analogous to the port 
unions using decentralized bargaining parallel to centralized national bargaining. 
The Waterfront Employers Union did not want unrestricted decentralized 
bargaining because it 'bid up' wages and conditions above the minimum levels in 
the GPO. The 'rachet effect' that this resulted in, with respect to wages and 
conditions, compromised the employers collectively. Employers were therefore 
caught between centralized bargaining (an 'externalized' system whereby the 
72 In this sense, the practice of decentralized bargaining on the New Zealand waterfront was 
comparable to a pattern documented by an earlier industrial relations literature with respect to the 
situation in Britain in the late 1960s and 1970s (see Fox and Flanders 1969; Batstone et al. 1977; 
Beynon 1977; Lane and Roberts 1971). Ironically, in the 1990s, industrial relations theorists (such 
as Katz) 'rediscovered' decentralization Gust as the employers did). 
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WEU assumed responsibility for national bargaining) and decentralized bargaining 
whereby individual employers made deals over and above the prevailing GPO. In 
effect, in this period there was a breakdown on the employers side of the 
'externalized' mode of bargaining, in that individual employers refused to delegate 
authority to the employers' organization. 
Particularly after the introduction of new, increasingly capital-intensive types of 
vessels and operations, individual employers sought to 'purchase' productivity and 
to minimize disruptions to work by negotiating satellite agreements. This allowed 
the Federation to 'pick off these employers. In reflecting on the pattern of 
decentralized bargaining on the waterfront, we can consider "bargaining structure . 
. . both as a reflection of the parties' relative power and as a determinant of 
power" (Katz 1993: 13). The Federation and port unions used decentralized 
bargaining to further fragment and weaken the employers, thereby consolidating 
and increasing their own already existing (not insubstantial) industrial strength. 
(4) The Employers Reorganize 
Collectively the employers responded in two ways to this fragmentation. First, 
throughout the rest of the 1970s, the Waterfront Employers Union sought to have 
the legislated right of individual employers to negotiate their own special 
agreements removed. For instance, at one of the WEU Management Committee 
meetings in 1979 some members expressed the following view: 
if Government could be shown that there was indeed a single 
unified employer organization in existence it might be possible to 
persuade Government to change the Waterfront Industry Act to the 
extent that a unified employer organization would be the only party 
authorized to negotiate agreements on the waterfront. 73 
73 Minutes of PEA/WEU Management Committee Meeting 50, 21/3/79. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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However this attempt to establish a legislative 'monopoly', of the type provided 
for labour, was unsuccessful. Their second response, as the preceding quote 
alludes to, was to reorganize their own representative body. 
The upsurge in the number of special 'site' agreements (such as the Scancarriers 
and Strider class vessel agreements) was instrumental in the reconstitution of the 
employers' organization. The following comment contained in the 1978 WEU 
Annual Report, which succinctly summarizes the employers' reasons for forming 
a new inclusive organization, is worth quoting at length: 
In recent years with the introduction of new areas of operation on 
the waterfront and the appearance on the scene of new interests, 
services and types of vessel, we have unfortunately seen a number 
of sharp divisions where particular interests, not necessarily 
members of either our Association or [employers'] Union, have 
found it necessary for their own benefit to enter into agreements 
with workers' unions which have had unfortunate side effects on 
the industry in general. As Employers know to their cost, the 
workers' unions are adept in using concessions gained from one 
interest as a lever to obtain similar concessions from another. This 
is particularly so in relation to Container, RolRo Terminal 
operations vis-a-vis conventional operations and vice versa. The 
need for an even more unified Employers' Organization controlling 
all negotiations with the various Waterfront Workers' Unions has 
consequently been well recognized for some time now. 
Undoubtedly it is deviation from the established pattern conditions 
of employment which has caused the present fragmented position 
which Workers' Unions are ... so adept at exploiting.74 
The earliest reference I can find of a proposal to form a new employer's 
organization is in the minutes of a Waterfront Employers Union meeting, held in 
March 1976, where it was resolved to organize a conference of the various 
interests in the industry with a view to "the possible formation of a strong 
74 PEA/WEU Annual Report 1978. Port Employers Association Records, 89-395, Box 130 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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employer body in the industry.,,75 At this conference, which was held in April 
that year, it was decided to form a new over-arching employers' organization to 
represent the different employer interests. The extent to which this reorganization 
was prompted by the power the unions achieved through the fragmentation of 
bargaining is indicated by the following comment, made at a PEA Management 
Committee Meeting in 1976: 
[a] single negotiating body on the employers' side was the very 
thing that the Unions did not want as this would nullify most of 
their bargaining ability.76 
NZAWE was formed subsequently, in 1981, registered as an employers' 
organization under the Industrial Relations Act 1973, and then it took over the 
WEU's responsibilities as the official employers' organization in July 1982 (see 
Chapter 9 for a detailed discussion of how the new organization was formed). 
This new inclusive employers' organization, which drew in representatives of the 
other main employer bodies, had a more militant outlook than the Waterfront 
Employers Union. At the Waterside Workers Federation's conference in 1982, 
President Ray Fergus spoke of the "re-formation of the employers' structure and 
their apparent hard line management." 77 In his report at the same conference, 
General Secretary Jennings remarked: 
The Employers have actually formed themselves into a National 
Union and this was done deliberately to attack the conditions of 
waterside workers. They have already begun to attempt to pick off 
. 78 some port Ulllons. 
75 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 634, 17/3/76. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
76 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 642, 5/7/76. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
77 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Conference, 18/10/82. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/7 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
78 Ibid. 
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However the formation of the new employers' organization still did not prevent 
the fragmentation of bargaining. Despite the formation of NZA WE, the 
Waterfront Employers Union still considered it vital that the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976 be amended to eliminate the ability of individual employers to "make 
independent deals without reference to either the Employers' Union or the new 
A .. ,,79 ssoclatlOn. Consequently, at the first meeting of the NZAWE Council in 
1981, a discussion of the need to lobby for amendments to the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976 occurred, and agreement was reached that it was "essential that changes 
to the Act must limit negotiations of agreements, both national and local, to 
Unions or Industrial Associations of Employers."so 
The reason for the employers continuing to push for this change in law is that 
individual companies continued to negotiate special agreements independent of 
NZAWE. For instance, in 1982 NZAWE indicated its intention to take control of 
the renegotiation of a special agreement for a shipping company, Gearbulk 
Shipping (N.Z.), which was not a member of the organization (but was a 
registered employer of water siders). Since 1974, Gearbulk Shipping had operated 
specialized vessels which were able to combine as cargoes unitized forestry 
products, containers, and bulk cargo. This company had never been a member of 
the PEA or the WEU. One of the reasons for this was, according to Gearbulk's 
General Manager (P. Breuer), that these organizations had never recognized the 
specialized nature of these vessels, maintaining that they were merely an 'updated' 
conventional vessel, when in fact they were a high capital cost operation which 
required faster turnaround times than conventional vessels, and hence needed to be 
79 Minutes of PEA/WEU Management Committee Meeting 106, 20/5/81. Port Employers 
Association Records, 89-395, Box 206 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
80 Minutes of NZA WE Council Meeting 1, 9/7/81. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, 
Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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worked under different terms and conditions than these latter. 81 Consequently, in 
1980, Gearbulk Shipping had itself negotiated a special shiftwork agreement with 
the WWF which was ratified by the Waterfront Industry Tribunal. Yet a paper 
produced by NZA WE in 1982 stated that this organization would take over the 
industrial advocacy of the Gearbulk shift agreement. In a letter to the Chief 
Executive of NZAWE, Gearbulk's General Manager wrote: "We cannot 
understand how this statement of intent could be made when we have never been 
consulted."s2 Moreover, Gearbulk would not accept the involvement ofNZAWE 
in its negotiations. 
As the Gearbulk case demonstrates, despite the formation of a 'united' employers 
organization, NZA WE still faced the problem controlling the actions of employers 
who were not members of the organization. In effect, this resulted from the fact 
that the Waterfront Industry Act 1976, which allowed registered employers to 
negotiate with unions, did not make membership of the employers' organization a 
prerequisite to registration. Furthermore, NZAWE continued to face the problem 
of getting its members to delegate authority in bargaining to the organization. As 
we will see below, individual employers continued to 'go it alone' in negotiating 
special agreements with the unions. Deals of this type, which were done at the 
local level, illustrate continuing employer disunity. 
The continuing frustration of the employers' organizations at these special 
agreements was registered, in very forthright terms, in a paper sent to NZA WE by 
the Stevedoring Employers Association: 
There is little doubt in the minds of our Association that the 
Waterfront Industry is in a mess. The Unions have purposely and 
systematically picked off individual employers to the extent that the 
81 Letter from P. Breuer to D. Young, 10/5/82. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 
25 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
82 Ibid. 
GPO as it was intended and presently stands is a work of fiction 
that bears no resemblance to current practices. Special agreements 
proliferate, special cargo rates are often astronomical, and the 
bonus system is a machine that devours money faster than it can be 
generated. . . . Essentially we have reached our current position 
because we as employers have offered no united front, and have 
allowed ourselves to be backed into a corner time and time again.83 
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As one of the distinct set of interests within NZA WE, the Stevedoring Employers 
Association (SEA) lobbied it on a number of issues. In this case the SEA, as well 
as arguing for greater unity amongst employers, proposed a high-wage solution 
with reduced manning levels. It stated: "We can afford to make the pay attractive 
enough to buy flexibility", but added the proviso that this was only the case if 
manning levels were cut. 84 As we shall see, this statement foreshadowed the 
approach that NZA WE subsequently was to take. 
The first two rounds of national negotiations after the formation of NZA WE, 
which resulted in the introduction of GPO 459 (in March 1981) and GPO 470 (in 
March 1982), were still handled by the Waterfront Employers Union as the new 
organization did not officially take over as the official employers' organization 
until July 1982. These negotiations took much the same form as the previous 
three rounds: the Federation secured wage increases based on the threat of 
industrial action on a national scale (although in neither case did strike action 
actually occur). For instance, when the negotiations in 1982 stalled at one point, 
the Federation exercised this strike threat very effectively. At the Federation's 
Conference in 1982 General Secretary Jennings said: "The National Executive ... 
were preparing a recommendation to port unions for full scale direct action by all 
ports when the Employers sought further discussion and the offer of a package 
83 New Zealand Stevedoring Employers Association 'Paper to New Zealand Association of 
Waterfront Employers', 12110/83. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 57 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
84 Ibid. 
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deal.,,85 This latter GPO was settled before a wage freeze was imposed by the 
National Government in June 1982. 
NZA WE, at this time, also had a significant decision go against it. This was a 
case where the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, in taking what by all counts must be 
regarded as a narrow, legalistic reading of an agreement, rendered a decision 
which severely hampered the employers (and favoured the unions). In 1982, a 
time of considerable redundancies (see Chapter 10), the Federation placed a 
restriction on the working of non-cellular and partly cellular vessels within 
. . I 86 contamer termma s. Undoubtedly this was done to keep more work for 
watersiders. As Roth (1993: 197) writes, "watersiders alone had the right to work 
ships in conventional ports, while composite gangs of watersiders and harbour 
workers worked in the terminals." In response, NZA WE took a case to the 
Tribunal in an attempt to have non-cellular vessels worked within the container 
terminals. However the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Federation.87 As General 
Secretary Jennings remarked, in his address to the WWF Conference in 1984: 
the Container Terminal Operators attempted to force all vessels 
carrying containers to be worked by the composite work [force] at 
the Terminals and took the case to the Tribunal against our wishes. 
They made a mistake, which we have capitalized on since.88 
85 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Conference, 18/10/82. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1417 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
86 Cellular container ships carry containers alone. They are so named because of the 'cells' into 
which containers are placed aboard the ship. The non-cellular vessels in question were multi-
purpose ships (often roll-on / roll-off vessels) that carried containers but lacked 'cellular' container 
space as such. It appears that this restriction was extended to include even partly cellular vessels. 
87 At the Auckland Container Terminal, at least, cellular container vessels had been worked prior to 
1982 on the basis of vessel-by-vessel 'dispensations' granted by the Auckland Union. However the 
employers sought a general ruling that all vessels could be so worked at each of the four terminals. 
The Tribunal's narrow legalistic definition hinged on the term 'cellular', which had been inserted 
into the container terminals agreement prior to the term 'container ship'. Although this term had 
not been contained within the original agreement set down by the arbitrator (R. Davison), this 
change had been made by the employers and the Federationjointly at some stage in 1970s during a 
review of the agreement. The Tribunal interpreted this clause to mean that only cellular vessels 
had right of access to the Terminals. 
88 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Conference, 15/10/84. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/8 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
Table 11.1 : Productivity and Costs (Percentage Change) 
Year Rate of work Average 
(Tonnes per total cost per 
gross gang tonne 
hour) 
1971 +3.3 +24.1 
1972 +7.7 +7.1 
1973 +3.9 +12.1 
1974 -3.4 +18.1 
1975 +3.9 +9.5 
1976 +2.4 +14.8 
1977 -0.7 +17.1 
1978 +6.1 +3.8 
1979 +10.3 +8.7 
1980 +6.2 +17.8 
1981 +9.5 +11.2 
1982 +7.7 +15.3 
Source: Waterfront Industry Commission 
Annual Reports 
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NZAWE then attempted (unsuccessfully) for the next five years to get the 
Tribunal's decision overturned. 
Despite this setback, NZA WE took a much harder line in subsequent rounds of 
national negotiations. Part of the reason for this approach was that, throughout the 
1970s, costs had increased at a greater rate than attendant increases in 
productivity. Graphs 11.3 and 11.4 show that productivity on conventional 
wharves and in container terminals increased during this period.89 However Table 
11.1 demonstrates that these productivity increases had been outstripped by cost 
increases.9o This was in large part due to the fact that, despite the wage controls 
of the 1970s, the Federation had been successful in gaining substantial wage 
increases. Although the wage-price freeze between 1982 and 1984 held wages 
down briefly, a number of exemptions were granted by the Wage Freeze Authority 
during this time (see WIC Report 1984:19-20). Furthermore, gang sizes remained 
at much the same size as during the break-bulk era, despite the potentially labour-
saving effects of the unitization of cargo. In light of this situation, the newly 
reorganized employers' association attempted to comprehensively 'restructure' the 
GPO in the 1984 wage round. A good deal of this effort centred on attempting to 
reduce gang sizes, as the Stevedoring Employers Association had previously 
advocated. 
Significantly, at the same time as the employers were regrouping for an attack on 
the wages and conditions of waterside workers, there was a feeling at the national 
level of the Waterside Workers Federation that some of the port unions were 
89 In Graph 11.4 the base year for the index is 1970 (100). This index covers cargo (un)loaded at 
all ports, except cellular container cargo. 
90 This table only deals with cargo handled on conventional wharves. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that a similar (if not greater) cost structure applied in the container terminals, particularly 
insofar as wage increases secured in the GPO were automatically passed on to workers in the 
terminal via the 'trigger mechanism' which linked the two agreements. 
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taking matters too far, in using their industrial strength to secure special wages and 
conditions from individual employers at the local level, in a manner which might 
provoke 'clawbacks' by NZA WE. This was colourfully expressed in a 
conversation I had with a national union official who said that some of the port 
unions had taken the view that "everyone else is a pack of bastards and we'll 
screw whatever we can locally" (fieldnotes). He described a number of what he 
regarded as "exorbitant rates" that had been negotiated on some jobs during the 
1970s.91 
This tension between the Federation and the local unions (and their members) was 
also manifested in the area of gang strengths. In 1982 the Federation sought to get 
agreement amongst its members to push for a decrease in the 9 hour day, in 
concert with the introduction of a two-shift system, as a way of utilizing excess 
labour. However there were problems with this move insofar as it would have 
meant eliminating much of the 'spelling' which occurred. A Lyttelton Union 
representative stated that in saving jobs "the shorter working day would assist, but 
a price would have to be paid and that was the spelling system.,,92 And, as a 
representative of the Auckland Union replied, "The current situation is that there 
is spelling, and a shorter working day because of this. It is a luxury and the 
membership do not want to give it away.',93 This is a clear case where the rank 
and file were not prepared to trade off job control for greater long-term job 
security. The Federation's General Secretary, Sam Jennings, accused them of 
shortsightedness: 
91 One such example, which I uncovered in the records of the Waterfront Industry Commission, was 
negotiated between the Whangarei Watersiders Union and the Northland Harbour Board in 1975. 
This agreement was to unload cargo from a fire damaged vessel at the Port of Whangarei. The 
watersiders who worked on this job earned $350 for a 40 hour week, which was well in excess of 
the average weekly wage. This wage was based on working 6 hour shifts 24 hours a day, earning 7 
hours at treble time, as well as clothing and travelling allowances, meal money and bonus 
payments. 
92 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10/82. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1417 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
93 Ibid. 
the members in most ports are on a kamikaze course in respect to 
job security and job protection. Some members are showing quite 
clearly by their actions that jobs can be worked with less than the 
required gang strengths. The attitude seems to be 'let's make hay 
while the sun shines' .94 
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To be sure, these divisions within the Federation did not manifest themselves 
'externally'. For example, the introduction of voluntary unionism for a brief 
period in 1984 did not result in any members leaving the unions.95 But the 
divisions did impede attempts by the Federation to 're-group', in order to confront 
the new employers' organization. Significantly, this process continued to be 
hampered by the opposition to forming a national union. At national conferences 
in the early 1980s the Federation executive had pushed for the formation of a 
national union, but these efforts had failed in part because of the Auckland 
Union's disagreement with the Federation over the management of the 
superannuation fund (see Chapter 9). Indeed, the prospect of the largest and most 
powerful of its member unions suing the Federation did not augur well for its 
future as a centralized national organization. Thus, at the same time as the 
employers reorganized, divisions began to reassert themselves within the 
Federation. 
(5) The Tide Begins to Turn 
The tide began to tum in favour of the employers in the mid-1980s. There are a 
number of reasons for this shift in the balance of power. The reorganization of the 
employers into NZA WE undoubtedly played a part in this process. 
94 Ibid. 
95 The National Government introduced voluntary union membership via the "Industrial Relations 
Amendment Act 1983 (which came into force on 1 February 1984). This Act abolished 
unqualified preference clauses, prohibited their negotiation in the future, and prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of union or non-union membership" (Deeks and Boxall 1989:51). 
On the waterfront, this move required an amendment to the Waterfront Industry Commission Act 
1976. 
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Overwhelmingly, however, what turned the tide in favour of the employers was 
the prospect, and then the reality, of deregulation both of the labour market and of 
the waterfront industry itself. 
In 1984, the fourth Labour Government entered office. At first, this resulted in 
jubilation on the part of some segments of the union movement. President 
Malcolm commented at the Waterside Workers Federation's Conference in late 
1984 that: 
This, the Ninth Biennial Conference, is blessed with being held 
with a workers' government, the Labour Party, being in power .... 
The workers' government of New Zealand, the Labour Party, one 
would surmise will not, during the period from 1984 through to 
1987 fall into the bottomless pit, or attain the aloofness of the third 
Labour Government. 96 
Indeed, the new Government reintroduced compulsory unionism (Deeks et al. 
1989:51) and ended the wage-freeze regulations (see Boston 1984). Also, in a 
move that signalled the beginning of the reform of the state-regulated industrial 
relations framework, the Labour Government introduced the Industrial Relations 
Amendment Act 1984 which eliminated compulsory arbitration. The Federation 
of Labour supported this change (see Walsh 1989; Boxall 1990), as did the 
Waterside Workers Federation which had been arguing for the abolition of 
compulsory arbitration since the 1950s. 
But the jubilation on the part of the union movement was short-lived, as this 
Government embarked on a sweeping programme of economic reform and 
deregulation (see Bollard and Buckle 1987; Boston et al. 1991; Roper 1988). This 
was to have an impact on the waterfront in two key respects. First, moves to 
96 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Conference, 15/10/84. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/8 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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abolish the Waterfront Industry Commission gathered momentum. Second, the 
deregulation of the labour market resulted in the abolition of the Waterfront 
Industry Tribunal through the Labour Relations Act 1987 (which I will deal with 
in Chapter 13). As we shall see, this climate of reform had a decisive impact upon 
the practice of industrial relations on the waterfront. 
The next round of national bargaining took place after the lifting of the wage 
freeze by the Labour Government in November 1984. In May 1984, prior to the 
rescinding of the freeze, there had been industrial action in opposition to it: "At 12 
ports 22,314 man-hours were lost in protest at the continuation of the Wage Freeze 
Regulations and the lack of progress in re-negotiating conditions of employment" 
(WIC Report 1984:21). After the freeze was lifted the Federation vigorously 
attempted to make up for lost ground. In December 1984 a 12 day stoppage 
occurred at the four container terminals, ostensibly over manning levels on 
particular vessels, but the NZA WE annual report states that: 
it was believed that the outcome of the dispute was secondary in 
that primarily the WWF was seeking to give an advance warning 
for the forthcoming negotiation of the Composite Workforce 
Agreement and GPO.97 
In this round of negotiations, the Federation put in a number of inflated claims. 
As Roth notes, the Federation: 
put in a claim for a 25 percent pay rise and a reduction in working 
hours. They asked for an extension of bereavement leave to cover 
uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces .... Another claim ... was for paid 
long-service trips overseas for members and their wives and 
children: a trip to the South Pacific after 10 years of service, to 
Australia after 25 years and to the United States or Britain after 30 
years (1993: 189). 
97 NZA WE Annual Report 1985. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 62 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Although the Federation did not succeed in these claims, through GPO 490 (which 
was registered with the Tribunal in March 1985) it achieved a 7 percent increase 
in the hourly rate, as well as in special rates and allowances (WIC Report 
1985:20). Moreover, the employers' attempts to 'restructure' the GPO (which 
involved attempts to bring the 'satellite' agreements under the umbrella of the 
national agreement) failed. 
To a large extent, the employers' failure to restructure the GPO was a result of 
resistance by the Federation. However, these efforts were also hampered by 
disunity amongst the members of NZAWE. For instance, in response to "the 
spread of special shift agreements which . . . made the General Principal Order 
increasingly irrelevant", NZAWE attempted to get the agreements standardized 
and to gain control of them by seeking to incorporate a shift-work agreement into 
GPO 490.98 NZA WE put a proposal forward which, in tum, was met by a 
counter-proposal by the Federation that was deemed to be unacceptable. But this 
effort was undermined by a company that broke ranks and sought to establish its 
own agreement on terms more favourable to watersiders. As the NZA WE annual 
report noted: 
when an employer, who was a party to the agreement proposed by 
the Association, commenced direct negotiations with the 
Federation, the Association was forced to abandon its efforts to 
achieve a satisfactory shift work agreement. 99 
Thus the employers were still plagued by individual employers handling their own 
negotiations directly with the Federation, which in this case stymied an attempt to 
incorporate special agreements into the national agreement. The attitude of 
NZA WE was that: 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
a General Principal Order that was broad enough to avoid the need 
for special agreements would not be achieved and maintained if 
employers could still be coerced by the Waterside Workers 
Federation into negotiating separate agreements. 100 
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Thus NZA WE continued to press for the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 to be 
reformed to remove the right of individual employers to make agreements with 
port unions and the Federation. Although this particular effort at reform continued 
to be unsuccessful, there were moves afoot to 'reform' the industry as a whole. 
In many respects, the most important discussions in 1984 for the future of the 
waterfront, occurred not within the Conciliation Council for GPO 490, but rather 
in Parliament over deregulating the ports. The prospect of 'waterfront reform' 
was first raised by the publication of the Ministry of Transport's 'Onshore Costs 
Study' in 1984. This report is generally acknowledged as being a cornerstone of 
the reform process (Jeffries 1992; Ward 1990). As its title implies, the report was 
intended to "examine the potential for reducing the costs of moving export cargoes 
from the farm gate or factory door to the seaward harbour pilotage limit" (MOT 
1984:236). Submissions had been made by a large number of groups (including 
the Waterside Workers Federation and NZAWE).lOl The report was presented as 
a 'discussion document' and, although it did not present any substantive 
recommendations, the underlying thrust was that costs were too high and that the 
institutional arrangements (including those relating to waterfront labour) had a 
significant role to play in this state of affairs. 
100 Minutes of NZA WE Council Meeting 26, 1711 0/84. Port Employers Association Records, 90-
220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
101 The Ministry of Transport, in another document, noted that: "Of the submissions, 21 came from 
shippers or shipper groups; 8 from shipping companies and conferences; 8 from harbour boards 
and the Harbours Association; and 4 from stevedoring interests. Others to contribute submissions 
included waterfront employee and employer groups, freight forwarders, the insurance industry, 
land transport operators and a number of individuals and organizations" (MOT 1985 :i). 
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The former Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Minister of Transport, Bill 
Jeffries, claims that: "the On Shore Costs study described the chaos and cost of the 
existing alTangements" and, as such, the report directly fed into the reform process 
(Jeffries 1992:161). The first step in this process was an 'Industry Conference' 
held in December 1984. Jeffries, who chaired this Conference, notes: "All the 
participants in the industry were summoned to Wellington for a one day meeting. 
The Government gave notice that it intended to pursue a programme of port 
reform" (Jeffries 1992:161). 
The initial moves toward waterfront reform undoubtedly constituted an important 
part of the 'climate' of industrial relations on the waterfront. In September 1985 
the Government convened the Ports Industry Workshop to further discuss port 
reform (including the terms of employment of watersiders), and invited the 
attendance of representatives of the Waterside Workers Federation. However the 
Federation boycotted the innocuously titled 'workshop', which General Secretary 
Jennings later described as "jacked up", and organized a 48 hour national stoppage 
in protest at this, along with the employers' attempts to renegotiate the GPO (see 
beloW).102 This demonstration of industrial strength undoubtedly was designed to 
deter the Government from pressing ahead with discussions on port reform. 
However the Ports Industry Workshop simply proceeded without Federation 
representatives. The upshot of the workshop was the establishment "of a 
representative committee which would meet during 1986 to design a new ports 
system" (Jeffries 1992:161).103 The Ports Industry Review Committee, as it was 
102 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/lO/86. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/9 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
103 The actual terms of reference of the Committee were: "to review the proposals for institutional 
and legislative reforms within the industry which were put forward at the Workshop for the purpose 
of improving efficiency" and "to report to the Minister of Transport with recommendations as to: 
(i) an agreed list of objectives for the port industry; and (ii) the institutional and legislative reforms 
within the industry which the Committee considers will be necessary to meet these objectives and 
improve efficiency" (Ports Industty Review Committee 1986:v). 
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known, consisted of representatives from throughout the industry.104 Unlike the 
Workshop, the Federation executive decided to accept representation on the 
Committee, and General Secretary Jennings was appointed to it. If the Federation 
were not able to stall the process of reform through industrial action, they would 
attempt to influence the direction of reform. 
With the prospect of waterfront reform looming on the horizon, NZA WE seized 
the opportunity to go on the offensive. Almost immediately after GPO 490 was 
settled in March 1985, the employers applied to have it renegotiated. In doing so, 
they were seeking what they had not been able to do in the previous round of 
negotiations, namely to 'restructure' the agreement. A NZAWE newsletter makes 
this clear: 
The employers have taken the unusual step of lodging claims for a 
new General Principal Order rather than wait for the Waterside 
Workers' Federation to lodge its claims first. By taking this step 
the employers are the applicant for the purposes of the Conciliation 
proceedings. The claims are almost identical to those put forward 
last year which proposed a restructuring of conditions of 
employment on the New Zealand waterfront. lOS 
This pre-emptive move was the other reason for the 48 hour national stoppage 
referred to above. As NZA WE itself noted, in addition to protesting the Ports 
Industry Workshop, the Federation gave as a reason for this stoppage, "The action 
of employers in lodging claims for revising the General Principal Order rather than 
waiting for the Waterside Workers to lodge claims."I06 
104 The Ports Industry Review Committee comprised ten representatives as follows: W. Jeffries 
(Under Secretary to the Minister of Labour; I. Brokenshire (General Manager, Lyttelton Harbour 
Board); D. Graham (Assistant Managing Director, Union Shipping Group); S. Jennings (General 
Secretary, Waterside Workers Federation); B. Knowles (Managing Director, N.Z. Wool Board); F. 
McKenzie (Chairman, Bay of Plenty Harbour Board); R. Whyte (General Manager, Blueport 
ACT); 1. Wilson (National Secretary, Habours Union of Workers); B. Wood (General Manager, 
Waterfront Industry Commission); D. Young (Chief Executive, NZAWE). 
105 NZA WE Newsletter No.8, l3/9/85. 
106 Ibid. 
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The NZA WE Council had resolved that "the highest priority should be attached to 
the claims for reforming the terms and conditions of employment on the 
waterfront in the forthcoming negotiations."I07 These claims involved an attempt 
to standardize agreements by establishing a common set of hours prescribing two 
work periods (or shifts) per day (which had not been achieved in the previous 
GPO), to substantially decrease gang strengths, to reduce bonus rates, and to 
establish a single agreement for all conventional operations which would 
incorporate all of the existing 'satellite' agreements under the umbrella of the 
national agreement. But continuing employer fragmentation impeded this process. 
NZAWE noted in its 1985 Annual Report that "there are still many instances ... 
of individual employers ... handling their own industrial affairs.,,108 In GPO 514, 
which was settled in December 1985, the Federation achieved a 15.5% increase in 
the basic hourly rate (they had sought 30%), as well as in special rates and 
allowances" (WIC Report 1986: 18). However, this (not insubstantial) increase 
was granted by NZA WE with the proviso that further negotiations were to be held: 
The parties to the general principal order agreed to meet, as 
required, during the currency of the order to continue conciliation 
proceedings with the objective of negotiating a revision of the 
terms of employment. The intention was to ensure progress with 
the objective of reaching agreement by 30 June 1986. At that date 
the parties were to jointly report on the basis of agreement to the 
Government and to the Waterfront Industry Tribunal (WIC Report 
1986: 18-19). 
The Federation's approach, however, was to stall the process by refusing to return 
to conciliation proceedings. The employers responded by attempting to force 
changes, via the Tribunal, by constantly appealing decisions of the local Port 
107 Minutes of NZAWE Council Meeting 33, 17/10/85. Port Employers Association Records, 90-
220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
108 NZA WE Annual Report 1985. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 62 
(Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Conciliation Committees in what were colloquially referred to by the unions as 
'fishing expeditions' (applying in the hope of winning something). General 
Secretary Jennings commented that: "Their stratagem is to entice port union 
officials in a PCC meeting to discuss problems with the knowledge that the Act 
provides for an appeal.,,109 Although it appears that the employers did not gain 
much in this manner, it did tie up members of the Federation executive in Tribunal 
hearings. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Federation was not always 
made aware by port unions of matters which could be appealed to the TribunaL 110 
These matters came to the fore again in the 1986 bargaining round, which was 
decisive. Although the Federation attempted to 'hold the line' (by not agreeing to 
any restructuring of the GPO) there were a number of developments which 
continued to tum the tide against them. The push by the Government for 'port 
reform' was gathering momentum by this time. The Ports Industry Review 
Committee had returned its report in August 1986 and made a number of 
recommendations to the Government on ways to reform the industry. 1 11 Although 
it recommended that the Waterfront Industry Tribunal was to remain intact, at the 
109 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/10/86. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/9 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
110 General Secretary Jennings remarked at the WWF conference in 1986 that: "There have been 
times when the Federation's fIrst knowledge of a dispute is when it is advised by the Secretary of 
the Tribunal that a hearing date has been set. . . . In the circumstances it is imperative that the 
Federation be advised on matters [referred] to the Port Conciliation Committees which could be the 
subject of an appeal by the Employers to the Tribunal." Ibid. 
III The Committee made recommendations in four areas: port administration, cargo-handling 
operations, employment of labour, and dispute settlement procedures. The most signifIcant 
recommendation in the area of port administration was that the Harbours Act 1950 should be 
amended such that Harbour Boards were required to develop a more "commercial outlook" and "a 
business-like approach to operations" (Ports Industry Review Committee 1986:15). With respect 
to cargo-handling operations, the Committee made a number of recommendations which were, in 
effect, intended to increase competition within the fIeld of stevedoring. Regarding the employment 
of labour, the Committee recommended that "a system of pooled labour be retained to cater for the 
fluctuating nature of work on the waterfront, and to maintain the facility of competitive 
stevedoring" (ibid:20). SignifIcantly, however, the Committee was "not able to reach agreement on 
whether the labour pool should be administered by a Government agency, such as the Waterfront 
Industry Commission, or by employers in consultation with the unions" (ibid:20). The six 
employer representatives supported abolishing the Commission, while the two union 
representatives and the representative of the Commission itself supported retaining it. The 
Committee did, however, recommend that the Waterfront Industry Tribunal be retained. 
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same time in September 1986 the Government's Policy Statement on Labour 
Relations announced that the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, along with all other 
specialist institutions, would be abolished. I 12 
The Labour Government's Minister of Transport, Richard Prebble, delivered a 
speech at the WWF conference in 1986 where he said that the Commission would 
be retained (which belied what was subsequently to happen), but confirmed that 
the Waterfront Industry Tribunal would be abolished: "the Government's 
industrial relations policy is now to end these specialist institutions and I support 
h· ,,113 t IS move. Faced with this prospect, and despite constantly criticizing the 
Tribunal during the previous 30 years, the Federation's executive actually 
supported retaining this institution. General Secretary Jennings remarked: 
In spite of its shortcomings, the Waterfront Industry Tribunal has 
given many decisions in favour of the Federation and the 
recommendation of the Government's White Paper to have it 
incorporated into the overall Arbitration System is not in the 
interests of waterside workers and must be opposed with venom. 114 
But, equally, Jennings recognized that they probably would lose it and that they 
had to prepare for the worst case scenario: 
the Tribunal ... is to be replaced by [the] Arbitration Court whose 
members will be decided by the FOL and Employers . . . [and] 
every effort has to be made to get input on who sits on this Court, 
because we can't afford to have outsiders telling us how to do 
things. I 15 
1\2 Bill Jeffries who was at the time was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Ministry of 
Transport, and responsible for overseeing the process of port reform, later wrote: "The new 
Industrial Relations legislation . . . abolished special industry arbitral institutions. When the 
decision to abolish these special purpose authorities was made within govermnent, I was advised to 
avoid recommending their continuance as far as ports were concerned" (Jeffries 1992:161). 
However he does not identify who advised him to take this course of action. 
1\3 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 22110/86. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/9 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
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There was a feeling amongst the Federation executive that the prospect of port 
reform and industrial relations reform did not augur well for the future of the port 
unions, and consequently that care needed to be taken in what they attempted to 
achieve in national negotiations. Indeed, prior the 1986 bargaining round the 
Federation Executive, in a circular to port unions, urged caution: 
In forwarding remits Port Unions should be cognizant of the fact 
that discussions are currently being held on restructuring the 
Waterfront Industry. 116 
However, at the Federation's conference late in 1986, Jennings (referring to this 
circular) commented that: 
Irrespective of this advice some port unions have forwarded remits 
in such a vein as to lead one to believe that we are still operating in 
the '60s or even in the early '70s.117 
As we shall see below, it was all the Federation could do to stave off NZAWE's 
push for changes to the GPO. 
In the words of Federation General Secretary Jennings, NZA WE sought to effect 
in the 1986 bargaining round "complete and revolutionary changes to conditions 
of employment on the New Zealand waterfront.,,118 The most significant of these 
changes, as before, involved an attempt to incorporate all Principal Orders into the 
GPO, as well an attempt to secure an agreement that no further special agreements 
were to be made unless agreed to by the Federation and NZA WE. The employers 
also sought compulsory redundancies, manning reductions, and changes to the 
116 Federation Circular to POli Unions, 30/6/86. New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union Records, 
92-305, Box 15/10 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
1I7 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 20/10/86. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/9 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
118 Ibid. 
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bonus system. The constituent members of NZA WE were in agreement that no 
wage offer should be made if the GPO was not reformed, at least in some areas, at 
the same time. 119 
The Federation resisted all moves to 'restructure' the GPO (in the terms outlined 
above), arguing that GPO 514 should be renegotiated only in the form of a wage 
increase, with talks about 'restructuring' to occur later in the term of the new 
order. In the face of opposition by NZAWE to this latter proposal, the Federation 
withdrew from conciliation proceedings and refused to return until March 1987 
(even though GPO 514 expired at the end of 1986). Prior to resuming talks, the 
Federation mounted a five day national stoppage which resulted in the loss of a 
massive 88,762 man-hours (WIC Report 1987:60). Undoubtedly the Federation, 
after refusing to return to conciliation, timed this stoppage to coincide with a peak 
shipping period. As the following comment from a NZA WE newsletter indicates, 
this tactic was very effective: 
the industrial action taken by waterside workers . . . at the peak of 
the export season has come at a particularly critical time for many 
export cargoes. Accordingly NZA WE is making every effort to 
resolve the dispute with waterside workers as soon as possible. 120 
The Federation also took other action, such as refusing to negotiate with the Apple 
and Pear Board over seasonal labour requirements at the Ports of Napier and 
Nelson. General Secretary Jennings commented on national radio in February 
1987 that the Federation "will not be prepared to cooperate with any employer 
until the wage round has been settled.,,121 
119 This sentiment is apparent in the minutes of NZA WE Council Meeting 45, 26/2/87. Port 
Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
120 NZAWE Newsletter 664, 23/3/87. 
121 As quoted in NZAWE Newsletter 645, 16/2/87. 
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Largely as a result of this action, the Federation was able to resist all attempts to 
comprehensively restructure the GPO. But, once again, this resistance was 
assisted by employer disunity. Although the NZA WE Council was firm in its 
resolve to restructure the GPO, it appears that they were not so confident in the 
resolve of individual employers. Yet again, NZA WE abandoned its attempt to 
restructure the GPO, stating that: 
Reflecting a concern that further special deals by individual 
employers would continue to erode any new GPO, the Association 
finally abandoned its attempt at a comprehensive reform of the 
agreement when the Government announced that there would be no 
reform of the present legislative and institutional framework 
governing labour arrangements in the waterfront industry. 122 
In this statement the NZA WE Council was referring to the fact that the 
Government did not intend to change the provisions in the Waterfront Industry 
Act 1976, in order to remove the right of individual employers to negotiate 
agreements with unions (which had the potential to undermine its efforts to effect 
change through the national agreement). In abandoning their attempts to 
restructure the General Principal Order NZAWE officials were aware, however, 
that the broader industrial relations framework was about to be substantially 
altered. NZA WE waited until this occurred before pushing for further change. 
Although the Federation still wielded a considerable degree of industrial strength 
(as the national stoppage clearly indicates), and successfully resisted the 
employers' attempts to radically revise the GPO, the Federation made concessions 
on gang manning in return for a wage increase. These concessions were made 
under the pressure of the prospect of port reform, and the immanent introduction 
of the Labour Relations Act which would result in the abolition of the 'specialist 
122 NZA WE Annual RepOlt 1987. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 62 
(Alexander Turnbull LibraIY, NLNZ). 
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framework' of waterfront industrial relations. But they were also made in 
recognition of the fact that the Federation, in a period of employer attacks, could 
no longer maintain the status quo on manning. 
As I noted above, throughout the 1980s there was a feeling within the Federation 
executive that some of the rank and file were pushing matters too far in the area of 
spelling. For instance, General Secretary Jennings had urged caution over spelling 
at the Federation Conference in 1984: 
When considering spelling on the waterfront even the minds of 
Federation Officers boggles [sic]. The conditions for job manning 
have been eroded, not by employers, but by members of unions 
who see the waterfront as secondary to driving a taxi . . . [or] 
operating a trucking business. The bell is tolling, and we know for 
whom. 123 
This sentiment was echoed by some port umon officials, tempered with the 
recognition that the port unions could not eliminate spelling because the rank and 
file were not prepared to trade off job control against long term security of 
employment (register strengths, that is). At the same conference Ron Quince, the 
President of the Lyttelton Union, said: "We cannot escape spelling - it is part of 
the system and will be utilized against us and it is time to face up to it.,,)24 Since 
the early 1980s the employers had been attempting to decrease gang strengths, 
citing extensive spelling as a reason, and it was this latter that the employers 
attacked with vehemence in the 1986-87 bargaining round. Indeed in large 
advertisements placed in newspapers at the time of the national stoppage, 
NZA WE argued for a reduction in manning levels and the elimination of spelling 
(see Roth 1993: 192).125 Faced with such pressure, and in recognition that excess 
123 Minutes of the Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 15110/84. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14/8 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
124 Ibid. 
125 Roth notes the advertisements were headed "N.Z. Ports at a Standstill" and, among other things, 
they claimed that "Waterside gangs are 30 percent overmanned and on average 30 percent of 
watersiders are absent during paid working hours" (1993:192). 
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spelling had undermined its ability to resist change in this area, the Federation 
took the position that gang strengths could not be maintained. 
The outcome of the negotiations, which resulted in the registration of GPO 539 in 
May 1987, was in a sense what the Stevedoring Employers Association had 
proposed in the early 1980s - 'purchased' flexibility predicated upon manning 
reductions. Under this agreement, manning scales were reduced by 17% in return 
for a 9% increase in the basic hourly rate together with a 1 % increase in 
superannuation contributions. 126 The new manning scales were national scales 
that took precedence over the scales previously contained in Supplementary 
Principal Orders, and were explicitly linked to changes in work practices. The 
1987 Waterfront Industry Commission report states: 
At the time that the new, reduced gang manning was introduced, 
the Association of Waterfront Employers advised all waterside 
workers that employers intended to ensure that bad management 
practices which had allowed 'spelling' to flourish would be stopped 
(WIC Report 1987:19). 
Short of engaging in a protracted dispute, which the Federation did not regard as 
desirable in the climate of reform, this was the best agreement it could get. 
Although the wage increase was smaller than in some industries in the 1986-87 
bargaining round, it was above the average increase gained in the private sector 
(see Harbridge 1988).127 The Federation traded off against this wage increase the 
one condition that it regarded as being the most difficult to defend. 
The fact that GPO 539 was ratified by the port UnIons, which as per usual 
conducted ballots of the rank and file on whether the document should be agreed 
126 This information is contained in the NZA WE Annual Report 1987. Port Employers Association 
Records, 90-220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
127 In a review of wage settlements in this bargaining round, contained in 817 documents negotiated 
in the private sector, Harbridge notes that the "mean percentage annualised wage increment ... was 
7.3 percent (1988:52). 
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to, indicates that under the circumstances it was regarded as acceptable. 
Federation correspondence with port unions indicate that, given the broader 
environment that this round of bargaining took place within, most union officials 
(if not actually the rank and file) regarded the concession on gang manning as 
reasonable. Insofar as redundancies could only be effected on a voluntary basis, 
reduced gang manning did not directly result in any watersiders losing their jobs. 
The fact that the Auckland Union (the largest of the port unions), which initially 
opposed the reduced gang strengths, itself traded off register strengths against 
work practices later in 1987 (see Chapter 10) indicates the degree to which the tide 
was turning in favour of the employers. 
(6) Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a discussion and analysis of the pattern of 
industrial relations on the waterfront from 1972 until 1986. This period was 
characterized by a dynamic of union strength and employer weakness. I have 
demonstrated how this dynamic was expressed through a specific combination of 
centralized and decentralized bargaining which strengthened the Waterside 
Workers Federation's hand. Conversely, the employers were unable to achieve a 
fully centralized and 'externalized' form of organization, bargaining, and mode of 
action. 
This pattern persisted, even after the employers reorganized, until the mid-1980s. 
Ultimately what turned the tide in favour of the employers was the fourth Labour 
Government's moves to reform the bargaining system and to deregulate the 
waterfront industry. Although the concessions made by the Federation on gang 
manning were described by NZAWE as the first significant step in 'reforming the 
GPO', in the 1986-87 bargaining round the Federation staved off the attempt by 
NZA WE to completely revamp the national agreement. However the process of 
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reforming the remainder of the GPO was materially assisted by the introduction of 
the Labour Relations Act 1987. In one crucial area this Act did precisely what 
NZA WE had been unable to do for 15 years previously: it brought all satellite 
agreements together with the national agreement. A detailed analysis of this, and 
other effects of the Act on waterfront industrial relations will be provided in 
Chapter 13. In the next chapter, however, I will examine the pattern of work 
relations in the period after containerization. 
CHAPTER 12 : WORK RELATIONS IN THE CONTAINER ERA 
To varying degrees, members of occupations possess and control 
the knowledge needed to perform specific, often complicated work 
tasks. Both this knowledge base and its control are in constant 
flux, however, as occupational decline, revival, or death remain 
ever-present possibilities. Deskilling - a series of power moves by 
managers that fracture, reassign, and render obsolete many of the 
tasks an occupational group has claimed for itself - is a potent 
force in this process of change. 
Harrison Trice (1993:19) 
(1) Introduction 
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In this chapter I will examine the impact of containerization on the pattern of work 
relations on the waterfront. I demonstrated in Chapter 6 that as a result of what I 
termed 'the problems of management', and the solutions adopted, waterside 
workers had a considerable degree of control over the labour process. In this 
chapter I will outline the potential threat to this worker autonomy that 
containerization posed. More specifically, drawing on other studies and my own 
fieldwork observations, I will demonstrate that container technology has the 
potential to increase employer control of work. However I will argue that this 
potential was not realized while the bureau system was in existence. 
In Chapter 10 I argued that, despite the effects of containerization and declining 
levels of trade, the Waterside Workers Federation and port unions retained 
considerable control of the labour market. Indeed union control of the labour 
market was strengthened after containerization through the use of supplementary 
registers to restrict and then to eliminate casual labour. Furthermore, 
containerization led to a fragmentation of employer interests such that the 
employers' national organization could not secure the consent of individual 
employers to an exclusively 'externalized' form of bargaining. 
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In this chapter I will demonstrate that union control of the labour market, which 
persisted until the mid-1980s, was mirrored in watersiders' control of work 
practices. Containerization did not result in a sweeping change overnight; break-
bulk work, while continually diminishing, co-existed alongside container work for 
most of the period under consideration. The pattern of work relations which I 
identified in Chapter 6 persisted on break-bulk jobs. Moreover, there were 
continuities in this pattern, which centered on the wage-effort bargain, on 
container jobs - a pattern in which watersiders continued to exert considerable 
control over work. 
(2) Containers: A Potential Solution to the 'Problems of Management'? 
In Chapter 6 I identified what I termed the 'problems of management' on the 
waterfront in the break-bulk period. These problems stemmed from the inherent 
variability of waterfront work which resulted in high levels of 'process 
uncertainty' (Kelly 1978). The stowing of cargo involved "non-uniform tasks" 
(Litwak 1961: 178), and the resulting non-routine nature of waterfront work 
resulted in an inability to implement Taylorist methods of work organization. 
Instead, use was made of 'autonomous work groups' (Kelly 1978) in the form of 
gangs which had to be granted a certain level of autonomy and freedom in 
performing work. The problem for employers was how to ensure that this 
autonomy was exercised responsibly in order to elicit from gangs consistent levels 
of effort. 
These inherent problems of controlling the performance of break-bulk work were 
exacerbated by the bureau system of labour administration that the waterfront 
labour market was organized through (principally because employers were unable 
to hire and fire watersiders). The strategy that employers adopted in response to 
these problems was, to repeat the phrase coined by Trist et al. (1963:36), 
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"management through the wages system" (rather than direct supervision). This 
strategy centered on the use of monetary incentives, together with negotiations on 
the job over "the terms of the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:74). 
The introduction of container technology, however, had the potential to disrupt 
these arrangements. Most significantly, regardless of the reasons for it being 
introduced, container technology has the potential to increase employer control of 
work by ushering in a workflow system which approximates that of Taylorism. 
The reasons for this center on the manner in which containers change the nature of 
the labour process. If standardization is largely responsible for the success of 
containers (see Branch 1986:83), it is also the key to the possibility of increasing 
employer control and the (re)assertion of managerial prerogative. Writing in the 
labour process tradition, Mills notes that: 
As a result of the integration of standardized cargo units, a vessel 
designed for these units, and the hoisting gear andlor dock 
equipment necessary to move them to and from stow, there is little 
variation in operational circumstances. Since each unit can be 
loaded to a predetermined place of stow, or discharged to a 
predetermined place of deck storage, operations can be completely 
planned (and computer simulated) before the vessel arrives. With 
all subsequent shipboard and dock work then sequenced, the need 
for initiative, innovation, and ingenuity is eliminated, while the 
range of skills and experience which routinely come into play is 
dramatically narrowed (1979:139). 
Levels of process uncertainty associated with the nature of the labour process are 
substantially decreased through the use of container technology, and previously 
non-uniform tasks are rendered uniform and visible. Furthermore, standardization 
means that waterfront "work can be closely and continuously supervised and 
subjected to an on-going audit and review" (ibid: 139). 
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For labour process theorists like Mills, the amenability of container work to 
management surveillance and direct control is pivotal to their argument regarding 
the routinization, deskilling and degradation of waterfront work. According to 
Mills, containerization ushers in what Richard Edwards (1979) refers to as a 
system of 'technical control'. Moreover, for Mills, the potential for employer 
control, which is inherent within container technology, is automatically and 
unambiguously realized. In Mills's characteristically dystopian labour process 
school account of technological change on the San Francisco waterfront, a loss of 
worker autonomy is identified as the effect of increasing employer control which 
followed directly after containerization. 
If we take the point regarding the degree to which varied and non-uniform work is 
rendered predictable and routine by container technology, there would appear to be 
some credence in the argument of labour process theorists such as Mills. The 
numerous articles devoted to the development of mathematical models of 
container systems (for example, Ferreira and Sigut 1993) speak to the degree of 
predictability and standardization that container technology makes possible. 
However, what such arguments overlook (and this has long since become a stock-
standard critique of the labour process school) is the capacity for worker 
resistance, and the way that new technologies are socially mediated. That 
container technology renders waterfront work more amenable to direct forms of 
control does not automatically and unambiguously result in such forms of control 
being realized. Indeed, subsequent studies indicate that Mills overstates the 
effects of container technology with respect to eroding the control waterfront 
workers had over their work. 
Finlay (1988) and Wellman (1995) demonstrate that the evolutionary assumptions 
regarding increasing employer control of labour markets and work, which 
characterize the work of orthodox labour process theorists such as Mills, do not 
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necessarily apply on the waterfront even after containerization. While the use of 
container technology has the potential to facilitate direct and continuous 
supervision of waterfront work, this potential is not automatically translated into 
management control of work. There are two parts to this argument. First, 
container technology does not completely deskill waterfront workers. Both Finlay 
and Wellman demonstrate that new sets of skills emerge (such as those involved 
in container crane driving). Second, those jobs which might be regarded as 
deskilled (such as the work of stowing cargo, which is replaced by the mundane 
and standardized tasks of fastening and unfastening containers within the hold or 
on deck) are still subject to problems of control for employers. Finlay expresses 
this sentiment superbly: 
Standardized cargoes have resulted in standardized, and simplified, 
tasks. But if the tasks are simpler to perform, employers find it no 
easier to control their performance, although they may well be 
better able to monitor their performance (1988:144). 
The argument that I will make in this chapter further substantiates the findings of 
Finlay and Wellman. In framing this argument, I will take a leaf from Finlay's 
book. In his analysis of containerization on the Los Angeles waterfront, Finlay 
(1988 :26) states that he "pay [ s] relatively little attention to the motives, devious or 
otherwise, of those responsible for developing, funding, and implementing this 
technology." Instead, he maintains that he is 
far more concerned with how workers and the union reacted to the 
technology, how it affected relations among workers and between 
workers and their supervisors, and whether it tilted the balance of 
power in favour of anyone or other group (ibid:26). 
Similarly, I will abstract from the issue of why container technology was 
introduced. While I briefly discussed the introduction of container technology in 
Chapter 8, a definitive business history on the topic has yet to be written, and 
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needless to say it is outside the scope of this study to do so. Nonetheless, from the 
few studies that deal (albeit tangentially) with this topic (see Sinclair 1973; Craw 
1982), it seems that containers were introduced by shipping companies as much to 
get a competitive edge as to increase managers' control over waterfront work. 
However the more fundamental issue is that, incidentally, this technology has the 
potential to allow managers to (re )assert their authority in the workplace. 
Furthermore, because of the capital intensity and cost of container operations, the 
new technology supplies a motive for them to attempt to do so. 
In Chapter 8 I made the point that the capital intensity of container shipping not 
only facilitates, but also necessitates decreases in ship turnaround times. To quote 
Finlay again: 
the container has introduced a sense of urgency and immediacy into 
stevedoring that was previously lacking. Because of 
containerization, employers now have a far more critical need to 
secure workers willing to supply speed and productivity (1988:90). 
Although numerically fewer, workers are still central to container work, and 
moreover a premium is placed on the pace and quality of work. On container jobs, 
"management still depends on the patience, ingenuity and initiative" of 
water siders (Wellman 1995:161). Far from eliminating the indeterminacy of the 
wage-effort bargain, subject to the strictures of a rationalized system of technical 
control, 'contractual silences' (Hyman 1995) in this area remain. On New 
Zealand's waterfront, these silences continued to be exacerbated by the bureau 
system of labour allocation, wherein employers still had no control over the 
watersiders they were allocated, and could neither 'employ' or dismiss workers at 
their own discretion. In this context, instead of realizing the potential for direct 
supervision which is inherent in container work, employers continued to place 
emphasis on the 'wages system' in order to 'buy' productivity, and there were 
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continuities in the indulgency pattern which existed on break-bulk jobs. Indeed, 
rather than the containerization enhancing the ability of employers to control 
workers, the opposite occurred: it led to the employers themselves becoming more 
fragmentated, a situation which, as I demonstrated in the last chapter, the unions 
capitalized on. 
Thus the central argument I will make in this chapter is this: even if container 
technology has the potential to increase employer control of work, and if 
irrespective of the reasons for its introduction the capital cost of this new 
technology supplies a motive for employers to attempt to do so, this potential was 
not realized in New Zealand. In the next section I will describe the nature of 
container work, and then I will demonstrate that it has the potential to be better 
invigilated by teasing out changes in the relationship between foremen and gangs. 
(3) The Nature o/Container Work 
Unlike break-bulk work, which is traditionally carried out by gangs of waterfront 
workers using cargo winches and basic hand-held equipment, a container 
operation uses wharfside container cranes, ship-board cranes, or tractor units (in 
the case of roll on / roll off vessels) to move standardized containers on and offthe 
ship. Gangs smaller than those used in a break-bulk operation secure and release 
containers on the ship, while other individuals driving straddle carriers or forklifts 
move and position containers on the wharf. 
In this section I will use material from my own fieldwork observations to 
corroborate the findings of Finlay and Wellman, to the effect that, rather than 
completely deskilling water siders, container work gives rise to new sets of skills; 
and, moreover, despite the decrease in the levels of process uncertainty and the 
greater uniformity of tasks relative to break-bulk jobs, that managers continue to 
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be reliant on the skills and initiative of workers. In the discussion that follows, I 
will provide not merely a 'technical' description of work, but will also identify 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of this type of work from the point of 
view of the men who perform it. The point I want to make is that, in terms of the 
physical nature of the work itself, there are similarities with break-bulk work in 
the sense that container work has its own inherent conveniences and hazards, its 
own types of easy jobs and "dirty work" (Hughes 1951), and that it requires 
particular sets of skills and held its own intrinsic interests for watersiders. In 
doing so, I will focus partiCUlarly on jobs which the preceding studies make little 
mention of - those using shipboard cranes - which were of considerable 
importance on the waterfront at ports other than the four where container terminals 
were located. In this discussion I will leave aside issues of autonomy and 
discretion at work, which hinge on the relationship between foremen and gangs, 
and deal with them in the next section. 
In the period under consideration, container work in New Zealand occurred in two 
different settings. Firstly, cellular container ships were (un)loaded in the four 
container terminals (at the ports of Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton and Otago) 
using portside container cranes and straddle carriers. This is the type of container 
work that is most often dealt with in academic studies such as those referred to 
above. Secondly, container work was performed on 'conventional' wharves 
(recall that in New Zealand this term refers to all areas outside of the container 
terminals). This work took two different forms. The first of these is the work of 
(un)loading roll on / roll off vessels (which were prohibited from entering the 
container terminals). These vessels were also worked at the Union Shipping 
Company's 'Seacargo Terminals'. The second involved vessels which had their 
own shipboard cranes. As we shall see below, the work in each of these settings is 
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slightly different. In the following account, I will draw on my fieldwork 
observations of the three different types of container work. 1 
I will deal first with the process of (un)loading containers using ship-board cranes. 
This was a very important method of working containers because, prior to 
deregulation, the only ports that had portside container cranes were those where 
the four container terminals were located (although some ports did have large 
'general purpose' cranes that could be used for containers). This method also 
allowed private stevedoring firms to work container vessels outside of the 
terminals, as only fully cellular vessels were allowed access to the terminals. For 
this type of work, gangs of watersiders were allocated to stevedoring companies 
on ajob-by-job basis in the same manner as On break-bulk jobs. 
Vessels with their Own gear are often termed 'self-sustaining' as they have .the 
capacity to load and unload containers without the use of a wharfside container 
crane. The actors in this type of work are similar to the Ones On a break-bulk job: 
gangs On the wharf and on the ship supervised by foremen-stevedores, along with 
a crane driver and a hatchman. However the tasks they perform are different. I 
will describe a typical loading operation of a non-cellular container vessel using a 
single ship-board crane.2 
Prior to being loaded, containers are usually stacked in a storage area close to the 
ship, arranged in the order they are to be loaded in. A heavy forklift is used to 
1 Insofar as I conducted my fieldwork after the waterfront had been deregulated, and the bureau 
system of labour administration abolished, the following description of container work will be 
restricted to certain specific features of this type of work. The most immediate effect of 
deregulation on container work was to reduce gang sizes and to render the members of gangs direct 
employees of stevedoring companies. However my fieldnotes are valid, insofar as the observations 
in question relate to the tasks that are performed and the skill-sets that are utilized, which did not 
change after deregulation. 
2 Insofar as I provide an account of work which is based on my own fieldwork, the 'narrative 
strategy' I adopt involves switching between the past and present tenses (for a discussion of this 
type of strategy, see Zeller 1995). 
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move the container to the side of the ship, or alternatively is used to load trucks 
(comprising a trailer towed by a specially designed small truck). Typically, there 
is one forklift to two truck and trailer units. The forklift driver hoists each 
container, waits for a trailer to be positioned beneath it, and then lowers the 
container onto the deck. Because of the weight of the containers, even this 
relatively straightforward task requires a modicum of precision. I observed one 
instance when a forklift driver lowered the container too far to one side of the 
trailer, causing it to tilt, and the truck driver signalled that it needed to be 
repositioned by tooting his horn and making a hand signal. 
The truck driver then tows the trailer onto the wharf and positions it beside the 
ship, alongside two containers that are sitting on the wharf. These containers are 
used as a work platform by the men on the wharf who are responsible for attaching 
the container to the ship's crane. Often there is a queue of two or three containers 
waiting to be loaded. There are two methods of attaching containers to the ship's 
crane. The first of these involves attaching wire cables to eyelets at the bottom 
four corners of the container. Each of the cables is linked to a central cable which 
is connected to the ship-board crane. When the cables are in place the container is 
then lifted. The second method is used for containers which do not have eyelets at 
the bottom. It involves using a mechanical device called a 'spreader' which, in 
essence, is a rectangular metal frame connected to the crane via a wire rope. 
Arguably, using the spreader is harder because of the difficulties in positioning it 
correctly on top of each container. The spreader is lowered by the crane operator 
and ropes attached to each corner of the spreader are used by the men on the wharf 
to position it on top of the container which is to be loaded. Often it takes 
considerable maneuvering to get the spreader positioned on top of the container. 
The crane drivers exercise considerable skill in doing so, and it sometimes takes 
several attempts before it is successfully accomplished. The drivers I watched did 
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this with great patience and diligence particularly given that some of the cranes, on 
the older vessels which ply the Pacific Islands trade, are not in good repair and 
have unresponsive controls which the driver must 'wrestle' with. 
Ultimately, however, the crane driver is dependent on the men on the wharf to get 
the spreader secured to the container. This was brought home to me while sitting 
in the 'cockpit' of a shipboard crane watching the driver (who I will call John) 
load a vessel. On this particular job, the forklift was taking containers directly to 
the side of the ship, and a forklift driver had placed a container slightly askew, 
relative to where the crane was descending. John watched with considerable mirth 
as the gang on the wharf struggled to get the spreader into place on top of the 
container. I said "what are they doing"? John said that they "didn't know the 
tricks" (fieldnotes). In this case "knowing the tricks" involved not attempting to 
pull the spreader into place, because of its considerable weight, but rather allowing 
the crane operator to lift and lower it again to slightly reposition it. 
Another 'trick' was for the forklift driver to lift the container slightly to 'meet' the 
spreader. Similarly, unloading containers in this fashion takes longer than the 
loading operation because of the difficulty of lowering containers onto the trailers. 
In this case, the watersiders actually 'chase' the container with the trailer rather 
than relying on the crane driver to lower it directly onto a stationary trailer. Also 
some of the containers, such as 'half-units' made up simply of a base and a pillar 
in each comer, are particularly difficult to deal with. To position the spreader 
correctly on these requires very good timing and coordination, both by the gang on 
the wharf and the crane driver. 
The broader point is that, although container work is standardized, it still requires 
knowledge of how to do it correctly. Watersiders possess, to use Wellman's 
(1995:161) phrase, "an implicit body of working knowledge" that management 
524 
depends on being used. 'The tricks' were an important part of this body of 
knowledge. Someone who did not "know the tricks" could make life very difficult 
for himself, and could be the subject of either humour, derision, or both. Equally, 
water siders might "know the tricks" but deliberately decide not to use them, and 
work slowly, either individually or collectively (as in the case of a go-slow), or 
negligently. I witnessed what can happen when this occurs: on an unloading job 
one of the watersiders accidentally left one comer of a container in the hold 
coupled to the container below it, and when the crane driver attempted to lift the 
container found that it would not budge. Similarly, on 'reefer' jobs (those 
involving refrigerated containers), if a container is not unplugged before being 
lifted, in the words of a foreman, it "goes out with a flash", which can damage the 
unit or the power supply. Such mistakes need only occur a few times before ajob 
would be slowed down considerably in a manner, as we shall see in the next 
section, that the foreman could do little about. 
Once the spreader is correctly positioned on top of the container one of the men on 
the wharf pull a rope that locks it in place, and the container is then lifted. This is 
when the operation is at its most dangerous. When the container is first lifted, the 
crane driver has no control over the initial 'swing' of the container, which could 
easily hit a man on the wharf or, in the case of an unloading operation, could 
easily swipe a man offthe deck. After the initial 'swing', the crane operator must 
make adjustments for the roll and pitch of the ship so that the container does not 
hit the side of the ship, the gang, or other containers. Although ships often have 
more than one shipboard crane it is not unusual (particularly on the smaller 
vessels) for only one to be used at a time, because the ship can become too 
unstable if they work simultaneously. A foreman (who was also an ex-seaman) 
explained: 
The way you use ship's gear, if you're lifting two containers at a 
time you get too much movement in the ship. So you're lifting 
forty ton, if they both lift together, you know, and the ship heels 
over. And then with a lot of the ships . . . [which] are smaller 
again, with their own gear, ... they list. They really fall over when 
you pick up a twenty ton box .... When you're at the length of the 
crane, the jib crane, right out over the wharf, and then you pick up 
twenty tons! (Interview) 
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The pitching and rolling of the ship, caused by lifting one container at a time, 
poses a particular hazard for the men on the ship, who are often situated perilously 
on top of a stack of up to four containers. In the case of a loading operation, as I 
noted above, the ship rolls when the container is lifted, but on an unloading 
operation it rolls when the container is released. A very simple principle of 
physics is involved here ('for every action there is an equal and opposite 
reaction'). A watersideI' described this effect, from the point of view both of a 
crane driver and a member of a gang on deck, in the following manner: 
When you get a container on your crane, good as gold, but when 
you start swinging it out, the ship goes over .... And you're on top, 
three or four [containers] high. And as soon as the container lands 
on the deck . . . next thing you know the ship is corning back to 
balance again. . . . You [have to] balance yourself. . . . And 
sometimes in wet weather, you know, you balance yourself alright 
but you're liable to slide. And there's nothing to stop you from 
sliding right over the wall; you'd either land on the wharf or in the 
[sea] .... You've just got to brace yourself. And if there's another 
container already standing there, then you brace yourself on the 
other container. (Interview) 
In general, the greatest danger to watersiders is when the container is in the air. 
As a foreman observed: "Once you lift ... [a container] off the ground it becomes 
dangerous. Whatever's not on the ground is a dangerous object" (interview). This 
was brought horne to me before going onto a vessel by the following exhortation: 
"never walk under a container when its in the air" (fieldnotes). In the vernacular 
of watersiders, the ship is separated into an "on" side (the side on which 
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containers are being lifted from the wharf to the ship or vice-versa) and an "off' 
side. A watersider who was showing me around a ship commented that: "If you 
didn't know any better and walked down the on side of the ship while a container 
was being lifted, you'd find yourself knocked into the sea with a dirty big 
container on top of you." (fieldnotes) I noticed that at all times when a container 
was in the air, even when it was some distance away from them, the men kept one 
eye on where it was. 
A crucial actor in the loading and unloading of containers is the hatchman. As on 
a break-bulk job, where the hatchman directed the winch operator, on a container 
job the hatchman directs the crane driver (who often cannot see the wharf clearly) 
via a hand-held radio. One watersider went as far as to comment that: "The most 
important man, I say, on that ship is the hatchman .... His job is to inform the 
crane driver what part of the hatch the container is going to" (interview). Because 
containers (unlike break-bulk cargo) have to be precisely placed in the hold, the 
hatchman's instructions are crucial to the job. In carrying out this task, "the 
foreman tells the hatchman, and the hatchman tells the boys" (interview). But the 
hatchman also alerts the crane driver to any dangers, such as whether the ship is 
rolling too much, whether the container is in danger of hitting the side of the ship, 
and so forth. 
When a container is being lowered onto the deck in the correct position, the gang 
aboard the ship grab the corners of the container, turn it the right way round, and 
push it so that it lands beside the next container. Sometimes it has to be lifted 
slightly in order to be positioned correctly. Again this is exacting and demanding 
work: a moment's inattention can result in a foot (or a person) being pinned under 
a container. Although I only saw this type of work on calm days, in the interviews 
I conducted it became apparent that this task was rendered even more difficult 
(and dangerous) by windy weather: 
You need the four men, one on each comer, to control the 
container. At times, if there's a bit of wind, four men can't hold it. 
And if you're trying to land a box that weighs fifteen tons, and 
you're trying to land it on four twist locks, and the ship's moving 
and the wind's blowing, ... [they] would have a terrible job. To 
make matters worse, the ropes that are holding it are virtually 
straight up and down, so it's not as though you can pull [it] 
sideways. (Interview) 
527 
The containers on the outside of the deck take longer to position because they 
must be aligned with the pillars attached to the ship. Each of the two outside 
comers of these containers must rest on one of the pillars. Once the container is in 
position, one of the men pulls the release rope attached to one comer of the 
spreader to release it. The gang on the ship are then involved in coupling the 
containers together (in the case of containers in the hold) using twistlocks and 
ridgebolts. The containers on the outside of a stack on deck have to be 'lashed', 
which is physically demanding and often dangerous work. I will provide a 
description below of this type of work on cellular vessels. 
The container terminal operation, the more familiar of the three ways of working 
containers, while broadly similar to that using ship's gear, is different in a number 
of ways. These operations use wharfside container cranes (which are several times 
larger than ship's cranes) that are on rails on the wharf, the jib of which juts out 
over the vessel that is being worked. Whereas heavy forklifts, sometimes in 
concert with truck and trailer units, are usually employed on conventional wharves 
to move containers around, in the terminals 'straddle carriers' are used. A straddle 
carrier is a tall and specialized vehicle, so named because it 'straddles' each 
container in order to lift or lower it. The straddle carriers move the containers to 
and from 'the stack', and position them or move them away from beneath the 
container crane. The container crane then lifts the containers and places them on 
the ship, and vice-versa when a vessel is being unloaded. 
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It will be recalled that, because of a union-enforced restriction, only fully cellular 
vessels were able to be (un)loaded in the terminals. In some respects these vessels 
are easier to load and discharge than non-cellular vessels, because the containers 
do not have to be guided into place by the gang on the ship, and the containers in 
the hold do not have to be coupled together. Instead, each hatch in the hold of a 
cellular ship is divided into a series of 'cells', which the containers snugly fit into, 
and the container crane operator simply lowers the container into the appropriate 
one. The spreaders that are used automatically attach to and unattach from the 
containers, and because they move straight up and straight down are easier to 
position on top of the containers. A foreman explains: "with a ship with cells ... 
the box just goes straight down into a slot, and that goes down, it unhooks itself, 
and then you put the next one on top" (interview). 
As with the self-sustaining vessels, new sets of skills are utilized within the 
container terminals. In the former case I mentioned the task of operating ship's 
cranes, which involved much dexterity and skill. In the terminals, the task of 
moving containers to and from the ship to the wharf (and vice-versa) was 
performed by the drivers of the portside cranes. It will be recalled, however, that 
the container terminals utilized a composite workforce that comprised both 
water siders and harbour workers, in the ratio of six watersiders to one harbour 
worker, that were allocated for a period of a few months at a time. Under the 
original arbitrated decision which established the composite workforce, harbour 
workers gained the sole right to drive the container cranes (and watersiders the 
right to drive ship's gantry cranes). Insofar as container crane driving was not 
performed by watersiders, I will not provide a description of this type of work. 
Instead, the interested reader is directed to the excellent ethnographic description 
of the work of operating these machines provided by Finlay (1988:125-8) and 
Wellman (1995:166-70). Suffice to say that, like the drivers of ship's gantry 
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cranes, the work of container crane drivers was skilled and central to a container 
job. 
Watersiders did, however, operate straddle carriers. Like container crane driving, 
this involved a new set of skills. The sheer size of the machines, and the fact that 
the driver is perched in a cab which is 25 feet from the ground, makes 
maneuvering them no mean feat. Moreover the driver has to respond quickly to 
instructions issued by radio. A watersider provides the following description: 
You're concentrating on what you're doing. Because you got your 
earphones on, you got your mic. here, you got your pad here. And 
they'd say 'oh, straddle six, 'speaking', 'go to G for George box 
163'. So you've written all this down while he's telling you, so 
you go to G for George, go along and look down the row. Number 
16, top container. And you pick that up, you back out [and tell 
them] got hold [of it]. 'Righto, better take it to the ship.' So you 
take it to the ship. But before you get to the ship, the foreman turns 
around and says 'straddle six, put it in Row Three'. So you go and 
drop that in Row Three. Soon as you leave that, someone says 
'straddle six, go to G George, 162'. So you go back to G George 
and pick up 162, then you go back and you do it all over again. 
(Interview) 
This work requires intense mental concentration. If the wrong container is picked 
up, the whole sequence of loading can be affected. And if a container is moved to 
the wrong place it can easily become lost amidst hundreds of containers in a 
container yard. Thus, as the same water sider continues: 
You're concentrating on what you're doing. And then they might 
tum round and say 'oh, go and pick up the forty foot spreader.' So 
you go along and you find out where the spreader is. So you put 
your spreader on. You call up 'got the forty foot'. 'Oh well, go 
now to row so and so'. And also they give you the container 
number as well. So you got all this . . . and you pick the container 
up, make sure you're in the right spot, make sure you're the right 
number, you pick it up and then they tell you if its either to go on 
to the road, or to the ship, or whether they just wanted it shifted 
from one bay to another. (Interview) 
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Opinions of straddle driving varied; just as Wellman (1995: 167) found, there were 
watersiders who said that driving straddle carriers was tedious, because it just 
involved moving containers from one location to another (as is indicated in the 
first quotation above). But others said it was very good work. One watersider 
who I interviewed said: 
it was a good job. It was an interesting job .... Because you're on 
the move all the time, the time goes fast, and sometimes if there's 
no work for you, you park your machine up and sit up there. And if 
you got nothing else to do, you read the newspaper. ... You're 
doing something different all the time. (Interview) 
Thus, although there was intense mental concentration required, this made the job 
'interesting', and it was broken up by the unscheduled 'rests' that drivers often 
were able to take. Sometimes these occurred when mistakes were made (oftennot 
by the drivers themselves). A union representative put it bluntly: "there will 
always be fuck-ups" (fieldnotes). A foreman explained a common source of 
problems: 
Where we get holdups is that if you're at the ship's side and you 
want a sequence of containers to go from the bottom to the top, say 
there might be six containers, so you write down the numbers of 
the six you want in the sequence you want them, and you send ... a 
watersider round to find them. They go round and they look for 
them, and then they'll come back ten minutes later and say 'we can 
find such and such'. So of course then you call the office [to see] if 
its been received, and you find that it hasn't been received, its been 
cancelled or something like that. . . . So then you try to do 
something else in the meantime until its sorted out. (Interview) 
Often it was when a 'fuck-up' occurred that an unscheduled rest could be taken by 
the straddle carrier drivers. 
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But the new skills exercised by qualified straddle carriers drivers (and container 
crane drivers) must be counterbalanced by the fact that on a container operation 
there still are 'shit jobs', a prime candidate for the worst of which is lashing. 
Whereas 'shit jobs' on a break-bulk operation were largely a result of the type of 
cargo that was being worked, lashing by its very nature is dirty and dangerous 
work. It involves fastening the containers on deck to the ship to prevent them 
from falling off when the ship is at sea (in the case of a loading job), or 
unfastening containers prior to them being discharged. A watersideI' described 
this type of work in the following manner: 
when you're lashing those containers ... the locking bars and the 
twist locks, and also the bottle screws, are all full of grease. And 
the thing is, sometimes you've only got space of . . . well you 
wouldn't even have a metre space. You might have two foot 
between the containers that you've got to go in, and lash 'em. And 
you're crawling over the bottle screws that's already been up, and 
they're all greasy and its a very dirty job. Very dirty job. 
(Interview) 
Because lashing involves working on deck, watersiders often have to work atop a 
stack of as many as four containers. This is particularly dangerous on the 'self-
sustaining' vessels described above, because the ship 'swings'. Although using a 
portside crane does not cause the ship to swing (because it lifts straight up and 
down and is not connected to the ship itself), the ship still moves around if there is 
'a swell' , and thus there is still the danger of falling off the stack: 
When the wind is blowing a howling gale ... and you're on top of 
the four high, and you've got forty foot containers being blown all 
over the place, and you're up there and there's nowhere to go ... 
(Interview) 
Another watersideI' commented: 
When you go three or four containers high ... you've got to be 
taken up by crane in a box, and then you're supposed to have your 
safety belt on. That's only while you're in the box. Because if its 
blowing a very, very strong southerly, specially night, with oilskins 
on and everything else like that, and you got gumboots and its wet, 
you could slip .... Its a dangerous job. (Interview) 
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As well as the inherent dangers associated with lashing, the tasks involved are 
uniform. Finlay (1988:138) writes that "Lashing can be arduous, even dangerous, 
work, but it is routine unskilled work nonetheless." But he also notes that it is 
crucial to the job: "if the lashers worked too slowly, the entire operation would be 
delayed" (ibid). As in the case of working below deck on non-cellular vessels, the 
work must be done correctly using implicit working knowledge, and at a certain 
pace, if a job is to proceed on schedule. 
The third of the three ways of working containers, the roll on / roll off operation, 
is quite different, and arguably simpler than either of the lift-on / lift-off 
operations. Using large forklifts, each container is placed on a four-wheel trailer 
unit designed to be towed by a truck. This can either be done in a cargo 
marshalling area, or at another site (some trailers arrive at the port with the 
container already on them). The rear of a ro / ro vessel opens, and a ramp is 
extended to the wharf. The type of vessel that I observed most frequently, had 
three decks. The trailers are driven into the middle deck (the 'tween deck) using a 
small tractor unit. They are then either raised to the upper deck on a gigantic 
elevator or driven to the lower deck on a ramp. 
Although this type of work does not have the same difficulties and dangers as a lift 
on - lift off operation on the conventional wharf (such as attaching the spreader to 
the container and dodging the container as it is lifted), putting the container aboard 
on a four wheel trailer is no mean feat. Anyone who has attempted to manoeuvre 
a four wheel trailer can appreciate the problems of doing so within the narrow and 
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confined space of a ro / ro vessel's hold. Once again, like knowing 'the tricks', 
there is a hard way and an easy way of doing this, as the trailer can be either 
'backed' or 'pushed' into place. A water sider noted that: 
Its easier trying to push a wagon with a container on top than it is 
trying to back it in. To push a wagon in, driving wise, it is easier. 
You're going forwards and you got two lines on your tow bar and 
onto the truck. And you got a bloke there pointing you. If you 
can't see he's pointing you .... [when] you bring it to the left, that 
means to say the wagon's going to the left. But when you're 
driving backwards, if you want the wagon to go left you got to tum 
right. So its easier to push one in. (Interview) 
After the trailers are parked in place, they are secured to the deck using a series of 
chains, and are rendered immobile with wooden chocks which are placed under 
their wheels. This work is, in effect, a type of lashing. It is important that this job 
is done correctly, as the trailers can move while at sea with the pitch and roll of 
the ship. Although it is not as dangerous as lashing on deck, there is some danger 
to water siders, if there is 'a swell', of trailers moving while being secured, or of 
being run over by an incoming or outgoing trailer. 
Thus we have seen that, on each of the three types of container operations, there is 
considerable variation in the types of jobs performed by watersiders. Some jobs 
are simple, but others are complex; some are dirty and unpleasant, while others are 
clean and easy; some boring and others intrinsically interesting. Under the bureau 
system watersiders would be rotated between different jobs. Assuming 
watersiders had the requisite qualifications, they could at one time or another do 
all of the different jobs (both within the container terminals and on conventional 
wharves), which went a long way towards forestalling boredom: 
You had different jobs [on] different days. See now, going in say 
this afternoon, and you look up on the board [and see] oh I'm on 
the wash. So that means I'll go and wash boxes. And then you go 
in the next day, and you more or less know what's .... Like the 
ship's in, you're hatchman. Or you might go there as a straddle 
driver. So you do three months straddling, yeah, you do straddling. 
And then when you're back onto the [conventional wharf] you 
might be on the railway. So you're using forklifts, heavy forklifts 
to pick up containers and you stack them three high. Or you can 
use the top-lifter, if the straddles can't get to the wagons to take the 
container off, you can take them off by the top-lifter, off the 
railway. So I mean there was a variation of jobs which was very, 
very good. (Interview) 
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Although there were still 'shit jobs' (primarily lashing), because of the system of 
worker rotation no-one had to do these for long periods. Even watersiders without 
any 'tickets' could, for instance, be allocated as 'general duties' men within the 
terminals (to pack and unpack containers, clean sheds, wash containers and so 
forth), or on the conventional wharves they could work 'on the rail' or with reefer 
containers. A water sider commented: 
If you were on the rail you had two blokes doing the repairs and 
stacking and everything else, and one used to be looking after the 
shunting and loading of the railway wagons. When you're on the 
reefers your sole job was ... to go over the frozen containers and 
when the forklifts came to pick up a container you make sure that 
everything's all clear for it to take off. (Interview) 
There is no doubt that some of the tasks (such as lashing) are just as arduous as 
working with break-bulk cargo, but overall container work is less physically 
demanding. In contrasting container work with break-bulk work, one watersider 
said: "Everything was back-breaking in them days .... It was all manual work." 
Consequently, unlike the claims of labour process theorists (such as Mills 1979) 
regarding the degradation of work as a result of containerization, many watersiders 
were happy to see an end to break-bulk cargo. In a casual conversation with a 
watersider I said "There isn't really any break-bulk work left, is there?", to which 
he replied forcefully "No, thank God!" (fieldnotes). No doubt, matters of personal 
preference differed; another watersider, powerfully built, said he didn't mind the 
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occasional break-bulk job as it allowed him to get "a workout". Still other 
watersiders were equivocal; one reminisced about the 'old days' on break-bulk 
jobs: 
I look at it this way. Everything is a different sort of work, 
compared to what it was years ago. But if you want harmony, then 
you go back years ago. I mean when we were loading a meat ship, 
down below, everyone would be there, they'd be laughing and 
joking, and you'd be having a laugh with your mate and he'd be 
having a laugh with you .... I still go back to the old days. It was 
bloody hard work, but you enjoyed hard work. (Interview) 
The mention of a meat job is interesting, for this same watersider, later in the 
interview, extolled the virtues of containers in eliminating these cold and 
uncomfortable jobs: 
I used to hate meat jobs, they were so cold. Just imagine first thing 
in the morning, going down and finding out your working in 27 
degrees below zero. And you have to bring the thermometer down 
there, we could work as long as it was 20 degrees below zero, but 
not 27. And I tell you what, your hands used to get cold, your feet 
used to get cold and you couldn't feel your hands, and you're trying 
to pick up meat. When the containers come in, and they started 
loading containers with meat, thank Christ! I didn't like meat jobs, 
they were too cold for me. (Interview) 
Although he enjoyed the comradery of a large meat job (which has no counterpart 
on a container job), he did not like the conditions in which such jobs were worked. 
The equivocation in this comment speaks to the fact that, from the point of view 
of watersiders, container technology cannot be viewed purely in black and white 
terms. Container work has its own inherent advantages and disadvantages. 
In the preceding discussion I demonstrated that container work leads new sets of 
skills to emerge, which corroborates the findings of Finlay and Wellman. One 
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watersider reflected on the 'skilled' nature of container work in tenns of formal 
qualifications: 
Well, put it this way, every job that I done on the waterfront ... I 
had to get a ticket; ship's cranes, I had to go for a course for it; 
deckwork, I had to go for a course for it; driving an articulated 
truck, you had to get a ticket for it. You had to get a ticket for a 24 
ton forklift .... This is what makes you laugh, they say you're not 
skilled, on the waterfront. But when you look around, and you've 
got to drive all these machines, and they look at you and turn 
'round and say 'oh, you're only a bloody old wharfie'. But when 
you look at it, you're a lorry driver, you're a front-end loader, 
you're a crane driver, you might as well say you're a steeplejack 
going up on top of all these boxes. I mean the thing is, you're jack 
of all trades and master of none. (Interview) 
More formally, in a useful corrective to the labour process school account of Mills 
(1979), Wellman writes that: 
The skills necessary for containerized longshoring obviously differ 
from conventional skills; but the modern technology has not 
eliminated skill. New skills are required, and thus, in some 
contexts, re-skilling is occurring. Mental activity is also necessary 
on the modern waterfront. Longshoremen working on container 
docks are thoughtful actors, using an implicit body of working 
knowledge to accomplish their tasks (1995:161). 
Just like on break-bulk jobs, then, managers and foremen are still dependent on 
watersiders to utilize this knowledge on each of the three types of container 
operations. As I observed on numerous jobs, even slight mistakes (like wrongly 
positioning the spreader, failing to disconnect reefer containers from their power 
supply, or failing to uncouple containers from each other), let alone organized go-
slows, could cause costly holdups. As Wellman (ibid:164) puts it, despite the 
degree of mechanization on container jobs, "the pace of the modem hook is 
detennined by the hands of longshoremen on levers in cranes and lashings on 
containers. " 
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Despite technological change, physical labour remains the most characteristic 
form of work. 3 Thus the dependence of managers on workers has not been 
eliminated by containers, and indeed in some ways has been heightened (because 
of the increased premium placed on ship turnaround time). The counterpart of this 
dependence, however, is that container work does have the potential to be better 
invigilated and thus the potential to be better controlled by management. 
(4) Tlte Foreman's Gaze: 'Boxes and Numbers' 
In the preceding section I have held in abeyance issues of autonomy and control. 
Insofar as these hinge on the relationship between foremen and gangs, I will now 
examine the (changed) role of the foreman within a container operation. The 
formal management hierarchy was not greatly changed by containerization. As 
before, the larger companies had a middle-management hierarchy that was 
comprised of the positions of master-stevedore, cargo supervisor and foreman-
stevedore. But, if the positions that made up this 'system of supervision' were 
largely unchanged, the tasks their incumbents performed differed. In this section I 
will focus specifically on changes in the role of the foremen-stevedore. It will be 
recalled that in the break-bulk system the foreman's work was divided between 
'service' and 'labour control' tasks. This division remained under the container 
system, but the nature of the tasks involved changed. 
The reason why in the break-bulk period, as well as exercising a labour control 
function, foreman worked in a technical service capacity largely hinged on the 
discontinuous nature, and inherent variability of break-bulk work. There was a 
constant stream of 'new' information (e.g. cargo plans and labour lists) and 
3 For a comparable case, see the discussion of chemical production by Nichols and Beynon (1977). 
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service tasks (e.g. rigging of gear and 'setting up' of the job) which had to be 
performed on each job. As one foreman (Grant) remarked: "there was never two 
ships the same, or two cargoes the same" (interview). Many of these 'service' 
tasks (which were central to the foreman's skill) were eliminated when 
containerization occuned, because cargo ceased to be variable. Standardization 
eliminated all rigging and re-rigging of gear. Whereas previously, "you'd be 
shifting gear quite often depending on where the cargo was in the hatch", on 
container vessels gear was not rigged or shifted. Grant noted: "there's no rigging 
of gear or anything like that, as it was in the old days" (interview). Similarly, 
foremen no longer required extensive knowledge of different types of cargo, and 
of how to stow it in the hold. In effect, these changes made redundant all of the 
foreman's specialist knowledge of different types of cargo and methods of 
working cargo. One foreman I interviewed (Ray) expressed the changes in the 
following way: 
Its more standardized, you don't get the unknowns like you could 
before ... its more of a regular type of job. You know, it is getting 
more like a factory. (Interview) 
However new service tasks emerged in the place of the ones that were eliminated. 
The other side of standardization is that work must be performed in a pre-
determined order, as specified on the cargo plan. Thus the primary service task 
centered on following the cargo plan to the letter by monitoring the sequence of 
containers. Ray commented: 
the cargo was all the same, they were boxes and numbers, so you 
worked with numbers, numbers and numbers. Because every box 
that's loaded into a container ship is pre-planned, and every 
position on the ship is numbered. (Interview) 
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Before each job, foremen were given a plan which set out where containers were 
to be loaded, or which ones were to be unloaded. The containers were identified 
by a number which corresponded to a position on the ship: 
You get a, its almost like a sheaf of plans .... You get the plan and each 
space on it has got a number on it. (Interview) 
Rather than 'setting up' the job (by ensuring that gear was rigged and so forth), at 
the beginning of each job the foreman had to concentrate more intensely on the 
cargo plan. Ray said that: "When you arrive in the morning, of course, getting the 
plan is the main thing." He continued: 
You . . . get a list of a list of papers handed to you by any member 
of the office staff that are there. And they say 'oh, you're doing so 
and so, here's the plan' and away you go. So you don't have any 
pre-briefing or anything at all. You go to the ship, and you've got 
all the papers. They've been compiled over a period of time, and 
whoever put it together has a fair idea, but you're given it at the 
starting time. I've always maintained that we should get more 
notice so that you could sit down quietly and go through the whole 
procedure, get an idea of what you're going to do, instead of getting 
all the men on the job at seven o'clock in the morning, you've got 
all the papers and away you go. Well it would be nice if you just 
had that, even half an hour to go through [ them]. (Interview) 
The reason that concentrating on the plan is so important is that it had to be 
followed to the letter - there is no room for error. This is particularly crucial in 
loading containers (according to ports of call, container weights, and so forth). If 
just one container is out of sequence, then the whole job will be out of sequence. 
Unlike the plan of a break-bulk job, the plan of a container job cannot be altered. 
To quote Ray again: 
everything's done because there's a reason behind everything. And 
if you do exactly as the plan tells you, you've got no problems. 
(Interview) 
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Containers must arrive at the ship's side in the sequence that they are to be loaded 
in, and a foreman on the wharf directs this part of the operation using the cargo 
plan. Similarly they must be picked up and placed on the ship, in the designated 
space. Ray again: "Loading or discharging, you check the numbers off so you 
know exactly where you are." If a foreman made a mistake in reading the cargo 
plan the effect could be disastrous. Grant recalled a number of instances when this 
occurred: 
there have been times where they've put about twenty boxes [in], 
and then found that they'd put in the wrong [one], they'd made a 
mistake. A couple of times where a new bloke came and, looking 
at the plan, instead of looking at the bow, looked at the stem and 
put them all in there .... [He had to] take them all out, you'd lose 
two or three hours. (Interview) 
Thus the foreman's 'service' function changed such that, instead of rigging gear 
and 'setting up' the job, it centered more on intensively monitoring the order (or 
flow) in which containers were (un)loaded. Changes in foreman's 'service' 
function, were also accompanied by (not um-elated) changes in the 'labour control' 
function. 
First and foremost, containerization narrowed the foreman's "span of control" 
(Perrow 1972:37), that is, the actual number of watersiders under the control of 
the foreman on each job. To quote Ray: 
containerization meant that you had a lot fewer men. And instead 
of working say five or six gangs on a ship, that means five or six 
hatches, you'd be probably working only one or maybe two. 
(Interview) 
Similarly, the work the gangs perform is also much more visible than on a break-
bulk job, where several gangs would often be working below deck in a hatch and 
out of sight of the foreman. Container jobs provide the opportunity for foremen to 
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more intensively observe the gangs. Hatches are open and the foreman on deck 
usually has a good vantage point from which to oversee the men and their work. 
As a foreman said "you can see at a glance if they're all there" (interview). 
Not only could container work be better invigilated, it had to be so. Because of 
the sequencing process, work had to be done in a particular way and the foreman 
was required to be constantly vigilant in watching for mistakes. There was less 
room for errors, and the workflow system demanded the foreman's constant 
attention. Grant said that there were: 
Less men to supervise, but more cargo supervision than before. 
Because whereas in the past if you were going to load a whole lot 
of sacks, or anything at all, once you saw where they were going 
that was it. But with containers you've got to watch each 
individual one to make sure it goes in its individual slot. Because 
they're different ports, different weights, different all sorts of 
things, and they must be stowed in the conect place .... You got to 
make sure that ... each and every box is going in the right place. 
Although the foreman supervised fewer gangs than on a break-bulk job, it was 
more important that the gangs worked in a particular way. In break-bulk work 
there was considerable leeway in the manner in which cargo was stowed. A 
foreman commented that: "Providing they were in that end of the hatch, and it was 
accessible at the other end, there was no problem. So it [the cargo] just sort of 
went together the best way, you know, the way it anived. They did the best they 
could with it" (interview). However, with containers, it was very important that 
work was done conectly as one mistake could through the whole sequence out. 
Ray said that there was a shift in his role: 
More to watching the cargo. You know, the men don't have so 
much to do, but its more important they do it exactly right. I mean 
there's no room for enor, its got to be spot-on. You know, you 
can't exactly turn round and say 'well that will be near enough' or 
'she'll be right', sort of thing, it's got to be right according to the 
plan. (Interview) 
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In a sense, because of the nature of the operation, watching the cargo is 
tantamount to watching the gangs. Whereas previously a foreman could set up a 
'run' of break-bulk cargo (and would have several hatches to mind at the same 
time), and would simply look to see that the hook was moving, on a container 
operation, foremen had to watch each and every container - rather than just 
ensuring that the crane was working. Ray observed that: 
You have to be able to concentrate. And I mean its not just one 
after the other sort of thing, there's a gap in between, but you can't 
afford not to be there. And you may look as if you're standing 
around totally idle, but if you're not actually within range of what's 
happening . . . Its less interesting because you're glued to that 
position. I mean you can't wander away, whereas the old days of 
loading, maybe if you were on a meat ship or something and you're 
loading for one port and all hatches are working, you could stand at 
the top of the gangway and see that everything's working. And as 
long as it was going in and out, there was no problem. But this job 
you've actually got be there to be able to read the number on the 
container. ... There are times when it is easier, and there are times 
when it can be, you know, restrictive. You dare not go away. It's 
not a matter of you can't trust anybody, it's a matter of there must 
be somebody who actually checks that its correct. (Interview) 
As I noted above, mistakes could be disastrous. Ray continues: 
if you go away and you find that they've put four or five containers 
in, and they've gone into the wrong cell or something, you've got 
problems. You've got to get them out as quick as you can and put 
them in the right place. You can't tum round and say 'oh well, 
she'll be right, I'll tell the [ship's] mate and he can alter things', 
because its not done that way .... The whole chain would be upset, 
because its all pre-planned. . . . Its got to be exactly right. 
(Interview) 
Ray contrasted the sort of supervision on the 'pre-planned' container jobs with 
that on a break-bulk job: 
You can't go back and check after its happened. You know, you've 
got the ships with the cells in them, you put one box down on the 
bottom and the next one comes over the top. You don't know 
what's underneath. So you've got to observe each and every one .. 
. . Whereas on the break bulk, we could ... say six trucks of barley 
to go into a particular hatch. Well you'd tell the gang that's their 
six trucks, and of course away they would go, and it was going into 
one position. Well that virtually took care of itself. You know, 
you didn't have to constantly be there. But with a container ship, if 
you say 'that goes in there, and that goes there', and you walk away 
and you come back and for some unknown reason its just, you 
know, a slip or something and its gone down in the wrong cell. 
(Interview) 
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Thus a container operation provided the opportunity for constantly monitoring 
gangs, and also a reason to do so. 
In this section I have demonstrated the amenability of container work to direct and 
continuous supervision, which hinges on changes to the role of the foreman within 
container systems. I have shown how container work demands the foreman's 
constant attention. Under the break-bulk system the foreman's gaze is sporadic, 
but on container jobs it is constant. As Wellman (1995:171) notes, container 
"work can be audited and monitored and is usually done in full view of 
supervision." However, this potential for a better invigilated labour process does 
not automatically translate into greater control of work by management (and yet on 
container jobs it is more important that watersiders perform work in a particular 
way and at a particular pace). Indeed, my argument is that on the waterfront in 
New Zealand, given the conditions which prevailed under the bureau system of 
labour administration, the potential for greater employer control was not realized. 
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(5) Control on the Job 
In Chapter 6 I argued that the degree of control of work practices watersiders 
exerted on break-bulk jobs had as much to do with the organization of the labour 
market, as the nature of the labour process. This is demonstrated again by the fact 
that containerization, which had the potential to lead to greater employer control 
on the job, did not result in this potential being realized. Instead, the strength of 
the port unions in the labour market, which persisted up until the mid-1980s, was 
mirrored in watersiders' control of work practices. 
In large part this was due to the fact that the bureau system of labour 
administration continued to deprive employers, even on container jobs, of "their 
power to hire and fire" (Edwards 1979:16). But it also was a result of the fact that 
the waterfront unions' control over the labour market was strengthened after 
containerization (for example, through the use of supplementary registers to 
'squeeze out' casual labour). In Chapter 10 I demonstrated that a national labour 
market developed, and that the unions exerted greater control over an (albeit 
shrinking) labour supply. Similarly, in the last chapter I demonstrated the unions' 
strength in bargaining. Each of these aspects of labour market strength impacted 
on work relations by bolstering the willingness and capacity of water siders to 
effect disputes at the workplace level. 
The employers' lack of ability to hire and fire (which weakened the foreman's 
position) was exacerbated on container operations, where the quality and pace of 
work were at a premium. With the exception of the four container terminals, and 
the Union Shipping Company's 'Seacargo Terminals', all watersiders continued to 
be allocated for the duration of a job only. But even in the two types of terminals, 
a system of worker rotation was secured (see Chapter 10). This system preserved 
the 'averaging' effect, with respect to the allocation of work, which in turn 
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maintained the horizontal (rather than hierarchical) properties of the labour 
market. Different qualifications notwithstanding, all watersiders were provided 
with broadly similar work opportunities. Equally, employers could not specify 
who they wanted, and had to accept the gangs they were allocated. 
As was the case with break-bulk cargo, the actor who these tensions were refracted 
through was the foreman. In the preceding section I demonstrated that, although 
the foreman's 'span of control' decreased, it was vital that work was performed in 
a particular way. Simply being able to see men work does not automatically 
guarantee greater control over them; foremen (and indeed the whole management 
hierarchy) had no more control of water siders than in the break-bulk era. There is 
every indication that, as was the case with break-bulk work, watersiders on 
container jobs simply did not tolerate foremen attempting to assert their authority. 
A foreman commented on this problem: 
No foreman could go on the job and start waving his arms around 
and ... playing the big guy, because he would soon be brought 
down to size. . . . A few did, but they never lasted very long. 
(Interview) 
When I asked a foreman about what could be done if their were problems with 
discipline on a container job, he replied: 
Well you could put them on penalty. There were occasions when I 
put men on penalty. I never got much satisfaction out of it because 
they always came back and had the last say .... It was the sort of 
thing that you tried to shy away from. Threaten, by all means. 
(Interview) 
Watersiders could be reallocated to the same foreman at a later date. However, 
the other side of this was that foremen would be rid of a troublesome gang. The 
same foreman said he would: 
mostly grin and bear it. It never lasted, that was the thing, because 
you knew tomorrow, maybe, they'll be replaced, you'd get 
somebody else, the job would finish. (Interview) 
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The limited power of foremen to discipline watersiders had its concomitant in the 
labour market strength of the union, which was reflected in the capacity and 
willingness of watersiders to slow work down (or stop it altogether) on container 
jobs. Although, as I will show below, one of the potential sources of disagreement 
- negotiating over rates - was eliminated, there were numerous other issues that 
arose which rendered stoppages on container jobs a not infrequent occurrence. 
Two of the most important of these were lines of demarcation and gang manning. 
While demarcation issues had been resolved in the terminals (via the composite 
workforce agreement), they arose frequently on ro / ro and 10 / 10 jobs outside of 
the terminals. And, as I demonstrated in Chapter 11, issues of gang manning came 
to the fore in the 1980s. I will provide now some examples of actions taken by 
watersiders over these issues. 
The degree of control watersiders exerted on the job is indicated by the fact that 
lines of demarcation were policed with ever more vigilance after containerization 
(particularly in the 1980s, when severe downward pressure was placed on register 
strengths by the employers). The following example is a case in point. In 1985 a 
dispute occurred at Lyttelton, which concerned a roll on / roll off vessel owned by 
Pacifica Shipping. The issue at the heart of this dispute concerned the 'point of 
rest', namely the place where watersiders' responsibility for moving containers 
ended and that of harbour workers began. The dispute concerned a practice which 
had been challenged both by the Lyttelton Harbour Board and the Harbour 
Workers Union regarding what was the 'normal area of work' for watersiders. 
The employers wanted it registered as a demarcation dispute and sent to the 
Waterfront Industry Tribunal for resolution, but it was first heard at a Port 
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Conciliation Committee meeting from which I have taken the following excerpt.4 
(Mr Hayes is the employers' representative and Mr Quince is the union 
representative. ) 
Mr Hayes: The stevedore has given instmctions which the watersiders have 
disobeyed. 
Mr Quince: What is the normal area? 
Mr Hayes: The area that has been used on the instmction of the stevedore. 
Mr Quince: Then that area that the cargo is in has been the normal area 
worked if 
the stevedore has so desired. 
Mr Hayes: It changes depending on the requirements of the company. 
Mr Quince: Does the company have the right to go into that area? 
Mr Hayes: You are disobeying the stevedore's instmctions. Normal work 
is what 
is needed to do the operation. 
Mr Quince: Us going across this imaginary line is normal. ... Someone 
comes out 
of the blue and decides it is a demarcation dispute. A demarcation 
dispute only 
comes up if it is a new area of work. ... You saw what happened this 
morning. If you want hundreds of people locked in physical combat, 
you will get it. Our 
members are adamant on this. 
Although the vehemence with which the Lyttelton Union pursued the issue, and 
the fact that the stoppage subsequently extended to the container terminal, were 
perhaps unique to the 1980s (when the unions faced shrinking work opportunities 
and carne under pressure for redundancies), this type of 'boundary' dispute was 
not in itself unusual. The cost of such stoppages to employers was considerable 
and often resulted in the issue being conceded. 
'Go-slows' were another way in which watersiders responded to issues in dispute 
on the job. There were two different types of go-slows. The first was a formal 
union authorized go-slow (sometimes under directions from the national executive 
4Minutes of Lyttelton Port Conciliation Committee Meeting 394, 16110/85. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 164,3/6/13 (National Archives). 
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of the Federation) designed to put pressure on employers at times of negotiation. 
There were numerous examples of this tactic during the 1970s. The second type 
of go-slow was one that was initiated by the watersiders themselves relating to a 
particular job. For example, a dispute occurred at the Lyttelton Seacargo Terminal 
in 1985, over the packing and unpacking containers within the terminal, which 
resulted in a worker-initiated go-slow at the terminal.s 
The unions rigorously policed gang strengths on container work. For example, 
one case (which eventually was taken to the Waterfront Industry Tribunal) 
involved the number of lashers on a job involving a quayside container crane at 
the Port of Auckland in 1980. In this case the Auckland Harbour Board (the 
container terminal operator) attempted to circumvent an agreement that each of the 
two portainer cranes should have an eight man lashing gang; when a third crane 
was brought into operation, on an 'as required' basis, the Board sought a six man 
lashing gang. The Tribunal noted that: "This proposal was conveyed by the 
operations manager of the Board to the union walking delegate by telephone early 
one Saturday morning.,,6 In this case, the Auckland Union vehemently opposed 
the proposal, and it was taken all the way to the Tribunal (which decided in favour 
of the Union). 
Although the local union opposed this proposal by the employers, there were 
numerous cases (which are evident in Port Conciliation Committee minutes) 
where employers attempted to alter gang sizes (by releasing labour improperly, for 
instance), where the men on the job actually initiated a dispute. This continued to 
occur even after the General Principal Order was 'restructured' in 1987 (see 
Chapter 11). For example, at the Port of Lyttelton a gang of watersiders engaged 
5 Minutes of Lyttelton Port Conciliation Committee Meeting 399, 6/12/85. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 164,3/6/13 (National Archives). 
6 WIT Decision 776, 12/11/80. Waterfront Industry Commission Records, W3472, Box 57 
(National Archives). 
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on a devanning job would not work until an extra man was appointed. In the 
words of an employers' representative: "Men have been engaged to do devanning . 
. . . Four men in the container gang and one pointer. The men refused to start 
working. They claim an extra pointer should be employed.,,7 This case was 
subsequently taken to the local Port Conciliation Committee and the Union won. 
In the preceding sections I have demonstrated that containerization changed the 
way that work was carried out. Although many of the tasks involved are less 
complex than their counterparts on break-bulk work, there is a premium placed on 
carrying them out correctly and at a certain pace. Furthermore, because of its 
capital intensity, the cost of a container job that is subject to a go-slow (or a 
stoppage) is much higher than that of a break-bulk job. Far from decreasing the 
workplace power of watersiders, in this sense containers increased it - despite the 
potential of container work to be better invigilated. This idea is succinctly 
encapsulated in a felicitous statement by Finlay (1988:121): "The ease of 
monitoring worker performance does not mean that it is easy to control". This 
was particularly the case in New Zealand where the system of labour 
administration, and their labour market strength, placed watersiders in a position 
of some considerable power on the job. 
The employers' lack of ability to effectively discipline watersiders, and their 
capacity and inclination to engage in action on the job, led to a continued 
management emphasis on the 'wages system', in order to elicit cooperation, and 
continuities in the indulgency pattern which existed on break-bulk jobs. I will 
deal with each of these facets of work relations in the following sections. 
7 Minutes of Lyttelton Port Conciliation Committee Meeting 421, 16/8/87. Waterfront Industry 
Commission Records, W3472, Box 164,3/6/13 (National Archives). 
550 
(6) 'Money and Motivation' 
It will be recalled from the discussion of work relations in Chapter 6 that 
management in the break-bulk era was, to a large degree, 'management through 
the wages system'. Elements of this employer strategy continued, albeit in 
modified form, on container jobs. This took the form of attempts to 'buy' 
cooperation and productivity in order to minimize disruptions to work. There 
were however changes to the way that this quid pro quo, which centered on the 
wage form, operated. 
First and foremost, the elimination of variable cargoes impacted on the wage 
structure. It will be recalled that the non-standardized nature of break-bulk cargo 
provided the opportunity for on-the-job bargaining over 'special conditions' 
associated with different types of cargoes. These negotiations resulted in rates 
being settled well above the standard 'book rate', which came to serve as the 
starting point for negotiations. Insofar as containers were standardized, the many 
different 'book rates' for different classes of cargo, together with on-the-job 
negotiations over rates, were eliminated. 
The bonus system also was modified to take account of containers. This occurred 
when the bonus system as a whole was revamped in 1970 (as a result of 
negotiations which occurred during the Waterfront Conference) through Principal 
Order 306. The incentive contract rates which were set replaced all Waterfront 
Industry Commission cooperative contracts and employers' incentive schemes 
which operated at ports throughout the country (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of 
these latter). The new system simplified and standardized the calculation of bonus 
payments through a series of 'trade' and cargo classifications. 8 It should be noted, 
8 Under the new system, rates were established for particular classes of cargo in particular trade 
categories (which were determined by geographic trading areas). These were calculated on the 
basis of average bonus payments per unit of cargo with minimum standard ship's gangs for the 12 
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however, that bonus payments continued to be pooled at all ports.9 A standard 
bonus rate for containers at each port was calculated using conventional rates as a 
basis. Apart from interport differences, which were the result of variations in the 
rates of work that were used to calculate bonus rates, on container jobs the 
variability of bonus rates associated with different types of cargoes was 
eliminated. 
The standardization of cargo thus eliminated the aspects of the wages system that 
hinged on different types of cargo (variable bonus rates and special rates). This 
was accompanied by a shift from informal to formal negotiations, as negotiations 
on the job over the 'terms of the effort bargain' were replaced by formal 
negotiations between unions and either the employers' organization or individual 
employers. This shift limited the extent to which watersiders could exert their 
workplace power in bargaining on the job - deals had already been done, and wage 
rates struck by negotiations between the unions and the employers. That which 
previously was a function of the work-group became a function of the union. 
Nonetheless, watersiders were paid high wages for the majority of container work. 
As I argued in the preceding chapter, rather than containerization enhancing the 
ability of employers to control workers, if anything it led to a fragmentation of 
employer interests and organization which was reflected in agreements wherein 
employers attempted to 'buy' cooperation at the level of work. 
In the four container terminals standard rates were negotiated which took the place 
of special rates and dirt rates. The original arbitrated container terminal agreement 
months ended 30/9/68, increased by a standard figure of 10.64%. Because levels of productivity 
differed between pOliS, contract rates for the same classes of cargo in the same trade area differed 
in like fashion. 
9 Principal Order 306 specifically states that "The payment of incentive contract bonus shall be 
made in accordance with port arrangements. It will be recalled that, by the time this order was 
agreed to, the 'arrangement' at all ports was for the bonus to be pooled (see Chapter 6). 
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resulted in the payment of a flat rate to all workers who worked in the terminals, 
which took the place of special cargo rates and dirt rates that might otherwise have 
been earned on a break-bulk job. These rates were, in the words of a Federation 
publication, "paid to all Terminal workers irrespective of what they are doing or 
where they are doing it.,,10 On the job bargaining was replaced with standard 
rates for container work. Similarly, at the time the agreement was established, an 
'equity payment' (to compensate for a decrease in the amount of work available 
resulting from the use of containers) was secured by the Waterside Workers 
Federation for full container load containers which passed through the terminals. 
Thus there was a shift towards formal negotiations between unions and either the 
employers' organization or individual employers, which took the place of on-the-
job haggling over rates between gangs and foremen. A foreman I interviewed 
described this change in the following manner: 
they still got a rate for containers. I could never work that out, how 
that came about. But we were never involved in striking rates .... 
It was between the Union and the Company. (Interview) 
It was partly because of such standard rates that, despite the elimination of on-the-
job bargaining over rates, the wages for work at the country's four container 
terminals, which were contained in the separate container terminals agreement, 
were considered by watersiders to be excellent (see Chapter 10). Watersiders 
were paid very well to work in the container terminals, and consequently some 
saw this as the most desirable of waterfront work. One (now retired) watersideI' 
said: 
when you [were] . . . around the container terminal for three 
months, you know you're going to have three months good money . 
. . . You know, in them days you came home and say to Mum, 'well 
IOWWF Circular "History of Container Introduction and Development on New Zealand 
Waterfronts", 1980. 
I've got the container terminal for three months' .... You know 
that you've got three months good wages coming in. (Interview) 
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To be sure, not all of the attraction of container terminal work centered on wages: 
conditions of work were also good. As I noted in the previous chapter, a four day 
working week had been secured, along with very high overtime rates. 
Although the wages and conditions for working containers over conventional 
wharves were not the same as those in the terminals, they were nonetheless very 
good. In Chapter 11, I demonstrated that numerous 'satellite' agreements (in the 
form of one-off Principal Orders) were negotiated by the Federation and the port 
unions with individual companies. Through these agreements individual 
employers sought to 'purchase' increased turnaround times and uninterrupted 
work for container vessels that were worked on conventional wharves by making 
concessions on wages and conditions, which the local port unions and the 
Federation capitalized on. 
However the terms and conditions of work on container jobs, which generally 
were superior to those on break-bulk jobs, still did not guarantee, at the workplace 
level, that work proceeded as employers wanted it to. At best, they provided a 
modicum of 'protection' against stoppages and some degree of assurance that 
work would proceed at a certain pace. Moreover, it was not the case that these 
better terms and conditions were traded off against watersiders' control of work 
practices. Indeed, because of standardized rates, watersiders were unable to "exert 
much influence over the 'wage' aspect of the effort bargain" (Edwards 1986:259) 
on container jobs, and this standardization took this aspect "of effort bargaining 
away from the individual work group" (ibid:241). In this context, practices such 
as spelling assumed an added significance as an area where watersiders could 
exert their workplace power. As we shall see in the following section, the 
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indulgency pattern which existed on break-bulk jobs, at least with respect to 
spelling, continued on container jobs. 
(7) Continuities in the Indulgency Pattern 
In this section I will demonstrate that, far from eliminating the informal work 
practices which characterized break-bulk work, in relation to container work 
management continued to remain 'indulgent'. Significantly, there is every 
indication that on container jobs foreman (and management generally), at least 
with respect to spelling, were as 'indulgent' as on break-bulk jobs. 
In Chapter 6 I argued that an important feature of the indulgency pattern regarding 
spelling was as part of the effort-bargaining process. While this was still the case 
to a certain degree on container jobs, informal practices such as spelling became 
less of a quid pro quo with foremen (and managers) and more an expression of the 
sheer workplace power of watersiders. There were two aspects to this shift: it was 
conditioned by an expectation by watersiders themselves that spelling should 
continue, despite substantial differences between the two types of work, and it was 
occasioned by high manning levels the Federation had achieved for container 
work. These manning levels were, in turn, a product the Federation's degree of 
control over the labour market (see Chapter 10). I will deal with each of these 
factors in turn. 
First, the expectations on the part of watersiders regarding spelling were 
conditioned by the fact that break-bulk and container work occurred side-by-side. 
It must be emphasized that, although the proportion of break-bulk work was 
diminishing, the two types of work co-existed for much of the period under 
consideration. Because allocation to work on conventional wharves was for the 
length of a job, watersiders thus had experience of both types of work, and often 
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would alternate between a container job and a break-bulk job, depending on the 
vessels that were in port. The degree to which watersiders switched between the 
two types of work is highlighted by the fact that some ships, like the 'multi-
purpose vessels owned by Gearbulk Shipping (which I mentioned in the previous 
chapter), carried both types of cargo. A foreman said: 
On the first change-over yog had ships, and you still have ships 
come in, with break-bulk and containers, and the same foreman's 
doing both. (Interview) 
Not only was it the same foreman, it was the same gangs that did both types of 
work. This meant that the relationships between foremen (and management 
generally) and gangs, and the expectations surrounding work practices, on the two 
different types of jobs became blurred. To be sure, the water siders allocated to the 
country's four container terminals did container work only, but even there the 
system of rotation meant that, within the short space of a few months, watersiders 
experienced both types of work. 
However spelling was not merely the result of worker expectations; equally 
important for (continuities in) the indulgency pattern were levels of gang manning. 
If part of the key to spelling on break-bulk jobs was gang sizes, this factor 
increased in significance in occasioning spelling on container jobs. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, gang sizes had not been reduced significantly by 
containerization. Indeed, it is a testimony to the success of the Waterside Workers 
Federation in influencing the terms on which containers were introduced that gang 
sizes for container jobs still were high. The comment made by Auckland Union 
President Jack Clare in 1974 (which I quoted in Chapter 10), to the effect that he 
believed the Auckland container terminal had the highest manning levels in the 
world, is worth recalling. Although this is a rather extravagant claim, it does 
speak to the degree to which the Union kept gang manning levels up, in the face of 
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containerization. The dispute in the Auckland telminal that I mentioned in a 
previous section, where the Union sought to defend the use of an eight man 
lashing gang (against employers claims for a six man gang) by making it the 
subject of a Waterfront Industry Tribunal hearing, indicates the lengths that the 
unions were prepared to go to in defending gang strengths for container jobs. This 
success of the Federation in getting allocated to the container terminals 'general 
duties' men, who packed and unpacked containers, washed containers, cleaned 
sheds and so forth, was also important as a way of 'soaking up' labour in the 
terminals. 
However these gang strengths (which approximated or even exceeded those on 
conventional jobs) were not unique to the container terminals. For container jobs 
on conventional wharves, gang strengths were not much different than those for 
break-bulk cargo. A touchstone of comparison is that a standard general cargo 
hold gang was six men (with four men on the wharf). This manning scale was 
retained on some types of container work. For instance, one of the vessels I went 
onto in 1991 (after gang strengths had been decreased substantially following 
waterfront reform), a small non-cellular container vessel with containers in the 
hold and on deck, had a three man gang freeing containers which were then lifted 
using the ship's crane. I was aware that in the days prior to waterfront reform this 
type of work had been performed by a 6 man gang. Although the gang worked at 
a steady pace, I simply could not see how 6 men could be occupied by the tasks 
involved. Worried that this reflected my lack of understanding as an outsider, I 
asked the hatchman (who was also a union delegate) about it, to which he replied 
that it had been part and parcel of the "good old days" - a central feature of which 
had been spelling (fieldnotes). 
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This type of sentiment was repeated in interviews with foremen. When I asked a 
foreman (who supervised work on conventional wharves) whether spelling 
oCCUlTed on container jobs prior to waterfront reform, he replied immediately: 
Oh yes. Even more so, because they still retained the number of 
men they'd had for conventional ships, on a container ship. 
(Interview) 
A retired watersider described the type of spelling system that operated on 
container vessels that were worked outside the terminals: 
When you're not doing containers you're doing lashings. 
Especially on deck cargo, and the thing is you had six in your team . 
. . . So what you do .... if you're on twist locks or anything else 
like that, well you break down in threes. (Interview) 
Although it was slightly different, a type of spelling system also operated in· the 
container terminals. To be sure, often work was supervised by more foremen in 
the terminals. This is how a watersider, with considerable container terminal 
experience at the Port of Lyttelton, described the situation: 
Round the terminal, every job that you had, you'd have a different 
foreman. So you had a foreman for the rail, you got a foreman for 
the freezers, you got a foreman on the ship, you have another 
foreman doing break-bulk if there was break-bulk to break down, a 
foreman for the wash. So you might have one foreman for three 
men. That's right, you had three men over the reefers, you had 
three men at the rail, and each of those three men had a foreman 
each. . . . They had more bloody foremen than you had bloody 
workers. . . . This is what used to make us laugh, because there 
used to be ... more chiefs than there was indians. (Interview) 
In the interview I asked him whether the number of foremen put a stop to spelling. 
He replied: 
Oh no. I mean the thing is, you know, if you were on the rail and 
you were doing your shunting like, looking after the straddles going 
onto the railway wagons, you don't have a break until there's 
nothing coming in and then you can have a break. (Interview) 
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Even though there were a considerable number of foremen, watersiders still had 
the opportunity to spell. In some cases (such as the one above) this practice was 
limited because of the amount of work, but men could rest when there was no 
work. But in other areas it was left to the men to decide. The straddle drivers had 
a certain amount of freedom in this area. A watersider said: "The only thing the 
straddlers haven't got, they haven't got a foreman." And there were two men per 
straddle: "when I first went on the waterfront, you used to have two blokes to one 
straddle. And you do an hour up and an hour down. Because you sit in a straddle 
for a bloody hour and I tell you what, because you're concentrating on what you're 
doing" (interview). In this case, the watersiders themselves decided how best to 
organize their rest periods. 
High manning levels, however, did not automatically result in spelling being 
tolerated by management. Rather it was tolerated because the job would not have 
worked properly without it, a feature which derived from the continued 
expectations of the watersiders, and ultimately was an expression of their 
workplace power. One foreman stated that: 
if you turned around and said 'well no-one's going to leave the job' 
... they'd all be there. But the next day you'd find things never 
sort of worked. You found you had all sorts of problems. And 
then when you sat down and thought about it, you'd say well its 
just being bloody-minded to say 'well I've got nothing for you to 
do but you stay here'. (Interview) 
It would have been particularly futile to have kept men on the job given that, like 
the break-bulk jobs, management needed the cooperation of watersiders. Rather 
than the indeterminacy of the wage-effort bargain being eliminated, subject to the 
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strictures of a rationalized system of 'technical control', there remained many 
'contractual silences' surrounding how container work was performed. 
Continuing to condone spelling was, in terms of relations at the 'point of 
production', an important way in which those silences were filled. 
Moreover, on container jobs, employers had less capacity to resist spelling because 
of the importance of achieving fast turnaround times, together with the increased 
likelihood of direct action bolstered by the strength of the port unions and the 
Federation. In this context, spelling became less informally 'bargained over', and 
more forced upon management. Thus this practice became increasingly a 
manifestation of the 'frontier of control' (Batstone 1988), which was pushed 
further back in favour of watersiders. This is indicated by the fact that the Port 
Employers Association attempted in earnest to stop spelling, but could not. This 
in itself was not unusual- the Association had attempted to do so in the break-bulk 
period - but the way it did so changed. Previously the Association had put 
pressure on its own members in an attempt to 'self-regulate' spelling, which was 
unsuccessful because spelling was condoned by individual employers as a crucial 
element in the wage-effort bargain. 
In 1972 Chairman Blakeley stated at a meeting of the PEA Management 
Committee that: 
on a number of occasions, the Committee had decided to stamp out 
spelling and instructions had been issued to employers to take the 
appropriate action. Yet no lasting improvement has resulted. . . . 
The degree of spelling which is now taking place ... seems to be 
accepted by local employers as inevitable. It did seem that the only 
way this abuse could be effectively controlled was for the 
Management Committee itself to take control of the situation 
through a national inspectorate. 11 
11 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 539, 15/3/72. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Although the PEA did appoint a travelling inspector of spelling in 1973, who 
travelled to a number of ports, he was confronted with much resistance by 
watersiders and also by the port unions. For instance, the Auckland and 
Wellington Unions would not allow the inspector to check the level of spelling. 
When he boarded a vessel the watersiders would stop work, leave the vessel and 
stand on the wharf where they could not be properly checked off against the labour 
list. 12 The fact that this system of inspection subsequently folded, in the face of 
vehement resistance at the workplace level, rather than as before because 
individual employers gave way on it, suggests that by this time spelling could be 
as much forced upon employers even if they did not implicitly condone it as part 
of the wage-effort bargain. 
Furthermore, the Waterside Workers Federation and the local port UnIons 
successfully opposed the appointment of port inspectors (under the provisions of 
the Waterfront Industry Act 1976), undoubtedly because they would have 
uncovered (and disrupted) the extent of spelling (see Chapter 11). These 
represented failed attempts by the employers organization, one of which used the 
law, to eliminate practices which were condoned by individual employers as part 
of the indulgency pattern. 
Although the Federation did not officially sanction spelling (because of its 
potential to undetmine gang strengths), in the 1970s it is apparent that the port 
unions, at least, came to informally tolerate it (as the preceding examples of the 
Auckland and Wellington Unions demonstrate) as a way of utilizing 'excess' 
labour - which were a product of gang strengths that the Federation itself had 
negotiated. And when the Federation Executive proposed an alternate way of 
I2 Minutes of PEA Management Committee Meeting 544, 12/7/72. Port Employers Association 
Records, 89-395, Box 205 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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utilizing excess labour, through a reduced working day and the introduction of a 
two shift system on the conventional waterfront, it was vehemently resisted by the 
rank and file. It will be recalled from the discussion in the last chapter that 
watersiders simply were not prepared to reduce spelling in order to achieve a 
decrease in the length of the working day (and a two-shift system) on the 
conventional waterfront. The rank and file refused to trade off job control against 
the prospect of greater long-term job security. Here it is worth repeating a 
statement by an Auckland Union representative at the WWF Conference in 1982: 
"The current situation is that there is spelling, and a shorter working day because 
of this. It is a luxury and the membership do not want to give it away.,,13 At the 
same conference R. Powley of Bluff said that: 
members were fooling themselves if they thought they could stop 
spelling, as the reality of the situation is that spelling has become 
part of the everyday operation of each port. 14 
This comment is telling: it indicates that spelling was a common practice, both on 
break-bulk and on container jobs. 
Rather than there being two distinct or discreet patterns of work relations, which 
equated with the two different types of work, the lines were blurred. The 
expectations and practices on break-bulk jobs substantially encroached upon 
container work, as indicated by the fact that spelling was pervasive on both types 
of work. That spelling was a reflection of the workplace power of watersiders, 
forged against the backdrop of their security of tenure within the labour market, is 
indicated by the fact that the Federation itself was unable to limit spelling - even 
against the prospect of greater long-term job security. As I demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, spelling was taken to the point where, at least according to the 
13 Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Conference, 18/10/82. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 1417 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
14 Ibid. 
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Federation's officials, eventually it undermined the capacity of the Federation to 
protect gang strengths. 
(8) Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a picture not of a group of workers who were 
deskilled by containerization, whose work was degraded, and who were subjected 
to pervasive management control of work, but rather of a highly paid group of 
workers, many of whom acquired new sets of skills, who continued to exercise 
considerable control over how work was carried out. The degree of influence 
which the unions exerted within the labour market had its concomitant in 
watersiders' levels of control on the job. Although the potential for increased 
employer control of work inheres within container technology, rather than 
realizing this potential employers continued to exercise 'management through the 
wages system' in an attempt to 'purchase' productivity, and there were 
continuities in the indulgency pattern between break-bulk and container jobs. 
This pattern, however, obtained only until the mid-1980s. Because a good deal of 
watersiders' workplace power was intertwined with the pattern of power relations 
within the labour market, it was critically affected by state-sponsored attempts to 
disrupt the institutional framework through which the labour market was 
organized. Significantly, the end of the waterfront's 'specialist framework' for 
industrial relations, effected through the Labour Relations Act 1987, particularly 
sapped watersiders strength on the job (in large part, by decreasing gang 
strengths). I will deal with this aspect of labour market deregulation, along with 
moves to deregulate the waterfront industry as a whole, in the next chapter. Then, 
in Chapter 14, inter alia I will tease out the effects of these moves to deregulate on 
the pattern of work relations. 
SECTION FIVE 
THE POST-REFORM PERIOD 
CHAPTER 13 : THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 1987 
We don't need the employers to do it to us any more; the 
Government does it for them through the Labour Relations Act. 
Auckland Waterside Worker. l 
The final demise of the Waterfront Commission witnessed. . . [a J 
once in a lifetime opportunity to restructure the waterfront 
industry. 
Les Dickson (NZSEA Chairman)? 
(1) Introduction 
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In this chapter I will examine the effects of the Labour Relations Act 1987 upon 
industrial relations in the waterfront industry. Most assessments of the Act's 
impact in the private sector deal primarily with groups which had previously been 
within the ambit of the conventional arbitration system (see Wood 1988; 
Harbridge and Walsh 1989; Harbridge and McCaw 1989; Harbridge and McCaw 
1990). This chapter, however, provides the opportunity to examine in detail the 
effects of the Labour Relations Act upon one of the few occupational groups in the 
private sector which, historically, sat outside the mainstream of the Arbitration 
system? Insofar as the effects of the Act upon watersiders and waterfront 
employers were intertwined with further moves by the Labour Government to 
deregulate the waterfront industry, I will also discuss the most important aspects 
of port reform. 
In identifying elements of continuity and change in the shift from one institutional 
framework to another, I will (as before) deal with bargaining processes and 
I As quoted in Management magazine (November 1990:73). 
2 Comment in a speech to 'Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference', Auckland, 27/6/91. 
3 In view of this study's scope, I will limit this discussion solely to the Act's effects upon 
watersiders and waterfront employers, and their representative organizations. No attempt will be 
made to evaluate its impact on the other main occupational groups on the waterfront (harbour 
workers, foremen-stevedores and tally clerks). 
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outcomes, as well as shifting relationships between the key actors. I will focus 
upon the way in which the relationships between these actors, which involved 
tensions between the national and the local, between centralized and decentralized 
forms of organization, bargaining, and modes of action were reworked in response 
to this legislative intervention. In particular, I will identify shifts in the relative 
balance of the national and the local, of centralization and decentralization within 
these spheres. And I will stress that these changes were not preordained, that it is 
necessary to examine the strategies that the key actors employed within this new 
legal framework to industrial relations. 
(2) The Labour Relations Act 1987 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 registered the first major step in the process of 
deregulating the labour market. Although there is a difference of opinion between 
academic commentators as to whether the Act was the culmination of a process of 
evolutionary change in New Zealand's industrial relations system, which had been 
initiated by the Industrial Relations Act 1973 (Boxall 1990; Hince 1993), or 
whether it marked an abrupt break with earlier attempts to revamp this system 
(Geare 1989), there is no doubt that it did make substantial changes in the legal 
framework which hitherto had governed industrial relations. The background to 
this piece of legislation, which was introduced by the fourth Labour Government 
at the end of its first term in office, has been well documented (see Walsh 1989; 
Boxall 1990), and its provisions have been discussed in detail elsewhere (see 
Grills 1987; Geare 1989; Deeks and Boxall 1989). Consequently, I will provide 
only a brief summary of the features of the Act which substantially impacted on 
waterfront industrial relations. 
First and foremost, the Act brought together all industries in the private sector 
under the same regulatory framework. Insofar as it abolished specialist 
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institutions such as the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, undoubtedly the Act was 
drafted with industries like the waterfront in mind. Indeed the Government's 1985 
industrial relations 'Green Paper', which was the precursor to the Act, had 
questioned the necessity of bodies such as the Tribunal. In some quarters within 
the Labour Government there was a feeling that specialist tribunals allowed wages 
and conditions to get out of step with those in other industries.4 In place of the 
Arbitration Court, and specialist institutions like the Waterfront Industry Tribunal, 
the Act established an Arbitration Commission and a Labour Court. The former 
dealt with disputes of interest voluntarily referred by the employer(s) and union(s) 
involved, whereas the latter dealt with disputes of rights, personal grIevances, 
demarcation disputes and points oflaw (Geare 1989:216). 
However, largely because of the contradictory pressures on the Labour 
Government at the time (see Walsh 1989), the Act did not completely reformthe 
industrial relations system. Most significantly, it did not eliminate the legal 
supports of unions, which were based on union registration. Instead, as Boxall 
notes, the Act "tried to facilitate bargaining reform without fundamentally 
overturning the arbitral framework of union rights - exclusive jurisdiction (i.e. the 
sole right of a registered union to negotiate for the members covered by its rules), 
blanket coverage (i.e. the right to extend the net of an award to include 
'subsequent parties') and compulsory membership" (1990:526). Although there 
were some modifications to this framework, the rights conferred upon registered 
trade unions remained fundamentally intact. 5 
4 This sentiment was expressed by the Richard Prebble (the Minister of Transport) in his speech to 
the WWF Conference in 1986. It will be recalled that the Govermnent had previously attempted a 
policy of 'containment' with respect to preventing watersiders' wages and conditions from moving 
beyond the wharf gates. 
5 Although the Act did not make union membership compulsory, registered unions were able to 
"negotiate union preference provisions requiring all employees to join the union within 14 days of 
being requested to do so by the union. Failing agreement to negotiate a preference provision, the 
issue is ... determined by a ballot of all employees in the industry carried out by the Registrar of 
Unions" (Grills 1987:32). Similarly, although provisions in the Act enabled a union to 'contest' 
the coverage another union had of its members (which in effect meant that unions could compete 
for members), there were clear limits imposed on this process. As Deeks and Boxall (1989:52-3) 
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The Act did, however, make substantial changes to both the bargaining options 
and procedures open to unions and to employers. Whereas the Industrial Relations 
Act (1973) allowed voluntary collective agreements to be registered, thereby 
giving second tier bargaining legal recognition, the Labour Relations Act 1987 
stipulated that workers could only be covered by one document. The Act clearly 
distinguished between an 'award' (essentially a document settled through 
conciliation and arbitration which had blanket coverage of all employers within an 
industry) and an 'agreement' (a document negotiated directly between a union and 
a single employer which applied only to the signatories) (Geare 1989:218). And, 
as Deeks and Boxall state, the Act 
retains the system of registered trade unions with rights of access to 
conciliation and other disputes procedures but aims to encourage 
unions and employers to make wage deals that are more appropriate 
to industry and enterprise circumstances. It stipulates that workers 
can be covered by an award or an agreement but not by both, thus 
effectively eliminating the practice of 'second tier' bargaining 
(1989:42). 
The Act sought to shift the level at which agreements were made, from the 
occupation to level of the industry and the enterprise (Boxall1990:524).6 Clearly 
it was intended to facilitate decentralized bargaining, but 
note, this type of competition for members between registered unions had to be done through a 
process which was both "rigorously democratic ... and time consuming." Equally, there were 
limits imposed on the ability of groups of workers to register new unions (and hence the possibility 
of 'dual unionism'): "A group can apply for registration as a new and separate union even if some 
or all of the workers are already members of a registered union ... [but] registration will only be 
granted if the workers are not bound by an award or agreement" (Geare 1989:224). 
6 In a sense, the amalgamation of unions which was expected to occur was intertwined with the 
projected effects of voluntary arbitration. Walsh writes "Labour expected that voluntary arbitration 
would be the spur to important efficiency gains. It would lead to the collapse of the large 
occupational awards and threaten the viability of the arbitrationist unions. They would be replaced 
by more appropriate bargaining structures - industry awards or, in larger companies, enterprise 
agreements - with conditions of employment tailored to the specific needs of the bargaining 
parties" (1993:185). 
it did not open the barn door to uncontrolled decentralization of 
bargaining. It granted unions the sole right to elect enterprise 
bargaining, but with a vital catch - they could not elect to have both 
an award and a registered enterprise agreement with respect to the 
same group of workers . . . . Where an award existed, the Act 
enabled employers to seek exemption from it if a second-tier 
bargain was negotiated . . . . If the Labour COUli granted such an 
exemption, the union lost the unilateral right of return to the parent 
award (Boxall 1990:530-1).7 
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The moves towards decentralization were also counterbalanced by the stipulation 
that registered unions were required to have at least 1000 members. As Walsh 
notes, "This was designed to rationalize union structures and also to forestall the 
development of enterprise unionism" (1993:185-6). 
The Act continued the provision of voluntary arbitration for disputes of interest, 
which had been introduced in 1984. Furthermore, it re-established the union right 
to strike (which historically had been traded off against compulsory arbitration) in 
the case of interest disputes.8 This marked a shift from "a conciliation / 
arbitration system banning strikes to a system accommodating both voluntary and 
conciliated settlements tolerating the use of direct action as a bargaining ploy" 
(Deeks and Boxall 1989:42). I turn now to examine the effects of this new 
industrial relations framework upon the waterfront. 
7 There was one exception to this rule: composite agreements. This was a particular type of 
enterprise agreement which was designed to incorporate a number of unions at a single site."These 
are defmed as voluntary settlements 'between one or more employers in any undertaking or group 
of undertakings and two or more unions or associating representing workers within the undertaking 
or group of undertakings'. The workers in question could not also be covered by any other award 
or agreement. An important difference, however, between composite agreements and other types 
of agreement is that "parties can subsequently withdraw from a composite agreement and return to 
the award without employer agreement" (Deeks and BoxallI989:93). 
8 As Boxall (1990:526) notes, the Act was informed by the view that "strikes in relation to the 
pursuit of new interests are quite appropriate but are a sign of poor industrial relations in relation to 
arguments concerning the interpretation or application of existing rights and individual 
grievances." Under its provisions, "Strikes and lockouts are legal in respect to interest disputes 
provided they are carried out during a period within 60 days of the expiry of the award, or during a 
period after the award has expired" (Grills 1987:30). 
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(3) Negotiations Within the New Legal Framework 
The most immediate change on the waterfront which resulted from the Act was 
that the institutional framework was fundamentally altered. In order to bring the 
industry under the Act, the Waterfront Industry Commission Amendment Act 
1987 was passed. This Act removed all references to the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal, but retained the functions and powers of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission. The Act also transferred the setting of register strengths from the 
Commission back to the employers and unions at the port level. The Waterfront 
Industry Tribunal was then abolished in October 1987, and the industry became 
subject to the Labour Court and Arbitration Commission. Although they were not 
specifically legislated for, Port Conciliation Committees continued to exist by 
agreement between the employers and the Federation under GPO 539, and these 
functioned at most ports until September 1989. 
From the point of view of the Federation, the first and most significant change 
which resulted was the need to form a national union. Although this was 
extensively discussed at the 1986 conference, and a ballot of members ordered, it 
did not occur until late in 1988. Indeed, in the interim period the Auckland Union 
investigated the possibility of forming a separate union under the Act (insofar as it 
had more than 1000 members). It is important to recall that just four years earlier 
(in 1984), a remit at the national conference to investigate forming a national 
union had failed. Furthermore, from 1984 until 1986, the Auckland Union had 
taken legal action against the Federation over the issue of how the superannuation 
fund was being managed. There is little doubt, given continuing splits within the 
Federation, that a national union would not have been formed if the Act had not 
required it. 
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Although the Labour Relations Act did not legally require such a drastic change in 
the structure of the employers' organization, the fact that in June 1987 the Harbour 
Boards Employers' Union left NZAWE provided the opportunity for the 
employers to restructure under the terms of the new Act. As I demonstrated in 
Chapter 9, since NZAWE was first formed its relationship with the harbour 
boards' employers' organization had been strained. Although the HBEU had 
'liaised' with NZAWE, and had been represented at negotiations for General 
Principal Orders, it had retained control of its own industrial affairs. When the 
HBEU left, NZA WE reorganized around its four main 'interest groups': the 
WEU/PEA (which represented shipping companies and shipping agents), the New 
Zealand Stevedoring Employers' Association (which represented stevedoring 
companies), the Container Terminal Operators Association, and the Association of 
Bulk and Homogenous Shippers (which represented shippers).9 NZA WE then 
was registered as an employers' organization under the Act. As a result of this 
reorganization, the HBEU was not involved in the first round of negotiations 
involving NZAWE and the WWU under the Act in 1988. It to these negotiations 
that I now tum. 
Although the Act did not remove the unions' legal sources of strength (union 
registration and the benefits it conferred, that is), the way that it altered the 
bargaining options of unions hit the Federation particularly hard. At the 
Federation's 1988 Conference, General Secretary Jennings stated that: 
The Labour Relations Act . . . is basically an instrument that 
favours employers, especially as the economic climate is 
increasingly harsh. The bargaining positions that are available to 
us . . . are much constrained, they will encourage disunity amongst 
9 Formally, the reconstituted NZA WE Council comprised three representatives from the 
WEU/PEA, and two representatives from each of the other constituent organizations. 
workers and encourage port specific agreements that will be to the 
advantage of the employer. 10 
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By preventing a union from being party to more than one document, it eliminated 
the way in which the port unions had effectively operated since the mid-1970s. 
The effect of removing second-tier bargaining was magnified on the waterfront as 
this had been central to union strategy and approach. As Harbridge and Walsh 
(1989:65-6) point out: "The effective outlawing of second tier bargaining had a 
major impact on those unions that had used it as a mechanism of negotiating a 
national blanket coverage, minimum rates award and supplementing those rates 
with increases negotiated on an employer by employer basis." 
Rather than seeking to decentralize bargaining (which was difficult to achieve 
without the Union's consent), NZAWE initially sought to use the provisions of the 
Labour Relations Act to centralize bargaining (which was easily achievable). At a 
NZA WE council meeting late in 1987, it had been resolved that one of its medium 
term objectives was to use the Labour Relations Act to achieve "a single 
agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment of waterside 
workers."!! Subsequently, in the 1988 round of negotiations, NZAWE sought to 
establish one 'general award' which incorporated all local and special agreements 
(with the exception of the Container Terminals agreement).!2 This award was to 
contain 'port schedules' (to take the place of Supplementary Principal Orders), and 
appended to it would be all existing special agreements which NZA WE sought to 
broadly standardize. In a sense, NZAWE was 'handed on a plate' what it had been 
\0 Minutes of Waterside Workers' Federation Conference, 17/10/88. New Zealand Waterfront 
Workers Union Records, 92-305, Box 14110 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
11 Minutes of NZA WE Council Meeting 53, 14/10/87. Port Employers Association Records, 90-
220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
12NZA WE and the WWU agreed that the Container Terminals agreement should be negotiated 
separately. This posed a problem because, by defmition, the same group of workers could not be 
covered by two agreements, but because of the rotation of watersiders through the terminal they 
effectively would be. However, the Arbitration Commission made a special provision for this 
agreement to stand alone from the 'general award' which was to be negotiated. 
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unable to achieve in the 1986-87 bargaining round (and several rounds prior to 
this) - the ready subsumption of all 'satellite' agreements into the national 
agreement. And it eliminated any further special agreements negotiated by 
individual employers, unless they could get the Union to consent to enterprise 
bargaining (which was highly unlikely). 
With its bargaining options limited, the Waterfront Workers' Union agreed to 
negotiate a 'general' national award which would subsume all existing local 
agreements. The Union's defence of the national agreement, to the exclusion of 
enterprise agreements, accords with the approach of most other unions at the time 
(see Walsh 1993). But, as we will see, before the national award could be agreed 
to, the field of play altered substantially, which led to a change in strategy by the 
employers. 
GPO 539 expired at the end of April 1988, and negotiations through the 
Conciliation Council began that month for a new national agreement. The main 
provisions NZAWE sought in negotiations over the 'General Award' were broadly 
similar to those sought in its previous attempts to 'restructure' the GPO: further 
manning reductions, a flat hourly rate bonus, standardized special cargo rates, 
revised skill rates, changes in the hours of work, and the introduction of seasonal 
(subsidiary) registers at three fruit-loading ports (Tauranga, Napier and Nelson). 13 
Negotiations proceeded for two months, much as they had done in previous years 
under the previous industrial relations framework. As NZA WE reported, "Little 
progress was achieved with the WWU refusing to accede to the employers' claims 
for flexibility of integrated hours, a flat rate bonus and manning reductions despite 
the employers' offer of a 10 percent increase on wages and rates for an 18 month 
term.,,14 (Claims for seasonal registers were held over until port schedules were 
13 NZAWE Newsletter 133, 8/4/88. 
14NZA WE Newsletter 145, 1/7/88. 
572 
to be negotiated.) The employers then offered a further 'wage package' which was 
rejected by all ports. During these negotiations the WWU used the strike 
provisions in the Labour Relations Act extensively. When award talks broke 
down, in September 1988, a 24 hour strike occurred at the ports of Auckland, 
Tauranga and Wellington. 15 
At the same time as the negotiations for the General Award were proceeding in 
1988, and industrial action was occurring, the WWU was fighting a pitched battle 
on another front. In the volatile climate created by port reform, where institutional 
fields were being reconstituted and boundaries renegotiated, paradoxically 
NZA WE became an ally in this dispute. The background to the dispute is as 
follows. The Port Companies Act, which was passed in April 1988, required 
harbour boards to establish 'port companies' and removed the boards' statutory 
monopoly on the provision of cargo-handling equipment on the wharf (which had 
been established under the Waterfront Industry Act 1976). This allowed registered 
stevedoring companies to supply their own cargo-handling equipment on the 
wharf. Whereas the 1976 Act granted harbour workers the right to drive 
equipment supplied by harbour boards (thereby forestalling demarcation disputes 
with waterside workers), the Port Companies Act 1988 deliberately left open the 
issue of which union's members had the right to operate this equipment. In the 
drafting of the legislation, the Minister of Transport Bill Jeffries had directed that 
the new Act, in his words, should "not perpetuate artificial demarcation of labour" 
on the waterfront (Jeffries 1992:162). The Waterfront Industry Act was also 
amended such that it did not specify which union should have coverage of this 
work. In effect, this signalled a 'hands off approach by the Labour Government; 
the matter was left to be settled by the two unions and their employers. 
15 NZA WE Newsletter 153,2/9/88. 
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It appears that there was some hope within the Government that this situation may 
have forced the two unions to amalgamate, thereby rationalizing waterfront 
unionism along the lines of the industry (rather than being split between two 
occupations), which was in keeping with the thrust of the Labour Relations Act. 16 
But the historic tensions between the two unions (which had long prevented 
amalgamation), together with the fact there had always been disputes between 
them over securing the boundaries of work coverage (see Chapter 7), resulted in 
what perhaps was the most significant demarcation dispute since containerization. 
The WWU took the view that watersiders had the right to drive on the wharf 
mechanical equipment supplied by stevedoring companies (insofar as they had 
always performed the work of stevedoring companies on the waterfront). The 
Harbour Workers Union, however, maintained that its members should have work 
coverage and sought (unsuccessfully) an amendment to the legislation in order to 
regain it. This union did, however, gain an amendment to its membership rules 
which it attempted to use to the same effect. However, as a NZA WE 
representative noted, "Despite the Harbour Workers' Union amended membership 
rule, stevedoring employers are intending to make use of the new provision and 
have their employees, waterside workers, driving their own equipment.,,17 
Numerous disputes arose around the country in October 1988 as harbour workers 
picketed stevedoring companies that were seeking to take advantage of the new 
legislation. 18 
Despite the tensions which it was experiencing with the WWU in the industrial 
sphere, NZA WE supported the watersiders (largely because it had long wanted the 
16 In a reply to an editorial in "The Dominion", Bill Jeffries stated at the time that: "The most 
obvious solution is for the Waterside Workers Union and the Harbour Workers Union to 
amalgamate. This was a major recommendation of a ports industry reform committee which I 
chaired." (The Dominion, 9/8/88.) 
17 NZAWE Newsletter 157, 30/9/88. 
18 The legislative provisions which allowed registered employers to provide their own cargo-
handling equipment on the wharves came into effect on 1 October 1988. Disputes initiated by 
harbour workers subsequently occurred at Auckland, Onehunga, Napier, Wellington and Lyttelton. 
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harbour boards' monopoly on cargo-handling equipment ended). In response to an 
editorial which suggested that harbour workers should be given work coverage, 
NZAWE's Chief Executive (David Young) wrote: "It is outrageous to suggest that 
stevedores should not be able to use their own labour to drive their own plant.,,19 
And, significantly, despite industrial action by watersiders over award 
negotiations, NZA WE agreed that a clause which guaranteed watersiders national 
coverage of this work would be inserted into the General Award when it was 
finally settled. Furthermore, NZAWE supported the WWU's application to the 
Labour Court in October for a judicial review of the Harbour Workers Union's 
amended union rule.2o The fact that this decision was subsequently lost was 
inconsequential. This is because the Labour Court heard the demarcation issue in 
November, and it issued a decision in December that waterside workers had 
primary coverage of cargo-handling equipment brought onto the wharves by 
. d 21 pnvate steve ores. 
Despite NZA WE and the WWU cooperating over securing work coverage for 
watersiders, negotiations for the General Award reached an impasse in November 
1988. The Union's executive recommended direct action and a series of stoppages 
occurred at ports around the country, including 48 hours strike action at 
Wellington, Whangarei and Gisbome, Nelson, and a three day stoppage at New 
Plymouth in November.22 NZAWE considered invoking the lockout provisions in 
the Labour Relations Act if further industrial action was to occur, but the Union 
19 The Dominion, 9/8/88. 
20 NZAWE Newsletter 160,21110/88. 
21 This decision did not, however, finally settle the matter. Although it was very clear that 
watersiders had coverage of cargo-handling equipment supplied by stevedoring companies, it did 
was not so clear in relation to equipment hired from port companies by stevedoring companies. A 
demarcation dispute between watersiders and harbour workers subsequently arose on this issue in 
September 1989. In this case, however, the Minister of Transport did become involved and held 
talks between the unions and the employers in question. As a result of these discussions an 
agreement was reached that harbour workers had coverage of work involving port company 
equipment. 
22NZA WE Newsletter 165,25/11/88. 
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agreed to return to conciliation in late December. 23 While it appears that some 
progress was being made towards settling the General Award, these negotiations 
were overtaken by further moves by the Labour Government to 'reform' the ports. 
The Government had announced in June 1988 that the role of the Waterfront 
Industry Commission was to be reviewed?4 But, unlike the legislative changes 
that resulted in the formation of port companies, which involved a lengthy period 
of consultation over three years, the decision to abolish the Commission was made 
and implemented in a matter of months. Part of the reason for this haste was 
undoubtedly that the Government was being pressured to abolish the Commission 
by powerful business interest groups such as the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable and Federated Farmers?5 After just four months, the Government 
signalled to the employers its intention to abolish the Waterfront Industry Act in 
October 1988?6 NZAWE fully supported this move: it will be recalled that a~ far 
back as the Waterfront Conference in the late 1960s, the employers had been 
seeking the abolition of the Commission, a sentiment which was evident in the 
attitude of employers' representatives on the Ports Industry Review Committee in 
1986. The Waterfront Industry Reform Bill which formally registered the 
Government's intention to abolish the Commission, on September 30 1989, was 
introduced into Parliament in December 1988. 
23NZAWE sent the following message to its members (on 6/12/88): "The Consultative Committee 
has recommended that strike action in any form, i.e. go-slows, complete stoppages etc., should be 
counter-acted by employers invoking the lock-out provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987." 
24 It is unclear what form this review took, and exactly by whom it was undertaken. In an article on 
port reform, Bill Jeffries (the Minister of Transport at the time) merely remarked that: "This review 
involved officials from the Department of Labour and Ministry of Transport" (Jeffries 1992: 162). 
25 The undue influence that these groups exerted upon the Fourth Labour Government has been 
well-documented (see Jesson 1989). They also produced a series of reports, for the purposes of 
pressure-group politics, which specifically addressed the waterfront and argued that the industry 
needed to be deregulated. The most important of these were as follows: The New Zealand Ports 
Industry (New Zealand Business Roundtable 1986), Corporatisation of Harbour Boards (New 
Zealand Business Roundtable 1987), and a publication jointly produced by the Business 
Roundtable and Federated Farmers in September 1989 entitled Ports and Shipping Reform in New 
Zealand: Current Developments and Future Requirements. 
26 Minutes of NZA WE Council Meeting 64, 14/1 0/88. Port Employers Association Records, 90-
220, Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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Although the WWU was strongly opposed to abolishing the Commission, this 
move by the Government (at least initially) did not trigger widespread industrial 
action. Rather the Union's executive put considerable effort into attempting to 
shape the outcome of the likely reforms. In particular, the union officials sought 
to ensure that some type of pool labour system was retained. Along with the 
waterfront employers and other employers groups, the Union made submissions 
on the Bill to the Select Committee during February 1989. However the resulting 
Act, which was passed in March, did not specify what the employment 
arrangements were to be after the Commission was abolished. Instead, this was 
left to 'the group of registered employers' at each port. As we shall see, it was 
only when it became apparent that a collectivized system of labour administration 
was not going to be achieved, and that the employers were seeking to decentralize 
bargaining on their own terms, that large-scale industrial action occurred. 
Following the introduction of the Waterfront Industry Reform Bill, award talks 
were adjourned. When they resumed in January 1989 the employers drastically 
altered their bargaining position. They took the attitude that, in view of the 
impending abolition of the Commission, their claims were no longer appropriate. 
In February NZAWE withdrew its claims and agreed to an interim wage increase 
of 6% on all except bonus rates.27 But, in return, NZAWE secured the WWU's 
agreement that it would not seek from the Arbitration Commission an extension of 
GPO 539 and the Container Terminal agreement beyond September 30 1989 (the 
date when the Waterfront Industry Commission was to be disbanded).28 
Furthermore, it was agreed that negotiations were to occur in the intervening 
period over terms and conditions appropriate to the new system of employment. 
27 NZA WE Newsletter 6/89, 24/2/89. 
28 The parties subsequently applied to the Arbitration Commission for, and were granted, an 
extension of the existing agreements until that date. 
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There was no clear indication as to what form employment would take after the 
Commission was abolished. During the first half of 1989 so-called 'Establishment 
Units' (comprising representatives of port companies and local stevedoring 
employers) were set up at each port to determine the employment structure best 
suited to the port. Broadly speaking, two types of arrangements were considered: 
either a pool of labour administered by the employers collectively through a jointly 
owned 'employment company' at each port, or direct employment by stevedoring 
companies and port companies themselves. At a meeting of stevedoring 
employers and Establishment Unit Chairmen in March 1989, indications were that 
a labour pool arrangement would be opted for by employers at most ports, apart 
from the container terminals and larger stevedoring companies at Auckland and 
Wellington. 29 
For the Union the possible shift to direct employment raised the issue of further 
redundancies, and the re-introduction of casual labour by employers in order to 
cope with fluctuations in the demand for labour. Consequently the Union sought 
to press the employers to retain some type of pooled labour administration system. 
It was even proposed at Auckland, where the Union branch had increased its 
shareholding in the Auckland Stevedoring Company to 50%, to set up a union-
operated labour hiring company. As Branch President Jimmy Hewitt stated at the 
time: "If we have to form our own pool company to make awards with watersiders 
we Will.,,30 By the time negotiations began in June 1989, it was beginning to 
appear that direct employment by stevedoring and port companies would occur at 
most, if not all, ports. And, even at Auckland, the Union did not actually have the 
resources to establish its own labour hiring company. Thus the negotiations in 
question took place in a period of considerable uncertainty for the Union and its 
member at all ports. 
29NZA WE Newsletter 8/89, 10/3/89. This newsletter stated that: "For most ports, it is likely that 
labour would be employed through labour pools." 
30 As quoted in the National Business Review, 3117/89. 
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As well as proposals for the new system of employment, during the first half of 
1989 discussions took place within NZA WE on the level at which bargaining 
should proceed. NZAWE's position was that terms and conditions of employment 
should be negotiated solely on a port-by-port basis, that there should be port 
awards rather than a national award. At a NZA WE Council meeting in March 
1989 it was resolved that local port awards were "the preferred option but should 
these be unobtainable with the Union then a national skeleton award with 
comprehensive port schedules should be considered.,,3l A companies' publication 
succinctly summarized this approach: 
The employer viewpoint is to see each port as a separate entity, 
competing against others. Each should make its award 
arrangements based on its own efficiency and profitability, they 
argue. They also want to see the threat of national stoppages 
removed, and feel port-by-port awards are the way to go (N.Z. 
Shipping Directory 1991 :5). 
With the immediate prospect of the Waterfront Industry Commission being 
abolished, and with it a crucial source of union strength, the employers seized their 
opportunity to attack the water siders , national organization (with a view to 
reducing the sources of its bargaining power, such as national strike threats) by 
attacking the national agreement. This represented a classic attempt, to use Katz's 
words, "to decentralize the structure of bargaining with the expectation that this 
change would produce bargaining outcomes more favourable to management" 
(1993:13). This attempt to change the level of bargaining both reflected a shift in 
the relative bargaining power of the key actors (as a result of port reform) in 
31 Minutes ofNZA WE Council Meeting 68, 16/3/89. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, 
Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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favour of the employers, and an attempt by employers to TIlliher increase that 
power by separating out each port thereby fragmenting the Union.32 
External pressure was also placed on NZA WE to achieve port-level awards in this 
round of negotiations. As I noted above, the push for port reform (particularly the 
abolition of the Commission) had been sustained by large corporate interest 
groups. These groups exerted considerable pressure not only on the Labour 
Government, but also upon NZAWE directly. For instance, the Employers' 
Federation (to which NZAWE was affiliated) sought the right to make proposals 
for employment structures to replace the Commission. NZA WE opposed this 
attempted 'intervention,?3 Nonetheless, in August 1989 a combination of 
business groups had placed large newspaper advertisements which proclaimed 
'The New Zealand Business Community Says: The Time for Port Reform Is 
Now". The advertisements listed five aspects of reform: abolition of the 
Commission, use of casual labour, manning reductions, methods of work as the 
prerogative of employers, and most significantly for the discussion at hand, that 
"pay rates, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment 
should be decided at port level.,,34 
This pressure was also the result of an institutional 'realignment' of corporate 
actors, occasioned by the shift to direct employment, which repositioned port 
users. Although NZAWE was not replaced as the employers' organization until 
after this round of negotiations, there were shifts in approach which preceded this 
formal reorganization. In the New Zealand Stevedoring Employers' Association's 
32 Katz (1993:13) writes that bargaining structure can be regarded "both as a reflection of the 
parties' relative power and a determinant of power." 
33 Minutes ofNZA WE Council Meeting 61, 31/1/89. Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, 
Box 62 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
34 Christchurch Press, 16/8/89. The following groups sponsored the advertisement: Federated 
Farmers, the Employers' Federation, the Manufacturers Federation, the Retail and Wholesale 
Merchants Association, and the Tourist Industry Federation. 
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1989 Annual Report, the President (Ian Farquhar) wrote of a significant 
development at a conference of waterfront employers held in April that year: 
For the first time ever, there was a clear indication that shippers 
and shipping companies were not seeking to be directly involved in 
A ward negotiations or labour management and that this role should 
be handled by the direct employers of labour - stevedores, terminal 
operators, and to a lesser extent port companies.35 
However shippers were indirectly involved in shaping negotiations. Trebeck and 
Barnard (1990: 196) point out that the 1989 negotiations were characterized by a 
marked shift in the balance of forces: 
Those handling the negotiations with the umons were 
representatives of the future employers - stevedores, port 
companies and container terminal operators. However, in the lead-
up to the negotiations there was a major shift in responsibility, 
away from the shipowners, who had traditionally called the shots, 
towards the shippers. The catalyst for this power shift came from 
shipper groups and reflected their realization that, while ship-
owners may have paid the bills for stevedoring services, shippers 
ultimately bore the cost, via the freight rate. As a consequence, the 
employer negotiators reported regularly to shipper groups on the 
progress of the negotiations. 
This is a somewhat simplistic account: it is not entirely COlTect to state that 
shipowners always led negotiations, because (as I have demonstrated) after 
containerization large stevedoring companies and container terminal operators 
also played a significant role. However the general thrust of their statement is 
cOlTect. Previously, stevedoring companies, container terminal operators and 
shipping companies dominated NZA WE, which accommodated only minority 
representation by shippers. Rather than seeking direct involvement in negotiations 
after deregulation, the shippers exerted new found market power. They ceased to 
have any involvement in bargaining; but they exerted pressure upon stevedoring 
35 Port Employers Association Records, 90-220, Box 57 (Alexander Turnbull Library, NLNZ). 
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companies directly through the market (which forced employers to act in certain 
ways in bargaining). This was part of an institutional realignment whereby 
shippers, in an increasingly competitive market, ceased to be price takers. 
The deregulation of the industry, in concert with the Labour Relations Act, 
provided shippers with more options in terms of influencing stevedoring 
companies. Previously, because the national agreement set minimum wages and 
conditions, wages could only be brought into competition upwards. It will be 
recalled that shippers, faced with these constraints, put pressure on stevedoring 
companies to make special agreements conceding better wages and conditions 
(which NZAWE regarded as undermining the employers' collective interests). In 
the new environment, however, shippers sought to bring pressure to bear on 
stevedoring companies to reduce labour costs (by reducing manning, for example), 
and to compete on labour rates, by attacking the national award. 
However, the Waterfront Workers Union trenchantly attempted to defend the 
national award. This stance, in effect, resulted in an almost complete reversal of 
the positions adopted by the Union and NZA WE just two years before. 
Previously, the Union used local bargaining (albeit underpinned by a national 
agreement which established minimum wages and conditions) to fragment the 
employers, and NZA WE attempted to limit this type of bargaining by 
strengthening the national agreement. However the employers now sought to 
secure local bargaining by smashing the national agreement, which the Union 
attempted to defend. 
There is no doubt that the WWU was well-placed to engage in local bargaining, 
because its branches were well-organized and, as I demonstrated previous 
chapters, always had negotiated agreements at the port level. Indeed there was a 
strong sense in which national bargaining had always been driven 'from below' by 
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the port unions. But it was precisely the local autonomy of the port unions which 
had rendered local bargaining a potential threat to the national organization. This 
threat had been amply demonstrated by the intercinine dispute over GPO 305 
almost twenty years earlier, in 1970 (see Chapter 5). 
The lengths that the Union went to in defending the national agreement indicate 
just how important it was to the organization. It served not only to underpin 
agreements negotiated at the port level, by establishing national minimum wages 
and conditions, but also served to ensure national unity. (Recall the comment by 
President Wasley during the disagreement within the Federation over GPO 305 in 
1970: "The question of retaining national unity depends on observance of national 
agreements"). Although the hitherto loosely-knit national Federation had been 
transformed into a national union, and hence had greater control over its branches, 
this transformation would not have occurred if the Labour Relations Act had not 
required it. There were continuing divisions within the Union which exacerbated 
the danger of its local branches being split off from the national organization 
during the course of local negotiations. 
The Union was confronted not only with the move to eliminate the national 
agreement and decentralize bargaining to the port level under the Labour Relations 
Act, but also with the impending abolition of the Commission and the 
occupational registration system. This latter development undermined one of the 
Union's crucial institutional supports - joint control of the labour supply. There 
was also considerable uncertainty over the form that the new system of 
employment would take, and over how many watersiders would be employed. 
There was the possibility of massive redundancies. It was in this climate of 
uncertainty that negotiations for the new award occurred. 
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When negotiations in the Conciliation Council began in June 1989 they broke 
down almost immediately over the basis on which an agreement was to be 
negotiated. Under the Labour Relations Act unions could specifY the level at 
which negotiations took place, and the Waterfront Workers Union insisted upon 
national rather than local negotiations. However, this was met with considerable 
opposition from the employers, in that NZA WE negotiators flatly refused to 
negotiate a national award on the purported grounds that they had no mandate 
from their members to do so. As a NZA WE newsletter noted: "Employers are 
insisting that all terms and conditions be negotiated on a port by port basis 
whereas the Union are claiming the continuation of a national document 
system. ,,36 The matter was then referred to the Arbitration Commission, which 
met in July and referred the parties back to conciliation. 
NZA WE's representatives then attempted to initiate negotiations at the port level. 
The Port of Tauranga, a major log-exporting port, was targeted to secure a port 
agreement. This move was a result both of a decision by NZA WE and the actions 
of the local employers and port users. Bob Seamer, the Chairman of the New 
Zealand Stevedoring Employer Association, explained that this occurred through 
the "formation of the Port Tauranga Industrial Council, who with the assistance of 
the major forestry companies filed for a port award.,,37 Under the Labour 
Relations Act the Union had to meet with the employers through the Conciliation 
Council if only to refuse to negotiate at this level. At the negotiations, which 
occurred in July 1989, six union representatives were present and 34 employer 
representatives (the NZA WE negotiating team together with representatives of the 
stevedoring companies at Tauranga). One of the Branch Secretaries who had been 
a member of the Union's national negotiating team described these negotiations as 
"a joke". He continued: "Not that it was funny, we just didn't have anything to 
36NZA WE Newsletter 23/89, 30/6/89. 
37 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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talk about" (interview). The employers tabled a document which comprehensively 
set out terms and conditions proposed for the period after the shift to direct 
employment. The Union formally refused to negotiate a port award on the basis of 
their claims for a national award. However, shortly after, the employers also 
lodged claims for port awards at Auckland and Wellington. 
The Union then engaged in a series of one day strikes at the ports of Auckland, 
Lyttelton, Tauranga, and Port Chalmers, together with a series of unauthorized 
stopwork meetings at several other ports, in response to these efforts by the 
employers to secure port awards?8 Further strike action occurred in August 1989 
at eight ports as a protest against the lack of progress in the award negotiations.39 
Generally, this took the form of unauthorized stopwork meetings and one-day 
stoppages intended to put pressure on employers. 
The Container Terminal Operators, through NZA WE, had already agreed to a 
national 'skeletal' document with comprehensive port schedules at the Container 
Terminal Award negotiations which had begun in July 1989.40 For the 
conventional wharves, however, NZA WE continued to push for port awards. 
Early in September it sought to negotiate port awards at Tauranga and Wellington. 
Although the Union's national negotiating team attended these negotiations, they 
refused to enter into discussions. NZA WE's research officer noted that: "The 
Union negotiating party on both occasions was the National Executive of the 
NZWWU which in both instances refused to negotiate the port documents.,,41 In 
response to the employers' continued claims for pOli awards, the Union then 
initiated a 48 hour national strike which occurred in the middle of August. 42 
38 NZAWE Newsletter 27/89,28/7/89. 
39 NZAWE Newsletter 28/29,4/8/89. 
4°NZA WE Newsletter, 26/89, 21/7/89. 
41 NZAWE Newsletter 33/89,8/9/89. 
42 NZA WE Newsletter 30/89, 18/8/89. 
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Further strike action occuned at several ports, and then the Union initiated another 
national stoppage, this time for four days, in the first week of September.43 
Largely as a result of this concerted industrial action (under provisions of the 
Labour Relations Act), and the steadfast refusal of the Union to negotiate port 
awards, the employers conceded that a 'skeletal' national award could be 
negotiated together with 'port codes of employment'. In securing this agreement, 
however, a series of trade-offs were made on each side. The Union agreed to 
accept 'eight points of principle' put forward by the employers before any 
negotiations could begin. These included acceptance of direct employment, the 
re-introduction of casual labour, flexibility in hours of work, reductions in 
manning, compulsory transfer of watersiders between employers and ports, 
flexibility in the use of the workforce, and no restrictions on the introduction of 
new technology. Although these points were agreed to in principle, how they were 
to be implemented in practice at each port (the actual proportion of casuals at each 
port, for instance) was subject to further negotiation. 
The Union's acceptance of these points was premised upon the employers 
accepting that fifteen conditions were to be negotiated nationally. These 
conditions included a national work coverage clause, compulsory umon 
membership, annual holiday and leave provisions, redundancy payments, training 
and safety provisions, and the term of the agreement. Although a 'skeletal' 
national award was eventually settled, what then happened was that the bulk of 
negotiations occuned at the port level and the national clauses were simply 
inserted into each of the port codes that were subsequently agreed to. 
43 NZAWE Newsletter 32/89,1/9/89. 
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By mid-September 1989 Gust prior to the abolition of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission) tentative agreement was reached between the Union and NZA WE 
regarding the details of most of the fifteen national conditions. However 
negotiations stalled on the issue of redundancy. The prospect of large-scale 
redundancies at each port had resulted in the Government introducing the 
Waterfront Industry Restructuring Bill in July 1989. This Act established a 
Waterfront Industry Restructuring Authority to which employers could apply for 
funding to defray the cost of redundancies. Trebeck and Barnard write: 
The government facilitated the restructuring process by arranging 
funds amounting to $NZ30 million (from a levy on the income of 
former harbour board land and a levy on port company shares) to 
help meet redundancy provisions. In the absence of these funds, 
the industrial award negotiations would have been severely 
constrained (1990: 196-7). 
However agreement could not be reached before the Commission was abolished 
on the actual terms and conditions for redundancies. Thus, prior to the 
Commission being abolished, agreement had not been reached on all of the 
national provisions in the award, let alone on port codes. 
When the Commission was abolished on September 30 1989, an unusual situation 
developed in that the majority of watersiders had no employer. There was a 
'window period' of nine days when work stopped at every port because hiring 
arrangements had not been finalized with the employers. The South Island union 
officials who I interviewed went to great lengths to explain that this was, in their 
words, "not a strike"; rather, the watersiders simply did not have an employer. 
Furthermore, there was no award or agreement for them to work under because 
GPO 539 had expired consequent upon the abolition of the Commission. 
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As a stop-gap measure, an 'interim agreement' was reached on October 9 that 
allowed all except the four container terminal ports (which were subject to a 
demarcation dispute) to operate until port codes were settled. The agreement 
established an arrangement whereby watersiders would work for 8 hours a day, 
Monday-to-Friday, for a standard wage of $110 per man for each work period. 
Although the agreement facilitated the introduction of the cross-hiring of 
watersiders between employers, and the introduction of flexible manning scales, it 
did not allow for the use of interport transfers and casual labour (which were to be 
negotiated over at the port level).44 The agreement also provided for a 
redundancy agreement broadly similar to the one in GPO 539 for watersiders who 
were not required by stevedoring companies. Under the terms of this agreement 
1380 watersiders, who comprised approximately 40% of the total workforce, were 
made redundant almost immediately. 
The interim agreement did not, however, apply to the four container terminal ports 
which, owing to a dispute, were closed for the first three weeks in October. 
Negotiations for the container terminals composite agreement had been occurring 
parallel to the general award negotiations, and the dispute related to the terms on 
which the container terminal composite workforce would work. It was essentially 
a demarcation dispute concerning work coverage of ro / ro vessels worked in the 
container terminals. The employers sought to have these previously excluded 
vessels (un)loaded within the terminals. Although both unions agreed to allow 
such vessels into the terminals, the Waterfront Workers Union argued that the 
ship's hold had to be worked by watersiders alone, whereas the Harbour Workers 
Union maintained that it should be worked by the composite workforce.45 
44 NZAWE Newsletter 37/89,13/10/89. 
45 NZA WE Newsletter 38/89, 20/10/89. 
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Like the dispute in 1988, over work coverage with respect to operating mechanical 
equipment on the wharf, this dispute was characterized by the two unions 
trenchantly attempting to defend their respective job territories. At one point, the 
Waterfront Workers Union even sought to register a dispute of interest with the 
Arbitration Commission in order to cancel the provision for composite gangs from 
h . . I 46 t e contamer termma agreement. This seemingly intractable demarcation 
dispute, which closed the four main ports for a full three weeks, was only resolved 
when the container terminal operators agreed to these vessels being given limited 
access to the terminals. Under an interim agreement between each union and the 
container terminal operators, composite gangs of waterside workers and harbour 
workers unloaded the top deck of ro / ro vessels within container terminals, but the 
vessels were then moved to conventional wharves where gangs of watersiders 
alone carried out the hold work (Roth 1993: 197). The matter was referred to a 
working party for six months in order to arrive at a final solution, with the option 
of employers seeking a legal remedy if agreement could not be reached. The 
conventional wharves at these ports were then signed up under the same interim 
agreement as the rest of the ports, in order to allow port codes to be negotiated.47 
At the time of the port level negotiations, the Union faced not only massive 
redundancies but also the workforce being divided between different employers 
within each port. The Union and each of its branches were trying to keep together 
a membership which was in effect being collectively made redundant, and then 
rehired subject to the whims of individual companies. Companies at some ports 
engaged in discriminatory preferential hiring. For example, union officials at 
Lyttelton informed me that two of the port's three companies (New Zealand 
Stevedoring and the Lyttelton Port Company) did not hire any watersiders who 
had been active in the union as job delegates or members of the executive. The 
46 National Business Review, 17110/89. 
47 NZAWE Newsletter 38/89, 20/10/89. 
589 
only company that did hire these watersiders was Pacifica Shipping, and this was 
largely a result of the longstanding association between this company and the 
union as joint partners in the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company (see Chapter 8). 
With the shift to direct employment many companies also attempted, often 
through not so subtle tactics, to drive a wedge between the Union and its 
members. The following comments by Bob Seamer (the General Manager of New 
Zealand Stevedoring) indicate the approach adopted by the largest stevedoring 
company, which employed approximately 40% of all watersiders: 
Just prior to October 1989 we realized we needed to recruit 
watersiders of the highest calibre so we put a communications 
package together and mailed this to all 3600 men on the WIC 
Register .... That package included a corporate profile, a copy of 
Wharftalk and individual profiles of each of our port operations ... 
. We felt it to be important for our new stevedore employees to very 
quickly relate to our company as their employer rather than have 
their only allegiance to the union. 48 
We had to win over the men that we were reasonable people to 
work for and that they didn't have to rely on the union. That was 
the hardest thing to overcome.49 
N.Z. Stevedoring believed we had to very quickly gain worker 
identification and accountability. Thus having employed 600 
waterfront workers, many of whom were highly 'Union' orientated 
and totally unfamiliar to a direct employer-employee relationship, 
we had to set about 'managing' them - instilling a company identity 
or 'corporate culture'. Most importantly we had to change their 
attitude to work and show them the accountability that came with 
working for a commercial company in a new, highly competitive 
environment as opposed to a pool labour system which had been in 
force for over 40 years. 50 
Attempts to foster this 'change in attitude' to work, borne of increased 
competition, did lead to divisions within the workforce at some ports. For 
48 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
49 As quoted in New Zealand International Business Magazine, (February/March, 1992:45). 
50 Speech to Institute for International Research Conference, Auckland, 23/2/92. 
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example, watersiders at Timaru were split between two compames: Turnbull 
Stevedoring and Timaru Stevedoring. A national executive member of the Union 
(who originally was from Timaru) remarked that: "Within 14 days you'd go into 
the smoko room and they were sitting at either end .... And that's competition. 
And the employers were saying, if you don't fucking do this the other company 
will get your job" (interview). 
It was in this unsettled context, associated with the shift to direct employment, that 
port codes were finally settled. Once again, the NZA WE negotiators and the local 
employers targeted the Port of Tauranga, and negotiations for a 'port code' began 
there in the second week of October. These negotiations, as in other ports, 
occurred through a locally convened Conciliation Council where the Waterfront 
Workers Union's national negotiating committee was present. Conciliation 
Councils were then convened at all other ports (except the four container terminal 
ports), and negotiations began for port codes during October. Following the 
settlement of the demarcation dispute at the container terminal ports in mid-
October, via an interim agreement, negotiations also began in early November at 
these for port codes. 
Prior to these negotiations, it will be recalled that the employers' 'eight points of 
principle' had already been accepted by the Union (although these were subject to 
some local variation and interpretation), and the majority of the Union's 15 
conditions had been settled. Indeed, NZAWE's research officer wrote at the time: 
"It is encouraging to note that the main issues of contention relate to money 
matters only whereas the eight points of principle have been fully accepted by the 
Union and in many cases alreadyestablished."sl The Port of Tauranga, however, 
was the exception insofar as the employers trenchantly held out for a five day 
51 NZA WE Newsletter 40/89, 10/11189. 
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working week spread over any seven days (colloquially know as '5 over 7') in 
order to facilitate 24 hour operation, seven days a week. 
The Lyttelton port award was the only agreement which was formally settled 
through the first round of formal discussions in Conciliation Councils. However a 
series of 'informal discussions' then took place at a number of ports between the 
local employers and the local branch of the Union. As a result of these 
discussions, port codes for Auckland and New Plymouth, Wellington, Napier, and 
Timaru were settled in late November. It appears that these ports had the full 
involvement of the Union's national officers in settling the port codes. However 
at some other ports tensions developed between the local branches and the 
national executive in settling local port codes. Despite the unity that was 
manifested in the effective use of national strike action during this round of 
negotiations, in the context of decentralized bargaining and the shift to direct 
employment the local autonomy of the Union's branches reasserted itself in some 
cases. 
Although members of the Union's national executive were fully involved in 
formal negotiations at the port level, they were not always present at the 'informal' 
negotiations conducted between the local employers and the local branches of the 
Union. Negotiations of this type occurred between local employers and the Union 
branch at the ports where agreements were outstanding (Whangarei, Tauranga, 
Gisborne, Nelson, Otago, Bluff and Picton), three of which (Tauranga, Gisborne 
and Picton) had been closed because of strike action. NZA WE actively attempted 
to resolve the outstanding matters at the port level without the involvement of the 
Union's national officers, but this was met with resistance by these officers. This 
was to the chagrin of the employers who wanted to settle matters locally, as a 
comment in the National Business Review makes clear: "Employers' advocate 
John Button claims there would have been agreements reached in several other 
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ports by now without national umon 'meddling",.52 Similarly a NZAWE 
newsletter stated: "In the case of Tauranga, Gisborne and Picton no final 
settlement has been reached at local level but there is no doubt that such failure to 
settle is at least in pati due to national union involvement.,,53 
Because the watersiders' national organization had been transformed into a 
national union, the national executive could refuse to ratify the local port codes. 
Indeed, the Union's national officers did just that, at a handful of ports where they 
sought to 'shore up' the wages rates that had been agreed to by the local branch. 
As a NZA WE newsletter reported: 
In respect to Whangarei, Nelson and Bluff ... local negotiations 
have resulted in agreement being reached on most issues, including 
wages. The national office of the union has subsequently rejected 
some aspects of these locally negotiated settlements. 54 
This was particularly the case at Bluff where a port code had been settled between 
the local employers and the local branch of the Union. This agreement was 
actually brought into effect, but was subsequently rejected by the national Union 
on the basis that shift payments were too low: "While Bluff had been working 
under new conditions the National Union has refused to sign the port code on the 
basis of the remuneration levels that have been negotiated.,,55 The local 
employers responded with a 24 hour lock-out stating that they would "not tolerate 
interference in the local settlement".56 Watersiders at Bluff then went on strike. 
Moreover, the Union's General Secretary, Sam Jennings, threatened to call a 
national stoppage. 57 As a result, negotiations were re-opened with the national 
Union at Bluff (where the local employers conceded increased shift rates), as well 
52 National Business Review, 4112/89. 
53 NZA WE Newsletter 42/89, 1112/89. 
54 NZA WE Newsletter 42/89, 1112/89. 
55 NZA WE Newsletter 43/89,8/12/89. 
56 NZA WE Newsletter 42/89, 1112/89. 
57 National Business Review, 4112/89. 
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as Nelson and Whangarei. Port codes were settled at these and the other 
remaining ports during December. 
The last port to settle an agreement was Tauranga. Although the issue in dispute 
at most ports was pay rates, Tauranga was the exception. As I noted above, there 
the employers held out for what they termed 'flexible' hours of work (the 
introduction of '5 over 7'). Members of the Union's national negotiating team 
were fully involved in negotiations at Tauranga, and both they and the local 
branch sought to maintain a Monday to Friday working week, with optional 
overtime at the weekends. In the view of the President of the Union's Tauranga 
branch (Steve Penn), what was at stake was "the right and the freedom of choice 
to either work or not during the weekend.,,58 A standoff resulted, and a four week 
strike occurred. During this strike the national union officers threatened to put a 
black ban on cargo that was being diverted from Tauranga to other ports. 59 The 
employers responded by placing advertisements in newspapers which decried the 
Union's resistance to introducing flexible working hours. Also, timber workers 
from the neighbouring mills and logging contractors held a rally at the port to 
protest at the actions of the striking watersiders.60 
After three weeks, the Union suggested, as an interim solution, that water siders 
work under the agreement settled at Auckland. Steve Penn explained at the time 
that: "Our suggestion was to get the port back to work, get her operational - then 
form a subcommittee to thrash out a formula acceptable for both parties for hours 
of work.,,61 However the employers turned this offer down and trenchantly held 
out for the acceptance of 5 over 7. Ultimately what happened was that, after a 
58 Quoted in Christchurch Press, 8/12/89. 
59 Christchurch Press, 8/12/89. 
60 NZAWE Newsletter 43/89,8/12/89. 
61 Christchurch Press, 8/12/89. 
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prolonged dispute, the Union accepted a wage offer by the employers in return for 
agreeing to the hours of work which they were seeking. 
At the time, Les Dickson flaunted the Tauranga port code as having broken away 
from the national award. Such comments belie what actually occurred. It was not 
a 'breakaway' agreement in that the Union's Tauranga branch had not opted out of 
the national award. Furthermore, the national negotiating team had been party to 
all negotiations and had ratified the port code. A member of this team, who I 
interviewed, described the introduction of 5 over 7 as a concession that was made, 
in the face of concerted employer action, in return for increased rates of pay. 
Indeed, a close examination of the Tauranga port code demonstrates that some of 
the rates it contained were even higher than those settled at Auckland.62 The 
Tauranga agreement also contained a clause which mitigated the extent to which 
workers were 'on call': of the eight days off each month that watersiders were 
entitled to (as a substitute for weekends), the watersiders themselves could 
designate four days and their employers could designate four days as 'guaranteed 
days off. However the Union representative who I interviewed did say that, in 
hindsight, conceding '5 over 7' at Tauranga made it harder to refuse at other ports 
in subsequent rounds of negotiations. 
After a full three months, when the country's ports had been closed for much of 
the time, all of the port codes were finally settled. The outcome of these 
negotiations is best ascertained by examining the resulting documents (which 
applied to all except the container terminals). The documents in question were 13 
port codes of employment with national clauses inserted into them. Together 
62 The hourly rate and the' industry allowance' at Tauranga were the same as the rates that applied 
at all other ports. Auckland had the highest 'availability allowance' of all the pOliS, at $150 per 
week. This same allowance at Tauranga was slightly less at $145 per week, but the skill rates at 
Tauranga were higher than at Auckland. A 'class one' watersider at Tauranga received $4.00 per 
hour, a 'class two' watersider received $3.50 and a 'class three' watersider $3.00. The comparable 
rates at Auckland were respectively $3.75 (class one), $2.00 (class two) and $1.00 (class three). 
These two pOliS had the highest skill rates of all the ports. 
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these constituted 'the award'. The national provisions in the agreements were 
based on the Union's 'fifteen points of principle'. With the exception of the 
'subsequent patties' clause (which extended the agreement to all employers and 
watersiders at each port), the award stated that the fifteen provisions were 'subject 
to local variation'. But in practice they were reproduced in standardized form in 
each of the individual port codes and formed the national 'core' of the award. 
Although some of these clauses were rather weak in requiring, for instance, only a 
general commitment of employers to training and to safety, others were 
significant. For example, the work coverage clause secured union coverage at all 
ports of the types of work which watersiders had performed prior to the abolition 
of the Commission (along with the right to operate on the wharf equipment 
supplied by stevedoring companies). Compulsory union membership was also 
provided for, and although the employers had the right to effect compulsory 
redundancies, the redundancy agreement was basically the same as in GPO 539. 
Other significant clauses included standardized annual holidays and other leave 
provisions, and disputes procedures. Also, the award was set to expire at all ports 
on September 30 1990 (in order to keep the next round of negotiations 
synchronized). 
However, it will be recalled that these points were only accepted by the employers 
in return for the Union agreeing to accept the employers' 'eight points of 
principle' . Thus each port code contained provision for casual labour to be re-
introduced onto the waterfront, for compulsory cross-hiring of labour between 
employers as well as interport transfers, and also for greater 'flexibility' in the 
hours of work. Furthermore, methods of work became the prerogative of 
employers and gang manning levels were reduced (both of which signalled an end 
to the practice of spelling), and employers' were granted the unmitigated right to 
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introduce new technology. At some ports, in practice, gang strengths fell by as 
much as 50 percent.63 
Overall, in comparison to GPO 539 and the other special agreements which it 
replaced, the new agreement was greatly simplified. The number of job 
classifications which attracted special duties rates were significantly reduced, and 
replaced with a two or three tier employee classification system and standard 'skill 
rates' .64 The vast array of rates for special cargoes were eliminated, along with 
other rates (such as dirt rates and freezer rates) and travelling allowances. 
Incentive contract schemes were eliminated, and the numerous and detailed 
provisions relating to the operation of the bureau system (such as allocation and 
release of labour) were deleted. 
Although the Union had made a number of significant concessions, it did have 
reasonable success both in ameliorating some of the employers' claims, and in 
keeping provisions standardized between ports. For instance, in all but the fruit-
loading ports of Tauranga, Napier and Nelson (which were subject to considerable 
seasonal fluctuations in labour requirements), the use of casual labour was 
restricted to 25% of the permanent workforce. 65 And although all ports had the 
facility for 24 hour operation, Monday to Friday, only Tauranga had achieved this 
over a full 7 day week. Furthermore, despite wage rates being negotiated locally, 
the union succeeded in keeping the hourly rate out of competition (an increased 
basic rate of $10 per hour was obtained at all ports). However there were local 
63 Gang strengths on some operations at Auckland and Napier decreased from 12 to 7, at Tauranga 
from 12 to 6, and at Timaru from 14 to 7 (NZBRT 1990:5). 
64 Under GPO 539 there were numerous job classifications which attracted special duties rates, 
including the following: forklift drivers, hatchmen, winchmen, ropemen, deck crane drivers. The 
new port codes of employment, however, distinguished between only two or three 'classes' of 
watersider (depending on the port), each of which attracted standard skill allowances. 
65 At Tauranga the proportion of casuals that could be used was 50% of the permanent workforce, 
with provision that this restriction could be waived in exceptional circumstances. The Napier and 
Nelson port codes allowed for casuals not exceeding 25% of the permanent workforce to be 
employed, save for four months during the fruit-loading season when an unlimited number of 
casuals could be used. 
Table 13.1 : Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Hourly Rates 
Port Average HourI):: Rate 1988 HourI):: Rate 1989 
Wages Bonus Total 
Auckland 14.17 4.42 18.59 21.50 
Tauranga 12.22 6.35 18.57 21.63 
Wellington 12.95 3.56 16.51 17.75 
Lyttelton 12.82 3.37 16.19 16.50 
Nelson 11.39 5.49 16.88 17.00 
Timaru 11.61 2.69 14.30 17.50 
Bluff 12.79 4.21 17.00 17.00 
Gishome 10.90 5.36 16.26 17.00 
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differences in the amounts of some special rates and allowances, notably overtime 
rates, skill allowances and the availability allowance (for being 'on-call'). In some 
cases these differences were substantial. 66 
While differences in pay rates resulted in wage differences between ports 
(particularly between the larger and smaller ports), some differences in average 
wages between POlts had always existed even under the bureau system.67 The 
more fundamental issue is the extent to which an increase in the average wage had 
been secured at each port, relative to what was previously being earned under the 
bureau system. While this is difficult to precisely ascertain, Table 13.1 provides a 
rough indication of differences in the hourly rates between GPO 539 and the new 
award at a mix of large and small ports. Even these (very conservative) estimates 
reveal that at most ports the hourly rate increased - in some cases markedly. 68 
Although these data must be treated with a modicum of caution, it appears that 
average wage levels increased, at minimum, by between 5% and 10% across the 
board.69 This increase was higher than the average in the 1989-90 wage round 
66 For example, the availability allowance at Auckland was a flat rate of $150 per week, but at 
Wellington it was paid on an hourly rate to a maximum of $80 per week, and at Lyttelton the 
maximum was $60 per week. Similarly, the overtime rate for Sunday work was $7 greater at 
Wellington than at Taranaki. 
67 The differences in the weekly wage between ports can be gauged by comparing Auckland (which 
had one of the highest set of rates) and Bluff (which was amongst the pOliS with lower rates). The 
following figures are for the rates which obtained in normal hours Monday to Friday, and include 
the ordinary time rate, the industry allowance rate, availability payments and the top skill rate at 
each port. In the first work period the daily wage at Auckland was $172 compared to $136 at 
Bluff. At Auckland in the second work period daily wage was $184 and at Bluff it was $156, and 
in the third work period it was $244 and $192 respectively. 
68 In compiling Table 13.1, I compared the average hourly rate at each port in 1988 (which was 
published by the Waterfront Industry Commission in its fmal annual report) to figures I derived 
from the new award. In aniving at the figures for 1989, I used extremely conservative estimates of 
the hourly rate. I used pay rates solely for the first work period (which were comprised of the 
ordinary time pay rate, the industry allowance, availability payments and skill rates). In the case of 
skill rates, I used the top rate at each port. But I did so in order to counterbalance the fact that I 
have excluded from the calculation overtime rates, premium payments for weekend work, meal 
rates and so forth. These figures are, however, included in the figures for 1988. Undoubtedly 
these data underestimate the magnitude of the average hourly rate earned by watersiders at each 
port after the Commission was abolished. 
69 In aniving at this figure, as well as using the data contained in Table 13.1, I also got a general 
sense of wage levels after the Commission was abolished from interviews which I conducted with 
union officials and watersiders. In general, all agreed that watersiders were earning more than 
598 
(see Harbridge and McCaw 1990) and, overall, wage levels on the waterfront were 
still considerably higher than in many other blue-collar industries. Indeed the 
managing director of the Port of Napier Ltd, K. Gilligan, commented that: 
Our waterfront is still highly paid relative to business outside the 
port gates and it will take some considerable time to bring port 
remuneration rates to a closer relationship with those outside 
rates.70 
However what had been at stake in this round of negotiations, as much as wages 
and conditions, was the national document and indeed national unity within the 
Union. Commentators sympathetic to the employers noted with considerable 
satisfaction that the majority of negotiations took place at the port level. Trebeck 
and Barnard (1990: 196), who present an employer perspective, write: 
The negotiations were successfully concluded, albeit at the cost of a 
three week national waterfront dispute (longer in one or two ports) 
which brought shipping to a standstill. ... A key principle was that 
the main elements of the industrial award were settled at the 
individual port level, rather than at the national level. This 
provides greater flexibility in individual port circumstances to be 
reflected in award conditions. It also encourages employees to 
associate more closely with the interests of their port or employer 
vis-a-vis their national union and its office-bearers. Similarly it 
encourages inter-port competition rather than having competitive 
pressures muted by blanket national award conditions. 
But despite these claims, the Union (largely through judicious use of direct action) 
managed to retain some semblance of a national document, and thus resisted 
moves to completely decentralize bargaining to the port level. Indeed, despite 
NZAWE's success in having negotiations take place at the port level, the Union 
actually managed to keep some aspects of wages and conditions reasonably 
standardized across the ports. 
before (although, as we will see in the next chapter, this went hand-in-hand with an intensification 
of work). 
70 As quoted in Port Development International (September 1991 :50). 
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(4) Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the effects of the Labour Relations Act 1987 upon 
bargaining processes and outcomes on the waterfront. Most evaluations of the Act 
(in the private sector, that is) deal in an aggregate fashion with groups which had 
formerly been under the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court. This chapter 
provided the opportunity to examine in detail the Act's effects an occupational 
grouping in the private sector which had long been outside of the conventional 
arbitration system. 
In certain key respects, particularly with respect to bargaining outcomes, 
developments on the waterfront were consistent with those in other industries. 
The points of similarity include changes to the hours of work, and pay rate 
increases. With respect to the bargaining options taken under the Act, however, 
the effects on the waterfront were more dramatic than in most other industries. 
Commentators have noted that, in general, a decentralization of bargaining did not 
occur under the Act. Instead a re-centralization of bargaining around occupational 
awards occurred, largely as a result of the elimination of second-tier bargaining, 
and overall the level of enterprise bargaining did not increase (Harbridge and 
Walsh 1989; Harbridge and McCaw 1989; Boxalll990; Walsh 1993). 
However, the effects of the Act on the waterfront were more pronounced. 
Although enterprise bargaining did not develop, the period from 1987 to 1990 
witnessed a dramatic transformation in approaches to bargaining, with a shift in 
the balance of centralized and decentralized negotiations relative to that which 
previously existed. This was initiated by the employers under the provisions of 
the Act, and it resulted in a shift to a different combination of national bargaining 
and local bargaining than before, through port codes of employment with a 
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'skeletal' national award appended to them. Despite the formal elimination of 
'second tier' bargaining by the Act, local agreements on the waterfront persisted, 
and simply were institutionalized in a different way. 
To be sure, it was not the Labour Relations Act alone that resulted in this shift 
(which was stridently opposed by the Union). Rather it was the Act in 
combination with further port reform. Indeed, ultimately what turned the tide in 
favour of the waterfront employers was the Labour Government's decision to 
deregulate the industry. The Union was faced not only with the elimination of the 
specialized industrial relations framework, which resulted in attempts by 
employers to decentralize bargaining to the port level, but also with the 
elimination of the occupational registration system, which (as I demonstrated in 
previous chapters) had been a crucial part of the institutional power base of the 
Union, insofar as it had yielded joint control over the various facets of the labour 
supply. Massive redundancies occurred as the number of watersiders declined by 
over 50% (from 3156 on the bureau register in September 1989, to approximately 
1773 watersiders directly employed by stevedoring companies in March 1990).71 
The Union was faced not only with a sharp drop in its membership at the branch 
level, but also with its members being divided between different employers within 
each port. Further, a number of employers attempted to drive a wedge between 
the Union and its members. 
It was in this context that the local autonomy of the (former) port unions began to 
reassert itself. Under the Labour Relations Act the port unions were required to 
form a national union, which was unlikely to have occurred without this legislative 
intervention. The greater degree of formal control exerted by the national 
organization over the local branches that this organizational transformation 
71 Figures from the Waterfront Industry Restructuring Authority, cited in New Zealand Business 
Roundtable's report entitled Port Reform in New Zealand (1990:4). 
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yielded was counterbalanced by the shift to direct employment. As Gavin 
McNaught, the Union's industrial manager, observed: 
The ports have had, and by and large still have, a fierce 
independent nature that at times only just tolerates the national 
nature of the union. The move from the pool of labour under the 
Waterfront Industry Commission to company employment has 
perpetuated and in some instances accentuated this mood. 72 
In the 1989 round of negotiations, the Union's national officers closely monitored 
local negotiations and, in some cases, refused to ratify port codes which had been 
agreed to by the local branches of the Union. 
As I noted in previous chapters, decentralized bargaining at the port level had 
always co-existed alongside centralized bargaining. However, as well as being a 
source of opportunity in securing concessions from employers, decentralized 
bargaining did on occasion pose a potential threat to unity within the watersiders' 
national organization (as the dispute over GPO 305 in 1970 demonstrated). 
Previously, agreeing to a national document which underpinned all other 
agreements was a crucial key to national unity within the Waterside Workers 
Federation. Although this had been severely challenged in 1970, these problems 
had been overcome such that they did not manifest themselves in bargaining, as 
the Federation's 'external strength' (Fox and Flanders 1969:155) increased. These 
internal divisions did not reassert themselves in bargaining until 15 years later, in 
the face of employer attacks and deregulation. 
In this case, however, the situation was reversed: in 1970 the Auckland Union felt 
the Federation had made too many concessions, whereas in 1989 it was the 
national body which felt some port unions were giving things away. Similarly, the 
bargaining positions of watersiders' national and local bodies were altered: 
72 As quoted in Port Development International (September 1991 :50). 
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previously the Federation's national negotiators would negotiate a document that 
would then have to be 'sold' to the local unions and ratified by them (which was 
where the process broke down in 1970). But in 1989, as a national union, the 
local branches negotiated a document which the national executive had the power 
to veto. Thus, within the Union, the national and local were held in tension (and 
resolved) in a different way. 
Despite these tensions, and the degree to which the award was 'restructured', the 
fact that the Union had retained at least some semblance of a national award, in 
the face of concerted efforts by employers to undermine it through negotiations at 
the port level, was significant. This is indicated in the comments by employers to 
the effect that the national award had to be abolished. The following comments in 
publications sympathetic to the employers' position make this clear: 
Not all New Zealand's waterfront industrial hurdles were cleared 
with the advent of direct employment .... There remains the vexed 
question of the national award structure. Both the Watersiders' and 
Harbour Workers' Unions have stoutly rejected moves to put their 
awards totally on a port-by-port basis (N.Z. Shipping Directory 
1991 :5). 
At future award negotiations it is vital that further progress be 
made in the direction of port by port agreements. Any reversion to 
national negotiation would jeopardize the benefits already achieved 
for shippers and waterfront employees. This process will be 
facilitated to the extent that cargo interests maintain a close and 
strong involvement in the negotiations, as they did in 1989 
(Trebeck and Barnard 1990: 197). 
The renegotiation of award conditions later this year is obviously 
crucial to the long-term success of port reform. The objective must 
be to consolidate and extend the achievements already made -
principally by strengthening the local orientation, rather than the 
national orientation, of the awards. . .. [ An] important ingredient 
to the success of the negotiations will be regular interaction 
between management and employees at an individual stevedoring 
or port company level. Given the success which this consultation 
has evidently had over the past twelve months, it should be 
extended to the award negotiations context (NZBRT 1990:18). 
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The employers were to get their wish regarding decentralized bargaining. 
Ultimately what facilitated this process was not divisions within the Union as 
such, but rather another round of legislative change. The first was an amendment 
made to the Labour Relations Act in 1990, which allowed employers to opt for 
enterprise bargaining (albeit offset by the introduction of 'final offer arbitration'). 
The second (more significant) change was the introduction of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. While the Labour Relations Act 1987 registered a first major 
step in transforming bargaining procedures, it left union rights intact. The 
Employment Contracts Act, however, facilitated a shift to enterprise bargaining 
within a framework of individual and collective employment contracts in which 
unions need not of right be involved. The effects of this Act, along with the 
further effects of port reform, will be addressed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 14 : THE WATERFRONT AFTER DEREGULATION: 
CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES 
In retrospect, I think I have to say that we would have done better 
to adopt what you might call 'The Pol Pot Solution' - declare a 
'year zero', wipe out everything previous to it and start again with 
a clean slate. We should have made absolutely everyone 
redundant, then hired back those we wanted The people who left 
were paid a very handsome sum to depart. Those who stayed now 
work 50 per cent harder for 10 per cent more money. 
Richard Prebble MP 
The waterfront has changed with this Contract . .. Act. I mean the 
shipping companies are making more money now than they've ever 
made in their bloody life, and the worker is still getting cut off. ... 
He's getting hammered by this bloody Contract Bill. It only 
favours one person and that's the bloody boss. 
Lyttelton Waterside Worker 
(1) Introduction 
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In this chapter I will examine the patterns of industrial relations and work relations 
which developed in the post-reform period. In short, the chapter deals with what 
happened after interests ceased to be 'registered' through the law. It is not simply 
a chronicle of the unmitigated reassertion of managerial prerogative and the 
waning of union influence. Rather I will highlight the capacity of the Waterfront 
Workers Union to resist changes initiated by employers under the new legal 
framework. The misgivings which are apparent in the comment by Prebble above 
hint at continuities in this area. 
I will examine the effects of abolishing the legal and institutional framework 
which had been central to the Union's degree of control over the labour market, its 
success in bargaining, and its members' control of work practices, that had 
gradually developed since the 1950s. The success of this regulatory framework, 
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from the Union's point of view, by no means 'prefigured' the outcomes in the 
post-reform period, but it did significantly influence them. In the outcomes which 
resulted there are both continuities and discontinuities with the pre-reform period. 
Overall, the significance of the reforms has been the uncoupling of the link 
between union control over the labour supply and control of work practices. 
(2) Bringing the Firms Back In1 
Occupations continue to be a prominent feature of how work is 
organized, even though managerial hierarchies have come to be 
the dominant force. 
Harrison Trice (1993:19) 
Contra Trice, prior to 1989 managerial hierarchies were not the dominant force on 
the waterfront in relation to the waterside workers' occupation. Management, in 
the sense of 'man-management', did not exist because of the system of labour 
administration which meant that companies did not directly employ watersiders. 
Instead the 'occupation', legally defined, was central and the labour market took 
an 'occupational form' which was organized around exclusive registers at the port 
level. With respect to watersiders and their occupation, managerial hierarchies 
only became important following the abolition of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission and the attendant shift to direct employment. 
As a result of this change the port unions lost formal 'joint control' of the size and 
composition of the labour supply. In effect, this shift meant there was no longer a 
separate sphere of 'employment relations'. In place of the institutions which gave 
the union joint control, were substituted the decisions of a managerial hierarchy 
internal to firms. This marked a shift from a labour market that was organized 
around a legally constituted 'occupation', in which individual firms were excluded 
from key aspects of decision making regarding the labour supply, and which since 
I The title of this section is drawn from Baron and Bielby (1980). 
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the 1970s increasingly had became a national labour market (rather than a series of 
local labour markets), to one that was based around direct employment by 
individual companies at specific sites. This was extended by legal changes 
promoting a shift to enterprise bargaining. 
Insofar as, on the employers' side, firms became the key actors in the labour 
market, it is important to detail changes in types of companies on the waterfront, 
and the competitive environment in which these companies operated. This is 
important insofar as it crucially affected the position that they adopted in 
enterprise bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
In the post-reform period the industry was fundamentally divided between port 
companies and stevedoring companies. To recap, port companies had been 
formed under the Port Companies Act 1988 by 'corporatizing' the harbour boards 
(see Ward 1990). Amongst the stevedoring companies, the "industry is split 
between the dominant player - New Zealand Stevedoring - and individual 
companies who are strong in their own ports" (N.Z. Shipping Directory 1992:5). 
Appendix 1 demonstrates that the number of companies that were involved in 
stevedoring declined dramatically after the Waterfront Industry Commission was 
abolished. Significantly, the independent companies declined in number (with 
well-established companies such as Puflett and Smith folding) and the small 
'hybrid' companies (which the unions were involved in) all but disappeared. 
This process of rationalization was accompanied by intense competition between 
the remaining companies both within and between ports. The Port Companies Act 
1988 specifies that "the principal objective of every port company shall be to 
operate as a successful business." In line with this objective a number of the port 
companies engaged in a great deal of investment, particularly in container 
equipment. For example, Ports of Auckland Ltd bought a fourth container crane, 
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and Port Otago built a new berth at its Port Chalmers wharf facility which was 
completed in May 1991. Similarly the Lyttelton Port Company invested in a 
second container crane. However, this investment in container facilities was not 
restricted to the established container ports. The N.Z. Shipping Directory (1992:5) 
refers to "the aggression and new-found commercialism of the regional port 
companies" which manifested itself in investment in container cranes. For 
example, "Napier, Timaru and Tauranga have been at the forefront of purchasing 
container cranes" (N.Z. Shipping Directory 1991 :4). Indeed, at the Sulphur Point 
development at the Port of Tauranga two new post-panamax cranes were 
established in 1991, which effectively gave the port a 'container terminal' . 
This investment had its concomitant in fierce interport competition, particularly in 
the container trade. Geoff Mowday, the public relations manager for Ports of 
Auckland, commented that: 
Ports are leaner, and hungrier than ever before. With 14 ports on 
the New Zealand coast, the competition is 'white hot' for the 
500,000 TEUs (20ft equivalent units) or so that make up New 
Zealand's total trade. About 250,000 of those containers are 
handled in Auckland and Onehunga, so 12 ports compete for the 
balance and, in some cases, it is becoming a 'do or die' effort.2 
This interport competition has resulted, in some cases, in ports previously without 
container terminals becoming competitors with the established terminal ports. 
Thus, "Napier and Timaru now compete respectively with the established 
terminals at Wellington and Lyttelton" (N.Z. Shipping Directory 1992:4). 
Of course, the port companies differed in their involvement in stevedoring. At the 
ports where the harbour boards had traditionally operated container terminals 
(Auckland, Lyttelton and Otago), the port companies automatically were involved 
2 As quoted in National Business Review, 1/11/91. 
608 
in stevedoring as the new operators of these facilities. While some port companies 
took the opportunity to become fully-fledged 'service ports' (to provide port 
facilities as well as stevedoring services, that is), others were content to operate as 
'tool ports' by merely providing port facilities (see Turnbull and Wass 1994). The 
port company at Tauranga (Port of Tauranga Ltd) is a good example of a 'tool 
port'. As the company secretary commented in a speech: "We are ... not 
involved in stevedoring operations. We believe that this is best carried out by 
stevedoring companies operating in competition.,,3 The port company at 
Wellington adopted a similar approach. 
Other port companies became involved in stevedoring either directly or by 
establishing partly or wholly owned stevedoring subsidiaries (Port Nelson's 50% 
share in Tasman Bay Stevedoring is a good example). Similarly the Northland 
Port Corporation (the port company at the Port of Whangarei) formed a joint 
venture stevedoring company with New Zealand Stevedoring. The CEO of Port of 
Otago Ltd, Klaus Plate, gave the rationale for this type of move: "It is . . . only 
natural that port companies would look at . . . expansion into cargo handling 
operations if stevedoring costs at the port are considered a disincentive for trade 
through the port.,,4 
A number of port companies also became involved in conventional stevedoring 
with the intention of increasing competition within their port. The Lyttelton Port 
Company's decision in 1990 to take a group of watersiders out of its container 
terminal to work on the conventional wharves is a good example. The Company's 
cargo services manager justified the decision in the following manner: "This is 
purely a business decision on our part .... We like competition [within the port] in 
as much as it makes the port more attractive, in cargo-handling, to corne. If 
3 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
4 Ibid. 
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you've got cheap cargo-handling, more ships are going to want to use that port" 
(interview). The net effect of such moves was an increase in the level of 
competition on the conventional wharves. Indeed, as Bob Seamer (the General 
Manager ofNZS) noted: 
Conventional stevedoring has become intensely competitive as new 
players have entered the industry and some port companies have set 
up stevedoring operations and some container terminals have 
moved into conventional stevedoring. 5 
Thus the port companies were not only in competition with each other, but also 
with stevedoring companies which operated within their ports. Although, 
ostensibly, the move of port companies into stevedoring was to increase 
competition, in some ports the net result was for the port companies to attempt to 
'squeeze out' stevedoring companies. Indeed, in some ports, there has been a 
battle over which of the two types of companies will be the dominant player on the 
waterfront in stevedoring. At the Port of Lyttelton, for instance, the port company 
denied New Zealand Stevedoring access to the port's container cranes. 
There is also a high degree of competition between stevedoring compames, 
particularly between New Zealand Stevedoring (the country's only national 
stevedoring company) and the few remaining stevedoring companies that operate 
at one port only, such as Leonard and Dingley (at Auckland) and Turnbull's 
Stevedoring (at Timaru). The Managing Director of the Port of Napier, Ken 
Gilligan, commented that: "The competition stevedoring companies face is 
unbelievable. We have seen fierce competition at Napier and, sadly, there has 
been a major casualty in a stevedoring company going under [Pufiett and Smith]. 
More casualties might follow, because the pressure of business will lead to even . 
I ·,,6 . . ower pnces. Indeed even Bob Seamer, the General Manager of New 
5 Ibid. 
6 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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Zealand Stevedoring (the largest stevedoring company in the countlY), sounded a 
warning on the effects of this competition: 
Our wharves have gone from a pathetically unreliable industry to 
one of the most reliable, all in a period of only three years. The 
progress has been substantial, however it could, to a great extent, 
be undone by a threat to the viability of many stevedoring 
companies. Stevedoring rates have dropped too far and many are 
unsustainable at the current levels.7 
Thus the market was extremely competitive - both in the container and 
conventional spheres - between port companies, between stevedoring companies, 
and between port companies and stevedoring companies. In a highly competitive 
(service) product market of this type, it is commonplace for firms to seek a 
competitive edge by engaging in decentralized bargaining at the company level 
(see Capelli 1985). Indeed, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 facilitated just 
such a move to enterprise bargaining by companies that operated on the 
waterfront. In the next section of this chapter I will briefly outline the main 
features of the Act, and in the remaining sections I will identify its impact on the 
waterfront. 
(3) Decentralising and Decollectivising Industrial Relations: The Employment 
Contracts Act 19918 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991, which was introduced by the National 
Government elected in late 1990, came into force in May 1991. It was forged 
against a backdrop of extensive criticism by well-organized business interest 
groups (primarily the New Zealand Business Roundtable, but also the New 
Zealand Employers Federation) of its predecessor, the Labour Relations Act, and 
through the influence these groups exerted on policy-making by the National Party 
(see Walsh and Ryan 1993). The intention of the Act was to further deregulate the 
7 As quoted in The Transportant, volume 23, number 3, 1993. 
8 The title of this section is drawn from Hince (1993:10). 
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labour market, as a counterpart to the reforms which had 'liberalized' other facets 
of the New Zealand economy (see Bollard and Buckle 1987). Far from merely 
altering the existing state-regulated system, it removed entirely the regulatory 
framework which governed the practice of industrial relations, and established in 
its place a new 'minimalist' framework based on the law of contract. 
In the preceding chapter I demonstrated that the Labour Relations Act 1987 altered 
the framework that bargaining took place within, but it left the rights which were 
granted to registered unions largely intact. The Employment Contracts Act 1991, 
however, facilitated a shift to bargaining within a framework of employment 
contracts in which unions need not of right be involved. The Act did not merely 
modify, but rather completely abolished what Boxall referred to as the "central 
triumvirate of historical union rights - compulsory membership, exclusive 
jurisdiction and blanket coverage" (1990:536). In effect, the Act separated trade 
unions from the state, which had previously always guaranteed union rights 
through the union registration system. In tum this system had, until 1984, traded 
off union registration and compulsory arbitration against the right to strike. As 
Anderson has noted: 
The Employment Contracts Act shifts the focus of labour law away 
from a system based on the collective representation of the interests 
of workers and the recognition of the inherent inequality of 
bargaining power in the employment relationship, to one that 
stresses the primacy of the freedom of choice of individual workers 
in their relationships with their own employers (1991: 127). 
How did the Act accomplish this dramatic shift? 
First and foremost, the Act formally enshrines the notion of 'employee choice' 
with respect to bargaining representation. Part One of the Act confers 'freedom of 
association' upon all employees. Hince and Vranken point out that this 
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provision's "significance ... lies in the fact that it stresses both positive and 
negative freedom of association" (1991 :480). In effect, it confirms the freedom to 
'not associate', thereby rendering union membership voluntary. As Boxall 
(1991:291) notes, under this provision it is "illegal to negotiate pre- or post-entry 
closed shops" and "[a]ny form of union preference is also made illegal". 
Furthermore, the Act makes no mention of trade unions, substituting instead the 
vague term 'employee organization,.9 As Hince remarks, the Act 
does not include a single reference to the notion of trade unions or 
trade unionism. . . . All exclusive rights previously accorded to 
unions have been explicitly withdrawn. Whilst unions are free to 
playa role in industrial relations, they no longer have automatic 
and exclusive rights in the workplace. Exclusive rights to represent 
workers in collective negotiations and in processing grievances are 
two of the key rights abolished. . . . The statute uses the term 
'employee organization', but such organizations are accorded 
neither registered status, nor any of the historic rights that pertained 
to trade unions (1993: 11). 
The exclusive right of unions to represent workers in bargaining is replaced in the 
Act by the employees' right to choose a bargaining representative which, 
significantly, does not have to be a union. This shift in emphasis is dramatic. 
Anderson writes that "Prior to the Employment Contracts Act, a trade union 
enjoyed statutory monopoly bargaining rights in respect of all workers within its 
membership rule" (1991: 129). The loss of this right of exclusive jurisdiction 
means that unions have been transformed into merely "one agent of choice of 
individual workers rather than . . . the centre piece of the industrial relations 
system" (ibid: 130). 
9 The rubric in the Act states that '''Employees organisation' means any group, society, association, 
or other collection of employees, however described and whether incorporated or not, which exists 
in whole or in part to fUither the employment interests of the employees belonging to it". 
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Boxall (1991 :292) notes that the Act "conceptualise[s] the employment 
relationship as the product of the interaction between the (individual) employer 
and the (individual) employee." Unions are thus relegated to the status of a 'third 
party' to this relationship. Furthermore, although the Act requires an employer to 
recognize an employee's delegated representative, there is no legal obligation for 
employers to bargain with that agent (Hince and Vranken 1991:481). As Walsh 
notes, "It remains a curious anomaly in the Act that, although it goes to 
remarkable lengths to ensure that bargaining agents are properly authorized and 
accountable to their constituents, there is no guarantee that the other party will in 
fact bargain with the duly authorized agent" (1992:65). 
As well as dramatically changing the basis of worker representation, the 
framework of bargaining options is also fundamentally altered. Anderson writes 
that: "the Act removes state support for collective bargaining and considerably 
increases the power of employers to either refuse to bargain or to control the 
course of bargaining that they agree to" (1991:l31). The emphasis is upon 
'employment contracts', from whence the Act takes its name. Two options are 
presented: bargaining for either an individual employment contract (between one 
employee and one employer) or a collective employment contract (between two or 
more employees and one or more employers).l0 As Harbridge (1993:42) notes, 
"The type of contract and its contents are matters for negotiation." However the 
Act contains a "presumption in favour of employment contracts being individual 
ones in the first instance" (Hince and Vranken 1991:481). The fact that expired 
awards or collective employment contracts, until they are renegotiated and agreed 
to, are rendered down to series of individual employment contracts (albeit 
10 As Hince and Vranken (1991:481) point out, "the notion of an individual employment contract 
appears to have become the generic term as an employment contract is statutorily defmed to mean a 
contract of service .... Employment contracts that bind two or more employees, on the other hand, 
receive the additional qualification of being 'collective"'. 
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incorporating the same terms and conditions as the expired agreement) is 
consonant with this presumption. 
Similarly, the number of employers subject to the contract is a matter of choice by 
the employers themselves (which opens the gate to employer-initiated enterprise 
bargaining).ll Harbridge writes that the Act (1993 :31): "remove [ d] award blanket 
coverage provisions which enabled multi-employer bargaining to dominate the 
collective bargaining scene." As Hince and Vranken (1991 :484) point out, "the 
legislative emphasis as regards collective bargaining is towards decentralized, 
disaggregated bargaining." 
The institutions which regulate the process of negotiating and enforcing 
employment contracts are the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court, 
which were established in place of the Arbitration Commission and the Labour 
Court. The Tribunal "has both mediation and adjudication powers" in resolving 
disputes over employment contracts (Hince and Vranken 1991 :486). As Boxall 
(1991 :292) notes, it is "designed to provide 'low level', 'informal', 'speedy' and 
'fair' services. Much of the routine work of the old Labour Court (for example, in 
respect of the primary hearings of personal grievances and disputes of rights) is 
placed in its hands." The Employment Court, on the other hand, takes the place of 
the Labour Court as a "specialist labour court" with a widened ambit which 
extends to "all (judiciable) labour disputes" (Hince and Vranken 1991: 487). An 
important part of the broader role of this institution is that the Act "extends access 
to personal grievance provisions ... to all employment contracts. This is a major 
extension of individual rights because formerly such rights extended only to union 
members" (BoxallI991:292). 
11 Section 18(2) of the Act states that: "Nothing in this Act requires any employer to become 
involved in any negotiations for a collective employment contract to which it is proposed that any 
other employer be a party." 
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However, the increased access of workers to the legal machinelY for dispute 
resolution is counterbalanced by the fact that the right of a union to strike is 
restricted by the Act. The Labour Relations Act had afforded strikes a role in 
bargaining, and allowed a union to strike not only after an award had expired, but 
also within 60 days prior to it expiring. Under the Employment Contracts Act, 
however, "a strike is only lawful when it concerns the renegotiation of a collective 
contract, but only after the contract has expired. . . . The Act also prohibits strikes 
designed to compel firms into joining a multi-employer contract" (Walsh 
1992:68). Furthermore, the Act prohibits strike action by employees in support of 
other employees who are party to a different collective contract, thereby 
effectively "preventing sympathy or secondary action" (Anderson 1991:134). 
As Hince notes, "Two key thrusts of this statute were the facilitation and 
encouragement of, first decollectivisation and, second, decentralisation of 
industrial regulation in New Zealand" (1993:10). From a system in which union 
rights were guaranteed by law, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 facilitated a 
shift to bargaining within a framework of employment contracts in which unions 
need not of right be involved. Within what are generally referred to as advanced 
capitalist societies this Act, like the state-regulated system that it replaced, is 
unique. It has both the potential to facilitate what Hyman, writing in another 
context, refers to as the "erosion of industrial relations as a process of collective 
regulation of work and labour markets" (1995:13), but also, it should be noted, a 
reworking of collective regulation by unions. In the next section I will show that, 
while on the waterfront the Act's effects were (as Hyman's remarks indicate) 
dramatic, this potential was in fact not fully realized. What has happened has 
involved a form of reworking. 
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(4) Employment Contracts on the Waterfront 
(4.1) Initial Developments 
In the lead-up to the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) being passed, there was a 
clearly discernible shift in the attitude of the employers away from agreements at 
the port level to enterprise bargaining. Les Dickson, the Chairman of the 
Stevedoring Employers Association, commented to a conference in June 1991 
that: "With the impending legislation ... the stevedoring companies were able to 
review the pace of change, up until this time most saw merit in port awards. The 
industry is now reconciled to enterprise bargaining and considers this the only 
realistic option within the new framework.,,12 The Waterfront Workers Union 
(WWU), on the other hand, after (briefly) seeking agreement from the employers 
to negotiate at the port level became resigned to enterprise bargaining. As Roth 
(1993: 198) notes, the Union "executive was forced to recommend that branches 
pursue separate company agreements as required by the employers. It had been 'a 
dramatic change for us', admitted the national secretary; the union had been 
between 'a rock and a hard place'''. 
As I stressed in the preceding chapter, the local branches of the WWU were better 
placed than many other unions to deal with the shift to decentralized bargaining. 
This is because the Union's branches were already very well-organized at the local 
level and, as I have stressed in previous chapters, always had had a considerable 
degree of local autonomy (until 1988 having been organized as separate unions 
within a Federation). Furthermore, bargaining had always occurred at the local 
level (albeit under the umbrella of a national agreement). One of the points that I 
emphasized in the preceding chapters is that, in many respects, industrial relations 
had always been driven 'from below' by actors at the port level. The national 
12 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and POliS Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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organizations, both of employers and of the unions, had continually attempted to 
get leverage over the local, as this was the 'key' to strength within industrial 
relations. 
However the threat the Employment Contracts Act posed was not just because it 
provided for decentralized bargaining, but also because it abolished the whole 
framework of union rights. Ross Wilson, the National Secretary of the Harbour 
Workers Union, was very clear about this: 
We would be deluding ourselves seriously if we thought for a 
minute that the process we have called ports reform is in any sense 
over. The Employment Contracts Bill has the potential to devastate 
existing wages and conditions on the waterfront . . . . There is no 
doubt that this Bill has been prepared with the waterfront as one of 
its primary targets .... [It] challenges all ofthe assumptions that we 
have about bargaining and the role of unions, and their place in 
New Zealand society. 13 
Employers now, in negotiating enterprise agreements, did not automatically have 
to bargain with unions. Equally watersiders did not, as a matter of course, have to 
be represented by the Waterfront Workers Union (or indeed any union). And all 
claims to work coverage were contestable. The possibility of employers 
attempting to break union coverage at the local level was thereby raised. 
Indeed there were several notable instances in 1991, during the first round of 
negotiations under the Act, of individual companies seeking to circumvent the 
coverage of a local branch of the WWU by attempting to replace its members qua 
employees with other workers. However, as I will demonstrate below, these were 
the exception rather than the rule. First I will discuss the two main cases of 
circumvention, and then I will explain why the majority of employers recognized 
and bargained with the WWU, and did not attempt to displace its members. 
13 Report of New Zealand Harbour Workers Union Triennial Conference, March 1991. 
618 
The port company at Auckland (Ports of Auckland Ltd), which a national union 
official described as "particularly anti-union", attempted just such a 
circumvention. Negotiations for a collective employment contract covering the 
container terminal at this port, after taking place sporadically for a number of 
months, finally broke down in October 1991. The port company then announced 
its intention to contract out part of its operation at two sites (the 'movements 
office' and part of the container base), with the result that 27 workers (some 
watersiders and some harbour workers) were to be made redundant. As a 
subsequent Employment Court decision noted: "The workers themselves were 
invited . . . to negotiate new terms and conditions of employment" (ERNZ 
1991:499). However they did not do so, and each of the two unions sought an 
injunction in the Employment Court to prevent the redundancies from occurring. 
The WWU claimed that the redundancies "amounted to no more than dismissal of 
the 27 workers who had not agreed to the employer's proposed new terms of 
employment and appointment of a new workforce under the employer's new terms 
and conditions" (ERNZ 1991:499). In short, "the alleged redundancies were no 
more than a device to secure dismissal of the 27 workers and their replacement 
with a cheaper workforce" (ERNZ 1991:499). However the injunctions were 
declined by the Employment Court. The company's threat to replace union 
members was undoubtedly a bargaining tactic, but one which had substance 
insofar as it had arranged to replace these workers with an outside contractor and 
notices of redundancy had been served. 14 
More of its employees in the container terminal were then threatened with 
redundancy. 15 As Roth (1993:198) notes, "After intervention by the Auckland 
14 Waterfront Workers Union Executive Officer, personal connnunication, 14/7/94. 
15 This threat was effective because as the National Secretary of the Harbour Workers Union, Ross 
Wilson, (himself a specialist in labour law) noted: "the courts have ruled that it is legitimate for 
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Council of Trade Unions ... the Ports Company agreed to postpone the threatened 
dismissals ... and the union was able to save all members' jobs." However the 
price was the Union's acceptance of a collective contract with a flat rate of pay of 
$20 per hour. Thereafter the company insisted on new employees being party to 
individual employment contracts only.16 
The other notable case in 1991 occurred at the Port of Lyttelton. Watersiders at 
this port, as at a number of other ports, had traditionally carried out the work of 
discharging fish from foreign fishing vessels. Although no watersiders were 
permanently employed by firms to do this work following the shift to direct 
employment in 1989, it was still claimed by the local branch of the WWU as 
watersiders' work, and the Union acted as a labour broker in order to protect 
coverage of this type of work. A former President of the Lyttelton branch, Arthur 
Beckett, explained: 
They used to go to the Union and get men from the Union to do it, 
and if we could find the labour we used to supply it. ... The Union 
never got any money out of doing them, well they got handling fees 
but that was only very little because it was only for doing the wages 
and paying the men, and the men used to collect their wages from 
them. (Interview) 
Typically the Union arranged to employ watersiders on their days off who wanted 
to earn some extra money. However Independent Fisheries, a fish processing 
company, disrupted this arrangement. It built a new coolstore on the waterfront, 
staffed exclusively with casual (non-union) workers, which began operation in 
November 1991. A dispute erupted when Independent Fisheries hired 35 
unemployed workers from the New Zealand Employment Service to unload a 
employers to replace workers who do not accept a new contract with others who will, or with 
contractors, if the enterprise will benefit. A company does not need to be in financial difficulties 
for workers to be made redundant" (Harbour Workers Union, The Backgrounder, 6/4/92). 
16 Waterfront Workers Union Executive Officer, personal communication, 1417/94. 
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fishing vessel in November 1991. Undoubtedly this was done to cut labour costs, 
as the rate for watersiders was $17 per hour whereas for the unemployed it was 
only $8 per hour.17 The Lyttelton branch of the WWU vehemently opposed this 
move, and with support of the local branches of the Harbour Workers Union and 
Seamen's Union, erected a picket to prevent the vessel from being unloaded. This 
picket prevented two forklift drivers employed by the company from approaching 
the wharf, upon which the company ceased its attempt to unload the vessel and 
applied to the Employment Court for an injunction to prevent further picketing of 
the job. This application was successful, and it resulted in injunctions being 
granted against the Lyttelton branch of the WWU and the branch Secretary to 
prevent further picketing, which was deemed by the Court to be unlawful. 18 
Within union circles Independent Fisheries, as an employer, had a bad reputation. 
I was conducting fieldwork at Lyttelton at this time and later attended a protest 
directed at this company. The protest was organized by the maritime unions (of 
watersiders, harbour workers and seamen) and the Council of Trade Unions to 
mark the official opening of the company's new plant in July 1992. Prime 
Minister Jim Bolger, who was flown by helicopter over the protest to the plant, 
commented in his address that: 
There have been those old vested interests who have used the 
Employment Contracts Act as a wailing wall to lament the demise 
of compulsory unionism. But that old, deeply unsuccessful model 
of labour relations never delivered sustainable wage increases and 
never achieved the terms and conditions that, for instance, we see 
here today. 19 
Mr Bolger's comment on terms and conditions is somewhat ironical. I was told by 
several members of the local branch of the WWU that members of criminal gangs 
17 Christchurch Press, 23111191. 
18 Independent Fisheries v New Zealand Waterfront Workers' Union [1991] 3 ERNZ. 
19 Christchurch Press, 16/7/92. 
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had been involved in reclUiting the company's employees. These workers were all 
casuals employed job-to-job, and none of them were union members. Their pay 
was low and they experienced poor conditions of work. 
Indeed a group of 12 casual workers walked off the job in August 1992 seeking 
improved wages and conditions. One worker commented that: "They want us to 
work our guts out loading and unloading; we are sweating in a freezer.,,2o 
However, while they were off the job, the company simply hired other casuals to 
do their work. Some of the workers who were involved in the stoppage 
approached the Lyttelton branch of the WWU in an attempt to get union coverage. 
The branch considered allowing Independent Fisheries workers to join as 
"associate members", which would have meant that the Union would act as their 
bargaining agent. However there was a disincentive for most workers to join the 
Union because Independent Fisheries was unlikely to hire casuals who were union 
members, and it continually threatened to 'roster off men who raised issues of 
wages and conditions. Although a Lyttelton union official described the plant to 
me as "the scab factory", later they did have success in unionizing some of the 
workers, albeit through a different union. 
The two preceding cases were significant insofar as they either threatened, or 
resulted, in the loss of union coverage and work coverage. Nonetheless it was 
only eroded 'at the margins'. The case at Lyttelton was that of a fishing company 
(rather than a stevedoring company) challenging the local union in a somewhat 
'marginal' area of work. Although the case at Auckland did involve a major 
stevedoring company, which operated the container terminal, the challenge was 
again at the edges (involving just a small part of the operation) as a bargaining 
ploy. Significantly, no stevedoring company attempted to completely circumvent 
20 Christchurch Press, 14/8/92. 
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the WWU in bargaining or to displace the whole of the workforce. As I will 
demonstrate below, in the main, the majority of employers recognized and 
bargained with the Union, and did not attempt to displace or dislodge its members. 
A good example is New Zealand Stevedoring, which was one of the first 
companies to settle enterprise agreements (in the form of collective contracts) at 
each of the 11 ports where it had branches (see below). 
I am not suggesting that the potential threat to the Union posed by the 
Employment Contracts Act, as indicated by the preceding cases, should be ignored 
or downplayed, but that these cases need to be put in perspective. The question 
that needs to be answered is not so much why the Auckland Port Company and 
Independent Fisheries acted in the way they did (which undoubtedly centered on 
the cost benefits of circumventing the Union), but rather why more companies did 
not act in this manner. Why were the majority of employers prepared to recognize 
and negotiate with the WWU as the watersiders' bargaining agent, and to retain a 
unionized workforce? I will argue that there are two reasons for this development. 
Firstly, it would have been difficult for employers to break the control of the 
WWU over representing watersiders in bargaining, and their coverage of work. 
The strength of the Union, which developed within the state-regulated system, 
placed it in a position to resist encroachments upon it by employers seeking to 
drive a wedge between its branches and their members using tactics sanctioned by 
the ECA. Secondly, the provisions of the ECA, in weakening the Union's 
bargaining position, meant that employers could achieve considerable gains in 
terms and conditions (like abolishing penal rates) without doing so. Furthermore, 
the ECA allowed employers to modify work practices substantially. Thus the 
bargaining outcomes were a product of the Union retaining a modicum of control 
over the labour supply, in keeping workers unionized, and of what employers 
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could achieve with this already unionized workforce in the climate created by the 
Employment Contracts Act. I will briefly expand on each of these points. 
The fact that the WWU was firmly entrenched and well-organized at the port level 
is one of the reasons why employers were prepared to recognize and negotiate 
with it, and why they did not attempt to break the Union by introducing non-union 
labour. In Chapter 10, I demonstrated that since the 1970s the former Waterside 
Workers Federation exercised increasingly tighter control over the labour supply 
(which admittedly was diminishing through voluntary redundancies) to the point 
where a tightly sealed national labour market developed. Although the Union lost 
formal joint control of the labour supply when the Waterfront Industry 
Commission was abolished in 1989, as we shall see, the degree of control over the 
labour market that had been accumulated within and through the legally regulated 
system assisted the Union's branches in retaining actual control of the labour 
supply. This control, in tum, allowed them to keep the workforce unionized and 
well-organized at the local level. The very success of the bureau system, from the 
Union's point of view, through which it gained considerable control of the labour 
supply, set palpable limits upon what could be achieved by employers in the 
deregulated environment. 
Furthermore, it was not possible for companies to circumvent the Union by 
relocating their operations to 'greenfield' sites because ports, by their velY nature 
are spatially fixed, and it is exceedingly difficult and expensive to establish new 
ports. For this reason, employers could not 'escape' from well-established union 
branches (at the port level) and a unionized workforce. Consequently, employers 
had to restructure their operations using labour that was already well-organized. 
At ports where companies did attempt to circumvent the Union they were met with 
vehement opposition; the degree of resistance at the Port of Lyttelton to what, at 
best, can be considered a challenge to a peripheral area of work, bears witness to 
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this. Thus all attempts by employers to remove their workforce from union 
coverage, under the provisions of the Employment Contracts Act, came up against 
the barrier of labour that was already well-organized and embedded at the local 
(port) level. 
As I will demonstrate below, not only did the Union retain a presence on the 
waterfront, it continued to exert a degree of control over the labour supply. This 
control is indicated by the success of its branches in unionizing casual workers, 
and in acting as the bargaining agent for watersiders at each of the ports. It is 
further indicated by the failure in 1992 of the first company which attempted to 
employ a non-union workforce for stevedoring work (see below). 
However, I am not suggesting that the shift to enterprise bargaining posed no 
problems to the Union, with respect to maintaining the high degree of organization 
which it had previously achieved in the state-regulated environment. Coupled 
with the shift to direct employment, enterprise bargaining further divided the 
membership at each port between the companies which operated there. And 
rivalries, splits, and tensions did emerge within the membership at some ports, 
such as Timaru (see Chapter 13). There was nothing automatic or guaranteed 
about the level of union organization which hitherto existed on the waterfront. As 
I will explain below, the Union's branches had to do a considerable amount of 
work in order to keep this level of organization in place, given the split of workers 
between companies and the introduction of enterprise bargaining. 
In addition, apart from the existence of a well-organized union which would have 
been difficult to circumvent, the majority of employers were actually prepared to 
tolerate a union presence on the waterfront in the climate created by the ECA. 
This is because the Act enabled employers to erode the telIDS and conditions of 
work, and it weakened the control that watersiders, under the umbrella of their 
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Union, previously exerted over work practices. Under the Act a variety of tactics, 
other than attempting to drive a wedge between the WWU and its members, were 
available to employers in securing 'flexibility'. As we shall see, under the ECA 
waterfront employers were able to achieve considerable gains without attempting 
to circumvent the Union. 
In elaborating these points I will first deal with the nature of the employment 
contracts that were negotiated, and the modicum of control over the labour supply 
that the Union retained, after the ECA was introduced. I will then shift from the 
formal provisions of employment contracts, to the terms on which work was 
actually carried out in the post-reform period. 
(4.2) Negotiating Employment Contracts: Positions and Strategies 
In the standard refrain, the rationale provided by employers for enterprise 
bargaining is "to achieve a wage-work bargain that more closely reflects the 
specific operational requirements of the enterprise or establishment concerned" 
(Boxall 1993:150). For instance, the General Manager of New Zealand 
Stevedoring, Bob Seamer, spoke of "a need for terms and conditions of 
employment which met our enterprise's needs.,,21 This sentiment was echoed in a 
comment by the Company Secretary of the Port of Tauranga Ltd (a port company), 
Athole Herbert, to the effect that the Employment Contracts Act provided the 
opportunity for "individual employers to actually manage the implementation of 
employment conditions and practices in each enterprise. ,,22 But despite this 
purported desire to 'tailor make' employment contracts to suit each company (or 
branch thereof), the changes to the terms and conditions contained in the previous 
award that the employers were seeking in this bargaining round distilled down 
some broadly similar sorts of things. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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Generally, in negotiating employment contracts, the employers' catchcry was the 
need for 'more flexibility' than had been achieved in the national award and port 
schedules which had been settled in 1989 under the Labour Relations Act. 
Interviews I conducted with senior managers at the Port of Lyttelton in 1991 were 
peppered with references to the need for greater flexibility. The following 
comment by the Cargo Handling Manager of the Lyttelton Port Company, in 
reference to the container terminal is typical: 
Basically we've got a three shift system here now. There are days 
when no ships come in, quite a lot of days when no ships come in. 
There's a certain amount of work that still needs to be done in the 
areas of receival, delivery ... and this sort of thing, but we don't 
need the whole workforce here on those days, so probably we are 
going to be forced into looking into some other arrangement for 
working. Probably a more flexible working pattern. So that a set 
number of people come in and the others are called in as required. 
For instance, I think in Tauranga they work any five days out of 
seven in their conventional port code. Maybe something like that, 
without paying them to work four days and then paying them 
overtime to work at the weekend or whatever, then you just say 
'right, well there's five days work: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Friday, Saturday, Sunday'. Well that's just the basic weekly wage 
they get for that. ... More flexibility, that's what we need ... To try 
to get the maximum return for your basic hourly wage, rather than 
be stuck with all of these punitive rates. While you're employing 
someone that you don't want to employ early on in the week, and 
then having to pay punitive weekly rates at the weekend. 
(Interview) 
This comment is worth quoting at length for two reasons. It highlights (and links) 
two of the main types of flexibility: in working times (temporal flexibility) and in 
pay (financial flexibility).23 And it indicates that the Port of Tauranga provided 
the model for temporal flexibility which companies at other ports sought to 
emulate after the shift to enterprise bargaining. It will be recalled from the 
previous chapter that Tauranga was the only port where 5 over 7 was achieved 
23 See Atkinson (1984, 1985). 
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during negotiations for pOli schedules in 1989. Indeed, this was flaunted by the 
Tauranga Port Company's secretary, Athole Herbeli, in mid-1991: "At the Port of 
Tauranga, because of the special labour conditions alTived at after 34 days' strike, 
we have a set oflabour conditions unique on the New Zealand waterfront.,,24 
As well as increased temporal flexibility, companies were also seeking greater 
provision to use casual labour, as another way of dealing with the fluctuations in 
daily activities refelTed to above by the manager from the Lyttelton POli 
Company.25 In some companies this strategy was coupled to a move to effect 
more redundancies, in order to cut back the number of permanent employees. 
With respect to 'financial flexibility' there was an overall move to lower wage 
rates by introducing flat hourly rates (which eliminated overtime rates, skill rates 
and so forth). In terms of flexibility on the job, there was a push to further erode 
task boundaries and to eliminate lines of demarcation. Not all of these types of 
flexibility were given equal emphasis by each company.26 But generally it was 
some combination of these basic types of flexibility that companies sought in the 
first round of enterprise bargaining under the ECA. 
As I noted above, in making the transition to enterprise bargaining the Waterfront 
Workers Union was assisted by being well-organized at the port level. 
Significantly, the Union was not challenged by any of its members as their 
bargaining agent in negotiating enterprise agreements. As I noted in the previous 
chapter, tensions between the Union's branches and the national organization 
(re )emerged in the 1989 bargaining round. However, in negotiating enterprise 
24 Ibid. 
25 In the management literature this is referred to as 'numerical flexibility' (see Atkinson 1987). 
26 For example, task flexibility was more important for some port companies (which had combined 
workforces of harbour workers and watersiders) than for stevedoring companies. By the same 
token, some stevedoring companies sought greater temporal flexibility from their permanent 
employees, in preference to increasing the number of casual workers they were able to employ. 
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agreements in 1991, with the exception of Auckland, all of the local branches of 
the Union relied on the national office for representation in negotiations?? 
However, this is not to say that the shift to enterprise bargaining did not pose any 
problems for the Union. The Union and its local branches had to go to 
considerable lengths organizationally to prepare to negotiate enterprise agreements 
with each employer in each port. As it had done in previous bargaining rounds, 
the Union used a national negotiating team that travelled around the various ports. 
This team comprised national officials, and in negotiations within each port drew 
in representatives from the local branch, which included the local union secretary 
and union delegates from the company in question. 
I began to conduct initial fieldwork at the Port of Lyttelton at this time, and it 
quickly became apparent that much work had to be done by the local branch of the 
Union in order to keep its former level of organization in place, given that 
members were split between different firms, which were to be subject to separate 
employment contracts. A Lyttelton union delegate commented that water siders at 
the port were: 
independently employed by the Port Company, New Zealand 
Stevedoring, and Pacifica. Which has meant, of course, that the 
Union is now divided into three different entities, with a union 
secretary having to have some form of allegiance to three different . 
. . groups of people, probably with different values and different 
ideas. (Interview) 
One way this split was dealt with, in the context of enterprise bargaining, was to 
utilize and indeed strengthen the delegate system, whereby union delegates were 
27 Auckland's resistance to involving national officials of the Union is unsurprising given the 
somewhat uneasy position that Auckland had always occupied within the watersiders' national 
organization. It should be noted, however, that the Auckland branch did seek the help of the 
national officers when POlis of Auckland threatened to replace its container terminal staff. 
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elected by the workforce from each of the companies. This was particularly 
important insofar as delegates were involved in negotiating employment contracts. 
As an experienced delegate commented: 
I think the delegates themselves are going to have to be more vocal 
because they've got more responsibility. We might have to start 
training people to be a little bit more hard-nosed, a little bit more 
information in the old computer [their heads], so's they can argue a 
case. (Interview) 
The relative balance between the Union's national representatives and its local 
branch officials changed somewhat with the shift to enterprise bargaining. The 
General Manager of New Zealand Stevedoring, Bob Seamer, claimed that 
negotiations "primarily involved local employee representatives who were driving 
local talks along with a national or regional Union delegate acting as advisers 
only.,,28 In some respects this comment overstates what actually occurred, forthe 
Union's national officers were deeply involved in the negotiations, and were more 
than mere 'advisors'. Notably, enterprise bargaining raised the possibility of 
further competition on labour rates, not just between ports (as in the case of port 
awards), but between companies within each port. This represented one of the 
biggest threats, insofar as it raised the possibility that companies would try to 
undercut each other by pushing rates down. Thus one of the most important roles 
of the national officials in negotiating enterprise agreements was to attempt to 
retain some basic uniformity between companies on wages and conditions. One 
union secretaty remarked, regarding the role of these officers, that: 
the coordination, that sort of aspect, is just as important as it was 
before. Perhaps even more so now you haven't got a national 
award. They've really got to try and tie all those separate awards 
into some common thread that doesn't promote competition on 
labour rates basically. . . . [T]hat's the ultimate protection. 
(Interview) 
28 Speech to Port and Shipping Reform Conference, Auckland, 27/3/92. 
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In some respects the Union's national negotiating team was in a strategic position 
to know all of the rates negotiated with each company, whereas companies 
themselves did not generally have access to this information?9 
Despite the involvement of the Union's national officers in these negotiations, 
there is at least a grain of truth to Bob Seamer's comment because the Union's 
members qua company employees had the final say on their employment contract. 
A WWU executive member offered the following observation on this matter: 
"Each port's always had its own way of doing things. And now we've got 
different companies, we're doing what the men want in each company" 
(fieldnotes). Another national union official had some misgivings about this 
situation insofar as it could lead to "the tail wagging the dog" (fieldnotes). 
Certainly it was much more difficult for the national Union to veto agreements 
(which it did in 1989) even though, formally, it was a signatory to them. I will 
now move on to examine some of the contracts that were settled. 
(4.3) Negotiating Employment Contracts: Bargaining Outcomes 
One of the first companies to settle collective contracts at the enterprise level was 
New Zealand Stevedoring (NZS).30 It is worth focussing on this company is some 
depth because it was the largest (and the only national) stevedoring company in 
the country, employing approximately 40% of all watersiders within its branches 
at 11 of the country's 13 ports. This company is a case in point of what employers 
could achieve, while recognizing the Union and negotiating collective 
employment contracts, under the ECA. The General Manager of NZS, Bob 
Seamer, made the following comment at a conference at 1991: 
29 One member of the national negotiating team later told me, in an interview, that he had been 
offered a bribe by a representative of one company to divulge the hourly rate paid by another 
company at the same port. 
30 By September 1991 New Zealand Stevedoring had settled collective employment contracts at 8 
of its 11 branches. 
There were some who criticized us for recognizing or involving the 
Union [in negotiations] despite this being their legal right under the 
ECA. We believed however that we were putting the Union in a 
position where they too had to act responsibly or face the legal and 
financial repercussions open to us. More so however the Union 
leaders were subjected to the wishes of our employees whose jobs 
depended on the financial success of the company. In general we 
found Union leaders responsible and willing to accept change. A 
new and commendable attitude of responsibility was very 
evident.3l 
Seamer claimed that he adopted consultative approach: 
the Employment Contracts Act offers a new challenge and we've 
handled the change in legislation through consultation with our 
staff over the last 10 months. We've held several seminars where 
we shared with key employees sensitive company data including 
profitability and productivity. Through this consultation process, 
we have already made considerable progress towards achieving our 
port by port contracts. While we recognize the process will be 
more difficult in some ports, we believe we will arrive at 
agreements which will enable the company to survive through this 
. 32 present receSSlOn. 
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The extent of this 'consultation', and whether or not it truly constituted 'managed 
change' is a moot point (conversations I had with union officials at the Port of 
Lyttelton, at least, suggested otherwise). But, significantly, this company did not 
utilize outright 'anti-union' tactics - unlike some of the smaller stevedoring 
companies which I will identify below. 
Bob Seamer was himself intimately involved in the negotiations which took place 
within each of the company's branches. He later commented that: "The 
negotiating process took over 12 months and involved myself and my Personnel 
Manager being 'on the road' around our 11 branches for much of that time, but 
31 Speech to Port and Shipping Reform Conference, Auckland, 27/3/92. 
32 Ibid. 
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such a commitment is required to achieve real change in employment conditions 
under the Employment Contracts Act.,,33 Seamer directed negotiations through 
the intermediary of what a union official described as a "professional negotiator" 
(fieldnotes). Thus the Union's national negotiating team did not bargain with the 
managers of the local branches of the company. Strictly speaking, NZS negotiated 
site (as opposed to enterprise) agreements at the level of its local branches. But in 
many respects the process of site bargaining was still directed nationally by the 
company's General Manager. 
Two things were of paramount importance to the company in these negotiations: 
securing greater flexibility of working times and attacking penal rates and 
overtime rates (in an effort to decrease wages). Significantly, there was not an all-
out push by NZS for the unlimited use of casuals (by abolishing the varying 
percentage restriction on casual labour contained in the port schedules). Instead, 
at all ports, the company sought greater temporal flexibility (in the form of '5 over 
7 or '40 over 7') as a means of dealing with peaks and troughs. The Tauranga 
branch of the company already had 5 over 7, but the company sought to extend 
this type of working time arrangement to all of its branches. That the company 
clearly adopted this tactic, rather than pushing for more casual labour, is clearly 
indicated by comments by Seamer against the unbridled used of casual labour (see 
below). 
At a conference in 1992, Seamer spoke openly of the collective employment 
contracts that were settled: 
33 Ibid. 
These contracts are primarily "40/7" systems or the working of 40 
hours over any seven days, 24 hours per day and they were 
achieved with wage cost savings that have reduced earnings back to 
pre 1989 levels. This is not a regular rostered shift system, but a 
system where the company nominates which two days an employee 
may have off - usually not consecutively and as well determines 
which shift, day, afternoon or midnight, the employee will work. .. 
. We believe in most cases the wages, which we admit are higher 
than those outside the wharf gates, are justified because of the anti-
social work pattern and "on demand" nature and expectations of the 
shipping and export/import industry.34 
633 
Seamer's comment that wages compensated for the 'anti-social' hours of work 
(under this irregular three shift system) is interesting because, as he himself notes, 
wage rates had in fact decreased under these contracts (albeit not to the level 
'outside the wharf gates,).35 The basis of the payment system was changed to a 
flat guaranteed salary comprising 40 hours pay (whether work was available or 
not) at a specified hourly rate. The graduated skill rates, industry allowance, and 
availability payments specified in the expired port schedules were incorporated 
into the hourly rate so that all water siders within each of the company's branches 
received the same basic hourly rate (which was premised upon maximum 
flexibility on the job). The cuts in pay rates in the NZS contracts were achieved 
primarily by abolishing penal rates for weekend work (a crucial part of the 40 over 
7 system, from the company's point of view), and by cutting overtime rates back 
to a flat hourly rate lower than the rates which previously obtained. 
Pay rates differed between the branches of NZS at each port (for example, the 
hourly rate at Lyttelton was $18.50, whereas at Bluff it was $17.00)?6 These 
differences in rates reflected, to some extent, variations in rates of pay between 
ports under the port schedules which were settled in 1989. Because of these 
already-existing differences, it was more feasible for the Union to attempt to keep 
pay uniform between companies within ports, rather than between ports. In this 
respect, some of the NZS contracts, insofar as they were settled early in the piece, 
34 Ibid. 
35 This sharply contrasted with the previous wage round. In the negotiations in 1989 pay rates had 
increased (see Chapter 13), and these had been further 'topped up' by a 2% increase in 1990. 
36 There were also some minor variations in the hours of work, notably that Auckland and Tauranga 
had a '5 over 7' system (working 5 days out of every 7), as opposed to the 40 over 7 system that 
operated within the company's other branches. 
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established 'benchmarks' for the Union to work with. Nonetheless, the point 
which should not be overlooked is that under the provisions of the collective 
employment contracts that were agreed to, because of the abolition of penal rates 
and modifications to overtime payments, the wages of NZS employees decreased 
across the board. 
The reason why the Union and its members accepted these pay cuts undoubtedly is 
that they were negotiating from a position of some considerable weakness under 
the Employment Contracts Act. Tactically, it was impossible to strike at anything 
other than the enterprise level. This severely curtailed capacity for collective 
action was compounded by the fact that watersiders at many ports faced the threat 
of redundancy (both from NZS and other companies). Indeed in these negotiations 
Bob Seamer painted a picture of intense competition and financial difficulties 
which were detrimentally affecting NZS's branches. At the Port of Lyttehon, at 
least, the introduction of 40 over 7 (together with changes in pay) was practically a 
fait accompli, as it was already being trialled prior to the settlement of the new 
contract. A watersider who worked for New Zealand Stevedoring's Lyttelton 
branch explains: 
When I went into the new company [post-1989] conditions and 
wages were very, very good. Everything was charming, until they 
put the pressure on us. And they were going to put 14 men [off], 
make them redundant, because they said they couldn't afford to 
keep 'em. We didn't want to give them any of our workers, so they 
turned around and said 'right, what about if we give a trial and keep 
them in but 40 over 7'. That is, work any 40 hours in 7 days. No 
overtime, but when you work an extra hour, that's after your 8 
hours, they'll give you an extra third, it worked out to about a third 
extra. Anyhow we decided we'll do this for a three month period 
so we could keep our 14 workers on the job. That was the worst 
thing we ever did do, because once we started this 40 over 7 they 
would never ... turn round and say 'we'll put it back to the other 
way'. As I say, we were getting overtime for Saturday, double time 
for Sunday and yes it was very profitable. But soon as they turned 
over on this 40 over 7 my wages went down between 11 and 12 
grand a year. (Interview) 
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The employer attitude (which was not umque to NZS) was expressed by a 
stevedoring company manager as a choice between "more flexible arrangements 
and keep more [watersiders] on, or less flexible arrangements and more gO.,,37 
But these concessions on terms and conditions of work were counterbalanced by 
the fact that the Union held the line in some areas. Although penal rates for 
weekend work were lost, overtime payments were retained (albeit at a lower rate 
than before). And the basis of the salary guaranteed 40 hours pay per week, even 
if watersiders worked for a shorter period. Equally significant, however, is the 
fact that the 'casual ratio' was retained in all of the contracts (although this ratio 
differed between ports). Casual labour could only be utilized in a certain 
proportion (typically 25%, but at some ports as much as 50%) when permanent 
employees were not available to fill the positions in question. Also, provisions 
were formally written into the contracts for 'B' registers of casuals comprising 
watersiders made redundant by the company, along with the provision that the 
individuals on the B register had 'first preference' for all casual work that became 
available. Further casual workers could be used after those on the B register had 
been deployed, but this had to be "after consultation with the employees." 
Furthermore, permanent watersiders had the 'core' positions, and when these 
workers were not available men on the B register filled these positions.38 These 
provisions were crucial, insofar as a vital part of the Union's strategy was to keep 
casuals out of the skilled positions (such as driving heavy equipment) in order to 
forestall further casualization. 
37 As quoted in New Zealand international BUsiness, February/March 1992. 
38 The following clause was contained in each ofNZS's collective contracts: "The company will .. 
. maintain a B Register of casuals made up of previous company employees and such workers shall 
be given first preference for available work, provided that such industry qualified workers may be 
used in skilled positions, where all qualified permanent workers have previously been placed in 
other skilled positions." 
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To be sure, the Union's success in retaining restrictions on casual labour in the 
NZS contracts was assisted by the fact that the company was not seeking to 
increase the number of casuals it employed - instead seeking maximum temporal 
flexibility through the introduction of 40 over 7. Similarly, keeping casuals out of 
skilled positions to some extent equated with the 'preference' of this particular 
company with respect to ensuring that its permanent workers had continuous 
work. 
Not all companies took the approach of NZS. Indeed, some employers criticized 
the NZS contracts as being too generous. For example, Stephen Poole, the 
Managing Director of Leonard and Dingley, publicly criticized NZS for 
guaranteeing pay for 40 hours per week whether work was available or not.39 
Conversely, the Union to some extent regarded the NZS contracts "as a base line 
for negotiations with other companies.,,4o 
While only a handful of companies (like Ports of Auckland Ltd) attempted to 
circumvent the unions by displacing their members, many other tactics, provided 
for under the ECA, were used by employers in order to get leverage in negotiating 
with the Union employment contracts that embodied the requisite amount and type 
of 'flexibility'. These tactics included lockouts, the explicit threat of redundancy, 
and refusal to negotiate collective employment contracts. A number of the port 
companies adopted these tactics, along with some of the stevedoring companies. 
One of the worst cases involved Associated Stevedores at Tauranga under the 
direction of Les Dickson, who was the Managing Director and co-founder of (and 
a substantial shareholder in) the company. Dickson, who became Chairman of the 
New Zealand Stevedoring Employers Association in 1990, 'telegraphed' his 
39 As quoted in New Zealand International Business, February/March 1992. 
40 Ibid. 
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approach in a paper presented at a conference on waterfront reform which I 
attended in June 1991: "My view is that an employer on the waterfront must 
decide whether or not it is mutually beneficial to encourage workers to organize. 
If the answer is yes, then an employer should ideally pursue the negotiation of a 
CEC [Collective Employment Contract]. This would certainly encourage worker 
organization.,,41 The inference that I drew from this comment, in light of the 
tenor of his speech, was that he did not regard 'worker organization' as desirable. 
Unlike New Zealand Stevedoring, Dickson sought complete freedom to use casual 
labour, as and when required, by attempting to abolish the restrictions on casuals 
contained in the expired Tauranga port schedule. These restrictions were 
threefold: gangs comprising only casuals were not permitted, permanent 
employees had to operate ship's gear and other equipment which required 
certification, and the number of casuals that could be engaged was limited to 50% 
of permanent employees (Kiely 1991). After the award had expired, Dickson 
attempted what in legal terms is described as a "unilateral variation of contract" 
(ibid: 1991 : 12). He refused to negotiate collective contracts, and in a (somewhat 
hamfisted) attempt to assert his managerial prerogative, issued individual 
employment contracts which did not contain the restrictions on casual labour that 
had been contained in the expired port schedule. 
A case was then taken by the Union to the Employment Court, which gave rise to 
a landmark decision, in July 1991, on the rights of employers under s 19(4) of the 
ECA to vary contracts which had expired (see Kiely and Caisley 1993:57). Kiely 
writes: "The employers' argument was basically that the matters omitted from the 
individual contracts were essentially collective in nature and could not properly be 
incorporated into an individual employment contract. The Court . . . considered 
41 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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that the terms did concern the individual employee either directly or indirectly and 
accordingly had to be included in the individual employment contract" (1991: 13). 
Although Associated Stevedores lost the case, it then entered into negotiations for 
a collective employment contract and in September 1991 threatened a 'partial 
lockout' when the Union refused to abolish the casual ratio. Under this type of 
lockout the company simply 'locked out' the conditions in watersiders' existing 
individual employment contracts relating to the restrictions on casual labour. The 
company's position was that these conditions would be locked out until its 
employees agreed to a contract without these restrictions.42 The Union challenged 
the lockout, but the Employment Court ruled that it was lega1.43 Although 
Dickson was not able to substantially alter the situation with respect to using 
casual labour, by continually using such (legally sanctioned) tactics he kept his 
employees on individual employment contracts.44 
Negotiations at most ports occurred under the cloud of possible further 
redundancies, particularly on the part of the port companies. Some employers 
even used the threat of redundancy as a bargaining tactic. I mentioned above the 
case involving Ports of Auckland Ltd where threatened redundancies (under the 
guise of restructuring) forced workers into accepting a collective employment 
42 National Business Review, 6/9/91. 
43 Technically, according to rulings of the Employment Court, a partial lockout in negotiations for a 
new employment contract does not amount to a 'unilateral variation' of the contract. In practice, 
however, it may amount to the same thing. Kiely et. al. note: "When an employer engages in a 
partial lockout of this type, it is not a variation of the contract. The contract remains extant, and 
the employer is clearly in breach of the contract. However, if certain conditions are met, the breach 
of contract is rendered lawful, pursuant to s 64 [of the ECA]. If at any time the fundamental 
circumstances change, the employer's actions may be deprived of the protection they othelwise 
have, and the breach of contract would again become unlawful. Accordingly, it is clear that the 
contract itself has not been varied" (1993:64). Ross Wilson makes the point more forcefully: "The 
courts have ruled that it is legitimate for employers to unilaterally change the terms ... of contracts 
once old agreements or contracts expire, provided due notice is given and the employer claims that 
the change is in fact a lock out" (1992:5). 
44 Watersiders employed by Associated Stevedores were kept on individual employment contracts 
from 1991 until 1994, when the company was taken over by BHP which negotiated a new 
collective employment contract. 
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contract with a flat hourly rate (which eliminated all overtime payments). 
Similarly in June 1991, prior to the negotiation of employment contracts, the 
Lyttelton Port Company announced 130 redundancies (of watersiders, harbour 
workers and clerical staff).45 Then, less than a month later, the company further 
detailed plans to seek a 12-14% wage cut in negotiations.46 
In some cases, negotiations were very lengthy and contracts were not finalized 
until well into 1992. This was particularly the case with port companies which, in 
many cases, negotiated contracts that integrated the workforces of harbour workers 
and watersiders.47 After the abolition of the Commission, and the attendant shift 
to direct employment, the distinction between harbour workers and watersiders 
was briefly retained. The two occupational groups were covered by separate 
(national skeletal) awards. But this distinction was effectively abolished by the 
ECA. This was expressed by the Secretary of the Lyttelton Harbour Workers 
Union in the following way: 
Under the new Act there is no demarcation as such. So accordingly 
the employer has that on a plate, unless we have an ability to put 
protections in. The only way we can do that is by approaching it on 
a joint basis. (Interview) 
The fact that the two unions had to cooperate in bargaining was not new, because 
they had cooperated in this manner for twenty years in relation to the composite 
workforce agreement in the container terminal. But it did pose the problem of 
integrating two different workforces and two groups of union members. The same 
union secretary commented that: 
45 Christchurch Press, 22/6/91. 
46 Christchurch Press, 5/7/91. 
47 To recap, 'integrated' workforces of this type were employed by port companies only, because 
these companies replaced the harbour boards which had formerly employed harbour workers. 
there will have to be an amalgamation effectively of principles and 
conditions, wages, remuneration, to some extent. If you're going to 
have one document then while there may be variations within it, 
depending on what people do and what their functions are, there 
will be ... a fairly wide range of common general conditions, like 
overtime, sick pay, holiday pay, redundancy, and we'll have to 
negotiate that amongst ourselves first and then negotiate that 
position with the employer. (Interview) 
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Indeed, these negotiations required a good deal of preparatory work by the two 
unions. For example, at the Port of Lyttelton, the local union branches spent a 
great deal of time discussing matters, prior to entering into negotiations with the 
Lyttelton Port Company for a collective contract that covered both watersiders and 
harbour workers. The negotiations for this contract took some seven months (until 
mid-1992). 
(4.4) Summary 
Overall, the first bargaining round under the ECA resulted in the settlement of 
collective employment contracts. There were only a handful of companies (like 
Ports of Auckland Ltd and Associated Stevedores) which insisted on individual 
contracts, in an attempt to drive a wedge between the local branch of the Union 
and its members. However, the actual bargaining outcomes, in terms of wages 
and conditions, varied considerably between companies and ports. Overall, it 
appears that most companies achieved changes in working times, and many 
companies achieved pay cuts (so-called 'financial flexibility') relative to the levels 
under the previous port schedules. At least 40% of all watersiders (namely those 
employed by NZS) experienced cuts in pay rates and changes in working times. 
Earlier in this section there is a quotation from Bob Seamer, the General Manager 
of the largest stevedoring company in the country (New Zealand Stevedoring), 
which suggests that he had been criticized by other employers for recognizing the 
Waterfront Workers Union as the legitimate 'bargaining agent' of his employees. 
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However, in the end, most employers were prepared to recognize the Union and to 
negotiate collective employment contracts. This was so for two reasons. First, it 
was difficult for employers to circumvent the Union insofar as it was entrenched at 
the port level. Second, in the environment created by the ECA, employers were in 
any case able to achieve pay cuts, changes to working times and, in the case of 
port companies, integrated workforces. 
In the next section I will deal with the threat that casual labour posed to the Union, 
and how it was able to retain some semblance of control over the size and 
composition of the casual workforce. Indeed the modicum of control that the 
Union continued to exert over the labour supply is the main element of continuity 
with the pre-reform period. Then in the section which follows I will argue that the 
climate created by the ECA has led to an erosion of watersiders' control over work 
practices. This is the main element of discontinuity relative to the pre-reform 
period. 
(5) The Re-Casualization of Labour? 
One of the best outcomes [of port reform] has been the flexibility to 
use casual employees. The casuals want to work well, knowing 
there could be a permanent job down the track. Equally, the 
permanents don't want to be shown up by the casuals. 
Stevedoring Company Manager.48 
After the introduction of the ECA in 1991, there were no moves by the established 
employers of watersiders to completely recasualize the industry. Instead they 
adopted what might be termed a 'core and periphery' model (see Atkinson 1984), 
employing a 'core' of pelmanent employees that was supplemented by a 
'peripheral' group of casual workers. Les Dickson (of Associated Stevedores) 
commented in a speech, in 1991, that: 
48 As quoted in NZBRT (1990:8). 
The challenge for stevedoring companies heading into the new 
environment . . . is to mix and match the engagement of a work 
force [sic] comprising the right balance of permanent skilled 
employees, with the ability to engage part time and non permanent 
workers to supplement [them] as required.49 
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The preferences of companies differed in terms of the size of the 'core' and 
whether they tolerated restrictions on casual labour. At the risk of oversimplifying 
employer strategies, there were two different sets of 'employer preferences' in this 
area. These were shaped by the interests and operations of the companies in 
question, in concert with the resistance by the Union to attempts to increase the 
proportion of casual labour used on the waterfront. 
The first strategy utilized by some employers was to push the number of 
permanent workers down to the 'bare minimum', coupled with the flexibility to 
employ casual workers as and when required. As a Lyttelton Union Secretary 
commented: "The employers would like to have a very small pool of permanent, 
highly-skilled, leading-hand-type workers, who are topped-up as required with 
casuals."so Associated Stevedores, which I mentioned earlier, exemplified this 
approach insofar as it sought to increase the level of casualization by abolishing 
the casual ratio which was embodied in the port schedules that had been settled in 
1989. 
The second strategy is exemplified by the approach of New Zealand Stevedoring, 
which did not seek to alter the casual ratio in the employment contracts that it 
negotiated. NZS's General Manager, Bob Seamer, stated in 1992 that: 
We are opposed to significant casualization of the industry by an 
unskilled . . . work force. In the face of some opposition both 
49 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
50 As quoted in People's Voice, 1/7/91. 
internally and externally from some industly factions, we maintain 
that casualization would reverse the newly gained benefits of better 
productivity, quality and safety achieved since 1989 .... The 
company recognises the need for casual staff during work peaks, 
particularly in ports where seasonal exports are an important factor, 
but only in non-skilled positions.51 
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NZS employed a larger number of permanent workers than some of its 
competitors were prepared to, instead seeking maximum temporal flexibility from 
them. Other companies fell somewhere between the two poles, with respect to the 
relative size of the permanent workforce and the casual workforce. 
This 'core and periphelY' type of labour market was precisely the arrangement 
which had existed in the 1950s and 1960s with the consent of the unions. 
However the difference is that, in this earlier period, non-union casuals were 
accepted because watersiders had security of tenure in the labour market by virtue 
of the registration systems which operated: exclusive bureau registers for 
watersiders which limited the size of the labour supply available to employers, and 
a union registration system which conferred preference upon union members. 
Indeed, based on these registration systems, the port unions had an interest in 
allowing the use of casuals insofar as it allowed them to keep bureau registers 
restricted (in order to keep average wages up). Equally, individual watersiders 
further benefited from the use of casuals as a supplementary workforce insofar as 
it allowed them to take holidays and days off during peak periods (see Chapter 4). 
It was only after downward pressure was placed on bureau register strengths in the 
1970s that the unions sought to limit the number of casuals by establishing 
supplementary registers. 
After the Waterfront Industry Commission was abolished, and the legal and 
institutional underpinnings of the labour market were removed, watersiders no 
51 Speech to Port and Shipping Reform Conference, Auckland, 27/3/92. 
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longer had security of tenure in the labour market insofar as they were directly 
employed by firms. In this new environment casual labour became the greatest 
threat to union control of the labour supply and the labour market. Casual labour 
was a threat to permanent watersiders' jobs, which is why the percentage 
restriction on casuals was so important. But it was the possibility of non-union 
casual labour that posed the greatest threat, insofar as non-union casuals could 
undermine the terms and conditions of work of permanently employed 
watersiders. 
In the first round of negotiating employment contracts in 1991, the Union had 
considerable success in retaining the percentage restrictions on casual labour 
which had been encoded in the expired port schedules (25% at most ports), and in 
keeping casuals out of skilled positions. The casual ratio was abolished in 
employment contracts negotiated with companies at a handful of ports only. For 
example, the fruit-loading ports of Nelson and Napier had provision for 
unrestricted numbers of casuals for 16 weeks (the height of the export season) 
under the port schedules that were settled in 1989. Under the ECA this provision 
was transformed into unrestricted casualism at these ports. This was assisted by 
anti-union tactics of companies such as Omniport at Napier, which was formed in 
1990 to load apples for the Apple and Pear Board. Similarly the port company at 
Nelson (Port Nelson Ltd) sought (and achieved) the unrestricted use of casual 
labour. 52 
At all other pOliS, however, the casual ratio was retained. Even the more 
'aggressive' pOli companies, like the Lyttelton Port Company, retained the casual 
ratio (which in this case was 25%). To be sure, some of the contracts, like the one 
52 Indeed this was one of the two main 'benefits' of the ECA identified by the Doug Green, the 
Managing Director of Port Nelson Ltd. At a conference in 1991 he stated: "From Port Nelson's 
point of view, the Employment Contracts Act has given us the opportunity to employ unlimited 
casuals throughout the year and to offer our employees individual contracts." (Speech to Shipping, 
Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91) 
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with this company, stated that employers could hire above the ratio, when 
required, but first they had to consult with the local branch of the Union. In some 
cases, the strength of a particular branch of the WWU enforced further limits upon 
firms at some ports. For example, when Associated Stevedores (which pushed to 
eliminate the casual ratio at Tauranga) intermittently operated at Auckland, the 
local branch of the Union forced it to cross-hire watersiders from other companies 
up to the 25% casual ratio. 
The Union's success in retaining percentage restrictions on casual labour, by 
encoding them in the enterprise-level employment contracts which were 
negotiated in 1991, was undoubtedly assisted by the 'preferences' of companies, 
like New Zealand Stevedoring, which were not seeking to substantially alter the 
ratio. Equally, however, it was a result of determined opposition by the Union to 
changes in this area. The case of Associated Stevedores at Tauranga amply 
demonstrates this. The two ports where the casual ratio was lost were the ones 
that were subject to substantial fluctuations in labour requirements anyway (and 
did not employ many permanent workers), and which already had unrestricted 
casualism - albeit only for four months of the year - under the port schedules. 
Of equal importance to the formal provisions of employment contracts which 
limited the use of casual labour, was getting the casuals to join the Union, in order 
to exercise union discipline over them. One union official, at the Port of Lyttelton, 
expressed the threat posed by non-union casuals in the following manner: 
You're ... competing against casual labour in terms of rates .... 
You're competing with that great pool of unemployed who 
effectively have to work for $6.54 an hour or lose the dole. So ... 
that will be the market force pressure to drive down wages and 
conditions, and its happening already .... [Casuals] will undercut 
those already there, so that they will then be in the position of 
having to make a decision about cutting their conditions to 
maintain their level of work. ... The bottom line is that you have to 
unionize those workers. You have to get them to understand its in 
their interest as well to have protections in place. Otherwise they 
end up competing against themselves as well. (Interview) 
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Because of the 'freedom of association' clauses in the ECA, employment contracts 
could not stipulate that casual workers had to join the Union. Rather, such 
restrictions had to be achieved by the Union's branches informally at the local 
level. In doing so, they drew on organizational resources and networks which had 
been retained from the previous era when the port unions had joint control of the 
labour supply. Indeed the Union had considerable success in unionizing casuals. 
In 1991, at least, over 95% of casuals at all ports were members of the WWU. 
Once again, in many cases, the Union's success in this area was assisted by the 
fact that it was able to incorporate into employment contracts provisions for 'B 
registers'. As I noted above, the majority of contracts negotiated with New 
Zealand Stevedoring had this provision, as did contracts with companies such as 
the Lyttelton Port Company. Under these provisions, watersiders who were made 
redundant (or opted for voluntary redundancy) could be placed on these registers, 
which gave them priority for work as casuals. Typically, there was little difficulty 
in getting redundant watersiders, who had already been union members, to join the 
Union. And in many cases the remaining casuals were the same ones who had 
worked under the port schedules negotiated in 1989, and already were members of 
the Union. 
At the Port of Lyttelton, for instance, the provlSlon for 'B' registers in the 
employment contracts settled with the two of the three companies, New Zealand 
Stevedoring and the Lyttelton Port Company, greatly assisted the Union in keeping 
casuals unionized. 53 As well as ex-watersiders, these registers contained the 
names primarily of relatives of watersiders. A foreman who worked for the 
53 The third company, Pacifica Shipping, did not employ any casual workers. 
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Lyttelton branch of New Zealand Stevedoring said: "They've got about sixty 
[permanent employees] in Lyttelton now, and as the need arises they take on 
relatives of the watersiders. You must be a son or a son-in-law or something to 
get a job as a casual" (interview). When I was conducting fieldwork at this port in 
1991 the Union Secretary told me that, not only were all casuals auxiliary 
members of the union, they all paid a union fee. 54 In this sense, the casuals were 
'semi-permanent'. The same kinship networks and ties which underpinned the 
formal bureau registers were utilized in keeping a modicum of control of the 
composition of the labour supply. 
In Chapter 10, I demonstrated that the formal registration process was underpinned 
by kinship networks which were drawn upon by the (former) port unions in 
recruiting watersiders to the bureau registers. Given the abolition of the formal 
joint control of the labour supply, the Union's branches continued to tap into these 
already-existing 'informal' networks and ties, which underpinned the fOIDlal 
organization of the labour market, in order to keep control of the composition of 
the supply of casual labour. 
The Port of Wellington is another example where the local branch of the Union 
managed to achieve control over hiring casuals. At this port, the Union Secretary 
maintained a prioritized list of men who could work as casuals (it was referred to 
as "the casual list"). The individuals whose names were on the list were, 
predominantly, relatives of waterside workers employed at the port. The men on 
the list were issued a Union card, and the Secretary sent them a copy of the Union 
newsletter. The 'casual list' was circulated to the three employers in the port 
which (according to the Union Secretary), in the main, they used when hiring 
casuals. This was done under threat from the Union of the permanent employees 
54 As I noted in an earlier section, the exception at this port was Independent Fisheries which 
employed non-union casuals. 
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on a job stopping work if a company hired non-union casuals. Thus in this port 
the Union acted as a de facto labour broker, by regulating the hiring of casual 
labour. 
At many ports, however, it was the pressure applied by the permanent watersiders 
to the casuals, as much as the efforts of union officials in 'policing' the labour 
supply, which resulted in them joining the WWU. The Ports of Napier and 
Nelson, where unrestricted casualism was permitted, are a good example. A 
national union official said that permanent men in such ports applied pressure to 
casuals to join the Union: "It might not be exactly legal, but it happens" 
(fieldnotes). In response to my questioning as to why the majority of casuals 
joined the Union, another official commented that: "they have to work beside our 
members" (fieldnotes). 
To be sure, getting casuals to join the Union did not solve all of the problems that 
they posed. This was expressed by a Lyttelton union official who said to me that, 
although casuals may join the Union, "they don't necessarily take any notice of 
anything that the union has to say" (fieldnotes). A comparable example involving 
permanent workers occurred when Omniport, a stevedoring company in Napier, 
recruited 23 men "straight off the street" (in the words of a WWU official). 
Although these new permanent workers joined the Union, they then agreed 
(against the policy of the Union) to an employment contract which allowed casuals 
to do skilled job. 
Nonetheless, in the 24 months after the contract was settled in 1991, the Omniport 
workers, according to a national official, had gone from "an arm's length 
relationship" with the Union to having "become much more active within the 
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Union."ss Although these were pelmanent employees, and thus had a long-term 
'stake' in their jobs, the point still applies in the case of casuals. There is no 
doubt, that having casuals unionized (irrespective of the degree of notice they take 
of the Union), organizationally, is extremely important. This is because it is the 
first step in bringing them into the fold, in making them realize that their own 
interests are served by collective organization and representation. In the climate 
created by the ECA, where non-union bargaining agents are always a possibility, it 
is particularly important. 
Undoubtedly, it was the fact that the Union was already well-organized, and 
'entrenched' at the port level, that allowed it to retain the 'casual ratio' (at all but 
two ports) and to keep casual workers unionized. The formal 'joint control' over 
the labour supply that existed in the regulated period translated into a considerable 
degree of informal control by the Union after deregulation. All attempts to 
recasualize the industry, and to introduce non-union casuals, came up against the 
barrier of labour that was already unionized and well-organized at the port level. 
Equally, however, the majority of employers tolerated an extensive union presence 
on the waterfront because, in the climate created by the ECA, and under the 
provisions of the employment contracts that they negotiated, they were able to 
substantially erode control that watersiders previously exerted over work practices. 
It is the organization of work in the post-reform period that I will now address. 
(6) Reorganizing Work 
A paradoxical situation developed on the waterfront in the post-reform period. On 
the one hand, gang sizes were drastically cut, in some cases by as much as half 
55 Personal Communication, 14/7/94. 
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(see Chapter 13). But, by all estimates, levels of productivity increased. Consider 
the following figures regarding the Port of Tauranga. 
Table 14.1: Port Tauranga Productivity 
Cargo Tonnes Per Gross 
G H ang our 
1989 1990 1991 
Logs 74.2 78.8 114.9 
Bulk 89.8 123.7 166.8 
Kiwifruit 52.1 56.4 69.3 
Butter 24.3 25.8 30.3 
Dairy Products 24.3 25.8 91.1 
Steel 53.6 76.6 91.1 
General 37.0 45.5 57.2 
Ro-ro 125.8 170.5 192.3 
Conventional 28.7 29.9 41.0 
Source: Port Development International 
(September 1991:51). 
That these increases were achieved after gang SIzes had been substantially 
decreased is significant. For instance, Trebeck (1990:5) notes that gang sizes for 
loading logs were decreased by half, which translated approximately to a 150% 
increase in productivity on this particular operation. Insofar as gang sizes 
decreased on all operations at this port, significant increases in productivity 
occurred across the board. 
Many other ports experienced similar increases in productivity. For example, 
Ports of Auckland Ltd reduced manning levels by 26%, yet productivity at 
conventional wharves increased by 50% (from 10.15 to 15.26 tonnes per man 
hour).s6 Similarly, container exchange rates at this port increased in 1991 by 
21.5%.57 And the Lyttelton Port Company reported a 34% increase III 
productivity per employee in 1989 and another 28% increase in 1990.58 
56 Figures quoted in National Business Review, 24/1/91. 
57 New Zealand International Business, November 1991. 
58 Lyttelton Port Company Circular, 8/12/90. 
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These estimates must be treated cautiously (patiicularly insofar as companies are 
prone to presenting productivity increases in the best possible light), but there is a 
general consensus that levels of productivity increased dramatically in the post-
reform period. Undoubtedly part of the explanation for this increase in 
productivity, which occurred alongside gang-manning reductions, is technological 
change. New technology was introduced by companies in order to achieve a 
competitive edge. As I noted in section two of this chapter, the port companies 
invested heavily in container technology. Similarly New Zealand Stevedoring 
invested in new forklifts, automatic log-loading equipment, and new equipment 
for loading scrap metal and wood pulp. 59 
However, the introduction of new technology does not fully explain the magnitude 
of the productivity increases at ports such as Tauranga. Only on some operations 
can productivity increases be explained in these terms. For example, the 
introduction of 'spiralveyor' equipment at the Port of Napier undoubtedly 
accounted for most of the productivity increases in loading apples at that port.60 
In many cases, however, the investment in new technology merely resulted in the 
introduction of more of a technology already in use (such as container handling 
equipment), in order to cope with increased cargo volumes. Productivity increases 
in the post-reform period are not just a result of the fact that employers have 
introduced new technology; rather they have done this in concert with eroding the 
terms on which work is carried out. As one watersider poignantly commented: 
"They told us with modemization and technology, the worker would benefit. ... 
[Instead] they're using this depression and unemployment to squeeze every last 
drop they can.,,61 
59 Comment by Bob Seamer in a speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 
27/6/91. 
60 See NZBRT (1990:16). 
61 As quoted in New Zealand International Business, FebruarylMarch 1992. 
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Increases in productivity, at least in part, are attributable to the erosion of a good 
deal of the control that watersiders formerly exerted over work practices. In the 
pre-reform period, the centrality of labour within the workflow systems on the 
waterfront (which continued even after containerization), together with the hiring 
arrangements under the bureau system, allowed water siders to exert considerable 
control on the job - despite the potential of container technology to increase 
employer control of work. However in the post-reform period, following the shift 
to direct employment, the workplace power of watersiders has declined 
substantially. The potential for increased managerial prerogative on the job has, to 
a greater extent than ever before, been realized. 
The primary consequence of direct employment was that employers regained 
control of hiring. As I noted in the previous chapter, after the Commission was 
abolished in 1989, some companies engaged in discriminatory preferential hiring 
(by excluding active unionists) and attempted to drive a wedge between the Union 
and its members. The fact that employers have regained control of hiring and 
dismissal, in the environment created by the ECA and in the context of massive 
redundancies, has transformed relationships on the job. 
From the employers' point of view, one of the favourable aspects of the 
Employment Contracts Act is that it further facilitated the introduction of what the 
Chairman of the Stevedoring Employers' Association, Les Dickson, referred to as 
"flexible work regimes".62 First and foremost, demarcation boundaries between 
watersiders and harbour workers have been eroded, and in many cases completely 
abolished. This affected the port companies in particular, which had previously 
employed separate workforces of harbour workers and watersiders. To be sure, 
62 Speech to Shipping, Waterfront and Ports Conference, Auckland, 27/6/91. 
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the task boundaries that the WWU had previously attempted to maintain had been 
gradually eroded since 1989. But the ECA, in one fell swoop, did on the 
conventional wharves what had been done in the container terminals 20 years 
earlier (albeit on terms favourable to the unions): it integrated the workforce and 
eliminated work jurisdictions. The Port of Gisborne Ltd, in November 1991, was 
the first port company to arrive at a fully integrated workforce of watersiders and 
harbour workers. Along with the Lyttelton Port Company, a number of other port 
companies were also able to achieve this. Doug Green, the managing director of 
Port Nelson Ltd, commented in 1991 that: 
The work force [sic] we now have is both flexible and multi-
skilled. An employee may be called upon to work as a watersider, 
a foreman/stevedore, a crew member or even drive a tug. In 
addition he must do normal maintenance work on the wharves and 
in the workshops. The other day our electrician worked as a 
crewman on a vessel and then drove a forklift unloading cargo. 
The result of this flexibility is that we have virtually eliminated the 
cost of idle time.63 
This was not so unusual for the Harbour Workers Union, which encompassed 
more than 20 occupational groupings (ranging from carpenters to clerical 
workers), and since the late 1980's had accepted the shift to 'multi-skilling' as a 
means of protecting workers' jobs. A Lyttelton Harbour Workers Union 
representative commented: 
63 Ibid. 
our workforce, the harbour workers workforce, is about as multi-
skilled and as flexible as probably any in New Zealand .... You 
can have a crane driver driving a forklift in the morning, after 
smoko he might take the launch out to drop a pilot off, then he'll do 
the weighbridge in the afternoon, then maybe run the incinerator 
for the last couple of hours of the day. I mean that flexibility has 
been there for quite some time .... Probably the last two years for 
that group of workers. But other groups of workers like, say, 
carpenters and labourers, have always been used in an absolutely 
huge range of activities, from tradesmen's assistants to all those 
other ancillary things, for many years. Mainly because it gives 
them access to overtime and money, and it was a handy pool for the 
employer of course. (Interview) 
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Another harbour worker remarked that "the multi-skilling has really saved our 
backsides over the years" (fieldnotes). 
However the subsumption ()f waterside workers into generic port company 
workforces, with considerable task flexibility, was a major step for the Waterfront 
Workers Union. Historically it had always attempted to defend its occupational 
boundaries relative to the harbour workers, right up to 1988 when it won 
jurisdiction over driving equipment on the wharf (see Chapter 13). An employee 
of the Lyttelton Port Company, himself a union delegate, expressed the magnitude 
of the change in the following terms: 
There is no such word, basically, as demarcation, simply because 
they can get a water sider to drive any plant, but they can also get a 
harbour worker to go and do lashings on ships, and one thing and 
another. In other words, a watersider can do any job because 
you're all getting paid the same money, you're all employed by the 
same employer, and your job is basically the same, you can do all 
those functions. (Interview) 
Under the collective employment contract that was settled with this particular port 
company, there was established in the cargo handling area a pool of approximately 
40 employees who were allocated, as the need arose, to supplement those in 
various aspects of the Company's operation. When the contract was first 
introduced, there were only a limited number of men who had the training to swap 
between the various positions. Waterside workers did not immediately begin to 
drive the container crane, nor did harbour workers work in the holds of ships. 
However, under the provisions of the contract, this was limited only by the extent 
of training. The Company's cargo services manager commented that: "certainly 
we're getting more and more cooperation out of, not so much the unions, but the 
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workforce and the union indirectly .... We're getting the cooperation ... to move 
people around to get the maximum use out of them" (interview). 
Although the port companies did, by and large, integrate their workforces, the 
WWU still attempted to police task boundaries with the harbour workers in other 
areas. For example, in 1991 Ports of Wellington Ltd (a port company) secured a 
contract to unload a barge carrying sawn timber, which was owned by Sea Trader 
Ltd. The port company had for two months cross-hired watersiders from 
Container Terminals Ltd to do this work.64 However, in July of that year, Ports of 
Wellington elected to use its own employees, who were harbour workers. The 
local branch of the WWU immediately formed a picket, which was unsuccessful 
in preventing the work from being carried out, and became subject to legal action 
by the company. 65 The Union's national officers wanted members of the 
Wellington branch to walk offthe job in protest, but they refused to do so. Given 
the legal sanctions that employers could bring to bear in this type of case, it 
became increasingly difficult to police task boundaries. 
As well as the erosion of task boundaries, and consequently the all but complete 
elimination of demarcation disputes, an end was put to practices on the job (such 
as 'spelling') which had been central to the 'indulgency pattern' prior to 1989. 
This is significant, insofar as spelling was one of the more salient manifestations 
of the workplace power of watersiders, albeit supported by high gang strengths 
and the hiring arrangements under the bureau system, in the post-container period. 
Its elimination was in no small part due to the substantial reductions in gang sizes 
which occurred after 1989. But the fact that this practice disappeared altogether is 
also an indication of the extent to which relationships on the job have changed, 
64 Ports of Wellington Ltd was one of the port companies that did not employ any watersiders at 
this time, and was only minimally involved in stevedoring work. 
65 Port o/Wellington Ltd v New Zealand Waterfront Workers' Union [1991] 2 ERNZ. 
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and that patterns of employer indulgency have been replaced by greater (although 
not complete) employer prerogative. 
One of the effects of these changes is that foremen now have more power on the 
job. A foreman commented that direct employment made his job of supervising 
gangs "a lot easier, because you get far more cooperation if you're working with 
the same people. And of course the spelling has stopped" (interview). But the 
change in the power of the foreman is not just a result of developing a better 
rapport with permanently employed watersiders. Whereas under the bureau 
system, foremen could do little to exert their authority in the workplace, because 
the indirect employment relationship cut across attempts to impose industrial 
discipline on the job, with the shift to direct employment foremen are part of a 
management system which now wields the threat of dismissal. This has, to some 
extent, allowed the potential of container technology for greater control, which 
hinges on the amenability of container jobs to direct supervision, to be realized. 
Indeed, watersiders work with the fear of redundancy hanging over their heads. 
One watersider I spoke to said that "the threat of redundancy, the threat that 
someone else will come along and take your job, plays havoc" (fieldnotes). 
Watersiders are constantly under the pressure to improve their performances. In 
the new competitive environment companies are under considerable pressure to 
tum ships around quickly, and they often use this to justify attempts to further 
assert managerial prerogative. In 1991 a union official at Lyttelton showed me a 
fax which had been sent to the Lyttelton Port Company by a shipping company 
that threatened to divert cargo to the Port of Timaru if ship turnaround times were 
not improved. This threat, in tum, had been used by the Port Company to justify 
an attempt to put pressure on its employees, under the threat of redundancy if that 
particular trade was lost. As New Zealand Stevedoring'S General Manager, Bob 
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Searner, commented: "they now understand that if we are not making a fair return 
then they have no future. ,,66 
An indication of the pressure applied by companies to their employees is that 
some companies are seeking to go outside the terms of their employment 
contracts. In the words of one union official, some companies wanted watersiders 
"to do them favours" (fieldnotes). This was the case in 1991 at the Port of 
Lyttelton where, after negotiations with the Lyttelton Port Company had been 
concluded following several months of very protracted negotiations, the Company 
then applied pressure to watersiders to work overtime. A watersider explained the 
situation to me in the following manner: 
We have a guaranteed wage, and we have to work in a particular 
place, my shift is for four days, that's with the Port Company, and a 
fifth day I have to be available. Now, after that, once I've done my 
five days, I don't have to be, according to the award, available. 
And some of our guys who have other lives . . . away from the 
waterfront, are now having the pressure put on them by people 
saying they're not playing the game, because they don't want to do 
a fifth, sixth or a seventh day .... They have an agreement with you 
. . . but as soon as we get it signed up, they start to put the acid on 
people to do more .... And of course to get this award, we've 
dropped a hell of a lot in wages, we've dropped all penal rates 
virtually, every day now we get the same amount of pay whether its 
Monday or Sunday .... So we've given away things like meal 
money, shift allowances, all these things have gone. And of course 
they've got the award, but now they're wanting these little bits 
more from people, suggesting that they have to do a little bit more 
than what the award really says .... He [the employer] puts all sorts 
of pressure on you, and those individuals who haven't got the balls 
to stand up to him very quickly agree to come to work. (Interview) 
Equally, watersiders can no longer stop jobs in the way that they used to. Whereas 
considerable workplace power was gained by utilizing the strike threat on 
container jobs, this has now gone. The sanctions that can be brought to bear under 
66 Speech to Port and Shipping Reform Conference, Auckland, 27/3/92. 
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the ECA for illegal strikes are significant, and watersiders are conscious of losing 
their jobs. As a union delegate commented: 
Today, all the power has been taken away from the worker. You 
know, strike action, now its a 14 days notice thing. So most issues 
are over. If you had a major issue on the job, and you wanted to 
take some action, but the boss said 'sorry, but we're not interested', 
so you put 14 days notice in, by the time that's done the ship's 
sailed. Its gone, the issue and argument's gone. (Interview) 
To be sure, the other side of companies now engaging in 'man-management' is 
that many have introduced new management techniques. In some cases these have 
been drawn from contemporary human resources management or from 'total 
quality management' (or an amalgam of the two). Some companies, like NZS, 
have introduced a 'consultative' approach as a way of managing workplace 
change. Each branch of this company has a 'management committee', which 
comprises representatives of management, foremen and watersiders. The 
committees are supposed to meet in a 'high trust' environment. A union delegate 
from the Lyttelton branch of this company provided the following description of 
how this worked in practice: 
we have a bitch session up there, once every two months. We sit in 
with the guys and we get all their problems, write them all down, 
and take them upstairs and sort them out up there. Everyone has 
the right to have their say, and they do listen .... We can actually 
go and talk to our manager. You know, we've got a meeting with 
him today, which they asked for, just to fill us in on what's 
happening. I mean, we do liaise with them, whereas at some ports 
they do have problems. (Interview) 
However, later in the interview, the same delegate qualified this latter remark by 
saying that: "They're still trying to screw ya, I mean that's the typical boss. 
You've always got to be on your toes with him .... If they can make a quick dollar 
somewhere they'll take it. If you let 'em away with it, or if they can break a 
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condition they'll break it. They'll do that if they can get half a chance. So you 
have to police it, you have to police it a lot actually" (interview). 
Other compames, such as the Lyttelton Port Company, have introduced job 
appraisal systems. One union official said: 
They tried to start it ... with an all-up round of employee seminars 
for an hour. No-one actually understood a bloody word they were 
saying. It was absolutely horrendously bloody handled, and then 
they tried to implement it in terms of people writing up their own 
job functions and then evaluating that with their immediate 
superior. (Interview) 
Under these systems, the purported intention is to detail the nature of 'job 
functions', in order to establish training and skill requirements and forth, as well 
as to establish goal and performance criteria. But in many cases these are simply 
seen by union members as another means of management control. 67 In this 
particular case, the system was 'boycotted' by the Union, on the grounds that 
"they'll be saying performance-based evaluations will equate to your 
remuneration, at the end of the day" (interview). 
Similarly the consultative 'training seminars' held by some companies, often as 
part of job appraisal schemes, were viewed with contempt by some watersiders. 
One watersider, who worked for Pacifica Shipping, said that: "the idea now is that 
you have training seminars, and all the rest of it, but what good is it to them if you 
can't get your message through to the other side, and if you've actually got 
someone there that's not even listening to you. I think its a waste of time. I 
actually tum off within the seminars and things, unless I see some actual progress 
being made. And I don't see it" (interview). When watersiders spoke to me about 
67 This view is supported by a body of literature within industrial sociology (for example, see 
Austrin 1991; Sewell and Wilkinson 1992). 
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their employers, comments like "bastards", and "trying to screw us", and "shaking 
hands with one hand while putting the other in your pocket", were not uncommon. 
These were an important counterbalance to employer rhetoric about effecting 
'consultative change', 'worker commitment, and so forth. Often such comments 
by watersiders were made in reference to their conditions of work on the job. 
One watersider lamented the decline of worker control on the job in regard to all-
weather work: "A couple of drops of water on a piece of paper and ... we would 
have been out. Now we have men working till there's water dripping off their 
arses .... [They] were out in the hail the other day" (interview). Overwhelmingly, 
however, the condition of work which was seen by watersiders I spoke to as 
having the most detrimental impact on their lives, was the hours they were 
expected to work. Bob Seamer himself alluded to the impact on his employees' 
lives in the following statement which lauded anti-social hours of work: 
Today work on the wharves is a 24 hour a day, seven day a week 
operation. It is perhaps one of the most anti-social jobs going. The 
arrival and departure of ships dictate the rules. Our employees can 
be called in on any shift with little or no advanced [sic] warning. 
They never really know when they're going to be home .... It is 
the commitment of our employees and their response to the new 
environment which has so transformed the efficiencies of our 
waterfront.68 
In light of the comments above, I would question the extent to which this 
commitment is freely given. The considerable 'human cost' of the new hours of 
work ushered in by the ECA was brought home to me in interviews that I 
conducted with watersiders and union officials. In the main, the detrimental 
effects they spoke of resulted from irregular shift work. One watersideI' said: "I 
worked yesterday afternoon, and the day night before, and now I'm back tonight. 
68 The Transportant, vol. 23, no.3, 1993. 
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It's tough, not having the continuity .... It's hard to arrange your life" (interview). 
Another (who worked for NZS) said: 
You have three shifts a day. Our first one, we call it our first, starts 
at 11 0' clock at night till 7 in the morning, then 7 till 3, and the 
next one's 3 till 11. And on a day, if you haven't done your 8 hours 
for the day, they can call you in on anyone of those shifts. Before 
you come back they've got to give you an 8 hour break. You can 
finish at three in the afternoon and bring you back at 11 0' clock 
that night and work through till 7 in the morning. So that's your 
bloody 8 hours. Its an 8 hour break, but its not 8 hours sleep. It's 
the real bad one. (Interview) 
As an Auckland union delegate commented, "Our people are expected to work 
365 days a year, and 24 hours a day .... They haven't got a stable shift. If a ship 
comes in they want them to work 24 hours a day on it.,,69 Another watersider, 
who worked for Pacifica Shipping, said: 
There's someone working every day in this company, every day, 
including Sundays. And last Sunday we worked right round the 
clock right through the night and we worked Monday .... We've 
worked right through from 7:30 in the morning till 2:00 the next 
morning to tum the ship around. If our ship's running late we carry 
on till we finish it. Thursdays, if it strikes bad weather and its late 
coming in, we'll end up working right round [the clock] to clean it 
out. (Interview) 
There is no doubt that these hours of work detrimentally affect watersiders' family 
lives. A Union Secretary told me that one watersider's wife had called him and 
asked: "God, the old man's been bitchy recently, what's happening at work?" 
(fieldnotes ). 
There are also a number of indications that, not only has the configuration of the 
working day being changed, work itself has been intensified. This is so, simply by 
69 As quoted in New Zealand International Business, February/March 1992. 
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virtue of the cuts in gang sizes which mean that watersiders have to work harder 
for longer, with only the contractually specified rest periods. Often they are beset 
with fatigue while doing so. Reflecting on this point, one watersider observed: 
The thing that's hurt the industry more than any other is the 
Employment Contracts Act, where they can tum around now and 
make us work for 24 hours. They call it forty over seven, which is 
any forty hours in the seven days. It was take it or leave it. So we 
find that we're working sometimes from seven to three and then go 
home and start again at eleven that night and work till seven the 
next morning. So you're getting eight hours on and eight hours off. 
Trying to adjust your sleeping habits is just impossible. And you 
find that about three or four o'clock in the morning and you're 
looking at a . . . container number and the numbers start to run into 
one another, and you think of the driver who's driving the crane 
with a twenty ton container swinging around in the air, and you 
know he's tired .... That's the thing I don't like, that's the most 
unpleasant thing that's happened to me in my working life. 
(Interview) 
One union secretary said that many of his members were physically exhausted and 
much of the time were "working on instinct" (fieldnotes). 
This is not to argue that there is unbridled managerial prerogative on the job. 
There is, for example, still the possibility of worker resistance particularly given 
the crucial position of labour within container operations (see Chapter 12). 
Workers are still important agents within workflow systems on the waterfront. 
And there still are instances when watersiders, supported by their Union, resist 
attempts by managers and foremen to assert their authority on the job. However, 
with the shift to direct employment, and in the climate created by the ECA, the 
character of workplace relations most definitely has changed. It is more difficult 
for watersiders to turn this potential source of workplace power (their continued 
centrality to the workflow system) into actual control on the job. The extent of 
this change is registered by the fact that watersiders now rarely walk off a job, task 
boundaries have been increasingly eroded, and the previously pervasive workplace 
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practice of spelling has been completely eliminated. For the employers this shift 
in the balance of power at the level of the workplace, in concert with technological 
change, has translated into substantial gains in productivity. 
(7) Conclusion 
The argument that I have made in this chapter is that the level of organization of 
the WWU at the port level positioned it to resist encroachments by employers 
seeking to circumvent it by breaking its coverage over watersiders. However, 
most companies were in any case prepared to tolerate a union presence on the 
waterfront in the climate created by the ECA, insofar as they have been able to 
erode through enterprise bargaining wages and conditions and to weaken 
watersiders' control of workplace practices. Indeed, the modicum of control that 
the WWU retained over the labour supply is the main element of continuity with 
the pre-reform period. Similarly, the erosion of control over work practices is the 
main element of discontinuity. This discontinuity is in part promoted by the re-
emergence of small firms as employers on the waterfront. It is to this, the return 
of small firms and casualism, that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 15 : THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE SMALL FIRM 
(1) Introduction 
In this penultimate chapter I will deal with the return of casualism and the 
challenge to the Waterfront Workers Union's control of the labour supply which 
occurred in 1992 and beyond. This challenge was predominantly effected by 
small 'new entrant' firms. Small 'carpetbagger' stevedoring companies have re-
emerged which use either workers who do not belong to the WWU, or non-union 
casual labour alone. These pose the greatest threat to the Union's control of the 
labour supply. The contrast with the pre-reform period is stark regarding the 
positioning of the Union in relation to small firms. I will identify this contrast in 
the next section. 
(2) Small Firms As Opportunity and As Threat 
In Chapter 8, I argued that the occupational registration system, which was a 
crucial institutional support of the watersiders' local unions, also had the 
unintended consequence of securing the existence of small firms. These effects of 
the way that the labour market was organized intersected when a number of the 
unions became involved in establishing small stevedoring companies in the 1970s. 
In this sense, the existence of small firms within the context of the state-regulated 
labour market supplied a significant opportunity for the unions (to set themselves 
up in business, that is). At least indirectly, then, the unions materially benefitted 
from the existence of small firms. 
I also noted that after the bureau system was abolished, and their supporting labour 
market conditions were eliminated, small stevedoring firms (including most of 
those that unions were involved in) disappeared almost overnight from New 
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Zealand's waterfront. l Without a guaranteed supply of labour from the bureau, 
which they could retain on a job-to-job basis, small firms could not survive. This 
is because they could not afford to permanently hire watersiders. 
However a new type of small firm has re-emerged in the deregulated labour 
market, in the wake of the Employment Contracts Act, as the potential to 
circumvent the Union by using 'blackleg' labour and (non-union) casuals 
increased. Unlike the small firms of the pre-reform days, these new firms are 
avowedly anti-union and in the deregulated labour market they have emerged as 
the principal threat to the Union (both to its retention of coverage of the 
workforce, as well as to wages and conditions). The Union does not support the 
type of small firm that has emerged, nor would these firms be likely to support the 
re-regulation of labour market to restore the conditions which supported their 
predecessors. These small firms are the product of a deregulated labour market. 
In the immediate post-reform period, a handful of small firms were established 
and their employees did join the WWu. However these companies were 
established before the ECA was passed in 1991, and because of the provisions of 
the award (which was negotiated under the Labour Relations Act 1987) their 
employees were required to join the Union. For example, a new entrant 
stevedoring firm called Pacific Stevedoring (which was owned by Sofrana-
Unilines and Patricks, an Australian stevedoring company) was established at 
Auckland in 1990? Although it hired 25 watersiders "straight off the street" (in 
the words of a WWU national officer), its employees remained in the Union after 
1 There are only two 'hybrid' companies still in existence. The first is New Zealand Stevedoring 
and Marshalling at Tauranga, which is jointly owned by the local branch of the Union and the New 
Zealand Lumber Company. Because of its secure contracts this company was able to survive in the 
post-reform climate (see Chapter 8). The other company is Auckland Stevedoring, which is jointly 
owned by the Auckland branch of the Union and Leonard and Dingley. It experienced 
considerable financial difficulties after the bureau system was abolished, and was only able to 
continue operating after being restructured. 
2 New Zealand International Business, February/March 1992. 
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the ECA was passed in 1991. It appears that this company was formed largely so 
that its owners could get a foothold in stevedoring in this country. Although the 
company initially won some contracts from Leonard and Dingley (a well-
established stevedoring company at the port), it subsequently collapsed at the 
beginning of 1992. 
Similarly, a small new entrant stevedoring firm called Omniport was established at 
Napier in 1990. Like Pacific Stevedoring it too hired 23 men 'off the street', who 
joined the Union because they were required to do so by the prevailing award. I 
mentioned this firm in the discussion of casual labour in the preceding chapter, 
noting that although its employees remained in the Union following the 
introduction of the ECA, they were party to a substandard employment contract 
which allowed casuals into skilled positions. However I also noted that, after this, 
the relationship between the Union and the watersiders employed by Pacific 
Stevedoring strengthened. 
Both of these new entrant firms were established during the term of the Labour 
Relations Act, and consequently their employees were required to join the Union. 
Furthermore, this union coverage was retained after the ECA was passed. 
However, the more extreme case is that of small firms established under the ECA. 
These firms have attempted, under the provisions of the Act, to circumvent the 
WWU by using workers who belong to other unions, or by exclusively using non-
union casual workers. The first to attempt by a new entrant firm to break the 
WWU's coverage, by hiring workers who belonged to a different union, occurred 
at Auckland in mid-1992. 
A company called Aotearoa Stevedoring was established there by Captain Jim 
Douglas (who was previously a manager with NZS at Auckland, and who had 40 
years experience on the waterfront), in partnership with a group of 15 Maori 
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'worker-shareholders'. These workers refused point blank to join the local branch 
of the WWU, instead joining a Maori union (Te Roopu 0 Nga Kaimahi Maori) 
that the former clerical workers trade union official and Maori activist, Syd 
Jackson, was associated with.3 I called Jim Douglas shortly after Aotearoa 
Stevedoring was formed but he refused to discuss any aspect of the company's 
operation with me. However it appears that Douglas intended to secure 
stevedoring contracts by undercutting the labour costs of the other companies at 
the port. When this objection was raised by Auckland union officials, Douglas is 
reported to have said: "I'm not interested in their pay rates, quite frankly. We are 
here to run a business efficiently and pay a dividend for our shareholders.,,4 
The WWU, and particularly its Auckland branch, were vehement in their 
opposition to this company because of its potential to undermine the wages and 
conditions of its members. After some months the company eventually secured a 
contract to unload a conventional vessel (the 'Socofl Wind') in September 1992. 
However the local branch of the Union, in concert with the New Zealand Seafarers 
Union and its Australian counterpart, erected a picket in an attempt to prevent the 
ship from being unloaded. Although the police subsequently removed the 
picketers, and the vessel was worked, all watersiders at the port later stopped work 
in protest. Indeed, Australian seafarers on the Iron Dampier refused to sail while 
the company was working. 
Furthermore the company's equipment was damaged by persons unknown. Jim 
Douglas also claimed that its container spreader had been thrown into sea.5 
Although the company blamed the Union, there was no evidence to suggest that its 
members were involved. The upshot of these developments was that the company 
was unable to secure further contracts. Undoubtedly the strength of the resistance 
3 See Roth (I 993: 199). 
4 As quoted in Roth (ibid). 
5 Christchurch Press, 111 0/92. 
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(in the form of the organized picket and strike) by the waterfront unions to 
Aotearoa Stevedoring played a part in 'warning off other shipping companies 
from entering into contracts with this company. Aotearoa Stevedoring folded in 
June 1993. 
The fact that the only company that deliberately and systematically attempted to 
break the WWU's coverage promptly collapsed speaks to the degree of control 
that the Union managed to retain over the labour supply following the passage of 
the ECA. However, the Union continued to be challenged in this area. As we 
shall see in the next section, one of the strongest challenges came from other small 
stevedoring companies that emerged after the collapse of Aotearoa Stevedoring. 
(3) Developments to 1993 and Beyond 
In this section I will provide a brief discussion of the most significant 
developments which occurred on the waterfront in 1993. Although the historical 
narrative in this study formally ends at 1993, I believe that inter alia it is 
appropriate to 'update' the section above, on the challenge by small firms to the 
Union's control of the labour supply, with examples from 1994/5. 
It is extremely difficult to get copies of the employment contracts which were 
settled in 1992/3 bargaining round. Nonetheless a survey conducted by the WWU 
of its members in February 1994 provides some useful aggregate data in this 
area.6 According to this survey, 55% of the WWU's members have experienced 
pay reductions since the ECA was introduced, with 29% reporting no change, and 
15% having had their pay increased (although the majority of these latter members 
worked longer hours to get these increases). Similarly, 73% of members reported 
6 This postal survey was conducted in February 1994. The WWU's 1422 members were sent 
copies of the questionnaire, and 588 responses (41 %) were received. I was furnished with a copy 
of the results of the survey (including analysis) by the national office of the Union. 
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working shifts under either a '5 over 7' or a '40 over 7' agreement. In terms of 
contractual arrangements, the vast majority (84%) were working under collective 
employment contracts (either company or site). Overall, however, the number of 
watersiders declined (largely as a result of redundancies and company closures). 
From 1773 water siders who were directly employed by companies in the few 
months after the Waterfront Industry Commission was abolished in 1989, the 
number dropped to approximately 1422 in late 1993.7 
Thus, in terms of the effects of the ECA, the picture that emerges is one of pay 
reductions, significant changes to working times, and a further raft of 
redundancies. Significantly, however, while the ECA has decentralized industrial 
relations by introducing pervasive enterprise bargaining, it has not resulted in the 
'decollectivization' of industrial relations on the waterfront. Nor has the WWU 
been dislodged from the waterfront, as demonstrated by the predominance of 
collective employment contracts where the Union acted as the bargaining agent. 
The Union's success in keeping coverage of waterfront workers, including casual 
workers, is particularly significant. Until 1992, the only new entrant firm that 
attempted to use exclusively non-WWU labour ultimately was unable to use the 
workforce that it had assembled. 
However the Union's control over the labour supply began to be challenged in a 
number of areas in 1993. In some cases, this challenge was by established 
employers. For example, the Wellington branch of the Union (which traditionally 
had a considerable degree of control over casuals) lost out in the container 
terminal after it was purchased from Container Terminals Ltd by the Wellington 
Port Company. An anecdotal example from a local union official speaks to this 
loss of control: 
7 This latter figure includes 150 harbour workers who amalgamated with the Auckland branch of 
the WWU in September 1992 (see Roth 1993:200). 
There's a bloke who was in our union years ago, who was an 
absolute bloody thief, he was also trading in drugs, so we got rid of 
him. The Port Company has actually re-employed this joker as a 
casual. Now I said to the Port Company this joker is not a suitable 
person even for you to employ as a casual. But they just continued 
to employ him. (Interview) 
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The most fundamental challenge, however, came from other new entrant small 
firms which, like Aotearoa Stevedoring, attempted to break the Union's coverage. 
As I noted above, there was no move amongst the larger companies to effect a 
complete recasualization of the workforce. However, in the post-reform 
environment, small new entrant companies have emerged that employ (non-union) 
casual labour alone. These companies often contract for work at ports other than 
where they are based, and consequently have been nicknamed 'suitcase 
stevedores' by union officials. Like the small firms which existed under the 
bureau system, these companies survive on the remaining conventional 
stevedoring work (like apples and logs). Because of this, these companies require 
little investment in fixed capital. A union official commented, regarding this type 
of company, that "You don't need much to form them. No investment in heavy 
equipment or anything" (interview). To date, two such companies operate on the 
waterfront, and each has been involved in a major dispute with the Union. 
The first of these companies is Quay Stevedoring Services, which is based at 
Nelson. The company was formed in 1994, and employs a completely casual 
. workforce comprising workers who do not belong to the WWU. In effect, some 
of these workers are semi-permanent casuals (a core of skilled workers who work 
as deckmen and winchmen). Because Quay Stevedoring employs only casuals it 
has very few of the overheads carried by companies that employ permanent 
workers (such as contributions to superannuation schemes, accident compensation 
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levies and so forth). This particular company operates primarily on the basis of 
loading apples at Nelson for the Apple and Pear Marketing Board.8 A certain 
proportion of apples are handled in boxes as break-bulk cargo; of those that are 
palletized, some vessels have pallet lifters, and consequently the company only has 
to hire a few light forklifts to move the pallets with. 
Quay Stevedoring was established without a great deal of difficulty at Nelson 
where, because of the high proportion of casuals, and the seasonal nature of the 
trade, the Union did not have as much of control of casuals as at other ports. 
However, a significant dispute did occur in mid-1995 when the company sought to 
'venture out' of its home port to Lyttelton, where most of the casuals in the port 
are 'associate members' of the Union (the exception being those at Independent 
Fisheries). Quay Stevedoring secured a contract to load apples at Lyttelton, and in 
June 1995 transported 20 of its 'permanent casuals' (none of whom belonged to 
the WWU) to Lyttelton to operate winches, and proceeded to recruited a further 20 
non-union casuals from Independent Fisheries to do (in the words of a watersideI') 
'the donkey work'. 
The Lyttelton branch of the Union immediately erected a picket line, supported by 
members from other South Island ports. A stopwork meeting was also held, and 
the only reason that a strike did not occur was that both the Union and its members 
could potentially have faced heavy penalties under the ECA. The police 
maintained a presence on the waterfront while work was proceeding, as well as 
escorting the casuals to and from the ship.9 Several picketers were anested when 
they attempted to prevent casuals from driving their cars through the picket line. 10 
As a result of the picket, which at various times numbered in excess of 100, the 
8 Quay Stevedoring does approximately 35% of the port's apple loading, and the Nelson Port 
Company does the remaining 65%. 
9 Christchurch Press, 23/6/95. 
10 Christchurch Press, 20/6/95. 
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loading of the ship was delayed by at least a full day. Indeed it was only 
completed after the picket had to be disbanded when the Lyttelton Port Company 
served the picketers with trespass notices. In response to a question in Parliament, 
the Minister of Police disclosed that the operation took 2145 hours of police time 
at a cost of $41 ,000. 11 
The other 'suitcase stevedore', the International Stevedoring Organization (ISO), 
was established by Les Dickson at the Port of Tauranga after Associated 
Stevedores (the company he founded and managed) was taken over by BHP in 
1994. Despite its grandiose title, ISO predominantly works for ITT Rainier at 
Tauranga loading logs. Like Quay Stevedoring, it employs a group of non-union 
'permanent casuals' who have a guarantee of a few hours work each week. This 
company poses a particular problem as it has employed a number of redundant 
watersiders, as a source of labour which already has skills and experience of 
waterfront work. None of these watersiders re-joined the Union, and they were 
described to me by a branch official at Lyttelton as having "no loyalty to the 
union" (fieldnotes). The permanent casuals include a man who had been a 
member of the Waterside Workers Federation executive in the mid-1980s. In a 
photograph of the executive members, which hangs in one of the branch offices 
that I visited in 1995, this individual is circled in red and labelled as 'a scab'. 
As well as working at Tauranga, ISO secured contracts at Gisborne and 
Wellington in 1995. Like Quay Stevedoring, Dickson brought with him to these 
ports a 'core' group of his skilled 'permanent casuals' as well as hiring some non-
union casuals locally. A Wellington union official said: 
II Ibid. 
He brought casuals from Tauranga here to man that ship. He manned 
the operation aboard ship with people from Tauranga. He actually 
hired local people to do the wharf work, which is generally unskilled 
work. (Interview) 
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At each port members of the local branch of the WWU staged a picket, although 
each time the casual workers crossed the picket line and the work was carried out. 
As at Lyttelton, watersiders were hampered in their attempts to prevent the casuals 
from working by the threat of legal action. 
(4) Conclusion 
I noted in the previous section that small firms have existed on the waterfront in 
two fundamentally different types of labour markets: one state-regulated, the other 
deregulated by the Employment Contracts Act. However, as the preceding cases 
illustrate, the Union is positioned differently in relation to small firms in each 
context. In the former setting, small firms provided an opportunity for the Union, 
but in the latter setting they are one of the greatest threats to the Union's control of 
the labour supply. Under the ECA the Union lost ground in attempting to 
maintain wages and conditions, and its members' control on the job has been 
eroded. However, the vehemence of the opposition of the Union and its members 
to small firms, such as Quay Stevedoring, demonstrates that much more could 
have been lost. The main reason why the Union is seeking to restrict the supply of 
labour to union members is that wages and conditions, and control of work 
practices, could be eroded even further if new entrant firms using non-union 
labour are allowed onto the waterfront. While Aotearoa Stevedoring went out of 
business, the WWU has not as yet been as successful in repelling the (albeit 
limited) encroachments by the latest crop of small 'union busting' firms. 
CHAPTER 16 : CONCLUSION 
The shoe was on our foot until 1989, and now it isn't. But I believe 
it will come back again. 
WWU Branch Secretary. 
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My goal in this thesis has been to examine patterns of power relations between 
waterside workers and their employers during the years 1953 to 1993. I stressed 
that these relationships were not merely 'given', but rather constituted by the 
framework of legal regulation which established the bureau system of labour 
administration. As a result, the power relations between the key actors on each 
side were in no sense predetermined, but rather were contingent outcomes shaped 
by the power resources that the actors were able to secure control of within this 
system. These relationships were played out within three separate (although 
overlapping) spheres: employment relations, industrial relations and work 
relations. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the labour market (or the province of 'employment 
relations', as I termed it) was organized through an occupational registration 
system which established exclusive registers at the port level. This system granted 
watersiders 'preference' in performing waterside work, and their unions were 
given formal joint control over the number of registered workers and ipso facto the 
number of union members. Within this 'closed' labour market the port unions, in 
accordance with the interests of the rank and file, had no reason to attempt to 
increase the sheer size of their membership. Instead they sought to equilibrate 
numbers of members with the supply of work opportunity. This strategy was 
facilitated by formal joint control by employers and unions over register 
limitations. It was this resource that gave the unions the ability to restrict the size 
of the labour supply. Further, given this degree of union control, casual labour 
was an important variable within the labour market in that it provided an 
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important source of 'flexibility', not just to the employers, but also to the port 
unions and their members. 
If exclusive registers allowed the port unions to limit the size of the labour supply, 
'internally' the labour market was organized horizontally, rather than vertically, 
around the principle of work equalization and averaging. Together with informal 
joint control over recruitment, which developed in the late 1950s, this arrangement 
enabled the port unions to consolidate their organizational capacity in the 
aftermath of the 1951 dispute. Despite the fact that the port unions had been 
created as a strike-breaking tactic by the Government during this dispute, the 
registration system created an environment in which unionism thrived, and 
provided a crucial source of union strength which impacted on patterns of 
industrial relations and work relations during the break-bulk period. 
The analysis of industrial relations in Chapter 5 showed how this increasing union 
strength was constituted in and through bargaining outcomes during this period. 
In turn, these bargaining outcomes were always played out through a tension 
between the national and the local, between centralized and decentralized forms of 
organization and modes of action. The subordination of these tensions was largely 
dependent on the organizational capacities of the summit organizations on each 
side. For the majority of this period, the port unions were united through their 
respective regional federations, until forming a national federation in 1967. These 
organizations made significant gains in wages and conditions, via a mix of local 
and national bargaining and through the judicious use of industrial action. From 
the late 1950s 'strike threats' were constantly in the background to national 
negotiations, and this constituted an important source of union bargaining power. 
At the level of work relations, in the break-bulk period, the inherent problems of 
control associated with the performance of work by gangs was actually 
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exacerbated by the bureau system of labour administration. This unintended 
consequence of the labour market arrangements at the level of employment 
relations hinged on the fact that individual employers had no control over hiring 
and firing. A distinctive pattern of work relations, which centered on the wage-
effort bargain, emerged as a result. Although the indirect employment relationship 
was a crucial source of watersiders' workplace power, the employers' attempted 
'solution' to this problem of control generated a new set of tensions. 
To compensate for the indirect employment relationship, the employers sought to 
introduce differences in reward, via monetary incentives, into the employment 
relationship. This move resulted in a tension between the wage form and the 
organization of the labour market. Incentive bonus schemes conflicted with the 
union-sponsored system of equalizing the distribution of work and the attendant 
horizontal (rather than hierarchical) organization of the labour market. This 
tension also had the potential to lead to the "diffusion of hierarchical pressure 
[between employers and workers] into antagonisms and competition among the 
workers" (Burawoy 1979:167). However, the port unions were able to resolve 
these tensions by securing the agreement of their members to collectively pool all 
bonus payments. To the extent that monetary incentives, which targeted the 
'wage' side of the wage-effort bargain, were only of limited success in securing 
consistent levels of effort, this problem manifested itself in the relationship 
between foremen and gangs. Rather than attempting to directly supervise 
watersiders, and thus to control their behaviour, foremen (with the implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, consent of managers) instead tolerated informal practices 
which increased watersiders' degree of autonomy on the job. 
Overall, the chapters in Section 2 of the thesis indicate that umon strength 
increased during the 1950s and 1960s. This strength, in turn, involved control of 
the labour supply, significant gains in wages and conditions, and a considerable 
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degree of worker control on the job. Technological change in the form of 
containerization had the potential to disrupt this, more or less stable, pattern of 
power relations which crystallized in the break-bulk period. However I have 
argued that such a disruption did not occur while the bureau system of labour 
administration was in existence. 
Contrary to what sociologists who work within the labour process tradition claim, 
unions and workers are not automatically disempowered by containerization, and 
employer control over labour markets and work does not unambiguously (re)assert 
itself following this process of technological change. Rather, the outcomes of this 
process are dependent on the strategies of the key actors, the institutional 
framework they operate within, the power resources they have at their disposal, 
and the way that these can be mobilized to deal with the challenges posed by 
containerization. The chapters in the third and fourth sections of the thesis 
demonstrate that the period after containerization was characterized by a dynamic 
of employer disunity (and weakness) and union cohesiveness and strength. 
Container technology had the potential to erode the control that waterfront unions 
exerted over occupational boundaries and work coverage, by making it possible 
for employers to create new sites of work. However in New Zealand, because of 
the framework of legal regulation, the new sites that were created at the port level 
were subject to the bureau system of labour administration, and the existing 
framework of union rights and jurisdictions. Although the port unions lost control 
of aspects of off-wharf container work, the majority of container work was 
performed within container terminals that were created within already existing 
ports. These terminals were established as much on the port unions' terms as on 
those of the employers. The separate industrial agreement that the container 
terminals were subject to, as 'legal fictions', was very much the 'jewel in the 
crown' of waterside workers' terms and conditions of employment. 
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The bureau system of labour administration not only empowered the port unions, 
it also had a significant impact on the types of firms that were involved in 
stevedoring. Chapter 8 demonstrated that the other major unintended consequence 
of this system was that it secured the existence of small firms. Contra the 
orthodox view in the sociological literature, in relation to the organization of the 
labour market, firm size was revealed to be a dependent variable. In the case of 
small firms, at least, firm size was dependent on the occupational registration 
system that the labour market was organized around. These unintended 
consequences of the way that the labour market was organized, the strengthening 
of the port unions and securing the existence of small firms, intersected when a 
number of the unions became involved in establishing small new entrant 
stevedoring companies. 
The emergence of these small 'hybrid' firms in the 1970s was part of a series of 
changes in company type that occurred after containerization. The other 
significant finding to emerge from the analysis is that, rather than containerization 
leading to pervasive vertical integration (as it did in other countries), this process 
occurred only unevenly and was accompanied by a process of 'vertical 
disintegration' . Instead of vertically integrated shipping companies dominating 
the market, a number of new types of firms and organizations became involved in 
stevedoring. 
As a result of these developments in company type and structure, which I outlined 
in Chapter 8, the employers became increasingly fragmented and disorganized 
through a proliferation of new types of actors and interests on their side. Rather 
than containerization increasing the ability of employers to control workers, it 
resulted in the employers as a 'bloc' becoming increasingly fragmented. The 
unions exploited the resulting divisions in a manner that consolidated their own 
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power. The period after containerization was characterized by increasing unity on 
the part of the unions, and increasing employer disunity. The chapters in Section 4 
demonstrate that these differing organizational capacities were reflected in 
outcomes within the spheres of employment relations, industrial relations and 
work relations. 
Chapter 10 explored how the strategies of the key actors regarding the labour 
supply changed in response to containerization. Significantly, these strategies 
changed in relation to register strengths. Whereas, in the break-bulk period, the 
employers had attempted to increase the size of registers, often in the face of 
opposition from the port unions, after containerization they attempted to decrease 
the size of register strengths in line with the increasing capital-intensity of 
waterfront work. Conversely, the port unions were empowered by the 
introduction of a 'permanent' 40 hour working week to seek increases in register 
strengths. 
The attitude of the port unions to casual labour was an important part of this shift 
. in strategy. Previously the port unions and their members had tolerated casual 
labour, as a supplement to the registered workforce, insofar as it allowed the port 
unions to restrict the size of registers, and was a source of flexibility in work 
patterns to watersiders. However, after containerization caused the employers to 
exert downward pressure on register strengths, the unions sought to restrict the use 
of casual labour. This move was accomplished through the creation of subsidiary 
registers which placed restrictions on the number of casual workers who could be 
employed. At ports during the 1970s there was, not one register, but two. Joint 
control of register limitations was a crucial power resource which allowed the port 
unions to manage downward pressures placed by employers on bureau registers, 
while simultaneously squeezing casual workers out of the labour market. 
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One of the costs of these restrictions on casuals was a considerable number of 
redundancies, with the number of registered watersiders decreasing by almost half 
during the years from 1970 until 1987, to a total of 3697. However all of these 
redundancies were voluntary, wherein individual watersiders elected to leave the 
industry. Moreover in 1980 the Waterside Workers Federation pushed for, and 
achieved, the complete elimination of casual labour. Coupled with a system of 
interport transfer of labour, the port unions in this period exerted increasingly 
tighter control over an (albeit diminishing) labour supply. In effect, this strategy 
led to the emergence of a national labour market (as opposed to the local labour 
markets that existed in the break-bulk period) which was tightly sealed. 
In the discussion of industrial relations, in Chapter 5, I made the point that, while 
bargaining at the national level was important, one of the keys to success for the 
summit organizations both of the employers and the unions within the sphere of 
industrial relations was to gain leverage over bargaining at the local level. The 
Waterside Workers Federation's ability to do so was challenged severely when the 
Auckland Union broke ranks by refusing to ratify a national agreement in 1970. 
This case amply demonstrates the fragility of national bargaining. However, the 
Federation quickly overcame this division, whereas for the employers a more 
persistent source of disunity developed after containerization, which stemmed 
from the proliferation of new types of organizations that were involved in 
stevedoring. The resulting fragmentation of actors on the employers' side was to 
be a persistent source of weakness in bargaining throughout the 1970s and a good 
portion of the 1980s. 
The port UnIons, and their Federation, used decentralized bargaining at the 
company level, parallel to national bargaining, to achieve a considerable 
"bargaining power advantage" (Katz 1993: 13). Thus the dynamic of union 
strength and employer weakness, wherein the threat of strike action by the unions 
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was central, was consolidated and extended by means of decentralized bargaining 
which further fragmented and weakened the employers as a 'bloc'. Even the 
formation of a new overarching national organization on the employers side 
(NZAWE) did not result in a fully 'externalized' mode of bargaining being 
accomplished, insofar as the new organization could not force individual 
employers to delegate their authority in bargaining to it. 
The degree of influence of the port unions within the realms of employment 
relations and industrial relations had its concomitant in the power of watersiders 
on the job. Although container technology had the potential to allow employers to 
(re )assert their authority in the workplace, the discussion of work relations in 
Chapter 12 revealed that, under the bureau system of labour administration, this 
potential was not realized. Rather than containerization removing all elements of 
indeterminacy from the wage-effort bargain, by ushering in a rationalized system 
of 'technical control', there were continuities between the pattern of work 
relations which existed on break-bulk jobs and the pattern on container jobs. It 
was a pattern in which watersiders continued to exert considerable control over the 
labour process. 
A dynamic of union strength and employer weakness therefore existed on the 
waterfront in the 1970s and for much of the 1980s. Indeed the strength ofthe port 
unions and their Federation was such that the approach of successive Governments 
during the 1970s was one of 'containment'. This approach involved attempting to 
prevent watersiders' wages and conditions from moving beyond the wharves, and 
avoiding at all costs provoking a major confrontation with the Waterside Workers 
Federation. In this sense the bureau system of labour administration 'escaped' 
from the control both of the Government and the employers. Indeed the 
'registered' interests within it 'fed' off each other. The organization of the main 
'interests', through legally constituted registration systems, was mutually 
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reinforcing to the point where the employers sought to strengthen the framework 
of legal regulation. Significantly, NZA WE (unsuccessfully) lobbied the 
Government to alter the Waterfront Industry Act 1976 in order to remove the 
ability of individual firms to make industrial agreements, independent of the 
employers' association, with the unions and the Federation. 
It was because of this 'loss of control' of the bureau system, and precisely because 
of its success from the point of view of the port unions, that the fourth Labour 
Government sought to abolish it. The pattern of union strength and employer 
weakness was only eroded as the institutional and legislative supports of the 
unions, which centered on the occupational registration system and the union 
registration system, were systematically dismantled by state reformers in the late 
1980s. By abolishing the Waterfront Industry Tribunal in 1987, the Labour 
Government began to pull at the threads of the bureau system of labour 
administration in a manner which eventually unwound the whole tapestry of the 
regulatory framework. 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 resulted in a shift in the relative balance of 
centralized and decentralized bargaining which had hitherto obtained. Previously 
the port unions and their Federation used decentralized bargaining parallel to 
national bargaining to fragment the employers. NZA WE, on the other hand, 
sought to strengthen the national agreement in an attempt to achieve unity amongst 
the employers. However, in the climate created by the new Act, the employers 
sought to abolish the national agreement. This move produced a different 
combination of centralized and decentralized bargaining than existed before. 
The shift in patterns of bargaining which resulted from the abolition of the 
specialized framework that regulated industrial relations on the waterfront was 
consolidated when the Labour Government eliminated the bureau system of labour 
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administration, and with it the occupational registration system, on September 30 
1989. Since that time the country's remaining watersiders have been directly 
employed by the companies that are involved in stevedoring. The consequences 
for the unions of abolishing the bureau system, which had constituted their 
institutional 'power base', were dramatic. First and foremost, the number of 
water siders declined by more than half, from 3156 in 1989 to just 1773 in 1990. 
Secondly, the shift to direct employment, coupled with the elimination of the 
union registration system in 1991 and the attendant transition to enterprise 
bargaining, gave employers the opportunity to attack the control that the 
Waterfront Workers Union and its members exerted on the waterfront. 
Chapter 14 teased out the effects of deregulation on the union's degree of 
influence within the labour market, its bargaining power, and its members' control 
of work practices. Significantly, I argued that the post-reform period has not been 
characterized by an unmitigated (re )assertion of managerial prerogative, or the 
waning of union influence. Instead the success of the bureau system, from the 
union's point of view, placed limits upon what employers could achieve after 
deregulation. The previous institutional configuration of 'registered interests', in 
which the union accumulated considerable power, thus impacted on power 
relations in the post-reform period. The main element of continuity with the pre-
reform period is that the union continues to exert some degree of control over the 
labour supply at the port level, most importantly in relation to the size and 
composition of the casual workforce. Conversely, the main element of 
discontinuity relative to the pre-reform period is that employers have eroded 
watersiders' control over work practices. Overall, it is the uncoupling of the link 
between union control over the labour supply and worker control of the labour 
process that has been the main outcome of waterfront reform. 
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The Waterfront Workers Union is currently being challenged by a new type of 
small firm which has emerged in the labour market climate created by the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Whereas the existence of small firms within the 
regulated labour market was a potential source of opportunity to the port unions 
(by allowing them to get established in business), the small firms that have 
emerged in the deregulated labour market exclusively use non-unIOn 
(predominantly casual) labour. Consequently, these firms pose the greatest threat 
to the union's remaining control of the labour supply. The union's future on the 
waterfront, and the future of its members, depends in large part on the degree of 
success they have in repelling the anti-union tactics of this new set of small firms. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX: THE PLACE OF FIELDWORK IN 
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 
(1) Introduction 
In this appendix I will explain how I conducted the research that the thesis is based 
upon. Insofar as I dealt with issues of 'form and context' (specifically the 
categories and analytic framework I employed) in the introduction to the thesis, I 
will restrict this discussion to situating the important role of fieldwork in the 
research process. 
To gather the empirical material which formed the basis of the thesis I used three 
methods: interviews, non-participant observation, and documentary research. 
Before outlining how and when I used these methods, I will provide a brief 
explanation of the background to the thesis. 
(2) The Background to the Study 
In the introduction I made the point that my interest in studying the waterfront was 
sparked by developments in 1989 after the Waterfront Industry Commission was 
abolished. I set out with the intention of conducting a study of industrial relations 
and work in the post-reform period. I began by keeping a file of newspaper 
clippings (which I still maintain). Then, late in 1990, I began to carry out some 
preliminary fieldwork at the Port of Lyttelton (the port closest to Christchurch, 
where I live). This was essentially a 'scoping' exercise. It involved seeing 'what 
was happening' at the port, as well as initial attempts to negotiate access to one of 
the companies there and to the local branch of the Waterfront Workers Union. 
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I visited the Lyttelton Port Company on two occasions early in 1991. I decided to 
seek access to the port from this company because, as the successor to the local 
harbour board, it had overall control of the port's facilities. I assumed (as it turned 
out, wrongly) that I would have to secure the consent of this company before I 
could even go onto the waterfront. Also, I was interested in the port company 
itself, as a new type of organization on the waterfront. 
I framed the request for access in terms of wanting to do research within the 
Lyttelton Port Company. My initial point of contact was with the company's 
public relations manager. I was given a copy of the company newsletter, the 
overall layout of the port was described to me, and I was given the impression that 
I would at least be able to conduct interviews with some of the company's staff. 
Indeed, I was able to arrange interviews with three senior managers. However, 
when it became apparent that I was interested in talking to some of the company's 
employees at a lower level, further access was denied. I was required to supply a 
detailed written research proposal to the company's management team, which was 
promptly rejected. I took it to be significant that this occurred at the same time as 
the company was engaged in a dispute with the union. 
At the same time as I was being rebuffed by the Lyttelton Port Company, a call to 
the local branch of the Waterfront Workers Union resulted in an appointment to 
see the union secretary, and subsequently an agreement to allow me to carry out 
interviews with union officials and members. It became rapidly apparent that I did 
not need the formal permission of the port company to enter the waterfront, as 
watersiders who I interviewed began to take me into their workplaces (which 
ranged from the holds of ships to the 'cockpits' of ship's gantry cranes). This 
initial informal access to the waterfront was very important (as I note below), even 
though while carrying out this fieldwork I changed the emphasis of the study to 
that of an historical sociology. 
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Two developments resulted in this shift in the study's emphasis. As I began to 
read the available literature about industrial relations and work on the waterfront 
in New Zealand, I realized that very little had been written about the post-1951 
period. At the same time, a vast quantity of archival material became available 
(see below). Despite this shift in emphasis, I continued to conduct fieldwork and 
interviews, which was to prove valuable in 'orientating' the documentary research 
that I subsequently engaged in. I will now describe each of the research methods 
that I used. 
(3) Fieldwork 
My reading of some classic sociological studies of work and occupations, which 
used ethnographic methods, formed the general background to my approach to the 
fieldwork. As a graduate student (and tutor) I had read selections of the work of 
Everett Hughes and that of some of his students (such as Howard Becker). 
Hughes had brought the anthropological tradition of fieldwork into sociology 
through the Chicago School (see Colomy and Brown 1995), and emphasized the 
importance of studying social activity 'in its natural setting'. I had also read the 
classic articles by Donald Roy (the author of one of the most well-known accounts 
of work to emerge from the Chicago tradition), and the studies by Alvin Gouldner, 
and William Whyte. 
Early in the research, I read three excellent accounts of waterfront work which had 
employed ethnographic methods (Finlay 1988; Kimeldorf 1988; DiFazio 1984). 
The study by DiFazio is particularly worthy of mention, for I was struck by the 
problems that he encountered in gaining access to the International 
Longshoremen's Association (the waterfront workers' union on America's East 
Coast). He noted that: 
When I began doing the ethnographic research ... many of the men 
were suspicious of my presence in the hiring hall. Two of them 
threatened my life the first day, thinking that I was a cop (DiFazio 
1984:50). 
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Although I did not expect to be threatened with death, I did find DiFazio's account 
slightly unsettling. Coupled with my own experience of being rebuffed by the 
Lyttelton Port Company, his account further alerted me to the perils of gaining 
access to do fieldwork at sites where power relations are omnipresent. Although I 
had a sense of trepidation in doing the initial fieldwork, as I noted above, access 
was readily granted by the union. 
The fieldwork I did at the Port of Lyttelton in 1992 involved observing the work 
of loading and unloading ships, talking with watersiders and union officials about 
their work, and attending protests organized by the local union branch against the 
actions of companies within the port. Despite not being granted access by the 
Lyttelton Port Company, I could move freely around the port with union officials. 
Some afternoons, after a stint of interviewing in Lyttelton township, I would go 
down to the port for a couple of hours and just watch work being carried out. 
(This has become increasingly difficult since the Lyttelton Port Company has 
restricted public access to the port, ostensibly for reasons of safety.) In each case I 
kept fieldnotes, which I wrote up each day after conducting fieldwork. 
I was granted an even greater degree of access to the union after I began to 
conduct research for its members. This happened in a rather fortuitous manner. 
During an interview with two union delegates in mid-1992 I mentioned that I was 
doing some research through the offices of the Registrar of Companies on 
historical patterns of ownership and control of stevedoring companies. I quote 
from my fieldnotes on their response: "This obviously struck a chord with the 
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men, and before I knew it they were asking me about the type of information I 
could get about shareholdings in Canterbury Stevedoring Services [their 
employer]". I offered to prepare a brief dossier on the origins and ownership of 
New Zealand Stevedoring (the 'parent' of this latter company), and the offer was 
readily accepted. After I had completed the file I gave it to the local union 
secretary who passed it on to the delegates in question. I know that other 
watersiders looked at this file, because one day as I was climbing into the cab of a 
shipboard crane to watch some containers being unloaded, the crane driver said: 
"that company information was interesting" (fieldnotes). 
Towards the end of a protest to mark the formal opening of Independent Fisheries, 
in July 1992, a local union official singled me out and asked if I could do an 
ownership search on this and another allied company. I made an entry in my 
fieldnotes at the time to the effect that I experienced a rather pleasing feeling of 
not just doing research 'on the union' but also 'for the union'. There was a quid 
pro quo involved here. Because I did research for the union, I was allowed greater 
access to the organization. At one stage, in late 1992, I visited the Lyttelton union 
office two to three times each week, and was allowed to peruse old union files and 
records. I worked in the executive meeting room, and I frequently had 
conversations with watersiders and delegates who entered the office; 
The key to this fieldwork part of the research, then, was the reciprocal relationship 
that I established with these workers, who held positions within the union. This 
fieldwork was only used in three chapters (12, 14, and 15), but it was nonetheless 
very useful in orientating the interviews that I conducted. In a journal I kept, 
which documented the research process, I noted at one point that: "my interest in 
small firms was stimulated by leaming that the [Lyttelton] Union had part-owned 
a stevedoring company, Lyttelton Stevedoring." This initial fieldwork was also 
important in allowing me to identify potential interviewees. 
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(4) Interviews 
Many of the contacts for interviews, particularly for watersiders (both current and 
retired) and former union officials, were made through the fieldwork at Lyttelton. 
However, some of the people I interviewed were located through personal 
acquaintances. This was the case with foremen-stevedores: a friend's father was a 
foreman-stevedore, who put me in contact not only with other foremen-stevedores, 
but also the former secretary of the Lyttelton branch of the Foreman-Stevedores 
Union. Also, through a mutual acquaintance, I made a contact with a manager of a 
shipping company who gave me the names of former stevedoring company 
managers. The manager in question had formerly been the company secretary of 
the Lyttelton Stevedoring Company, and it was through him that I gained access to 
this company's minute book. 
In total, I carried out 34 interviews with union officials, watersiders, foremen-
stevedores, stevedoring company managers, employers' representatives, and 
former Waterfront Industry Commission staff. The bulk of the interviews were 
conducted at Lyttelton and Christchurch. However, I also carried out some 
interviews at Wellington (on two of my several trips there to do archival research). 
The interviews varied in length, but generally they lasted for one to two hours. I 
taped all of the interviews, and transcribed them myself. This proved to be a very 
time-consuming task, given that each 1 hour tape took approximately 7 hours to 
transcribe. 
The type of interview that I conducted with each informant conforms to what 
William Whyte has termed the 'flexibly structured' interview. In this approach: 
The interview is structured in the mind of the interviewer, who 
follows a plan regarding the kind of information being sought, but 
who is flexible about the order in which the various pieces of 
information are brought out. The interviewer is also alert to 
recognize statements which suggest new questions or even new 
lines of investigation (Whyte 1979:57). 
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The interviews were 'structured', to the extent that I had a list of questions that I 
wished to ask each subject. But the interviews were also 'flexible' in the sense 
that they were open-ended enough to allow me to pursue unanticipated questions 
that arose in the course of interviewing. Sometimes, an off-the-cuff remark or an 
'aside' by an interviewee proved to be crucial in opening up a new line of inquiry. 
In general, the interviews and fieldwork I carried out were valuable in 'orientating' 
my documentary research at the National Archives and the National Library. On 
participant observation, from an anthropological perspective, Clifford writes: 
'Participant observation' serves as shorthand for a continuous 
tacking between the 'inside' and 'outside' of events: on the one 
hand grasping the sense of specific occurrences and gestures 
empathetic ally, on the other stepping back to situate these 
meanings in wider contexts. Particular events thus acquire deeper 
or more general significance, structural rules, and so forth 
(1988:34). 
While I was not a participant observer, as such, the point is still germane. And it 
applies equally to formal interviews. My use of the fieldwork method and 
interviews allowed me to tack back and forth between particular events (both 
contemporary and historical) and the context in which they occurred. In the case 
of historical events, the information elicited in interviews was contextualized via 
my archival research. Equally, however, information gained from interviews 
allowed me to make sense of the documents I was examining (and in this sense 
assisted in orientating the documentary research). Consider the following quote 
from a journal entry, which I wrote in 1994: 
If I had attempted the archival work at the beginning of the project, 
I would have been awash with information. Undoubtedly I would 
have organized it all, and sorted it out, but this task was made very 
much easier by having a clear idea of what I was doing. This was 
actually facilitated by the early fieldwork [that I] conducted at the 
Port of Lyttelton .... The fieldwork resulted in as many questions 
as answers: What did bureau rules contain? How were the GPOs 
negotiated? Had local bargaining always been a feature of 
industrial relations on the waterfront, and was it widespread? And 
so on. It was with these types of questions in mind that I travelled 
to Wellington in 1993 to the National Archives and National 
Library. 
(5) Documentary Research 
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If the fieldwork, then, was the key to the interviews it was also crucial for the 
process of documentary research. The bulk of the documentary research was 
carried out in 1993 and 1994. This involved seven trips to Wellington, each for 
approximately a week and a half. Collections of archives at two different 
locations in Wellington were examined. The records of the Waterfront Industry 
Commission, both locally and nationally, and of the Waterfront Industry Tribunal 
are located at the National Archives. These records only became available 
towards the end of 1992. Indeed, an inventory of the records had to be specially 
typed for me (at the not inconsiderable cost of $50) and I was amongst the first to 
examine them. Of particular interest were the decisions of the Waterfront Industry 
Tribunal. I read all 923 of these decisions, covering the years 1953-1987. This 
provided much useful information on the types of disputes that occurred during 
this period, and the positions adopted by the actors involved. 
Similarly the copies of the General Principal Order and the local Principal Orders, 
which are held at the National Archives, were very important sources of 
information on the telms and conditions of work that obtained in the period under 
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consideration. More generally, from the records examined I got a sense of how 
the Commission and its local branches operated. Locating copies of bureau rules 
(which hitherto had proven to be elusive) was particularly impOliant in this regard. 
The second set of records I examined are located at the National Library (also in 
Wellington). There are two collections of interest at this site: the records of the 
waterside workers' summit organizations from 1947 to 1988, and the records of 
the Port Employers Association and New Zealand Association of Waterfront 
Employers from 1949 to 1989. I was the first person to examine the records of the 
employers' organizations. This I ascertained by the fact that these records were 
not even entered on the National Library's computer access system, and had to be 
loaded onto this system before I could request them. 
In each case, the problems of validity and locating and accessing documents 
commonly associated with documentary research (see Platt 1981) did not arise. 
The records are all 'authentic'; they are all inventoried; and they are all readily 
available for inspection. Indeed, the records of the Commission are publicly 
available at the National Archives, as are the records of the employers' 
organizations at the National Library. Although the union records at this latter site 
constitute a 'restricted collection', a request I sent by letter to the Chief Librarian 
to access this collection was readily granted. 
The few elusive documents, which I could not locate at either set of archives, were 
fortunately able to be supplied to me by interviewees. These are as follows: the 
original arbitrated container terminal decision; the Federation of Labour guidelines 
regarding container packing and unpacking; and the weekly newsletters of 
NZAWE. 
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A great deal of detailed material was gained from the archival research, and some 
of it could not be incorporated into the study. Regarding the records that I 
examined, it seems appropriate to recall the words of the pilgrim: 
I cannot tell about them all in full; 
(6) Returning to the Field 
my theme is long and urges me ahead, 
often I must omit things I have seen. 
(Dante, The Divine Comedy.·Inferno) 
When the study was nearing completion, in late 1995, I again returned to 
fieldwork. I did a brief stint of interviewing union officials at Lyttelton, and a 
series of telephone interviews with local and national union officials at 
Wellington. I did so in order to identify developments in the period after I 
finished conducting the bulk of the fieldwork (which ended in 1993). I drew on 
these interviews in writing about the return of small firms to the waterfront. 
Conducting these interviews, at the end of the study, was particularly rewarding. 
Having written the bulk of the thesis, I was well-placed to make sense of the 
developments, with respect to casual labour and small firms, which the union 
officials described to me. 
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APPENDIX 1 : COMPANIES INVOLVED IN STEVEDORING 
In this appendix I present a schematic representation of the types of companies 
that were involved in stevedoring. To construct the charts which follow, I used 
the New Zealand Shipping Directory as the main database. The Directory is 
essentially an advertising pUblication, and it was published from 1962 until 1992. 
For my purposes, the Directory is useful insofar as it lists the names of the 
companies involved in stevedoring at each port during this period. 
Using the Directory for this purpose does not guarantee complete accuracy, as in a 
few cases the list it provided lagged behind shifts in the actual sphere of operation 
of some companies (withdrawals from some ports, changes in name, and so forth). 
For an advertising publication, such mistakes are unusual, and they appear to be 
the exception rather than the rule. In any case, where they have been detected, I 
have made the appropriate changes. It should also be noted that a copy of the 
1974 edition of the Directory was not available. Consequently, that year has been 
omitted from the charts. 
In order to ascertain patterns of ownership (and hence the main types of companies 
that were involved in stevedoring) I used two main sources: company annual 
reports (held by the Department of Accountancy Library, University of 
Canterbury), and ownership searches conducted at the regional offices of the 
Registrar of Companies. 
I have identified four main types of companies that engaged in stevedoring during 
the time period under consideration. l The company types are as follows: 
'It should be noted that, strictly speaking, harbour boards were not 'companies'. However, for the 
purposes at hand it is convenient to bracket them with the 'independent' companies that I have 
identified. This is valid, insofar as harbour boards were not owned or controlled by shipping 
companies. 
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(1) Shipping companies which carried out stevedoring; 
(2) Subsidiary stevedoring companies (which were owned by shipping 
companies); 
(3) Independent stevedoring companies (which were not owned by shipping 
companies); 
(4) Hybrid stevedoring companies (which were either partly or wholly owned by 
waterside workers' unions); 
Each type of company is identified on the charts by the shading used, as follows: 
411 shipping companies (unshaded) 
• subsidiary stevedoring companies 
• independent stevedoring companies 
411 hybrid stevedoring companies 
Additionally, compames that engaged in the practice of 'carpetbagging' (by 
contracting for stevedoring work at ports other than the ones where they had a 
permanent presence) have been designated in italics. U sing the Shipping 
Directory, I have identified these companies as those which did not have an office 
at the ports where they were listed as being involved in stevedoring (instead giving 
a contact phone number and address at the port(s) where they were permanently 
based). This method of identifying the companies that engaged in carpetbagging 
is not infallible, but it does give some indication of the extent of this practice. 
Thus the charts list both the names of the companies involved in stevedoring and 
the main company types. The schematic representation of these companies is 
constrained by need to present it in a manner which is consistent with the format 
of a thesis (on A4 paper, that is). In this format the changing patterns are not 
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visually as easily detected as when the charts are viewed full-size. Thus I will 
provide a written description of the patterns that I have identified. These patterns, 
in turn, inform the argument that I develop in Chapter 8. 
First and foremost, in the 1970s (after containerization) the number of shipping 
companies involved in stevedoring declined dramatically (which provides 
evidence of the process of 'vertical disintegration' that I referred to in Chapter 8). 
Second (and not unrelated to the first), after containerization there was an increase 
in the number of independent stevedoring companies (which is the 'other side' of 
the process of vertical disintegration). Third, the incidence of stevedoring 
companies that engaged in the practice of 'carpet-bagging' increased in the mid-
to-late 1970s, after the shift to containerization, as they 'chased' an ever-
diminishing amount of break-bulk work. Fourth, there emerged in the 1970s a 
number of small 'hybrid' firms in which the port unions were shareholders. Fifth, 
the small hybrid companies all but disappeared after deregulation (in 1989), and 
numbers of stevedoring companies declined overall. The remaining companies 
within the field of stevedoring are New Zealand Stevedoring (the only national 
stevedoring company), individual port companies, and a handful of stevedoring 
companies that are based at one or two ports. 
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N.Z. Sie\'edoring Co. N.t.. Stcl;c40ring Cri. N.Z~ Ste\,'edoringC~. . N~Z, St",;edruirtg Co. Seap<?~ <?~ra~.ons ~td S~~~~ o.~,t.io~~,~t~ 
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ASSOciated Ste~'edores Union Mai'iHn~;;: Services Union' Matitinie services 
Associated Stevedores Associated SIi:vedores 
N,Z. StcVcQ9!j:ng Co. Sea{l~rt Operations Ictd ~~port 9pc~tio!u Ltd 
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t1!NJ:lCl!f- ~eC!grfng-
!?~ 
ASSOCiated Stevedores Leonard and Dingley lid Leonard and Dingley Ltd 
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Associated Stevedores Associated Stevedores Associated Stevedores Associated Stevedores Auckland Harbour Board Auckland Harbour Board Auck1and Harbour Board 
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(JII/l:m Mah'thH¢ S(tn'ices- Unio/fMiJtilimc-S-Itt:vit:es Union Maritime &ri"(cs u"IQli Mar/t(me Sc,;;ftes: UnIon Aiarilif1fe Servka Union Shipping Co. 
~__ w ~ __ w ~__ w ¥~~~ ~__ w 
Associated Stewdores Associated Stevedores Associated Stel'edores Associated Stevedores 
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Pullett and Smith 
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Union M~itimq. Scrvkcs Union; Mnritinw- Sen'ices 
Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd 
Leonard & Di,!gfey Leonard and pingley 
M""ukau SiewOOrins M!\IlukauStevC<!orlng 
Seaport OperaJlons Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd 
Associated Stevedores Associated Stevedores 
-l'iZ:Mmiiaillni&_ NZ.MalShal\ii1g~ 
. . S~iL __ •.. ~!t:\-edoring 
S~~rt. Qp~:m.ti~~s ~td Seaport Opemtion~, L.t~ 
Union Maritin)~ SCririces Union Maritirile'Ser\'lces 
Bay ,l?f~I.~ty _~~~ye<!o~!ng ~~y. ~r.J?l~nty. ~t~~~oring 
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D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C Turnbull & Co. 
Unloh Mittitlnic Setvices Union Shipping Co. 
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,Co~aincf TertniJiiJls Ltd Container Tcrillioals·Ltd 
Seaport Operations Ltd 
Union Shipping Co. 
B~~ o~~.I~~ty ~[~~dor:ing 
Marine Services :& 
:'Slc\,cdotcs: 
Seaport Operations Ltd 
D.C Turnbull & Co. 
Union Shipping Co. 
Seaport Operations Ltd 
Union Shipping Co. 
. Contniner,'femihiitls Ltd 
~{c~af1d Stev~Mt1tttr 4~(kI(jnd {.iftl¥dvrlng At!£kj«Jtff$teveqnrJng 
Seaport Operatiqn.r Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd 
PI.1.~9!l·MarltiUle.Semces YI!~on_~_l!ipping_Co. Union Shipping Co. 
UZMa(sholling&N.Z-'Marsballing (Wb""iJ.). 
St .. ~d.ril!gJlfllfYIg.j 
1978 1977 1976 1975 1973 1972 1971 
Auckland Aucklnnd S"",cdoring Co. Aqchland St",'ed<!rjng Co. Auc~lartd Stevedoring C~. A-ucl;,lat~d Stc\'¢doring Co. Ailt~lap.d S~cv.e.d9t!ng Co. Auckland $tC\'edoring CQ. Auckl<U¥1 $.t~V~9ring Co. 
Leonard & Dingley Lcorurrd & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley 
Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd Northern Steam Ship Co Nortllem Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. NOnh lsl.""d Sleved<)rihg NOillllsl""d SlevedoIjhg Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Seatrnns Consolidated 
Auckland Harbour Boord Auckland Harbour Board Union Shipping Co. Seatrans Consolidated Union ~~ipp~ng, Co. U,ni.Oi~ S~.ippin~ Co. l!,~i.~t:t ~~pp~ng C~. 
United Stevedores Ltd Union Shipping Co. \Vaifematll. StiivedOring Waife~a: $nS.;edOting' W?~~¢~~:$,*~;~r:li:tg 
Auckland Harbour Board Auckland Harbour Board Auckland Harbour Board Holm Shipping Co. ~~!~~ Shippj~g Co. 
Auckland HMbour Board Marlqm~' SerViceS Ltd 
Bluff Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd N.Z .. SI\fycdonng &. Seatrans Consolidated Seatmns Consolidated Seatrnns Consolidated Scatrans Consolidated 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. W!lti~finget:j,ng NZ. SleYedorihg& N.Z:Slcvedorilig& NZ. Slel'cdorilig ~ N:Z, Sleyi<lorihti & 
United Stevedores Ltd \VJ"uirfirigml).g Wlt~~g~iing Wharfmg~rig WJli'imng¢:tif!.g 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Dunedin & Pori Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd N.Z, Sle\'cdOtirtg & N.~_ Stevedoring 8? N.Z, Sl'viM~rtg & N.Z." ~~~~,cdo-ti,itS· & N.Z, St<vi<lmi~g &: . 
Chalmers Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Wharfingering Wbpffingering WlWrfmgering Whartihi\Crirtg . Wh~ffitigeij\1'g 
Tapley Swift Shipping Tapley S\\ift Shipping Union Shipping Co. Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith RamsayUd Keith Ramsay Ltd 
Otago Harbour Board Keith Ramsay Ltd Tapley Swift Shipping Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans- Consolidated 
Otago Harbour Board Keith Rnntsay Ltd Tapley S\\ift Shipping Tapley Swift Shipping Tapley Swift Shipping Tapley S\\ift Shipping 
United Stevedores Ltd Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Otago Harbour Board Otago Harbour Board Otago Harbour Board 
Gisbomc Seaport Opemtions Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd United Stevedores Ltd Gi~b~e Stevedoring & G~~~me $tc\'C4~tlng & Gis~o'rri~ $te~'~~o~g & G,isb()mc Ste~'4d~g',& 
Shipping S¢rvice;S Slljp·ping. Scrvi.Cc~ ShlppingSer\'ic~ Si>ipping i><iviO<$ 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
L)1teiton Seaport Operations Ltd Scaport Operations Ltd Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
U:ni.c!!l.~~ipping C.o. Union SJ!ippi~g .Co: N,Z, Sj"yedo<llia &; . Seatrans Consolidated Seatrnns Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Seatnms Consolidated 
LytttIt91l.Slt\«Iorii:tg. C~. Lyllelton Stevedoring Co. Wharflpgenng t.i:z.:'Sio.\:i:dp,ri~g& N,.z.:Stc,~C4or4tg & N2;. st~v~doijhg & N':~~' S.t~'~~o~~~ &: 
L)1telton Harbour Board L)1telton Harbour Board United Stevedores Ltd W1Hiit1~ge.t:irig .W1Wfil~get~g • WhatfJi\ileIjhg . ... WliJitfiiigeIjhil 
l!~$t~nll _: Kiflsey'PndCo~:Lt4. !\mmOnd Co. Lid !\inSoY. '"" Co. ~Id .~¢)~ ~d Co::tic( 
Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. 
Napier Seaport Operations Lid Seaport Operations Ltd Union Shipping CO. J:-LZ: Stexedoiihg:~ . NZ: Sle~ed~lni! & , N.+:. Sl~,ve~iWg & N,:Z:, ~ie,v~o,r:4t~ & 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. N.Z. Sl~edi>ri"g &: W~,rli"g«iIJg 'Wliarfingering ·W1wfingw.ng %arnngwng 
What:tli~geri:ng Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
United Stevedores Ltd Seatrans Consolidated 
Nelson Anchor Dornlan Ltd Anchor Donnan Ltd Anchor Dorman Ltd Anchor Donnan Ltd Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & 
.Se~port Operatiol!s. Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd Notth lsland $tevedormg Gannaway & Co, Ltd Foundry Co. Foundry Co. Foundry Co. 
NefsanSlllvcdoros LId United Stevedores Ltd North I$land Stevl;!doring Gannaway & Co" Ltd Gan"qwClJ'&.Co .. L/~ ~an~~way & C;o. ~td 
Seatrans Consolidated Wcllingfcni Sl1j!\'edoring W~lllhgtan Slel'edo'riPE Wti~/rniionSteiiei1o.rlng 
Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Se8trans Consolidated 
New Plymouth Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd Union Shipping Co. N.Z. St,ev~Qr:ipg,~ N2. Slev,dorilig& N2. $,t~vcdo.fihg & N,:Z; st~v~?ri~g .&. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. N2, St~"~d9rina & Wh"rfIrig,<llig WlwfingerirH~ . :Wh:arfingwqg WluIrfingenng 
Whartlnge,rqtg Bay ofPlent)' Stevedoring Bay ofPlcnty Stevedoring Bay of Plenty Stevedoring Bay of Plenty Stevedoring 
United Stevedores Ltd Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Sea/rans Consolidated Sealrans Consolfdated Seatrans Consolidated 
Onehunga Se.apo.rl Operalioll~ Ltd Seaport .op'~ralions Ltd United Stevedores Ltd 
,"Mr!n1.'!~!!Jl S~Q@g Man",",," ~~v¢orlng 
Picton Seaport Operations LId Seaport Operations Ltd United Stevedores Lid Gannawa,v & ~~. 9annaw~y~. C~. Ullion Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
N()r!fj.j.rliu.i'd,Si~l;edi.i(!'ig . Ni;lrth l~faod Sft\;¢doriilg r~/b:ngt.oti Siey~doi:!/Jg ,G,mmmt'CIJ' ~ Co. G~nnaway & .Co. 
Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated WellilJg~O}l ~iei~dol'/n'g . W:~~h~lgici~I.S(~YMortng 
Southern Shipping Services Southern Shipping Serviccs Seatrans Consolidated Bay of Plenty Stevedoring 
Southern Shipping Sen;ces 
Tauranga I Mount Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd Bay of Plenty Stevedoring Bay of Plenty ~te,·~oring. B:ny.or,Plen~' Stevedorin~ ~ay of P!cnty. Ste\'~oring Bay ofP!~nty. Ste\'~~,riDg 
Maunganui Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping. S:o. Marino Setyices '& Manrio Senices &. .Marin,e S¢'~iCcs'& M¥iIi.o S6yi~s & 
Bay ofPIC!lty Ste,'edoring Bay 9f Plenty Steve~ori",g Morine SeriioOs.& Stevedores Ste\'cdotcs StC\'edores : . St(~\'edriteS 
M .... in.e S~rv~ci!$ ~ Marin¢: Senices & Stey.40t<s Mt. Maung. & Tauranga ML MaWlg. & Tauranga Mt Maung. & Tauranga Mt. ~.fuUng.'& Tauranga 
Stcycdores' stevedorcs ~" ~N~rth:~~l~~,S,tcycdoij!ig Stevedores Steycdores Stevedores Stevedores 
NZ Marthalling N.Z.M",,~ United Stevedores Ltd Northern S~~8!~1 S,hip Co Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co 
Mi. lliafsl.ining ~ North ls1ari~ $(6.\.,.idonng Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping ~~_. Sea trans Consolidated 
NLMarnhalJirtg 
Timaru Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Opemtions Ltd D.C. Tumbul! & Co. N,Z. Sjl)Vedoring &; nz, Sj.l'edn,frig & N.Z. Sle'·cilorihg & N ,Z. SI'''edO,iin~ &; 
D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co. Union Shipping Co. What:flngering WMrfillgenng , Wharfhig~ring , W)larfl~'gcii,ng 
Union Shipping Co. Uilion Shipping Co. H.J,R. Someryille & Sons H,J.R. Somerville & Sons HJ.R. Somerville & Sons H.J.R. Somerville & Sons H.1.R. Somerville & Sons 
HJ.R. Somerville & Sons N.Z, S~cvCd~~g &:; D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C, Turnbull & Co. D.C, Turnbull & Co. 
WbW{tngoong Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
UniJed Stevedores Ltd Seatrans Consolidated 
Wellington Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operations Ltd United Stevedores Ltd N.Z. SI<Vedorii>~ & n.z; S~~v~o'~.i1s: & N.Z, SleVedP';"\! & ~;Z: St~'~~rir~~,& 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. ',' . Whartlngcnp£ Whaifl1.gering wttil:j:tli):gc.rmg.·. ... ,,\VI)bt!irigenng 
Ccmlain¢f Tennjl\l:\ls Ltd Coittaiilct Tertnhuils Lt~ N.Z.Sleved6rirtg & : Seatmns Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Seatralls Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated 
'Wharfing~ri.ng Gannaway & Co. Ltd Gannaway & Co. Ltd Gannaway & Co. Ltd Gannaway & Co. Ltd 
Container 'Tenmnrus Ltd Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Contiliner :r~o~inalS Lid Wdji.gtim slo"i<lOiiiig :WE:lli~gton SI~\'&lQring ,W(lIington Ste)'Cdonng 
Geo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Goo.H. Scales (Pacific) .Ltd Geo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd 
C~t1taitler Tetrtllrtrus Ltd COntamer ,Tetmiitak Ltd 
Whangarci :AU~M4 StevedorIng __ Auckland Stewdcflng. Auckland Stevedoring 4!Jck1(lJiq ;'~fJv~dqrjng folck/.wid. Sfe~'C!don1Tg AIf~kland Sfet;/fdorilig ArJ.c.klai.~d S!~;;e~T~lig 
Seaport Operations Ltd Seaport Operalions Ltd North Island Stevedoring 1V~)rlh !.~{tiil<! S~t~'ed(ning W((i~eJ1ialii S.(~v(:doriJlg Wai(en(91l/. S(e.},~~~()r/ltg ».'~i!emij(~ S(cycifQ,t~lig 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
United Stevedores Ltd Seatrans Consolidated Scatrans Consolidated Seatrnns Consolidated 
1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 
AU(:kland Auckland Stevedoring Co. Allc.kland. Ste\"~orillg. Co. Auckland $~e:yed.Qring Co. Aucklatid Stol'edodng Co. Allckl<!nd StcYOOoribg Co. Au~~.1!lP4 S\evedqring Co. Auckland Stevedoring Co. 
Leonard & Dingley Lcorum:l & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley 
Northcrn Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Scatrons Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Shaw Saym & Albion Co. 
Union ~hil"'ping ~o. Union Shipping Co. Wa.itenilltp Ste'vedoring Wriilcniliui Ste"\Woripg Wl.litenlij(lJ. Ste-teaming" V(~~t¢~ti1·S~c~~O~~ l!~o~.~hipp!ng C~. 
Waitcnlata Slcyed.onng Waitemata Ste,+~d6ring LoW. T"ist Ltd. L.W. T"ist Ltd. L.W. Twist Ltd... ",uckliirt~ SWjipmg AiJiokland~hlPpi.rtg 
Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. Ail<kl."~ Shipping SerVices serviCes' 
L.W. T, .. ;SI Ltd L.W. Twist Ltd Scniees 
Bluff Seatrans Consolidated N.~. Stc>;--cdodng J;:: N . .z.. SlcYcdoring & Southland Steycdoring Southland Stevedoring Southland Stevedoring Southland Stevedoring 
N,Z .. St(:V~9ting & \Vltatfingcr1ng .V{!lilifuigcring Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Wlurrfingering Union Shipping Co. Uuion Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Shaw Savill & Albion Co. 
Dunedin & Port N.Z. Sre ... --e:doring.& N.Z.-Stc\'oooring & N.Z;.S~~';e40ring & NL St<yedoiliill. &. NZ. $tej'¢d9~~ig ~ N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Chalmers \VhaOingering WllnrnUgering Wharti:rigc~ing :W1liIrlingering Wlirirfingerirllt Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd 
Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd Tapley Swift Shipping Tapley S\\ift Shipping 
Seatrans Consolidated Seatrnns Consolidated Taplcy S",ift Shipping Tapley Swift Shipping Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Tapley S"ift Shipping Taple)' Snifi Shipping Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Shaw Sa\iU&Albion Co. Shaw Sa,ill&Albion Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Gisbome Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
OisbQ~~Ugil~ermi'& Gis~m~.Li@~~ery~g& 9isborn~ J.;ight~~jng &' q~s~~~.l;.!~l~~~g·&:·. 
Stol"CdonniCQ. . S(cvedOtiili Co. Slc~'-cdoiPig C9. . .. ·&t~:';.ed.oi:ing.C() . 
Pfljlett and Smith N.Z. Shipping Co. Pllflett and Smith Pufletl and Smith 
Pujletf and Smith N.Z Shipping Co. NZ. Shipping Co. 
LyHeiton Union Shipping: Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Seatrons Consolidated N,Z. Stt;:ve4oring &. 1<.Z, Stei·edorUig &. N.Z, SleYeQQiing &: N,Z, st'~~~Qiin~ /It. N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
N.Z;: Stc"~dodng &. \Vhan;ingcpilg Wb.aifqigering Wp¥f:ing~ri.~g Wl#rfiqge~ing Shaw Savill & Albion Co. Shaw Savill & Albion Co. 
WliJirtlngeting Kirisey and Co Ltd Kii~~S rind C9.:.Ltd. KJ",ey Md (;0: Lid KinseY nrtd Co. Ltd Kinsey Md Co.: Ltd KiiiSeyaillj to: Lid 
!\fnscy iq!q Co. ltd Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. 
Holm Shipping Co. 
Napier NL Stel'edoring &: N.L. Stcvedoiing& NLStei'ed6rUiii&: Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Wharfingering WllanTngerhig: WllaIfrilgering' : Richardson and Co. Richardson and Co. Richardson and Co. Richardson and Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. UIlion Shipping Co. 'N~pie~: S.le~:cC;t9mtg . (,:t>. . ' J'f!ipier Stevedoring Co. N~p~¢i:'S~;~ciring<:o: ~a~i~ $1~Ve~orjng·Cq . 
Richardson and Co. Richardson and Co. Puflett and Smith Pullett and Smith N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
Puflett and Smith Puflett and Smith 
Nelson Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & 
Foundry Co. Foundry Co. Foundry Co. Foundry Co. Foundry Co. FoundI)'Co. Foundry Co. 
Gannawav & Co. Ltd Gannaway ~ Co. Ltd Gannaway & Co. Lid G~nnqwllJ) & .C~. Ltd Gannaway & Co. LI4 Gannaway & Co, Ltd Gannaway & Co. Ltd 
Wellillg1o.~i Ste,;edoring We/lli1g(an Stewl1o.riug Weilingfol1.Stt!.l'e·datlng HWling,i.m Stehjdor{ng Wi!-IJingtQfI $Ieyo;don:ng Wellington Stet'eporing N.Z-Shipping Co. LId 
ML Manng. & Tauranga ML Manng. & Tauranga 
Stevedores Stevedores 
Seatrans Consolidatcd 
New Plymouth N,Z, Slc\"edoriJlg &; N.Z. Stevedoring & N.z: Ste\:odcit!rig &. DontirtiOll ~l~\'c4citlrig Ctl: DritJ~!J:llo~ ~t~\~q~ing C!'. p6.ni.i~iq~ Stev~oiJ,il~ Cq. P:<l~.~~·~t~\:~9.iing ~o.: 
WhJlrfiilgering \Vllarfingering Wbarting~rfng Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Uilion Shipping Co. 
Bay of Plenty Stevedoring Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
Union Shipping Co. Burgess Holm and Co. 
Onchunga 
Picton Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. UniOil Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Gannml'~1 & Co. Gq~"'mI'QY & ~C? Gan1!away 4: .C~. . Ga,!~C0:ay ~ .C;~'. GamunI'lO' & Co . q~l~~'~~'ay.?:. C~.'. . Gannmmy & Co. 
W.e.1!iI.lgto.n SlI!I'edoriJlg J-f~lfi!1gtOl~ Slel'li¢~f~ltg 1f(!lJfnglo.l.1.~'it!~~.e(/~rllig. ).v6rlljlg~(j}.1 $1~:I'f.'C!tj?ing Wi!.!ji~ita~ ~-I~e.~·ido6iig· Well!1.igtoli·$(el;~.«qri~lg·:: : NZ. Shippil1g C'o.Lld 
Bay of Plenty Stevedoring 
Tauranga I Mount Bay of.Plen~.y Stev~o~~ Bay of ~I~~ty ~te~'edori~g Bay of Plenty Stevedoring ~ay of Plenty ~.t~:~o~ng Bay of~lenty .Ste\"~<!ri.na: Maril\~·~ivkcS·& MQ.finC:Se..vlc¢S &' 
Maunganui Marine Services & Mathie Si!pdces &. Marine SerVices &. Marine'Sertices'&" Marine ServiCe;s & Sic,,"cdorcs' Ste ... idores 
$tc .. ~tes Stevoomes. St~"cdotcS Stc .... edotes Stevedores Mt. Maung. & Tauranga Mt Maung. & Taumnga 
Mt. Maung. & Taumngn Mt Maung. & Tauranga Mt Maung. & Taunmgn Mt Maung. & Tauranga Mt. Maung. & Tawangn Stevedores Stevedores 
Ste"edores Stevedores Stevedores Stc ... ·cdorcs Stevedores Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. 
Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co Northern Steam Ship Co. Northern Steam Ship Co. Northcrn Steam Ship Co. U~i~.l1 S~lipping.~q. Union Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. A!-/ijdal/d S'1/;!1;'~f.loring Allckland Sfe~'edoring 
Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated W(lift;ltia;(1 St!!l(ed~Yirjg NZ. Shipping Co. 
Timaru N.Z. SteVedoriJ:lg & N,Z. St(:vedorins'lk, N.Z. Stevcdoring & N Z, S\Oy,d""oS &: N,Z, St,",dnfi!1~ & N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
WhEl!fingcrtog ~~ngeri~g Wharfingering Wha,rfipogering WhIrrfingering Shaw Savill & Albion Co. Shaw Savill & Albion Co. 
HJ.R. Somerville & Sons HJ.R. Somerville & Sons HJ.R. Somerville & Sons H.J.R. Somerville & Sons HJ.R. Somerville & Sons H.J.R. Somerville & Sons H.J.R. Somerville & SOIlS 
D.C. TWllbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull &. Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co. D.C. Turnbull & Co: D.C. Turnbull & Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Wellington NL Stevedoring$< N,,, Stevedoring &. ~,.~. Sle\'e~Ori:t~~ ~ UI~io!, ~hippi!,~ .Co. '-:IlI.ion Sh.ippins:. ~o. l.-1.~t?J? Shipl"'ing .c;9: Union Shipping Co. 
\V1titrfingCf~ng WIlllffmgermg Wharfingcti~g Wel1ington}ittredqqrig WeHingf<l11 Sie,lC4Piing We)lingi9.n.Si~\·¢Qri.ng Shaw Savill & Albion Co. 
Seatrans Consolidated Seatrans Consolidated Gannaway & Co. Ltd Goo.H. Scales (Pacific) Lid Goo.R. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Goo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Goo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd 
Gannaway & Co. Ltd Gannaway & Co. Ltd Union. ~hipping C~. G~~\"a.~ an.~S~. G~away an~ C;;q. Gannaway and Co. Ganrunvay and Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Wcllingt!ID-$tcvcdoring N,Z. SteyedOiirig fJi .• )'1.2;: Si~vedoring & Holm and Co. Ltd Holm and Co. LId 
WdlingwA S~owdoring WeUiilgtQn $le .. "<idOtUtg Goo.R. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Wrntml)geril1S Whatfingering N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Goo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Geo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd 
Whangnrei 41.lcklp.1id Stevedoring Au.ckland Slei'e4oriJlg A~IC~fallp. $~eyedoril1g All.cklam1. SffJlwloring Ail~k/qf1c!.St~~·f!d.oring Ai.ick/alld Stel'edor(ng Auckland Stevedoring 
W(lf(e~I!~Ifl1.SJewdQtbfg 1V(l/.f~m(ila Sti~·ed.tj!ing Wq!le~trqt~ s.t~.l:'¢il~tfitg Wd.ftl!~atd S.fc}'edotlrfg ~<!~(t.'JI1q'~q ~'~~1'<:d6rf1fg ':Wa!~emaur SJ<:~)edQ~fijg N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Uilioll Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Northcrn Steamship Co. Northern Steamship Co. Northern Steamship Co. Northern Sleamship Co. Northcrn Steamship Co. 
Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley 
Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley 
Auckland 
Bluff 
Dunedin & Port 
Chalmers 
Gisbome 
L)1tclton 
Natlier 
Nelson 
New Plymouth 
Onehunga 
Picton 
Tauranga I Mount 
Maunganui 
Timaru 
Wellington 
Whangarei 
1963 1962 
Auckland Stevedoring Co. Auckland Stevedoring Co. 
Leonard & Dingley Leonard & Dingley 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Shaw Savill&Albion Co. Shaw Suvi1!&Albion Co. 
Unio~ Shippin~ Co. Union Shipping: Co. 
Auctdan~ Shipping Auckland Shipping 
SetVi<:es Sen.-ices 
Southland Stevedoring Southland Stevedoring 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Sha\\, Sa\;U&Albion Co. Shaw Savill&Albion Co. 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Keith Ramsay Ltd Keith Ramsay Ltd 
Tapley Swift Shipping Tapley S,\ift Shipping 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Shaw Sa\;lI&Albion Co. Shaw Sayill&Albion Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Oj$-tm~c ~ishlerjng & Gisb9rnc pght~ng &;. 
Slc\'cdoring to. Stoycdon.ng Co: 
Pliflett alld Smith PulIeH and Smith 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co. Shaw Sayill & Albion Co. 
Ki.ISCj' and Co. Ltd Kinsey and Co. Ltd 
Holm Shipping Co. Holm Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Richardson and Co. Richardson and Co. 
NL Shipping Co. Ltd N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
PuOett and Smith PuneH mld Smith 
Anchor Shipping & Anchor Shipping & 
Foundry Co. Foundr)' Co. 
Gmmaway & Co. Lid N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd Levin and Co. Lid 
Leyin and Co. Ltd 
OOltliniort Ste\'cdorirt~ Co. DOI1UrtiOJ:l Stc"ed9r4lg Co; 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
N.Z. Shipping Co. Ltd N .Z. Shipping Co. Ltd 
Burgess Holm and Co, Burgess Holm and Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Gallnml'ay & Co. 
N.Z. Shipping ('oDd 
"Muri1ie~r"'ice$.&: Mt. Maung. & Tauranga 
Sie\'ed6res Stevedores 
ML Maung. & Tauranga N.Z Shipping Co. Ltd 
Stevedores Union Shipping Co. 
Northern Steam Ship Co. 
Union Shipping Co. 
N.z. Shipping Co. L,d 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co. Shaw Savill & Albion Co. 
H.1.R. Somerville & Sons HJ.R. Somerville & Sons 
D,C, Turnbull & Co, D.C. TumbuU & Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Union Shipping Co. Union Shipping Co. 
Shaw Savill & Albion Co. Shaw SaviIl & Albion Co. 
Geo.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd Gco.H. Scales (Pacific) Ltd 
Gannaway and Co. Gannaway and Co. 
Holm and Co. Ltd Holm and Co. Ltd 
N.Z. Shipping Co. N.Z. Shipping Co. 
Northern Stcml1ship Co. 
APPENDIX 2: DATA SOURCES FOR GRAPHS 
The data sources for the graphs that appear in the thesis are as follows: 
Graph 3.1 : Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.1: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.2: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.3: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.4: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.5: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 4.6: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 5.1: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 5.2: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
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Graph 5.3: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports (waterfront average 
hourly rate); Pearce (1986) (manufacturing average hourly rate). 
Graph 6.1: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 8.1: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 8.2: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.1 : Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.2: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.3: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.4: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.5: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.6: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.7: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 10.8: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 11.1 : Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 11.2: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 11.3: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
Graph 11.4 : Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Reports. 
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APPENDIX 3 : MAPS (PORTS AND WORKFORCE SIZES) 
MAP 1: PORTS & WORKFORCE SIZES 1953 
Size of Registered 
Workforce 
• Less than 200 
* 200 - 500 
o 500 - 1000 
L1 More than 1000 
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Onehunga 
o 100 
I , , 
KI LOM ETRES 
MAP 2: PORTS & WORKFORCE SIZES 1970 
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• Less than 200 
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MAP 3: PORTS & WORKFORCE SIZES 1988 
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